

HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF THE

"DIRTY WARS"

SECOND
EDITION



DAVID KOHUT AND OLGA VILELLA

**HISTORICAL DICTIONARIES
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Second Edition

David Kohut
Olga Vilella

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Editor's Foreword

Warfare can assume many forms other than classic wars between countries and civil wars, which are generally recognized if inadequately regulated by international law. There is a vast amorphous category that includes warfare between countries and its own citizens for economic, social, ideological, or ethnic reasons. These are often horribly violent and implacable because the country, in the form of the government or military establishment, has infinitely more power than its opponents and can often make them disappear with impunity. Such “dirty wars” have occurred on both sides of the communist-capitalist divide for much of the past century, and they have been around much longer in countries of mixed racial or religious composition, occurring by way of “ethnic cleansing” and other techniques. In Latin America, during the Cold War, they became a plague that merited very serious attention.

This *Historical Dictionary of the “Dirty Wars”* is particularly important in expanding the scope of the *War, Revolution, and Civil Unrest* series by showing us what the future of warfare could be if we are not careful. It contains a chronology of events, an introduction, and a dictionary section that includes entries on people of the ruling government and those who were crushed by it, various political parties and other organizations that were involved in these events and the methods they used, and some (alas too few) on efforts to stop or at least restrain the excesses. There are six key entries in the dictionary: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay (an organization also followed in the chronology and bibliography). While reasonably rounded and comprehensive, however, this book cannot tell the whole story. The bibliography therefore refers readers to other sources of information.

This second edition is more than just an update of the previous edition. It expands the original scope of three countries to six and includes more information overall. It shows just how pernicious such wars can

be and that, once started, they are hard to stop and almost impossible for its victims to forget. The authors are David Kohut and Olga Vilella, both of whom wrote (with a third contributor) the first edition. They are keenly interested in Latin America and are members of Amnesty International. They feel strongly enough about these “dirty wars” to examine them carefully and meticulously, tracking down often elusive information and providing an overall picture of the lopsided situation of a war between a country and its own people. What they have brought to light is unpleasant, sometimes excruciatingly so, but essential to know if we are to avoid more instances of dirty warfare in the future.

Jon Woronoff
Series Editor

Preface

The scope of the dictionary is the period 1954–1990 in South America, when authoritarian regimes waged war on subversion, both real and imagined. The term “dirty war,” though originally associated with the military dictatorship in Argentina from 1976 to 1983, has since been applied to neighboring dictatorships in Paraguay (1954–1989), Brazil (1964–1985), Bolivia (1971–1981), Uruguay (1973–1985), and Chile (1973–1990). Although the concept is by no means peculiar to Latin America—the term has become a byword for state-sponsored repression anywhere in the world—these regimes were among its most notorious practitioners. In the mid-1970s they joined forces, creating Operation Condor, a top-secret network of military dictatorships that kidnapped, tortured, and disappeared one another’s political opponents. Their death squads operated both nationally and internationally, sometimes extending beyond the region.

Categories of entries include the countries themselves; guerrilla and political movements that provoked (though by no means exonerated) government reaction; leading guerrilla, human-rights, military, and political figures; local, regional, and international human-rights organizations; and artistic figures (filmmakers, novelists, and playwrights) whose works attempted to represent or resist the period of repression. Other entries relevant to the story include the United States, the Catholic Church, and terms such as “dirty war,” *desaparecidos*, and liberation theology. Words in boldface point the reader to additional entries.

The alphabetization of the dictionary entries follows the letter-by-letter system in which sorting ignores spaces, hyphens, and apostrophes. Commas and slashes, however, interrupt the sorting: FAMILIARES / RELATIVES precedes FAMILIARES DE DESAPARECIDOS Y DETENIDOS POR RAZONES POLÍTICAS, and PERÓN, JUAN precedes PERONISM. Dictionary entries for organizations formed in

Spanish-speaking countries or in Portuguese-speaking Brazil will be found under the Spanish or Portuguese version of the name; hence, readers looking for the Argentine human-rights organization MOTHERS OF THE PLAZA DE MAYO will be referred to MADRES DE LA PLAZA DE MAYO. References to individuals will follow the Spanish-speaking model. If an individual has two surnames (the paternal followed by the maternal), both will be used; for example, after the first reference in an entry, Salvador Allende Gossens will be referred to as Allende Gossens, not simply as Allende.

The introduction attempts to compare and contrast the six countries as they fell to dictatorship, experienced repression, and returned to civilian rule. The bibliography begins with a listing of general works (books and articles on at least two of the countries), followed by sections on each country in turn. The country sections are divided into works examining the background to the “dirty wars,” the “dirty war” period itself, and the aftermath. The subsections on the “dirty war” period are themselves subdivided into works of nonfiction and *testimonio* (a genre that blurs the line between nonfiction and literature), works of literature, and films and documentaries.

Warm thanks to the series editor, Jon Woronoff, and the staff at Scarecrow Press. The authors are grateful to Saint Xavier University for granting them sabbatical leaves to work on the project.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

AAA	Alianza Anticomunista Argentina (La Triple-A)
AAAS	American Association for the Advancement of Science
AD	Alianza Democrática
ADN	Acción Democrática Nacionalista
AFDD	Agrupación de Familiares de Detenidos Desaparecidos
AFEP	Agrupación de Familiares de Ejecutados Políticos
AI	Ato Institucional
AIB	Ação Integralista Brasileira
AID	Agency for International Development
ALN	Ação Libertadora Nacional
ANCLA	Agencia de Noticias Clandestinas
ANL	Aliança Nacional Libertadora
AP	Ação Popular
APDH	Asamblea Permanente por los Derechos Humanos
APDHB	Asamblea Permanente de los Derechos Humanos de Bolivia
ARENA	Aliança Renovadora Nacional
ASOFAMD	Asociación de Familiares de Detenidos, Desaparecidos y Mártires por la Liberación Nacional
BNM	Brasil: Nunca Más
CADHU	Comisión Argentina por los Derechos Humanos
CC	Comando Conjunto
CCC	Comando da Caça aos Comunistas
CELS	Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales
CEMDP	Comissão Especial sobre Mortos e Desaparecidos Políticos
CENIMAR	Centro de Informações da Marinha
CEPAG	Centro de Estudios Paraguayos “Antonio Guasch”
CGT	Confederación General del Trabajo

CGTA	Confederación General del Trabajo de los Argentinos
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CNI	Centro Nacional de Información
CNID	Comisión Nacional de Investigación de Desaparecidos
CNT	Convención Nacional de Trabajadores
CNVR	Comisión Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliación
COB	Central Obrera Boliviana
CODEPU	Comité de Defensa de los Derechos del Pueblo
COMIBOL	Corporación Minera de Bolivia
CONADEP	Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas
CONAPRO	Concertación Nacional Programática
COPACHI	Comité de la Paz (Chile)
COSENA	Consejo de Seguridad Nacional
CPT	Confederación Paraguaya de Trabajadores
DEOPS	Departamento Estadual de Ordem Política e Social
DICOMCAR	Dirección de Inteligencia y Comunicaciones de Carabineros
DIE	Departamento de Investigación Especial
DOI-CODI	Destacamento de Operações Internas-Comando Operacional de Defesa Interna
DOPS	Departamento de Ordem Político e Social
EAAF	Equipo Argentino de Antropología Forense
EGP	Ejército Guerrillero del Pueblo
ENR	Ejército Nacional Revolucionario
ERP	Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo
ESG	Escola Superior de Guerra
ESMA	Escuela Mecánica de la Armada
FAP	Fuerzas Armadas Peronistas
FAR	Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias
FASIC	Fundación de Ayuda Social de las Iglesias Cristianas
FPMR	Frente Patriótico Manuel Rodríguez
FREJULI	Frente Justicialista de Liberación Nacional
FRIP	Frente Revolucionario Indoamericano Popular
FSB	Falange Socialista Boliviana
FULNA	Frente Unido por la Liberación Nacional
GOU	Grupo de Oficiales Unidos
GT	Grupo de Tarea

HIJOS	Hijos por la Identidad y la Justicia, contra el Olvido y el Silencio
HRNGO	Human Rights Nongovernmental Organization
IACHR	Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
IADC	Inter-American Defense College
IBAD	Instituto Brasileiro de Ação Democrática
ICJ	International Commission of Jurists
IELSUR	Instituto de Estudios Legales y Sociales (Uruguay)
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPES	Instituto de Pesquisas e Estudos Sociais
JUC	Juventude Universitária Católica
LASA	Latin American Studies Association
LIID	Iniciativa Latinoamericana para la Identificación de Personas Desaparecidas
MAC	Movimento anti-Comunista
MAP	Military Assistance Program
MDB	Movimento Democrático Brasileiro
MDP	Movimiento Democrático Popular
MEDH	Movimiento Ecueménico por los Derechos Humanos
M-14	Movimiento 14 de Mayo para la Libertad Paraguaya
MIR	Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria
MLN	Movement for National Liberation
MNR	Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario
MOPOCO	Movimiento Popular Colorado
MPL	Movimiento Peronista de Liberación
MR-8	Movimento Revolucionário 8 de Outubro
MTP	Movimiento Todos por la Patria (also known as Todos por la Patria, or TPP)
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
OAS	Organization of American States
OBAN	Operação Bandeirantes
OPM	Organización Político Militar
PC	Partido Comunista
PCB	Partido Comunista Brasileiro
PC do B	Partido Comunista do Brasil
PCP	Partido Comunista Paraguayo
PDC	Partido Demócrata Cristiano

PDS	Partido Democrático Social
PDT	Partido Democrático Trabalhista
PFL	Partido da Frente Liberal
PIDEE	Fundación para la Protección de la Infancia Dañada por los Estados de Emergencia
PIT	Plenario Intersindical de Trabajadores
PJ	Partido Justicialista
PL	Patria y Libertad
PLR	Partido Liberal Radical
PLRA	Partido Liberal Radical Auténtico
PM	Polícia Militar
PMDB	Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro
PO	Palabra Obrera
PRF	Partido Revolucionario Febrerista
PRT	Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores
PS	Partido Socialista
PSD	Partido Social Democrático
PT	Partido dos Trabalhadores
PTB	Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro
SEDHU	Servicio Ecuménico por la Dignidad Humana
SER	Servicio Ecuménico de Reintegración
SERPAJ	Servicio Paz y Justicia
SES	Servicio Especial de Seguridad
SNI	Serviço Nacional de Informações
SOLI	Fundación Carlos Somigliana
TPP	Todos por la Patria (an alternative acronym for the Movimiento Todos por la Patria, or MTP)
Triple A	La Triple-A (also Alianza Anticomunista Argentina)
UDN	União Democrática Nacional
UN	United Nations
UNE	União Nacional de Estudantes
UNHRC	United Nations Human Rights Commission
UP	Unidad Popular
VOP	Vanguardia Organizada del Pueblo
VPR	Vanguarda Popular Revolucionária
WCC	World Council of Churches
YPFB	Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales de Bolivia

Chronology

ARGENTINA

1930 6 September: President Hipólito Yrigoyen is deposed in a coup led by General José Félix Uriburu. The Supreme Court goes on to rule that the military may legally oust an elected government.

1931 17 April: A palace coup forces General Uriburu to schedule elections before the end of the year.

1932–1942 During the “infamous decade,” General Agustín P. Justo and Roberto M. Ortiz come to power in fraudulent elections.

1943 4 June: The military overthrows President Ramón S. Castillo; in the resulting military government, Juan Perón becomes increasingly powerful as secretary of labor and welfare, minister of war, and vice president.

1945 9 October: The military arrests Perón and removes him from government. **17 October:** Thousands of workers demonstrate in the Plaza de Mayo, forcing Perón’s release.

1946 24 February: Perón is elected president. In his first administration (1946–1952), he aggressively pursues policies of nationalism and social reform. Eva Duarte “Evita” Perón, his wife and political partner, gains prominence as an advocate of the working class.

1952–1955 The second Perón administration loses popularity owing to economic crisis and the death of Evita from cancer (1952). Perón angers the Catholic Church by acts such as legalizing divorce.

1955 16 September: General Eduardo Lonardi initiates a coup that deposes Perón and sends him into exile. **13 November:** The “liberating

revolution” of General Pedro Aramburu, who overthrows Lonardi in a palace coup.

1955–1958 The administration of General Aramburu, who vigorously suppresses Peronism.

1956 9 June: Peronist generals Juan José Valle and Raúl Tanco stage an ill-fated revolt against Aramburu. Valle and many supporters face the firing squad.

1958–1962 President Arturo Frondizi allows Peronists to participate in gubernatorial and congressional elections. Peronist candidates do so well that the military forces Frondizi from office.

1963–1966 President Arturo Illia allows Peronists to participate in gubernatorial and congressional elections. As in 1962, Peronist candidates do well, and the president is deposed in a coup.

1966–1970 The authoritarian regime of General Juan Carlos Onganía.

1966 29 July: “The Night of the Long Sticks”: Police quell unrest at the University of Buenos Aires.

1967 The Argentine-born guerrilla Ernesto “Che” Guevara dies fomenting revolution in Bolivia, inspiring many young Argentines.

1968 Leftist trade-union leaders, removed from the Confederación General del Trabajo (CGT, General Confederation of Labor), form the CGT de los Argentinos (CGTA, CGT of the Argentines).

1969 29 May: Students and workers in the city of Córdoba stage a weeklong rebellion (the *Cordobazo*) against the government.

1970 29 May: Former president Pedro Aramburu is kidnapped and murdered, allegedly by a militant Peronist group called the Montoneros.

8 June: The military ousts Onganía; General Roberto Marcelo Levingston becomes president. **24 October:** Salvador Allende Gossens is declared president of neighboring Chile, becoming the first democratically elected Marxist president in the world.

1971 March: A second uprising in Córdoba prompts the military to remove Levingston; General Alejandro Lanusse becomes president.

1972 22 August: Massacre at Trelew: The military executes 16 political prisoners held at a navy airbase. **November:** Perón briefly returns to Argentina, naming Héctor José Cámpora to represent him in the forthcoming presidential election.

1973 March: Héctor José Cámpora wins the presidential election as Perón's stand-in, clearing the way for Perón's return to power. **20 June:** Right-wing Peronists open fire on their left-wing counterparts at Ezeiza International Airport, where over a million people gather to welcome Perón on his return. **July:** President Cámpora is forced to resign in a right-wing palace coup. **11 September:** Chilean president Salvador Allende is overthrown in a military coup led by General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte. **23 September:** Perón is elected president in a special election; his third wife, Isabel Perón, becomes vice president. **October:** The Montoneros and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (FAR, Revolutionary Armed Forces), merge under the name Montoneros.

1974 1 May: In a speech, Perón denounces leftist Peronists. **1 July:** Perón dies; Isabel becomes president. **November:** The military imposes a state of siege, escalating its war against guerrilla groups and other suspected subversives.

1975 November: Argentina is one of six founding members of Operation Condor, a secret network of South American military dictatorships.

1976 24 March: A military coup overthrows Isabel and imposes a three-member junta led by General Jorge Rafael Videla, who becomes president.

1977 January: Jimmy Carter is inaugurated as president of the United States.

1981 January: Ronald Reagan is inaugurated as president of the United States. **March:** General Roberto Viola succeeds General Videla as president. **December:** Lieutenant-General Leopoldo Fortunato Galtieri replaces General Viola.

1982 2 April: Argentina invades the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas. The British, long holding claim to the islands, send troops to recover them. **18 June:** Argentina surrenders. General Galtieri is forced to

resign in disgrace. **2 July:** General Reynaldo Benito Bignone becomes president.

1983 August: The military government approves the *Ley de Pacificación Nacional*, which grants amnesty to members of the police and armed forces guilty of human-rights violations. **30 October:** Raúl Alfonsín is elected president. **December:** President Alfonsín revamps the military, repeals the *Ley de Pacificación Nacional*, and establishes the Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas (CONADEP, National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons).

1985 April: Former junta members are put on trial. **December:** Five former junta members are sentenced to prison—including General Videla and Admiral Eduardo Massera, who are sentenced to life imprisonment.

1986 December: The government proposes, and Congress approves, the *Punto Final* (Full Stop) Law, which sets 22 February 1987 as the deadline for bringing new cases of human-rights violations before civil and military courts.

1987 May: In the face of an army rebellion by a group of junior officers (the *carapintadas*), the government announces the *Obediencia Debida* (Due Obedience) Law, which declares an amnesty for all members of the police and armed forces, except senior officers.

1988 The government suppresses two more *carapintada* army rebellions—one in January led by Lieutenant Colonel Aldo Rico and another in December led by Colonel Mohammed Alí Seineldín. The demands are higher pay, a larger military budget, and an amnesty for officers accused of human-rights violations.

1989 23 January: The Movimiento Todos por la Patria (MTP, Everyone for the Motherland), a grassroots human-rights organization, attacks and occupies the army garrison at La Tablada. The military is called in to crush the rebellion. **8 July:** Carlos Saúl Menem, a Peronist, takes office as president. **September:** A massive human-rights demonstration takes place in Buenos Aires following reports of an amnesty agreement between the Menem government and the military. **October:** The government pardons senior military officers, NCOs, and soldiers

accused of participating in the “dirty war.” Eight remain in prison, including Videla and Massera.

1990 3 December: Another *carapintada* rebellion, the last, is put down by loyalists in the military. **December:** Menem pardons those remaining in prison, including Videla and Massera and the Montonero leader Mario Firmenich.

1995 The chiefs of the army, navy, and air force publicly express regret for crimes committed by the military during the “dirty war.”

1998 June: Videla is arrested in connection with the illegal adoption of children—a crime not covered by the pardon. Ten more officers are arrested by April 2000.

2003 May: Néstor Kirchner is inaugurated president, promising to bring human-rights violators to justice. **August:** Both houses of Congress repeal *Punto Final* and *Obediencia Debida*.

2005 14 June: The Supreme Court rules that *Punto Final* and *Obediencia Debida* are unconstitutional. The ruling means that military officers could again face prosecution, though Menem’s 1989 and 1990 pardons remain intact.

2006 18 September: Jorge Julio López, a 77-year-old witness in the trial of the former police chief Miguel Etchecolatz, disappears. López remains among the missing. **19 September:** Etchecolatz is sentenced to life in prison for kidnapping, torture, and murder.

2007 July: The Supreme Court overturns the 1989 pardon of General Santiago Omar Riveros, opening the way for the reversal of many other pardons. **10 October:** Christian Federico Von Wernich, a Roman Catholic priest and former army chaplain, is sentenced to life in prison for complicity in kidnapping, torture, and murder. **December:** Cristina Fernández de Kirchner succeeds her husband, Néstor, as president, promising to conclude the trials of dirty warriors by the end of her four-year term.

2008 April: The Museum of Memory, a human-rights museum, opens on the site formerly occupied by the Escuela Mecánica de la Armada (ESMA, Navy Mechanics School), which the navy used as a torture center. The museum is expected to be completed by 2010.

BOLIVIA

1932–1935 Second Chaco War: Paraguay hands Bolivia its worst military defeat ever. After the war, reformist political parties challenge the status quo.

1941 Creation of the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR, Movement for National Revolution), a middle-class reformist party.

1951 May: Víctor Paz Estenssoro, of the MNR, wins a plurality, but not a majority, in the presidential election. Before Congress can elect the new president from the top three candidates, the outgoing president resigns, transferring power to an army junta.

1952 April: A popular uprising defeats the junta and brings the MNR to power.

1952–1956 President Paz Estenssoro establishes universal suffrage; reduces the military; approves the creation, by miners, of the Central Obrera Boliviana (COB, Bolivian Workers Central), a federation of trade unions; nationalizes tin mines; and enacts agrarian reform.

1956–1960 President Hernán Siles Zuazo, of the MNR, inherits a destabilized economy and takes austerity measures. Facing political opposition, he begins to rebuild the military.

1960–1964 The second term of President Paz Estenssoro. Now a conservative, he opposes the COB and continues rebuilding the military.

1964 4 November: Paz Estenssoro, in his third term as president, is ousted by his vice president, General René Barrientos. The military will control government until 1982.

1964–1969 President Barrientos leads a populist government, allied with conservative peasants but hostile to trade unionists and leftists. He stations soldiers at the mines.

1967 June: The military massacres striking miners and their families. **October:** The military captures and executes the Argentine-born guerrilla leader Ernesto “Che” Guevara in southeast Bolivia.

1969–1970 The presidency of General Alfredo Ovando. A moderate, he seeks a working relationship with the left, expropriating U.S. property and withdrawing soldiers from the mines.

1970 October: Conservatives in the military oust Ovando, but a left-wing military countercoup installs General Juan José Torres as president.

1970–1971 President Torres leads a left-wing government. The Asamblea Popular (Popular Assembly) is created, representing peasants and trade unionists. Its aim is to become a people’s congress.

1971 21 August: Colonel Hugo Banzer Suárez overthrows Torres, establishing authoritarian rule with limited civilian participation.

1973 11 September: General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte seizes power in Chile.

1974 Banzer Suárez establishes a military-only government, like Chile’s.

1975 November: Bolivia is one of six founding members of Operation Condor, a network of South American military dictatorships.

1977 January: Jimmy Carter is inaugurated as president of the United States. Under pressure from the Carter administration, Banzer Suárez promises elections for 1978. **December:** The wives of labor leaders begin a hunger strike, which results, 20 days later, in a general amnesty for political exiles.

1978 July: Siles Zuazo, having returned from exile, runs for president as head of a center-left coalition against the military’s candidate, General Juan Pereda Asbún. When Pereda Asbún is charged with vote fraud, he takes power in a coup, calling Siles Zuazo a tool of international communism. **November:** General David Padilla, supported by the left, overthrows Pereda Asbún, promising elections the following year.

1979 July: Paz Estenssoro wins a plurality in the presidential election. Congress, unable to decide among the top three candidates, names Walter Guevara Arce, the head of the Senate, as interim president. **1 November:** Colonel Alberto Natusch Busch stages a coup, the first day of which is known as the Massacre of Todos Santos (All Saints’ Day Massacre). Fifteen days later, he backs down, lacking popular or military support. Congress names Lydia Gueiler Tejada as interim president.

1980 June: Siles Zuazo wins a plurality in the presidential election. He is likely to be named president in August, when Congress is scheduled

to meet. **17 July:** General Luis García Meza takes power in what has become known as the cocaine coup.

1981 4 August: García Meza is ousted by a military junta.

1981–1982 Transitional military governments of General Celso Torrelío Villa and General Guido Vildoso Calderón.

1982 During a nationwide strike on 17 September, President Vildoso Calderón resigns, handing power over to the congress elected in 1980. The Congress elects as president Siles Zuazo, who establishes the Comisión Nacional de Investigación de Desaparecidos (CNID, National Commission of Inquiry into Disappearances). García Meza and Colonel Luis Arce Gómez, his former minister of the interior, flee to Argentina.

1986 Colonel Luis Arce Gómez is put on trial in absentia for human-rights violations.

1991 January: Arce Gómez is convicted in Miami, Florida, on drug-trafficking charges and sentenced to 30 years in prison.

1993 April: The Bolivian Supreme Court sentences García Meza in absentia to 30 years in prison for corruption, human-rights violations, and murder.

1994 García Meza is arrested in Brazil.

1995 March: García Meza, extradited to Bolivia, begins serving a 30-year prison term.

1997 Banzer Suárez, now a civilian politician, wins a plurality in the presidential election. Congress names him president.

1998 16 October: Pinochet Ugarte, Chile's former dictator, is arrested in London. Spanish magistrates had requested British authorities to extradite Pinochet Ugarte to Spain to face charges in connection with Operation Condor.

1999 Bolivian human-rights groups accuse Banzer Suárez of involvement in Operation Condor during the 1970s.

2002 5 May: Banzer Suárez dies.

BRAZIL

1930 3 November: The Old Republic is overthrown in a revolution. Getúlio Vargas becomes president and creates a strong central government.

1935 March: Leftists form the Aliança Nacional Libertadora (ANL, National Liberation Alliance). **11 July:** The ANL is banned. **November:** The Partido Comunista Brasileiro (PCB), with the support of Soviet agents, rises up against Vargas; the revolt is quashed by loyalist troops.

1937 10 November: Vargas and his military commanders stage an *autogolpe*, or “self-coup,” establishing a dictatorship called the Estado Novo (New State).

1942 August: Brazil enters World War II on the side of the allies.

1945 Three major political parties are formed: the União Democrática Nacional (UDN, National Democratic Union), the Partido Social Democrático (PSD, Social Democratic Party), and the Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (PTB, Brazilian Labor Party). **October:** The military, fearing that Vargas is becoming a populist like Juan Perón in Argentina, ousts him in a bloodless coup. **December:** The Partido Social Democrático (PSD)’s Eurico Dutra, a general, is elected president. He represses trade unions, and his policies lead to a decrease in real wages.

1950 October: Vargas, running on a nationalist platform, is elected president.

1951–1954 Two main political camps appear: the nationalists, led by Vargas and the PTB, and the conservatives, led by the UDN and the military high command.

1954 February: Vargas, under pressure from the opposition press, fires João Goulart, his labor minister, who has proposed a 100 percent increase in the minimum wage. **24 November:** Vargas, pressured by the military to resign, commits suicide.

1955 Juscelino Kubitschek—representing the PSD, a centrist party—is elected president. He pursues an ambitious developmental plan, which contributes to high inflation.

1959 Fidel Castro comes to power in Cuba. Brazil's Escola Superior de Guerra (ESG, Higher War College) adopts the theory of "internal war," which identifies leftist subversion, not external invasion, as the greater threat to Brazil.

1960 October: Jânio Quadros, representing the UDN, is elected president. It will be the last direct presidential election until 1989. Goulart, representing the PSD and the PTB, is elected vice president.

1961 January: Quadros takes office as president and raises fears that he is moving to the left. **August:** Quadros, inexplicably, resigns. **7 September:** Goulart, whom the military accuses of communist leanings, takes office as president after a compromise is reached—a constitutional amendment that reduces his powers and transforms the presidential system into a parliamentary one. He inherits serious problems, including high inflation and a deficit in the balance of payments.

1963 Goulart gains a widespread victory in a plebiscite that restores the presidential system. He abandons an International Monetary Fund (IMF)—approved stabilization plan and adopts radical nationalism, a program that includes agrarian reform, urban reform, voting rights for illiterates and military enlisted men, and greater state control over the economy.

1964 13 March: Goulart, lacking congressional support for his program, stages a rally, in Rio de Janeiro, at which he decrees agrarian reform, thus bypassing Congress. **19 March:** In São Paulo, conservative Catholic women lead an anticommunist parade, the *Marcha da Família com Deus pela Liberdade* (the Families' March for God and Liberty), which draws some 500,000 people. The military interprets the event to mean significant support for a coup. **31 March–1 April:** The military ousts Goulart. The leaders of the army, navy, and air force create the *Comando Supremo Revolucionário* (Supreme Revolutionary Command). Thousands of suspected subversives are arrested in *Operação Limpeza* (Operation Cleanup); many are tortured. **2 April:** Ranieri Mazzilli, the leader of the Chamber of Deputies, becomes interim president. He names the three-man *Comando* to his cabinet. **9 April:** The *Comando* decrees the first *Ato Institucional* (AI, Institutional Act). The AIs, of which there were many, would change the structure of gov-

ernment. **11 April:** General Humberto de Alencar Castello Branco is named the first of five military presidents. **11 April–15 June:** Castello Branco purges his political opponents, suspending political rights and removing legislators from office. **June:** General Golbery do Couto e Silva creates the Serviço Nacional de Informações (SNI, National Intelligence Service).

1964–1965 Castello Branco adopts a strict stabilization plan, which causes hardship among the working class.

1965 October: Opposition PSD candidates make gains in state elections. Castello Branco decrees AI-2, which abolishes all existing political parties. They are replaced by two parties under military control: Aliança Renovadora Nacional (ARENA, National Alliance for Renewal), a progovernment party; and Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (MDB, Brazilian Democratic Movement), a moderate opposition party. In addition, presidents, vice presidents, and state governors are to be elected indirectly.

1967 24 January: Castello Branco unveils a new constitution that incorporates the decree laws. **15 March:** General Artur da Costa e Silva is sworn in as the second of five military presidents.

1968 Opponents demonstrate, and armed guerrilla groups appear. **13 December:** Costa e Silva decrees AI-5, establishing a dictatorship. Political rights are suspended, including habeas corpus.

1969 March: The government issues a decree banning any criticism of the AIs, the government, or the military. **September:** Two guerrilla groups—the Ação Libertadora Nacional (ALN, National Action for Liberation) and the Movimento Revolucionário 8 de Outubro (MR-8, 8th of October Revolutionary Movement)—kidnap the United States ambassador Charles Elbrick. Four days later, they release him unharmed in return for the release of 15 political prisoners. The government escalates its repression. **30 October:** General Emílio Garrastazú Médici becomes the third of five military presidents, replacing Costa e Silva, who has been incapacitated by a stroke.

1969–1974 Médici presides over the most repressive period of military rule. The Destacamento de Operações Internas–Comando

Operacional de Defesa Interna (DOI–CODI, Information Operations Detachment–Operational Command for Internal Defense) becomes the principal death squad, operating torture centers across Brazil. He also presides over the “Brazilian Miracle,” a period of rapid growth and development.

1974 March: General Ernesto Geisel takes office as the fourth of five military presidents. He begins a tentative political liberalization called *distensão* (relaxation). **November:** In direct congressional elections, the opposition MDB wins over a third of the seats.

1975 November: Brazil is one of six founding members of Operation Condor, a secret network of South American military dictatorships. **October:** Vladimir Herzog, a Jewish immigrant and prominent journalist, dies under torture at the DOI–CODI in São Paulo. The death is officially reported as a suicide, prompting strikes and demonstrations.

1976 January: Manoel Fiel Filho, a union activist, dies under torture at the DOI–CODI in São Paulo. After the death is officially reported as a suicide, Geisel fires the São Paulo DOI–CODI commander.

1977 April: Geisel tries to slow the electoral rise of the opposition by announcing the April Package, which allows for a third of the senators to be appointed.

1978 October: Geisel begins to revoke authoritarian decrees, including AI-5.

1979 15 March: General João Baptista de Oliveira Figueiredo becomes the last of the five military presidents. He continues the process of political liberalization, now known as *abertura* (opening). **August:** Figueiredo gives an amnesty to those imprisoned or exiled for political crimes. The amnesty, however, covers torturers, as well. **November:** Figueiredo abolishes the two-party system.

1980–1981 Hard-line opponents of *abertura* set off bombs across Brazil.

1984 April: In Rio de Janeiro, a rally in support of direct presidential elections draws 500,000 people. **25 April:** Congress votes down a constitutional amendment calling for direct presidential elections.

1985 15 January: Tancredo Neves, an opposition presidential candidate, is elected president by an electoral college. José Sarney is elected vice president. **15 March:** José Sarney is inaugurated in place of Neves, who has taken ill. **21 April:** Neves dies. Sarney becomes president. **22 April:** Nine Argentine military-junta members go on trial in Buenos Aires for human-rights violations committed during their 1976–1982 “dirty war.” **May:** Legislation reestablishes direct presidential elections, gives illiterates the right to vote, and legalizes all political parties. The Archdiocese of São Paulo publishes *Brasil: Nunca mais* (Brazil: Never Again), which, using the military’s own records, documents the torture of political prisoners from 1964 to 1979.

1988 5 October: A new constitution takes effect, officially ending the dictatorship.

1995 August: Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Brazil’s president, establishes a law distributing death certificates and one-time payouts to families of *desaparecidos* (disappeared).

1996 April: *O Globo*, a Rio de Janeiro newspaper, publishes photos—leaked from a military archive—of slain Partido Comunista do Brasil (PC do B) guerrillas who disappeared in the 1970s.

2007 The government publishes *Direito à memória e à verdade* (The Right to Memory and the Truth), a 500-page book detailing the state’s role in torture, rape, and disappearances.

CHILE

1964 President Eduardo Frei Montalva of the Partido Demócrata Cristiano (PDC, Christian Democratic Party) takes office and begins a reformist government.

1970 4 September: Dr. Salvador Allende Gossens, leading the left-wing coalition Unidad Popular (UP, Popular Unity), wins a plurality of votes in the presidential election. The lack of a majority places the outcome of the election in the hands of Congress. **22 October:** Elements in the military, hoping to prevent the confirmation of Allende Gossens,

attempt to kidnap General René Schneider, a constitutional loyalist. Schneider is fatally wounded in the attempt. **24 October:** The Chilean Congress declares Allende Gossens the winner of the presidential election. **3 November:** Allende Gossens is inaugurated, becoming the first democratically elected Marxist president in the world.

1971 April: A strong economy helps the UP garner more than 50 percent of the vote in municipal elections. **June:** The PDC leader Edmundo Pérez Zújovic is assassinated by left-wing guerrillas.

1971–1973 Economic decline leads to labor strikes and growing resistance to Allende Gossens’s socialist agenda. Inflation rises from 22 to 600 percent. Food and other consumer goods become scarce.

1972 October: Truck owners stage a strike. **November:** Allende Gossens appoints several members of the military to his cabinet.

1973 Bus owners and copper miners strike. **May:** The UP fails to win a majority in congressional elections. **June:** General Carlos Prats González, the commander in chief of the army, quells a revolt of a Santiago tank regiment (*tancazo*). **23 August:** Prats González resigns as army commander. He is replaced by General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte. **11 September:** The armed forces overthrow Allende Gossens. As the presidential palace is being stormed, Allende Gossens commits suicide. **13 September:** General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte is named president of the military junta. **October:** General Sergio Arellano Stark leads a helicopter tour of military camps and orders the execution of political prisoners. The event is known as the “caravan of death.”

1974 June: The junta forms a secret police force, the Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional (DINA, Directorate for National Intelligence). **20 June:** Pinochet Ugarte becomes *jefe supreme de la nación*, supreme chief of the nation; other junta members relegated to subordinate roles.

29 September: Prats González (former commander in chief of the army) and his wife, Sofía, are assassinated in exile in Buenos Aires, Argentina. Pinochet Ugarte denies any connection to the crime.

1975 November: Chile is one of six founding members of Operation Condor, a secret network of South American military dictatorships.

1976 21 September: Orlando Letelier del Solar (former cabinet minister and Chile's ambassador to the United States during the government of Allende Gossens) and his colleague Ronni Moffitt are assassinated in Washington, D.C., by DINA agents.

1977 December: The United Nations (UN) condemns Chile for human-rights violations.

1978 4 January: Pinochet Ugarte calls a referendum, asking Chileans to respond yes or no to whether they support the fight against "international aggression." Seventy-five percent vote "yes," though his opponents claim electoral fraud. **19 April:** The junta signs an amnesty law absolving the military and the police of human-rights abuses committed from 11 September 1973, the day of the coup, to 10 March 1978. **July:** Pinochet Ugarte expels General Gustavo Leigh Guzmán from the junta.

1980 11 September: In a plebiscite, the constitution of 1981, also known as the "constitution of liberty," is approved by 67 percent of the voters. Opponents claim electoral fraud.

1981 11 March: Pinochet Ugarte assumes the presidency under the "Constitution of Liberty," which promises a gradual return to elected government.

1982 Period of economic recession contributes to rising government opposition.

1983 11 May: General strike of copper workers challenges regime's economic policies and marks the beginning of a series of protests. **December:** The Frente Patriótico Manuel Rodríguez (FPMR, Manuel Rodríguez Patriotic Front) is formed, continuing the armed-resistance campaign of the Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR, Movement of the Revolutionary Left).

1986 7 September: Pinochet escapes assassination in the FPMR's Operation Twentieth-Century attack.

1988 5 October: In a plebiscite, a majority of voters say no to eight more years of Pinochet; the results open the way for national elections in 1989.

1989 14 December: Patricio Aylwin Azócar of the PDC is elected president.

1990 11 March: Aylwin Azócar becomes president. **April:** Aylwin Azócar announces the creation of the Comisión Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliación (CNVR, National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation) to investigate and document alleged violations of human rights committed during military rule.

1991 March: The CNVR reports its findings.

1992 November: Former DINA officials General Manuel Contreras Sepúlveda and Colonel Pedro Espinoza Bravo are charged with the murder of Letelier del Solar; they receive prison sentences in November 1993.

1993 11 December: Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle is elected president.

1998 March: Pinochet Ugarte retires from active duty and assumes his position as senator-for-life (guaranteed by the constitution of 1981). **16 October:** Pinochet Ugarte is arrested in London. Spanish magistrates had requested British authorities to extradite Pinochet Ugarte to Spain to face charges of human-rights violations.

1999 8 October: A British court rules that the extradition of Pinochet Ugarte to Spain can go forward.

2000 March: Pinochet Ugarte returns to Chile after doctors declare that he is in too poor health to stand trial. **August:** The Supreme Court strips Pinochet Ugarte of his parliamentary immunity. **1 December:** Judge Juan Guzmán Tapia indicts Pinochet Ugarte on charges of kidnapping and murder in connection with the caravan of death.

2001 9 July: An appeals court rules that Pinochet Ugarte is mentally unfit to face trial.

2002 The Supreme Court upholds the appeals-court ruling; Pinochet Ugarte is forced to step down as senator-for-life.

2003 December: Human-rights advocates ask the courts to reconsider their rulings on Pinochet Ugarte's mental health, citing his lucidity in a recent television interview.

2004 28 May: An appeals court strips Pinochet Ugarte of his immunity from prosecution, this time in connection with the murder of political opponents in Operation Condor. **26 August:** The Supreme Court upholds the appeals-court ruling, opening the way for prosecution. **8 November:** General Juan Emilio Cheyre, the army commander, says that the army accepts responsibility for human-rights violations committed during the dictatorship. **Mid-November:** the Comisión Nacional sobre Prisión Política y Tortura (National Commission on Political Prisoners and Torture) issues its report, which concludes that the regime of Pinochet Ugarte tortured detainees as a matter of policy. **17 November:** The Supreme Court partly overturns the amnesty law of 1978, arguing that it does not apply to cases of disappearance. The ruling opens the door to hundreds of prosecutions. **2 December:** An appeals court strips Pinochet Ugarte of his immunity for a third time; he is sued in connection with the assassination in 1974 of his political rival General Prats González. **13 December:** Pinochet Ugarte is placed under house arrest and charged with nine kidnappings and one homicide in connection with Operation Condor. **Mid-December:** Congress awards each torture victim a lifetime pension of 112,000 Chilean pesos a month, about half the minimum monthly salary.

2005 23 November: Pinochet Ugarte is indicted on charges of tax evasion and corruption.

2006 25 November: On his 91st birthday, Pinochet Ugarte takes “political responsibility” for what happened during his regime. **10 December:** Pinochet Ugarte dies without having been convicted or cleared on any charge. His lawyers blocked every trial on grounds of ill health.

2007 28 August: The Supreme Court sentences Hugo Salas Wenzel, a retired army general, to life in prison for participating in the murder of 12 youths in 1987.

2008 27 May: Judge Víctor Montiglio orders the arrest of 98 former soldiers and DINA agents in connection with Operation Colombo, in which 42 people were kidnapped and killed. **July:** Judge Alejandro Solís sentences Contreras Sepúlveda to two life terms for the 1974 murder of General Prats González and his wife, Sofía.

PARAGUAY

1928–1930, 1932–1935 The Chaco Wars with Bolivia. Paraguay wins, but suffers heavy losses. The ruling Partido Liberal (Liberal Party) is criticized for its handling of the war.

1936 17 February: Colonel Rafael Franco ousts the Liberal government in what has become known as the Febrerista (February) Revolution. Franco's party, the Partido Revolucionario Febrerista (PRF, February Revolutionary Party), carries out social reforms.

1937 August: Franco is overthrown in a counterrevolution led by Liberal military officers.

1939 August: Marshal José Félix Estigarribia, a nationalist and a reformer, becomes president.

1940 August: Estigarribia writes an authoritarian constitution, which concentrates power in the president. The president can rule as a virtual dictator. **7 September:** Estigarribia dies in a mysterious plane crash. General Higinio Morínigo, though installed as an interim president, establishes a nonparty military dictatorship.

1946 Promising political liberalization, Morínigo forms a coalition government composed of Febreristas and members of the Partido Colorado (Red Party).

1947 12 January: Morínigo dissolves the coalition government, replacing it with a government composed only of Colorados, who harass the Febreristas, the Liberals, and the Partido Comunista Paraguayo (PCP, Paraguayan Communist Party). **7 March:** Febreristas attack the police station in Asunción, igniting a civil war in which the Febreristas, the Liberals, and the PCP rebel against Morínigo. **August:** The Colorados and an army officer named Alfredo Stroessner crush the rebellion. **November:** Juan Natalicio González, the leader of a Colorado faction called the *guionistas*, wrests the party's presidential nomination from Federico Chávez, the leader of another Colorado faction called the *democráticos*.

1948 February: Natalicio González is elected president unopposed. **June:** Aided by Stroessner, Felipe Molas López, the leader of the *gui-*

onista faction, deposes Morínigo. **August:** Natalicio González is sworn in as president. **October:** Molas López and Stroessner attempt to depose Natalicio González. The coup fails, and Stroessner goes into a brief exile.

1949 January: Natalicio González is removed in a bloodless coup. General Raimundo Rolón becomes president. **February:** Molas López and Stroessner remove Rolón. Molas López, now president, promotes Stroessner to brigadier general and appoints democráticos to his cabinet. **September:** Stroessner informs the democráticos of a plot by Molas López to remove them from the government. The democráticos oust Molas López and install their leader, Chávez, as president. Chávez rewards Stroessner with rapid promotions, including commander in chief of the army.

1952 Chávez, having served the remainder of the 1948–1952 presidential term, is elected to a second term unopposed.

1954 4 May: Stroessner ousts Chávez in a bloody coup, and Tomás Romero Pereira becomes interim president. **11 July:** Stroessner runs unopposed as the Colorado candidate. **15 August:** Stroessner is sworn in as president.

1955 October: A state of siege, in effect since 1947, is reinforced by the Law for the Defense of Democracy. The law, though aimed at curtailing communism, is invoked against the Liberals, the Febreristas, and others considered subversive. **20 December:** Stroessner quashes a coup attempt by Epifanio Méndez Fleitas, a dissident, progressive democrático. Méndez Fleitas is exiled; his followers, the epifanistas, are either exiled or imprisoned.

1956 Stroessner agrees to an austerity plan drawn up by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), a plan that causes widespread discontent.

1958 Guerrilla organizations, composed of young militant exiles, launch forays into Paraguay from across the border with Argentina and Brazil.

1959 1 April: Stroessner, under pressure from the democráticos, ends the state of siege. **4 June:** After violent student protests, Stroessner restores the state of siege, arresting the protestors and the democráticos.

1963–1967 Reaching an accommodation with Stroessner, Liberals and Febreristas receive an amnesty, return from exile, and become part of the loyal opposition.

1967 A new constitution allows Stroessner two more terms in office. It also creates a bicameral legislature, allotting two-thirds of the seats to the majority (Colorado) party and one-third to the opposition.

1968 Latin American Catholic bishops, meeting in Medellín, Colombia, commit the regional church to social justice. The Paraguayan church criticizes the Stroessner regime and creates Christian Agrarian Leagues.

1972 12 September: Police break up a protest meeting at the Catholic University, clubbing protesters and tearing down posters.

1975 November: Paraguay is one of six founding members of Operation Condor, a secret network of South American military dictatorships.

1975–1976 The military and Colorado peasant militias known as the *py nandí* (Guaraní for “barefoot ones”) destroy the Christian Agrarian Leagues, rounding up almost 3,000 members and holding them in concentration camps.

1976 April: A shoot-out between the police and the Organización Político Militar (OPM, Political Military Organization), an armed guerrilla group, leaves five police and 30 guerrillas dead. The police then arrest 1,500 suspected subversives.

1977 Jimmy Carter is inaugurated president of the United States. The Colorados revise the constitution to allow Stroessner unlimited terms. He will be reelected, by large margins, in 1978, 1983, and 1988.

1978 The U.S. State Department describes Paraguay as one of the worst human-rights violators in the Western Hemisphere. **February:** Stroessner ends the state of siege and begins to release political prisoners.

1979 February: Four opposition political parties create the Acuerdo Nacional (National Accord), calling for an end to political violence, an amnesty for political prisoners, and the establishment of democratic rule.

1980 17 September: General Anastasio Somoza Debayle, the former Nicaraguan dictator, who has been granted asylum by Stroessner, is

gunned down in Asunción by Argentine guerrillas. Stroessner restores the state of siege.

1981 January: Ronald Reagan is inaugurated as president of the United States. The United States relaxes its criticism of Stroessner's human-rights record.

1983 Most of the legal opposition boycotts the presidential and legislative elections, allowing Stroessner to capture more than 90 percent of the votes.

1984 January: Under international pressure, Stroessner grants an amnesty to the Movimiento Popular Colorado (MOPOCO, Popular Colorado Movement), a party composed of exiled epifanistas and democráticos. **February:** MOPOCO joins other members of the Acuerdo Nacional in a protest in downtown Asunción, an event that draws 2,000 people.

1985–1989 In its second term, the Reagan administration urges Stroessner to move toward democracy.

1985 May: The Acuerdo Nacional stages a prodemocracy rally.

1988 February: Stroessner is reelected, claiming 89 percent of the vote. Opposition members denounce the election as a fraud.

1989 3 February: Stroessner is ousted in a coup led by his second in command, General Andrés Rodríguez. Stroessner goes into exile in Brazil.

1991 The Centro de Estudios Paraguayos “Antonio Guasch” (CEPAG), a civilian organization, publishes *El precio de la paz* (The Cost of Peace), documenting Stroessner's human-rights violations.

1992 Martín Almada, a Paraguayan educator and torture victim, discovers what has become known as the Archives of Terror, a collection of documents that detail the workings of Operation Condor.

URUGUAY

1903 The progressive José Batlle y Ordóñez is elected president. During his two terms in office (1903–1907, 1911–1915), Batlle y

Ordóñez transforms the country into a welfare state—the first in Latin America.

1929 Batlle y Ordóñez dies. The Great Depression begins.

1933 31 March: President Gabriel Terra initiates a 10-year moderate dictatorship known as the *dictablanda*.

1938 Elections are allowed, presaging the end of the *dictablanda*, in 1942.

1952 A new constitution eliminates the office of president. All executive functions now reside in a nine-member Colegiado, composed of elected members from both parties.

1958 Economic crisis helps the Blancos win a national election, becoming the majority party for the first time in 93 years.

1963 The Tupamaro urban guerrilla movement is formed.

1966 The elections, won by the Colorados, include a plebiscite that abolishes the Colegiado and returns the country to a presidential system.

1966–1970 Oscar Gestido, the new president, dies in his first year in office. His vice president and successor, Jorge Pacheco Areco, faces a poor economy, labor unrest, and increasing guerrilla violence. Pacheco Areco uses strong measures to repress opposition.

1970 The Tupamaros execute Daniel Mitrión, a police advisor provided through the United States Agency for International Development.

1971 January: The Tupamaros abduct Sir Geoffrey Jackson, the British ambassador to Uruguay. **9 September:** More than 100 Tupamaros escape from prison; Pacheco Areco calls upon the military to help thwart guerrilla violence. **September:** The Tupamaros release Sir Geoffrey Jackson. **November:** Juan María Bordaberry, a Colorado, is elected president.

1972 1 March: Bordaberry takes office and continues the previous administration's campaign against the Tupamaros. **14 April:** The Tupamaros assassinate several government officials in Montevideo.

In response, Bordaberry declares a “state of internal war,” putting the military in charge of combating subversion. By midyear the Tupamaros are crushed. **June:** The government extends the state of internal war indefinitely. The Catholic Church calls for peace.

1973 12 February: Military officers insist on having a stronger role in government. Bordaberry creates the Consejo de Seguridad Nacional (COSENA, National Security Council), which is dominated by the military. **27 June:** With the support of the military, Bordaberry dissolves Congress, an act that sets off two weeks of demonstrations. The military suppresses opposition and consolidates its rule.

1975 November: Uruguay is one of six founding members of Operation Condor, a network of South American military dictatorships.

1976 June: The military deposes Bordaberry and suspends national elections, removing any pretense of civilian rule. **July:** Dr. Aparicio Méndez Manfredini is appointed president for a five-year term.

1977 August: The government announces a plebiscite, scheduled for November 1980, on a constitution drafted by the military.

1980 30 November: In a plebiscite, voters reject the constitution proposed by the military.

1981 September: General Gregorio Alvarez Armellino becomes president and announces a timetable for national elections and a return to civilian government.

1984 November: In national elections, Julio María Sanguinetti becomes president.

1985 1 March: Sanguinetti is inaugurated. By the end of the month, all political prisoners are released under an amnesty law passed by Congress.

1985 Congress establishes the Comisión Investigadora Parlamentaria sobre Situación de Personas Desaparecidas y Hechos que la Motivaron (Commission on the Situation of “Disappeared” People and Its Causes).

1986 August: The government proposes legislation that would grant an amnesty to all military and police personnel accused of human-rights

abuse. **22 December:** Legislation is passed that puts an end to investigations of human-rights abuse. The law is opposed by human-rights groups, torture victims, civil-rights lawyers, center-left political parties, trade unionists, and students.

1987 February: Opponents of the amnesty law campaign to collect enough signatures to force a referendum on human rights.

1989 16 April: In a referendum, voters uphold the amnesty (the *Ley de Caducidad*, or Impunity Law).

2000 August: President Jorge Batlle Ibáñez creates the Comisión para la Paz (Peace Commission) to investigate the fate of the missing (*desaparecidos*).

2005 March: The leftist President Tabaré Vázquez takes office, promising to reopen human-rights cases. **July:** The former President Bordaberry and his foreign minister, Juan Blanco, are charged in connection with the kidnapping and murder in 1976 of the Uruguayan legislators Zelmar Michelini and Héctor Gutiérrez.

Introduction

In 1954 General Alfredo Stroessner came to power in Paraguay, marking the beginning of a period that has since been described as the era of authoritarianism in Latin America.¹ His dictatorship (1954–1989), propped up by his Colorado Party and the military, was joined by the military dictatorships of his neighbors: Brazil (1964–1985), Bolivia (1971–1982), Uruguay (1973–1985), Chile (1973–1990), and Argentina (1976–1983). Together, these regimes tortured, murdered, and disappeared thousands of their political opponents in the name of anti-communism, and thousands more were driven into exile.

To explain this phenomenon, many scholars invoke the National Security Doctrine, which emerged during the Cold War. Inculcated into Latin American military personnel at the U.S. Army's School of the Americas and in training courses, the doctrine equated movements for social justice with the spread of international, Soviet-led communism. The perceived threat became even greater with the success of the Cuban Revolution in 1959. Other scholars, while not denying the dominant role of the United States in the region, question the emphasis placed on the National Security Doctrine to account for the military's actions. Carina Perelli, for example, in her case study of Argentina and Uruguay, argues that the armed forces there were not simply doing the bidding of the United States. They were reacting to social and political unrest in their own countries, having been asked to intervene by the dominant sectors of society.²

Military ideology in Latin America—whether imported from the United States or developed locally—shifted focus away from an external enemy to an internal one. The military reacted to a threat, not from an invading enemy, but from “subversives” within their own borders. “Subversive” was broadly defined. The category included armed guerrillas and their supporters, certainly, but also came to include anyone

or anything perceived as challenging the status quo. Trade unionism, intellectuals, students, clerics, liberation theology—all were perceived as dangerous. The ideology often had a religious component. To many, what was at stake was nothing less than “Western, Christian civilization.”

A change in enemy, the military reasoned, necessitated a change in strategy. After all, an internal enemy is not out in the open as in conventional warfare. Instead, it is hidden and pernicious and needs to be rooted out. Hence a different kind of warfare—a “dirty war” (*guerra sucia*). Suspected subversives were kidnapped—sometimes under cover of night, sometimes in broad daylight—taken to secret prisons, tortured, and often killed or exiled. Information obtained during interrogation sessions led to another wave of arrests. A by-product of this process was fear, which paralyzed society and stifled protest.

Fear breeds complicity and collaboration, and it was easy for many to say that the military knew what it was doing and that those who were disappearing must have been guilty of something. Yet groups and individuals, at great risk to themselves, spoke out. Local human-rights groups emerged, collaborating with regional organizations such as the Organization of American States and international organizations such as the United Nations. The Madres de Plaza de Mayo (Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo) and their offshoot, the Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo (Grandmothers) in Argentina; the Asamblea Permanente de Derechos Humanos de Bolivia (APDHB, Permanent Assembly on Human Rights in Bolivia); the Vicaría de la Solidaridad (Vicariate of Solidarity) in Chile; and Servicio Paz y Justicia-Uruguay—these were just a few of the groups that gave witness to the disappearances and offered support (material, social, psychological, and spiritual) to those affected by the violence. Many individuals refused to be silenced. Among them were the archbishop Paulo Evaristo Cardinal Arns, the physician Joel Filártiga, the lawyer Jaime Castillo Velasco, and the journalists Jacobo Timerman, Patricia Verdugo, and Rodolfo Walsh.

Even protesting from outside the country became dangerous as the countries of the region fell, one by one, under military rule. In the mid-1970s Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay created Operation Condor, a secret network that allowed the military regimes of the region to share information and work together in silencing dissent. (Ecuador and Peru would join in 1978.) Political refugees

seeking sanctuary in neighboring countries were tracked down, seized, and murdered.³

Not all the countries had a history of military intervention. Chile and Uruguay had had strong democratic traditions before succumbing to dictatorship. Democratic rule in Chile ended abruptly in a bloody coup on 11 September 1973, whereas the coup in Uruguay, also in 1973, played out over several months. And although the coups in Paraguay, Brazil, Bolivia, and Argentina were the latest in a long line, they had far-reaching effects. Stroessner, though young and politically inexperienced, clung to power for 35 years. The military in Brazil and Argentina, though expected to quickly return power to civilians as it had done in the past, was in no hurry to retreat to the barracks. In Bolivia, where the military had already been in control since 1964, the 1971 coup by General Hugo Banzer Suárez toppled the regime of a left-leaning fellow general.

Equally diverse were the transitions to civilian rule. The Bolivian military left power in 1982 after trade unionists staged a nationwide strike. The Argentine military left the following year, unable to control the economy and humiliated by its performance in the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas conflict. The transitions in Brazil, Uruguay, and Chile were protracted—the regimes finally allowed elections after negotiating their exits. And Stroessner was ousted by a fellow general after winning his eighth-straight rigged election.

After civility was restored, the countries took different paths toward investigating human-rights abuses. Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, and Uruguay established truth commissions, though their mandates were limited to investigating the *desaparecidos* (missing)—as opposed to incidents of kidnapping, illegal detention, and torture. Bolivia’s commission never issued a final report, but a nongovernmental human-rights organization published the truth document “*Nunca Más*” para Bolivia (Never Again for Bolivia), compiled by Federico Aguiló. In 2004 the Chilean government acknowledged the state’s role in torture by publishing the report of the Comisión Nacional sobre Prisión Política y Tortura (National Commission on Political Prisoners and Torture), a 1,200-page document based on the testimony of 35,000 victims. Paraguay’s truth documents, including *El precio de la paz* (The Cost of Peace), were published by nongovernmental human-rights organizations. Brazil’s document, *Nunca Mais* (the English version is *Torture in*

Brazil), was published by the Archdiocese of São Paulo, though in 2007 the Brazilian government acknowledged the state's role in torture, rape, and disappearances by publishing *Direito à memória e à verdade* (The Right to Memory and the Truth).

Although victims and their families welcomed the reports, what many ultimately hoped for was justice. The results have been mixed. In April 1993 the former Bolivian dictator Luis García Meza and 44 of his collaborators were convicted and sentenced to prison. García Meza began serving a 30-year sentence in 1995. Banzer Suárez and Stroessner, however, died without ever being prosecuted. Their Chilean counterpart, General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, facing charges of human-rights abuse and income-tax evasion, died in 2006 without ever going to trial. Hundreds of his former collaborators, though, have been prosecuted since 2004, when the Chilean Supreme Court partly struck down a 1978 amnesty. By July 2008, 256 had been convicted and 38 were serving prison sentences. In 1985 Argentina put its former junta commanders on trial, sentencing several of them to terms of varying lengths, including life. But the convicted were later pardoned, and many of their collaborators were shielded from prosecution by two amnesty laws passed in the late 1980s. In 2005, however, the Argentine Supreme Court struck down the amnesty laws, opening the door to prosecutions, and by the end of 2008, 28 “dirty warriors” had been convicted.

In Brazil, a controversial 1979 amnesty, decreed during the dictatorship, applied to all those guilty of “political crimes”—suspected subversives as well as military personnel, the tortured as well as the torturers. And in Uruguay, President Julio María Sanguinetti took the position that both the guerrillas and the military shared responsibility for the violence—a position known as the “theory of the two demons.” He freed all political prisoners and then proposed a blanket amnesty for the military. In the interest of national reconciliation, the argument went, everyone should forget what happened and move on. After much debate, the people of Uruguay agreed, voting in a referendum not to dredge up the past. In 2005, however, the country elected a leftist government, which quickly reopened human-rights cases.

Both the advocates of collective amnesia and the advocates of justice often defend their position by pointing to the need for national reconciliation. Although both sides of the argument have merit—truth can stir resentment as easily as it can heal—there is an awareness that truth

in itself is beneficial, even if it does not always lead to reconciliation.⁴ The events of the “dirty wars” are duly recorded, not only in the reports of truth commissions and of nongovernmental organizations but also in the outpouring of nonfiction, testimonial, and creative works. The testimonial and creative output from the region (including the exile communities) during and after the dictatorships is extensive, at least for countries that have strong literary traditions. Survivors of the period seem to have directed much of their anguish into testimonials, novels, plays, and films.

The sheer number of books and films inspired by the “dirty wars” raises the question whether this period in the region’s history was thoroughly unlike anything in recent memory. Even for Argentina, which had had a long tradition of political violence and where police use of torture had had a long history, one could argue that its “dirty war” was not only *quantitatively* different (more arrests, more torture) from what preceded it but also *qualitatively* so. One scholar, writing about testimonial literature and collective memory in Argentina, argued that to explain the repression of the recent dictatorship in purely historical terms is essentially to explain it away. It is something more than an item in a chronology—instead, it is “an exceptional moment in the history of Argentina.”⁵

The phrase “never again” (“nunca más” in Spanish, “nunca mais” in Portuguese) is used in the title of the truth-commission report from Argentina and in the titles of truth documents from Bolivia, Paraguay, and Uruguay. It expresses a fervent hope that atrocities like those documented never be repeated. Although many are rightly skeptical about humanity’s ability to learn from the past, there is still reason for optimism about the region’s future. Although the region has a long history of authoritarianism, alongside this authoritarianism exists a long tradition of respect for human rights. In the aftermath of World War II, Latin Americans—especially from Chile, Panama, and Cuba—played a leading role in the drafting of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights.⁶ Steeped in Latin American socialism, delegates like Santa Cruz from Chile were especially adamant about the inclusion of social, economic, and cultural rights—the “social-security rights” (work and education, food and health care, leisure and the arts)—arguing that these were the best defense against the return of fascism.⁷ Resistance to the recent military dictatorships—from lawyers and journalists, writers

and artists, religious groups and family members of the missing—is grounded in a tradition that could be termed counterauthoritarianism. Today, many of the human-rights groups that emerged during the repression are still active, having reinvented themselves to work on general issues in the public interest such as civil rights, community development, the environment, women and violence, and the rights of children.

The lessons of the “dirty wars” extend well beyond the Southern Cone. The term “dirty war” is applied in a wide range of contexts both past and present—the French in Algeria during the 1950s and early 1960s, the Mexican government’s response to leftists in the 1970s and 1980s, the Russian war in Chechnya, the dictatorship in Morocco, the tactics of the Los Angeles Police Department in combating gangs, and the “war on terrorism” conducted by the United States, to list only a few examples.⁸ As the Argentine journalist Horacio Verbitsky has said, “sacrificing civil liberties and human rights in the name of security has devastating effects.”⁹

NOTES

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The Dictionary

– A –

ABERTURA (OPENING). *See* FIGUEIREDO, JOÃO BAPTISTA DE OLIVEIRA.

ABRAMS, ELLIOTT (1948–). **United States** assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs under the administration of President **Ronald Reagan**, replacing **Langhorne A. (“Tony”) Motley**, who resigned in 1985. Abrams was a neoconservative lawyer who, since 1981, had been the assistant secretary of state for **human rights**, also under Reagan. By mid-1985, Abrams and other officials in the Reagan administration adopted a consistently critical stance toward the regime of **Augusto Pinochet Ugarte** in **Chile**. Abrams feared that the regime’s continuing repression jeopardized a peaceful return to democracy. In addition, the Reagan administration opposed the leftist Sandinista regime in Nicaragua, and failing to pressure the rightist regime in Chile would lead to charges of inconsistency. Abrams’s efforts against the Sandinistas resulted in his indictment in the Iran-Contra scandal and a temporary departure from government service.

ABUELAS DE PLAZA DE MAYO / GRANDMOTHERS OF THE PLAZA DE MAYO. A **human-rights** nongovernmental organization in **Argentina**. An offshoot of the **Madres de Plaza de Mayo** (Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo), the group was formed in 1977 by 12 **women** in search of their grandchildren, who had been abducted along with their parents or born in captivity. The children had become spoils in the government’s **“dirty war”** against suspected subversives, illegally adopted and raised by **military** families or by other families considered “decent” and “patriotic.” The Abuelas

compiled and distributed lists of missing children, petitioned government officials, and marched with the Madres in the **Plaza de Mayo**. Finding that their status as grandmothers offered no protection from harassment by the military and police, they adopted undercover methods to carry on their work, devising a secret code and meeting in public places while pretending to be engaged in traditional family activities.

Once the children were found, a serious obstacle to reuniting them with their families of origin was the lack of proof of a biological connection. Parenthood testing was of no use—more often than not, the parents were dead. What was needed was a test to establish grandparenthood. In 1981 the Abuelas began traveling to hospitals and research centers throughout the world in search of such a test. Their hopes were realized in 1984 when they were introduced to Mary Claire King, a geneticist at the University of California. She traveled to Argentina and helped develop a grandparenthood test that can establish—with up to 99.95 percent certainty—a genetic relationship between a child and a particular family. The Abuelas then persuaded President **Raúl Alfonsín** to create a National Genetic Data Bank, which has helped the Abuelas recover the past of 100 of the estimated 500 kidnapped children. Many of the recovered children have been united with their families of origin. Others have chosen to remain with their adoptive families. One brought an illegal-adoption case against her adoptive parents, who in April 2008 were sentenced to eight and seven years in prison, respectively. Many more children remain unaware of who their biological parents are. *See also* CHILDREN FOR IDENTITY AND JUSTICE AGAINST OBLIVION AND SILENCE; *DESAPARECIDOS*.

AÇÃO LIBERTADORA NACIONAL (ALN) / NATIONAL ACTION FOR LIBERATION. A leftist urban **guerrilla** organization in **Brazil**. It was founded in 1967 by **Carlos Marighella** as an offshoot of the **Partido Comunista Brasileiro** (PCB, Brazilian Communist Party). Unlike the PCB, the ALN adopted armed struggle.

In 1968 the ALN members robbed banks, honing their guerrilla skills and gathering funds. Then they turned to major operations. On 4 September 1969, the ALN and the **Movimento Revolucionário 8 de Outubro** (MR-8, 8th of October Revolutionary Movement) kidnapped

U.S. Ambassador Charles Elbrick, an event dramatized in the feature film *Four Days in September*. Elbrick was released unharmed on 8 September 1969 after the government broadcast the guerrillas' manifesto and released 15 political prisoners, **exiling** them to Mexico.

Though successful, the kidnapping brought reprisals. Between 1969 and 1971, government **death squads** rounded up hundreds of ALN members across Brazil. In September 1969 Marighella was ambushed and shot, and in October 1970 his successor, **Joaquim Câmara Ferreira**, was **tortured** to death.

The ALN sought to escape the repression by suspending armed struggle and organizing at the grassroots level. But the repression continued, and in early 1974 the ALN dissolved.

ACOSTA, JORGE EDUARDO. Also known as “el Tigre” (the Tiger). **Argentine** navy captain and head of GT-3/32, a navy task force based at the **Escuela Mecánica de la Armada** (ESMA, Navy Mechanics School). Along with colleagues like Rear Admiral **Rubén Jacinto Chamorro**, Acosta was responsible for the kidnapping, detention, and murder of at least 5,000 political prisoners, many of them thrown alive into the Atlantic Ocean from navy aircraft. He was also responsible for ordering the deaths of Dagmar Hagelin, a 17-year-old Swedish girl; Léonie Renée Duquet and Alice Domon, French nuns; and Azucena Villafior de Vicenti, founder of the **Madres de Plaza de Mayo**. He escaped trial and punishment, however, benefiting from the controversial law ***Obediencia Debida*** (Due Obedience), which exonerated junior officers (those below the rank of brigadier general). But because several of his victims were international citizens, other countries have taken an interest in prosecuting him. On 14 March 2007 an Italian court sentenced him, **Alfredo Astiz**, and three other officers to life in prison in absentia for the abduction and murder of three Italian citizens—Angela Maria Aieta and Giovanni and Susanna Pegoraro. He is also wanted in France and Sweden, and could face trial in Argentina, as well—the amnesty laws that shielded him and other officers from prosecution have since been struck down by the Supreme Court.

ACUERDO NACIONAL (NATIONAL ACCORD). A united front opposed to the dictatorship of **Alfredo Stroessner** in **Paraguay**.

Formed in February 1979 with the support of the administration of U.S. President **Jimmy Carter**, the Acuerdo consisted of four political parties: the **Movimiento Popular Colorado** (MOPOCO, Popular Colorado Movement); the **Partido Demócrata Cristiano** (PDC, Christian Democratic Party); the Partido Liberal Radical Auténtico (PLRA, Authentic Radical Liberal Party), a left-wing splinter from what was traditionally known as **Partido Liberal** (Liberal Party); and the **Partido Revolucionario Febrerista** (PRF, February Revolutionary Party). Another opposition party, the **Partido Comunista Paraguayo** (PCP, Paraguayan Communist Party), tried repeatedly to join, but was turned down. Among other things, the Acuerdo Nacional demanded an amnesty for political prisoners, an end to **human-rights** abuse, and a transition to democratic rule.

At first, the Acuerdo Nacional had little influence—only one of the parties, the Febreristas, was legally recognized by Stroessner, and MOPOCO was in **exile**. But in the 1980s, as dictatorships fell in neighboring countries—in **Bolivia** (1982), **Argentina** (1983), **Brazil** (1985), and **Uruguay** (1985)—it played an increasing role in mobilizing opposition to Stroessner. In February 1984, after Stroessner allowed MOPOCO to return from exile, the Acuerdo Nacional staged a protest in downtown Asunción, drawing 2,000 people. On 14 May 1985 it staged a prodemocracy rally, and then joined the Paraguayan **Catholic Church** in calling for political liberalization.

AGOSTI, ORLANDO RAMÓN (1924–1997). Brigadier general, commander of the air force, and member of the first junta (1976–1981) during the “**dirty war**” in **Argentina**. In 1985, at the trial of the nine junta commanders following the return to civilian rule, Agosti was sentenced to four and a half years in prison for his role in the repression—the air force was found to have been less active in the repression than the army and navy. A year later the Argentine Supreme Court upheld the conviction but reduced the sentence to three years and nine months. Agosti was the only member of the **military** to serve a full sentence for participating in the repression. He was released from prison in 1989. The two other members of the first junta, **Jorge Rafael Videla** and **Emilio Massera**, who had received life sentences, were released from prison in 1990 following a pardon by President **Carlos Saúl Menem**.

AGRUPACIÓN DE FAMILIARES DE DETENIDOS-DESAPARECIDOS (AFDD) / ASSOCIATION OF RELATIVES OF THE DETAINED-DISAPPEARED. A **human-rights** nongovernmental organization in **Chile**. The AFDD was founded in 1975 under the name Agrupación de Familiares por la Vida (Association of Relatives for Life). Like many other human-rights organizations that were formed in response to the repressive campaign of General **Augusto Pinochet Ugarte** following the 1973 coup, the AFDD was under the auspices of the **Catholic Church**. The AFDD's immediate goal was to assist the thousands of Chileans searching for the status of family members detained by the **military** and security forces. Like the **Vicaría de la Solidaridad** (Vicariate of Solidarity), the AFDD focused on documenting cases of abduction and disappearance, but its demands for truth and justice gave rise to a protest movement that gained international attention.

The inspiration behind this movement was Sola Sierra Henríquez, who joined in 1976 after her husband, Waldo Ulises Pizarro Molina, was abducted and disappeared. Sierra Henríquez organized public marches of **women** like herself who were searching for their loved ones. Parades of women marching through Santiago holding pictures of their missing relatives were a regular annoyance to Pinochet Ugarte and the armed forces. Other methods used by the AFDD to call international attention to its cause were unique. The AFDD sponsored workshops for the making and selling of *arpilleras*, cloth pictorials that relatives of the missing embroidered to illustrate their stories. Another method was chaining, in which large groups of people used link chains to attach their bodies to highly visible public structures such as guardrails or government buildings, while several protesters made speeches explaining the significance of the spectacle.

When democracy returned to Chile in 1990 under President **Patricio Aylwin Azócar**, the AFDD provided documentation and testimony for the human-rights investigation conducted by the **Comisión Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliación** (National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation). The commission issued its report, but the Chilean people have been divided over how to proceed. Some want to pursue justice; others prefer not to delve into the past. And there are many others who are too young to remember the Pinochet Ugarte era. For this last group, in June 1999, Henríquez staged a rock concert and

commemorative program at the Estadio Nacional (National Stadium), the Estadio having served as a detention and **torture** center during the repression. The program was both a reminder of the truth and a call for justice. One of the songs on the program, “They Dance Alone,” was written by the British rock star Sting in honor of the AFDD. *See also DESAPARECIDOS.*

AGRUPACIÓN DE FAMILIARES DE EJECUTADOS POLÍTICOS (AFEP) / ASSOCIATION OF RELATIVES OF THE POLITICALLY EXECUTED. A **human-rights** nongovernmental organization in **Chile**. Its members were originally part of the **Agrupación de Familiares de Detenidos-Desaparecidos** (AFDD, Association of Relatives of the Detained-Disappeared in Chile) when it was founded in 1975 to denounce the systematic disappearance of individuals perceived to be enemies of the junta. Early AFDD activities focused on documenting abduction cases and staging mass protests demanding information about abducted relatives. By 1978, as the AFDD shifted its focus from documenting cases to seeking justice for the missing, members whose relatives were known to have been victims of execution decided that their cause was specific enough to establish a separate group. Founded in November 1978, the AFEP has sought to obtain official acknowledgment of the deaths—for example, through death certificates, expressions of regret, and reparations. *See also DESAPARECIDOS.*

AGRUPACIÓN DE FAMILIARES POR LA VIDA. *See* AGRUPACIÓN DE FAMILIARES DE DETENIDOS-DESAPARECIDOS.

ALFONSÍN, RAÚL (1927–2009). President of **Argentina** (1983–1989), the first democratically elected president in that country after its “**dirty war.**” He was born in Chascomús, a small farming town 70 miles southeast of Buenos Aires. His father, Serafín Alfonsín, the owner of a general store, was a Spanish immigrant who supported the Republican cause in the Spanish Civil War and opposed the dictator Francisco Franco. Serafín also supported the **Unión Cívica Radical** (UCR, Radical Civic Union, or Radicals), a middle-class party founded in 1890, under whose banner his son would be elected president. Raúl attended the Liceo Militar General San Martín, a

military secondary school with a reputation for being the best school in the area. He graduated at 18 with the rank of second lieutenant in the army reserve, but in lieu of a military career, he attended the National University of La Plata, where he studied liberal arts and law and became active in the Radicals.

After graduating in 1950 with a law degree, Alfonsín entered politics and won a seat on the local council of Chascomús. An outspoken legislator, he endured verbal attacks, death threats, and a brief internment at the hands of the **Peronists**. He advanced steadily in his political career, winning a seat on the provincial legislature of Buenos Aires in 1958 (reelected in 1960) and then a seat on the Congreso Nacional (National Congress) in 1963. He made a presidential bid in the primary elections of 1972, hoping to wrest control of the party from its veteran wing, whom he accused of collaborating with the military. He lost by a wide margin to Ricardo Balbín.

Although some observers thought his political career was over, Alfonsín proceeded to build a large following. He won the support of many young people by forming the Movimiento de Renovación y Cambio (Movement of Renovation and Change), a Radical faction committed to social issues. Following the military coup of 1976, he spoke out openly against the disappearances and demanded that the government account for the missing. He cofounded the **Asamblea Permanente por los Derechos Humanos** (APDH, Permanent Assembly for **Human Rights**) and used his legal background to defend political detainees. He sought international support for human rights, finding allies in Europe and the **United States**. (He praised the policies of President **Jimmy Carter** but criticized those of his successor, **Ronald Reagan**.) During Argentina's invasion of the **Falkland Islands/ Islas Malvinas** in 1982, he was one of the few to speak out against the action, though he did support his country's claim to the islands.

On 30 October 1983, as the leader of the Radical Party, he was elected president, winning 52 percent of the vote and defeating the Peronist candidate Italo Argentino Luder. Alfonsín had built his campaign around the issue of human rights, promising to investigate the thousands of disappearances that took place under military rule and to bring those responsible to justice. Meanwhile, Luder had come out on record as supporting the *Ley de Pacificación Nacional* (Law of National Pacification), an amnesty that the military granted itself

before handing power back to civilians. Shortly after taking office on 10 December, Alfonsín repealed the military's amnesty and ordered the prosecution of the nine former junta leaders as well as such well-known "dirty war" participants as General **Ramón Juan Alberto Camps** and General **Suárez Masón**. And working from the idea that the **guerrillas** shared responsibility with the military for plunging the country into violence—an idea that became known as the "doctrine of the two demons"—he ordered the prosecution of former guerrilla leaders, among them Mario Firmenich, Fernando Vaca Narvaja, and Enrique Gorriarán Merlo.

To prosecute, he needed evidence. In December 1983 Alfonsín appointed a truth commission, the **Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas** (CONADEP), or National Commission on the Disappeared. On the strength of the facts collected by the commission, the civilian trial in 1985 of the former dictators—the first of its kind in the history of Latin America—resulted in the conviction of five, including life sentences for **Jorge Rafael Videla** and **Emilio Massera**. A second trial, in December 1986—in which a corporal and a police doctor were convicted along with three generals—was noteworthy for assigning responsibility for human-rights violations to lower-ranking officers.

A public outpouring of testimonials from victims made it likely that many more convictions would follow. But the junior-officer corps, threatened with prosecution and angered by military reforms that included forced retirements and budget cuts, fought back. A series of encounters with the military forced the Alfonsín government to pass two laws that significantly limited the scope of prosecution. The *Ley de Punto Final* (Full-Stop Law) set a 60-day limit for the filing of human-rights suits, and the *Ley de Obediencia Debida* (Due Obedience Law) reduced the number of indicted (about 400) to 39, exonerating junior officers on the grounds that they were following orders. His successor, **Carlos Saúl Menem**, took the additional step of pardoning the 39, as well as Videla, Massera, the other junta leaders, and the former **Montonero** leader Mario Firmenich. *Punto Final* and *Obediencia Debida* were struck down by the Supreme Court in 2005.

In October 2008 President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner unveiled a bust of Alfonsín, calling him a symbol of Argentina's return to democracy. He died on 31 March 2009, at age 82.

ALIANÇA RENOVADORA NACIONAL (ARENA) / NATIONAL ALLIANCE FOR RENEWAL. The progovernment political party during the **military** dictatorship in **Brazil** (1964–1985). It was created in 1965 as part of a strict two-party system. Its rival, created at the same time, was the **Movimento Democrático Brasileiro** (MDB, Brazilian Democratic Movement), the legal opposition party. Both parties existed until November 1979, when the two-party system was scrapped.

From 1945 to 1965, there were three principal political parties in Brazil: the centrist Partido Social Democrático (PSD, Social Democratic Party), the leftist Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (PTB, Brazilian Labor Party), and the conservative União Democrática Nacional (UDN, National Democratic Union). These parties were abolished when the two-party system was put in place. ARENA drew largely from the UDN and the PSD; MDB drew largely from the PTB, but also drew from the PSD.

ARENA consistently controlled Congress. After the November 1966 congressional elections, ARENA held 47 seats in the Senate to the MDB's 19, and 277 seats in the Chamber of Deputies to the MDB's 132. By the mid-1970s, however, the MDB threatened to take control through the ballot box, and the government had to take steps to maintain ARENA's dominance. In 1977, for example, President **Ernesto Geisel** introduced a set of constitutional reforms known as the April Package, one of which allowed one-third of the senators to be appointed.

Because of ARENA's control, Congress could be expected to rubber-stamp most government proposals. But ARENA sometimes infuriated the military by acting independently. In 1968, for example, ARENA members of Congress protested a police crackdown on university students, called for presidents to be elected directly—they were then elected by a roll-call vote in Congress—and voted against revoking the immunity of Márcio Moreira Alves, an MDB congressman who had spoken out against the government's use of **torture**. ARENA's act of defiance in the Moreira Alves vote particularly rankled—so much so that the government responded by issuing an *Ato Institucional* (AI, Institutional Act), one of whose provisions allowed the president to close Congress, a provision that was temporarily invoked. Moreover, in 1969, when the government revised the

constitution of 1967, the changes included a party-fidelity measure, which required legislators at both the federal and the state levels to vote the party line when the party leadership considered a vote to be of primary importance.

In 1979, to weaken the opposition, all of which was funneled through the MDB, the government abolished the two-party system and required all new parties to use the word *partido* (political party) in their names. ARENA became the **Partido Democrático Social** (PDS, Social Democratic Party). On 15 January 1985 an opposition president came to power, defeating the PDS candidate 480 to 180 in the electoral college.

ALIANZA ANTICOMUNISTA ARGENTINA (AAA or TRIPLE A) / ARGENTINE ANTICOMMUNIST ALLIANCE. A collection of right-wing **death squads** formed in 1973 in **Argentina** and active until the coup of 24 March 1976, when its functions were absorbed by the **military**. It grew out of the incident at Ezeiza Airport in June 1973, when a private army organized by José López Rega and Jorge Osinde opened fire on columns of leftist **Peronists** assembled to welcome **Juan Perón** home from **exile**. Fearing that the left might use the event to take control of the Peronist Movement, rightists had formed a loose federation of mercenaries from the Ministry of Social Welfare (headed by López Rega), the **trade unions**, the police-intelligence services, and fascist groups like the Comando de Organización (Organization Command) and the Concentración Nacional Universitaria (National University Concentration).

The AAA made its public debut in October 1973, claiming responsibility for a car bomb that maimed the leftist senator Hipólito Solari Yrigoyen. Two thousand deaths were attributed to it over a period of two and a half years. Some of its victims were **guerrillas**, but most were nonmilitant supporters of the Peronist left. They included governors and union leaders, academics and journalists, and actors and singers. Traveling in their customary Ford Falcons without license plates, AAA agents operated with impunity, publicly threatening prominent figures with death if they failed to leave the country in 24 hours. Many of their intended victims went into exile.

ALLENDE, ISABEL (1942–). **Chilean** novelist. Born in Lima, Peru, while her father was in the Chilean diplomatic service in that country.

Upon the dissolution of her parents' marriage, Allende was brought up by her mother and maternal relatives in Santiago, Chile. Her mother's remarriage to another diplomat sent the young Allende to live in **Bolivia** and Lebanon during her childhood. She finished her secondary studies in Chile after 1958 and worked for the Food and Agriculture Organization of the **United Nations** in Santiago from 1959 to 1965, a work interrupted by an extended stay in Belgium and Switzerland. In 1966 Allende settled once again in Chile, where she soon began writing a humor column for the feminist magazine *Paula* and collaborating with several children's publications in Santiago. In 1970 **Salvador Allende Gossens**—a first cousin of Allende's father, Tomás—appointed her stepfather, Ramón Huidobro, ambassador to **Argentina**. From 1970 to 1975 Allende hosted an interview show on Chilean television as well as a humor program—both of which enjoyed great popularity—and wrote several works for the stage. This period of the author's life came to an end in 1975—two years after the overthrow of Salvador Allende Gossens by a **military** coup—when she left Chile for Venezuela, where she would reside for 13 years. In Caracas, Allende contributed to the prestigious daily *El Nacional* and worked in several administrative jobs while she began the literary career that would bring her international renown. In 1988 she moved to San Rafael, California, where she still resides. In 1990, after the election of **Patricio Aylwin Azócar** as president of Chile, she returned to Chile for the first time.

Allende is the author of nine works—novels, collections of short stories, and memoirs—all of which have been best sellers in several countries and have been translated into 27 languages. She is best known for *La casa de los espíritus* (1982, translated as *House of the Spirits* in 1985), a novel that had its beginnings in a letter from the author to her dying grandfather, who would serve as the model for the protagonist, Esteban Trueba. Through four generations of the **women** of the Trueba family, *La casa de los espíritus* recasts the history of 20th-century Chile—including the Allende Gossens presidency and the bloody aftermath of the military coup—into a personal narrative combining politics, magic, and the redeeming aspect of love. In 1993 Danish director Bille August filmed *House of the Spirits* with an international cast that included Jeremy Irons and Meryl Streep, but critics ambivalently received the movie. The second Allende work associated with the period of the **“dirty wars”** is *De amor y de sombra* (1984,

translated as *Of Love and Shadows* in 1987). The novel is based on the actual assassination of five members of a Chilean family during the dictatorship of **Augusto Pinochet Ugarte**. Again, the theme of the redemptive power of love is examined in the text, as it narrates the story of two lovers, intent on exposing the massacre.

Perhaps one of Latin America's most recognizable authors, Allende has received innumerable awards and honors. She is a frequent, and popular, lecturer in Europe and the **United States** and has taught courses at the University of Virginia, Montclair College in New Jersey, and the University of California at Berkeley.

ALLENDE GOSENS, SALVADOR (1908–1973). President of **Chile** (1970–1973). Allende Gossens was a physician, a socialist leader, and the first government official to attempt Marxist reforms in a democracy. He was born into an upper-middle-class family in Valparaíso on 26 July 1908. After completing secondary school and serving in the army, he entered the School of Medicine at the University of Chile, where he became interested in radical politics. His social activism led to his being jailed twice and then expelled from the university. Readmitted, he earned a medical degree in 1932. The next year, he helped found the **Partido Socialista** (PS, Socialist Party), and would later serve twice as its secretary-general. He began his government career in 1937, when he was elected to the Chamber of Deputies as a Socialist. In 1945 he was elected to the first of three consecutive eight-year terms in the Senate, serving as Senate vice president for five years and then as Senate president (1965–1969).

After losing three consecutive bids for the presidency (in 1952, 1958, and 1964), Allende Gossens participated in the presidential election of 4 September 1970 as the candidate of **Unidad Popular** (UP, Popular Unity), a coalition including the **Partido Comunista de Chile** (PC, Communist Party of Chile), the PS, and breakaway members of the **Partido Demócrata Cristiano** (PDC, Christian Democratic Party). The three-way race was close. Allende Gossens won 36.2 percent of the vote; Jorge Alessandri, an ex-president representing the right, 34.9 percent; and Radomiro Tomic, a left-leaning candidate of the PDC, 27.8 percent. Because Allende Gossens obtained a plurality, not a majority, of the vote, the Chilean Congress was to decide the winner in a runoff election. Ordinarily, Congress

would favor the front-runner, but a Marxist candidate was a different matter. Many Chileans feared a left-wing dictatorship. Of the 200 votes available in Congress (150 members of the Council of Deputies and 50 senators), 80 were in the hands of the UP. To win, Allende Gossens would have to find support from other parties, most likely the PDC, which controlled 75 votes. In October he reached an understanding with the PDC. In return for their support in the runoff, he agreed to sign a Statute of Guarantees, affirming such principles as the freedom of political parties, **trade unions**, and private education. On 24 October 1970 Congress confirmed Allende Gossens over Alessandri by a vote of 153 to 35.

Succeeding **Eduardo Frei Montalva**, a Christian Democrat who was president from 1964 to 1970, Allende Gossens was inaugurated on 3 November 1970, becoming the first freely elected Marxist president in the world. Though lacking a majority of support in both the electorate and the Congress, he embarked on a wide-ranging program of socialist reforms. His government nationalized industry (including copper and banking), took over factories and farms, and raised the standard of living. For his UP followers—peasants, factory workers, students—the reforms held the promise of an end to capitalism and the creation of a more just society. Among many in the working, middle, and upper classes, however, the program caused anger and resentment. Economic policies like boosting salaries while freezing prices led to bankruptcies and high inflation. The wealthy lost property and social standing. And shortages of basic goods—exacerbated by truckers’ strikes—led to food lines and rationing. At the same time, right-wing groups engaged in acts of economic sabotage, and in the **United States** the administration of Richard Nixon worked to destabilize the Chilean economy and support the opposition.

By 1973 Congress was at an impasse. In that year’s midterm elections, the UP had failed to win a majority that would allow it to continue its program of reforms through legislation. On the other side, the opponents of Allende Gossens lacked enough seats to force him from office. While Allende Gossens sought compromise, some of his radical supporters called for violent confrontation. On 11 September 1973 the socialist experiment ended in a bloody **military** coup. Allende Gossens died during the ground assault on the presidential palace, La Moneda. For many years, his followers and widow claimed

that he was killed; evidence would later indicate, however, that the president committed suicide rather than surrendering. Allende Gossens was buried in an unmarked grave in Viña del Mar and later reinterred in a state funeral when democratic government returned to Chile in 1990.

ALMADA, MARTÍN (1937–). Paraguayan educator, lawyer and **human-rights** activist. He was born in Puerto Sastre, in the Chaco region. During his youth, Almada's mother moved the family to the city of San Lorenzo, where, because of the family's precarious economic situation, he worked from the age of six selling pastries on the street. He was, by all accounts, a brilliant student, and his circumstances did not keep him from completing his education with great success. In 1963 he graduated as a teacher from the Universidad Nacional de Asunción. With his first wife and fellow educator, Celestina Pérez de Almada, he founded the Instituto "Juan Baustista Alberdi" in his adopted city and soon took up social causes, among them a grassroots movement to create a housing complex for teachers, mostly women, who lacked houses of their own. He went on to graduate as a lawyer from the Universidad Nacional de Asunción in 1968. In 1972 he obtained a scholarship from the **Argentine** government to study at the Universidad Nacional de la Plata, where in 1974 he obtained a Doctorate in Education. He was reportedly the first Paraguayan to receive the degree.

His doctoral thesis in Argentina, "Paraguay: Educación y Dependencia" (Paraguay: Education and Dependency), was brought to the attention of the Paraguayan police that year. Almada was designated an "intellectual terrorist" by the regime of **Alfredo Stroessner** and soon arrested. In 1974–1977 he was held at Emboscada, the maximum-security penitentiary of Paraguay, built in 1816, and used as a **torture** and detention center by the regime. Among the inhuman treatment to which he and his family were subjected was a series of phone calls to his wife, during which Mrs. Almada was made to listen to the screams of her husband as he was tortured. The 33-year-old Celestina Pérez de Almada suffered a heart attack during one of these calls and died. The attention of international organizations for human rights, among them **Amnesty International**, coupled with a 30-day hunger strike begun by Almada, eventually won him

his freedom in 1977. Soon after, Almada, his mother, and his three children left for **exile**, first in Panama and later in France, where he joined UNESCO's environmental education division for educational projects in Africa and Latin America.

In the years following the fall of the Stroessner regime, Almada returned to Paraguay. In 1992 he made use of the *habeas data* provision, now enshrined in several constitutions of Latin America. The provision guarantees citizens, among other rights, the personal right to freedom of information. Almada discovered that some of the documents related to his detention were held at the police station of Lambaré, a suburb of Asunción. According to reports, most notably that of journalist Stella Calloni, he and Judge José Fernández went to the station, where they discovered documents related not just to the Almada case but also to the reign of terror known as **Operation Condor**. The search, expanded a few days later to include the headquarters of the Paraguayan Policía Técnica and eventually to other police stations, resulted in the discovery of over four tons of documentation. The documents were proof of what had long been known in human-rights circles: the existence of a clandestine pact through which repressive governments in Latin America conducted a campaign of abduction, torture, and murder against anyone perceived as an enemy of the state.

Collectively, the documents are known as the Archives of Terror, and they describe the wide-reaching effects of the secret pact. The files contain documentation granting Paraguayan citizenship to Josef Mengele, the notorious Nazi war criminal, as well as photographs and identity papers for some 1,888 people who remain among the *disappeared* (missing). It details specific cases of interstate cooperation in torture, such as the case of Gustavo Edison Inzaurrealde, a **Uruguayan**, who had escaped to Paraguay after being accused of belonging to an armed insurgent group. In Paraguay, he was handed over, along with four others, to officers of the Argentine **military**. The detailed report also included the information that Argentine intelligence officers and a Uruguayan counterpart had been allowed to torture the detainees while still in Asunción. Other files in the archive point to Operation Condor's expansion across the Americas. There is, for example, a petition by **Manuel Contreras Sepúlveda**, then chief of the **Chilean** secret police, asking for funds from the regime

of **Augusto Pinochet Ugarte** to “neutralize the enemies of the junta abroad, particularly in Mexico, Argentina, Costa Rica, the United States, France and Italy.” Among the victims of Operation Condor were the Chilean **Orlando Letelier del Solar** and his associate Ronni Karpen Moffitt, in Washington, D.C., and the Uruguayan legislators Zelmar Michelini and Héctor Gutiérrez, in Buenos Aires. Among the more troubling aspects of the discovery is evidence of cooperation between U.S. intelligence and the FBI and some of these regimes.

Faced with the dilatory actions of his government in bringing human-rights violators to justice, Almada created a Paraguayan branch of the American Associations of Jurists and organized a series of Tribunals against those implicated in torture and assassination, among them General Ramón Duarte Vera, Stroessner’s chief of police, widely regarded as the regime’s chief torturer. The Tribunals, which had no legal force, held hearings in which witnesses testified. The Tribunal convicted the former general, then serving as ambassador to **Bolivia**. The evidence was so compelling, the Paraguayan government recalled Duarte Vera home, tried him, and sentenced him to 16 years in prison. Almada participated in a similar Tribunal in Argentina against disgraced former captain **Alfredo Astiz**.

Since the discovery of the archives, Almada has labored intensively to safeguard them, with various results. Presently, his activities link him to programs in Paraguay for sustainable development, conservancy, and education. He also collaborates with several organizations in Paraguay dedicated to advancing the cause of human rights and the identification of those responsible for crimes under the Stroessner regime. He cooperated with Judge **Baltasar Garzón** in the investigation on the case against Pinochet Ugarte in Chile. He was also an active promoter of the creation of an agreement between the Center for the Rehabilitation of the Victims of Torture in Paraguay and the International Center for Victims of Torture (IRCT) in Copenhagen, Denmark, and, through his legal affiliations, has participated in recovery efforts of private property stolen by the Stroessner regime. He also presides, with his second wife and fellow attorney, María Stella Cáceres, over the Fundación Celestina Pérez de Almada, named after his first wife. The foundation concentrates on antipoverty and environmental programs. A frequent participant in world conferences on human rights, Almada is the author of *Paraguay: La cárcel olvidada*,

el país exiliado, his testimonial account of his experiences in detention under the Stroessner regime.

Widely recognized for his efforts in Paraguay, Almada has been honored by the French government for his discovery of the Archives of Terror. In 1997 he was awarded the Medalla de Gratiud by the Argentine organization **Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo** (Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo) and has received an award from the **Brazilian** group “Nunca Mais.” In 2002 he received the Right Livelihood Foundation Award, annually presented in the Swedish Parliament and sometimes called the Alternative Nobel Peace Prize. In awarding the prize, the Right Livelihood Foundation cited Martín Almada for “his outstanding courage in bringing torturers to justice, and promoting democracy, human rights and sustainable development.”

ALMEYDA MEDINA, CLODOMIRO (c. 1923–1997). A leader of the **Partido Socialista de Chile** (PS, Socialist Party), a Marxist scholar, and a high official in the **Unidad Popular** (UP, Popular Unity) government of **Salvador Allende Gossens**—all of which made him a target of the junta that ousted Allende Gossens on 11 September 1973. Like Allende Gossens, Almeyda Medina joined the PS as a student and spent his life as a committed Marxist. He held a variety of positions within the UP, including foreign minister, defense minister, and vice president. Although a voice of moderation in government, he would adopt a more hard-line stance after the coup.

On 11 September the army captured Almeyda Medina along with the other UP officers as they exited what was left of the heavily bombed La Moneda (the presidential palace). He was immediately sent to Dawson Island prison camp and then transferred to Santiago before his ejection from the country in 1975. During his **exile** (1975–1987), most of it spent in East Germany, he became an advocate for exiles forcibly expelled from the country and unable to return because of the junta’s ban on political dissidents. In 1987, defying the ban, he returned to Chile, where he was seized by the security forces of **Augusto Pinochet Ugarte**. The **military** government referred to him as an “apologist for violence” and sentenced him to internal exile, or *relegación*. An international campaign for his freedom, however, led the Supreme Court to commute his sentence after he had served 300 days. As a member of the PS central committee,

Almeyda Medina became active in the Movimiento Democrático Popular (MDP, Popular Democratic Movement), a leftist coalition formed in 1983 by the **Partido Comunista** (PC, Communist Party of Chile). In 1990 he reentered government service as ambassador to the Soviet Union under President **Patricio Aylwin Azócar**. He resigned his post under controversy, having sheltered his friend Erich Honecker, the former leader of Communist East Germany, in Moscow in 1991. Germany, now reunited, wanted Honecker extradited to face charges in connection with the East German government's policy of shooting people trying to escape communist rule. (Honecker was granted asylum in Chile, where he died in 1992.) Before his death in 1997, Almeyda Medina returned to writing and teaching at the Universidad de Chile in addition to his work on behalf of the PS. He was buried with a state funeral and military honors.

AMADO, JORGE (1912–2001). **Brazilian** writer, political activist, and cultural icon. The son of a cacao farmer, Amado was born in a farm then located within the jurisdiction of the town of Illhéus, now in the Itabuna district, in the state of Bahia in the rural north of Brazil. Though the precise jurisdiction of the town of his birth may seem a small matter, it is significant detail for his countrymen and -women. At the time of his death, an obituary in the *New York Times* stated “in a nation where soccer is king, Mr. Amado, who published his first novel at 19, was called the Pelé of the written word.” Widely admired in his native country, he remains one of the most endearing literary figures of Latin America's 20th century.

Lifelong militancy in the **Partido Comunista Brasileiro** (PCB, Brazilian Communist Party) resulted in periods of imprisonment and **exile** early in his life. The first period occurred in 1936, when he was accused of participating in an abortive uprising against the government of Getúlio Vargas. A few years earlier, Amado—then a journalist—had published his first novel, *O país do carnaval* (Land of Carnival), to great critical and public acclaim. This work was followed, in 1933, by the novel *Cacau* (Cocoa), which garnered him even more public acclaim—two editions were quickly exhausted in as many months—and a growing reputation as a socialist realist novelist. The novel's exploration of the working lives of the cocoa workers in his native north merited him the attention of critics, who

soon included his name among other socially conscious writers of Latin America such as the Venezuelan Rómulo Gallegos, the Peruvian Ciro Alegría, and the Ecuadorian Jorge Icaza, to name a few. His reputation was further enhanced by the publication of *Suor* (Sweat) shortly before his political imprisonment. Both novels were soon translated into Russian and published in Moscow. While he was in prison, his books—at this point Amado had written six novels—were declared subversive and publicly burned by the **military**. According to one source, the military kept scrupulous records: 1,694 volumes were burned in the city of Bahia alone. The city—formally known as São Salvador da Baía de Todos os Santos—is so widely associated with the author that the **Argentine** daily *Clarín*, in its obituary, wryly designated Amado its “founder.”

Freed from prison in 1938, he combined his work as a writer with greater militancy in the PCB, particularly in bringing attention to the political detentions and **torture** of dissidents. He was briefly exiled in **Uruguay** and Argentina. On his return in 1945, Amado—who had received a law degree from the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro in 1935—was elected to the Brazilian National Assembly for the state of São Paulo. Soon he was successful in sponsoring legislation calling for freedom of religion in Brazil. While in exile, he had written in defense of the imprisoned leader of the PCB, Luís Carlos Prestes. The book, published in Spanish in Argentina, circulated clandestinely in Brazil; it would eventually be published in Brazil as *O cavaleiro da esperança* (Knight of Hope). Brazil’s entry into World War II on the side of the Allies and the decision by PCB leaders to support the Vargas regime—following Moscow’s directives and Prestes’s release from prison—would lead to the military coup of October 1945; two years later, the PCB was outlawed. Deprived of his seat in the Assembly and with his books in the “subversive material” list once again, Amado went into exile in Paris. While in Europe, Amado and his family embarked on several trips throughout the Soviet Union and the countries of the Communist bloc. He was expelled from France in 1950 and lived for a time in then Czechoslovakia. In 1952 he was awarded the Lenin Peace Prize. He would not return to Brazil until 1955.

His return to his native country coincided with the period of optimism engendered by the presidential elections of that year. A new

stage then began for Amado as a writer; one that would bring him international renown. The gritty world of his first novels gave way to novels set among the *gente do povo* of Bahia—magnificent cooks, petty functionaries, and shopkeepers—and greatly leavened with humor. In this stage of his life, the writer distanced himself from the PCB and denounced Joseph Stalin’s crimes, without breaking, he claimed, with the idea of a socialist utopia. On more than one occasion, he was quoted as saying he had abandoned political duties to devote more time to his writing. (“Mas na realidade deixei de militar politicamente porque esse engajamento estava-me impedindo de ser escritor.” / “In reality, I abandoned political militancy because that commitment prevented me from being a writer.”) Soon after, on August 1958, he published what is perhaps his best-known novel, *Gabriela, cravo e canela* (translated in 1962 as *Gabriela, Clove and Cinnamon*). The novel sold out its first printing of 20,000 volumes in two weeks; by December of that year, it had sold 50,000. The tale of the beautiful Gabriela, her prowess as a cook, and the love of Nacib, the store keeper, would be brought to the cinema twice; both times the title character would be interpreted by Sonia Braga, the Brazilian actress most associated with Amado’s work, under the direction of Bruno Barreto. Other adaptations, for television and stage, have also been produced.

Although feminist scholars have pointed out that Amado’s novels objectify women, the feminine characters of the novels following the publication of *Gabriela, cravo e canela* remain among the best known, and best loved, among the author’s creations. Popular among other works of this period are *Dona Flor e seus dois maridos* (1966, translated in 1969 as *Dona Flor and Her Two Husbands*); *Teresa Batista cansada de guerra* (1972, translated in 1975 as *Tereza Batista: Home from the Wars*); *Tieta do Agreste: Pastora de cabras ou a volta da filha pródiga* (1977, *Tieta, the Goat Girl: Or, the Return of the Prodigal Daughter Melodramatic Serial Novel in Five Sensational Episodes, With a Touching Epilogue*); and *Farda, fardão, camisola de dormir: fábula para acender uma esperança* (1979, translated in 1986 as *Pen, Sword, Camisole: A Fable to Kindle a Hope*).

This last work, published during the period of relative liberalization under the presidency of General **João Baptista de Oliveira Figueiredo**, satirizes the literary aspirations of a mediocre poet, one

of the *coronéis* so vigorously mocked in Amado's universe, who seeks to join the august members of the Brazilian Academy of Letters during the early Vargas regime. The work, Rabelaisian in tone, results in the trouncing of the colonel's unfounded literary hopes while emphasizing, in the words of the critic Nancy T. Baden, "the ever-difficult role of the writer vis-à-vis military regimes." Two years earlier, Amado had joined a group of Brazilian writers and artists in signing a letter to then-minister of justice, Armando Falcão, protesting the banning of works by writers José Louzeiro, Ignácio de Loyola Brandão, and Rubem Fonseca. In fact, he is considered one of the few Brazilian writers who openly opposed the military regime with little fear of reprisal given his literary stature abroad, particularly during the 1969–1971 period, often termed *o sufoco* (the suffocation).

His literary output decreased somewhat with age, although never his popularity, particularly among young people, who often traveled to Bahia in later years toting one of his travel guides, such as *Bahia* (1970) and *Terra Mágica da Bahia* (1984). Amado's literary output includes books of poetry, short stories, juvenile literature, memoirs, and a play, as well as a translation from the Spanish of *Doña Bárbara*, by the Venezuelan Rómulo Gallegos. At the time of his death, it was estimated that his 32 books had sold more than 50 million copies worldwide in over 40 languages.

Politically committed to the end of his days—reportedly one of his unfinished novels told of the struggle for power between the church and the *coronéis* in the Brazilian *sertão* (countryside)—Jorge Amado was one of the most esteemed writers of Brazil in the 20th century. He was elected to the Academia Brasileira de Letras (Brazilian Academy of Letters) early in his career and received numerous literary and civil awards as well as popular recognition in his native country. Among these—and not surprisingly, given the popularity of the popular-art performances in this country—Amado's works served as inspiration for several samba schools during various Brazilian carnivals. The last of these, during the 1997 Carnival in Bahia, featured singer and composer Caetano Veloso at the head of the group Amigos do Amado Jorge (Friends of Beloved Jorge, a pun on his surname). A perennial nominee to the Nobel Committee throughout his long career, Amado was also distinguished in Latin America and Europe; among the recognitions was the medal of the commander of the Legion d'Honneur

of France and the Premio Camões, jointly bestowed by Brazil and Portugal, the latter a country that for many years banned his works. He also received the title *Honoris causa* from universities in Brazil, Portugal, Italy, Israel, and France. In the **United States**, Pennsylvania State University—where he was a visiting fellow at the Institute for the Arts and Humanistic Studies in 1971—holds a collection of his papers. Later, however, the author would be included in the “exclusion list” of the U.S. government, as would the Nobel laureate Gabriel García Márquez of Colombia, Carlos Fuentes of Mexico, and **Ernesto Sábato** of Argentina. Throughout his life, Amado also spoke proudly of his being designated an Obá de Xangô, an honorary priesthood bestowed on very few devotees of candomblé, the Afro-Brazilian religion of Bahia, to which the author had been an adept since his youth.

In ill health in his later years, Jorge Amado died in 2001. At the author’s request, his body was cremated and his ashes scattered, without ceremony, in the garden of his home at 33 Rua Alagoinhas, in the Rio Vermelho neighborhood of Bahia. The Fundação Casa de Jorge Amado is dedicated to the preservation and publication of the author’s work.

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL. An international **human-rights** nongovernmental organization. Created in 1961 by Peter Benenson, an English lawyer, Amnesty International works to free “prisoners of conscience”—those detained not only for political reasons but also for race, ethnicity, religion, or language. It is especially concerned with victims of **torture**. It tries to be as apolitical as possible, careful not to take up the case of anyone—a member of an armed **guerrilla** movement, for example—who advocates violence. Its mode of operation is simple. Amnesty International members are encouraged to write courteous letters to authority figures in the prisoners’ countries—a bishop, for example, or government official. The chain of letters, combined with reports sent to the media, shines a spotlight on the offending government, which, embarrassed, is often pressured into freeing the prisoner. Amnesty International also funnels reports to intergovernmental organizations like the **United Nations**. The organization made site visits to **Argentina** (6–15 November 1976) and to **Chile** (1973). It published reports on both countries as well as on **Bolivia**, **Brazil**, **Paraguay**, and **Uruguay**.

AMNESTY LAW OF 1978. Also known as Decree Law 2191. Pro-mulgated on 19 April 1978 by the **Chilean** junta, the law absolved the **military** and the police of **human-rights** abuses committed from 11 September 1973, the day of the coup, to 10 March 1978. The law was partly overturned on 17 November 2004, when the Supreme Court ruled that the amnesty did not cover cases of disappearance. The court argued that when bodies were never recovered, there was no proof of death, and therefore the crimes remained in progress. The ruling opened the door for hundreds of prosecutions.

ANAYA, JORGE I. (1926–2008). Admiral during the “**dirty war**” in **Argentina**. He was nicknamed “El Negro” because of his dark skin. In 1977 he was named director of naval personnel and had an office at the **Escuela Mecánica de la Armada (ESMA, Navy Mechanics School)**, Argentina’s most notorious **torture** center. He was appointed commander of the navy in September 1981 and served in the third junta (December 1981 to June 1982). He was the principal planner of the ill-fated **Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas** invasion. In the 1985 trial of the nine former junta commanders, Anaya was acquitted of **human-rights** crimes—the third junta had taken office after the worst of the repression was over. In May 1986, however, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, the nation’s highest **military** tribunal, convicted him of negligence for his role in the Falklands War. He was sentenced to 14 years in prison and stripped of his rank, though a civilian court reduced the sentence to 12 years. He was released from prison in October 1989 following a blanket pardon decreed by President **Carlos Saúl Menem**. In November 2006 he faced 266 charges of kidnapping and **torture** relating to his two years at ESMA and was summoned to testify before a federal judge. But he suffered a heart attack before he could testify, and remained in poor health. He died under house arrest.

ANGELELLI, ENRIQUE ÁNGEL (1923–1976). Roman **Catholic** bishop of La Rioja, **Argentina**. Born in the province of Córdoba, the son of Italian immigrants, Angelelli was ordained in 1949 and completed canon-law studies in Rome after his ordination. In his first appointment, as vicar in his native province, his duties included leading the Juventud Obrera Católica (Catholic Workers’ Youth) and teaching canon law and theology.

In 1960 he was elevated to the rank of Auxiliary Bishop of Córdoba. Bishop Angelelli participated in the Second Vatican Council, and in 1968 Pope Paul VI elevated him to the rank of bishop in the archdiocese of La Rioja. According to sources, including articles by **Horacio Verbitsky** in *El País*, Bishop Angelelli soon came into conflict with local landowners and traditional Catholic sectors in La Rioja by supporting the creation of **trade unions**—both for miners and for agricultural and domestic workers. In addition, he urged the creation of workers' cooperatives for producing bread, bricks, clocks, and textiles and for expropriating idle agricultural lands. From the pulpit, he denounced social ills: drugs, gambling, prostitution, and usury.

During the 1973 election campaign, **Carlos Saúl Menem**, a candidate for governor of La Rioja province, reiterated his support for creating agricultural cooperatives to take over idle lands. In July Bishop Angelelli visited the city of Anillaco—Menem's birthplace—and was promptly expelled by a violent demonstration of landowners, including Menem's brother, Amado. During a 1974 visit to Rome, the bishop was warned to remain in **exile** because his name had appeared among those marked for execution by the **Alianza Anticomunista Argentina** (AAA, Argentine Anticommunist Alliance).

Yet Bishop Angelelli resumed his duties in the archdiocese and, prior to the 1976 **military** coup, came into conflict with the local military by lodging a protest against the detention of Monsignor Esteban Inestal, the vicar general of La Rioja province, and two young members of the diocesan Movimiento Rural, one of the driving forces behind the cooperatives' efforts to expropriate idle lands. After the 1976 coup, the bishop presented a report to the first plenary session of the Argentine Episcopal Conference in which he detailed 37 instances of the military's persecution and harassment of the Catholic Church in La Rioja province, including the detention of priests, nuns, and seminarians; the inspection and confiscation of the luggage and documents of people attending religious retreats; and the firing, detention, and interrogation of lay workers.

On 13 June 1976 local landowners organized a religious celebration named Día de la Defensa de la Fe (Day of the Defense of the Faith), and Colonel Osvaldo Pérez Battaglia, the chief of the 141 Engineers Battalion of La Rioja, ordered a military parade in support

of the celebration. A local priest, Carlos de Dios Murias, denounced the celebration, and on 18 June 1976 Father Murias and another priest, Gabriel Longueville, were kidnapped from their residence. Their bodies were found two days later; autopsy reports included details of **torture** and mutilation. The bodies had been covered with army blankets, and beside them was a list of names of other priests, presumably a warning. Colonel Pérez Battaglia suppressed the publication of the assassinations, though the army issued a communiqué detailing further operations to eradicate “subversive elements” from the province.

Soon after, Bishop Angelelli began gathering information on the assassinations. On 4 August 1976 he visited El Chamental to attend a religious ceremony for the murdered priests. He then drove to La Rioja accompanied by another priest, Arturo Pinto. According to Father Pinto, an unknown vehicle forced their pickup off the road at a point called Punta de los Llanos. The bishop was found dead close to the pickup. Witnesses reported that the body lay in a posture at odds with the trajectory of a body thrown from a moving vehicle, and the coroner’s report attributed the death to a fractured skull caused by a blunt object. Nevertheless, according to Verbitsky, Colonel Pérez Battaglia ordered a local newspaper to report that the bishop died in “a car accident caused by the explosion of the rear left tire.”

Three days after Bishop Angelelli’s burial, a group of Argentine clergy directed a request to Raúl Francisco Cardinal Primatesta, the archbishop of Córdoba and the president of the Argentine Episcopal Conference, urging him to speak in protection of their ranks. Cardinal Primatesta counseled the “prudence of snakes,” reminding the religious that “hay tempus loquendi y tempus tacendi” (there is a time to speak and a time to remain silent). The Vatican, through the *L’Osservatore Romano*, described Bishop Angelelli’s death as a strange accident. During the years of the dictatorship, however, several bishops individually denounced the slaying. Among them were Jaime de Nevaes, the bishop of Neuquén and a founding member of the **Asamblea Permanente por los Derechos Humanos** (APDH, Permanent Assembly for Human Rights); Jorge Novak, the bishop of Quilmes and the founder of the **Movimiento Ecueménico por los Derechos Humanos** (MEDH, Ecumenical Movement for Human Rights); and Miguel Hessayne, the bishop of Río Negro. The slaying was also denounced by Adolfo Pérez

Esquivel, the 1980 Nobel Peace Prize Laureate, and Emilio Mignone, one of the founders of the **Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales** (CELS, Center for Legal and Social Studies).

On 19 June 1986, after the return of civilian rule, Judge Aldo Morales of La Rioja declared the incident “a coldly premeditated murder.” In *El País*, Verbitsky has linked Colonel Pérez Battaglia to another mysterious car accident, which claimed the life of Carlos Horacio Ponce de León, the Bishop of San Nicolás de los Arroyos. On 2 August 2006 President Néstor Kirchner declared 4 August a national day of mourning. In his remarks, he remembered religious workers victimized by state terrorism. To date, neither the Argentine Catholic Church nor the Vatican has officially condemned the assassination of Bishop Angelelli.

ANTI-SEMITISM. A disproportionate number of the victims of the “**dirty war**” in **Argentina** were Jewish. In the mid-1970s the country’s Jewish population was estimated at 400,000—the largest in Latin America. Although this number was only about 2 percent of the total population of 23 million, Jews made up between 12 percent and 19 percent of the missing (*desaparecidos*). Efforts have been made to explain the variance by noting that Jews were drawn to the professions and thus more likely to be recruited into opposition groups through the universities. Nevertheless, evidence suggests that anti-Semitism was a dominant factor. Bookstores and kiosks were well stocked with Nazi and neo-Nazi literature, Jewish neighborhoods were machine-gunned, and bombs were placed in Jewish-owned establishments. “Dirty war” survivors attest to the especially cruel and degrading punishments inflicted on Jewish prisoners.

Jews began immigrating to Argentina in large numbers during the 19th century. Although ostracized by the **military** and the wealthy landowners, they were not widely persecuted until the early 1940s, when the government openly sympathized with the Axis powers. After World War II, President **Juan Perón** opened the doors to Nazis and Jews alike. Anti-Semitism has remained an issue ever since, becoming overt in times of political crisis. Repression against Jews increased dramatically after the coup of 1976. Unlike Nazi Germany, the junta never made anti-Semitism official policy. Yet it did nothing to discourage the attitude, either.

ARAGUAIA GUERRILLA FORCES. *See* PARTIDO COMUNISTA DO BRASIL.

ARCE GÓMEZ, LUIS. The “minister of cocaine.” Former colonel and minister of the interior during the “delinquent dictatorship” (July 1980–August 1981) of **Luis García Meza** in **Bolivia**. The regime was internationally isolated because of its cocaine trafficking and its paramilitary **death squads** led by Latin American and European neo-Nazis. Arce Gómez, as interior minister, was involved with both. The death squads reported to him—he once warned that those violating the law had better carry their last wills with them. García Meza said of Arce Gómez, “Con Lucho, todo era muerte,” meaning that he was overfond of killing people. Arce Gómez also oversaw the production and distribution of cocaine. In 1982, shortly before the return to democracy, he went into hiding. He was discovered in Bolivia in December 1989 and extradited to the **United States**, where a federal court in Miami, Florida, convicted him in January 1991 for conspiring to smuggle drugs into the country. He was sentenced to 30 years in prison, though he was eligible for parole after 10 years. In 1993 the Bolivian Supreme Court convicted him in absentia for murders committed during the dictatorship, sentencing him to 30 years in prison without parole.

ARGENTINA (1976–1983). On 24 March 1976 the **military** seized control of a deeply divided nation and instituted its **Proceso de Reorganización Nacional**, commonly known as the “Proceso.” As part of its plan to restore order and eradicate leftist subversion, the junta launched its “**dirty war**,” institutionalizing a practice that continued for the next four years. People were kidnapped by members of military “task forces” and illegally held in any of about 340 Centros Clandestinos de Detención (Secret Detention Centers) across the country. There they were kept in squalor and regularly subjected to humiliation, rape, and **torture**. Victims were commonly forced to witness the torture of their children or spouses, and children born in captivity were taken from their mothers and given to military families. Most of the victims were eventually murdered, vanishing without a trace. Many were buried in common graves. Some victims were used as *relleno* (“stuffing”)—made to look as if they were

guerrillas killed in shoot-outs. Others were drugged, weighted, and thrown alive into the ocean out of navy aircraft. Inquiries made at police stations or military headquarters by worried relatives were met with official silence.

After the return to democracy in 1983, President **Raúl Alfonsín** created the **Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas** (CONADEP, National Commission on the Disappeared) to investigate the fate of the missing. In 1984 CONADEP issued its report, *Nunca más* (*Never Again*), finding evidence for the torture and murder of at least 8,960 persons (though **human-rights** groups place the actual figure at 30,000). Although the fight against leftist insurgents was one of the military regime's rationales for taking power and waging its "dirty war," CONADEP reported that very few of the missing had had any ties to guerrilla organizations. Most of the victims were unarmed but were perceived to be threats to the regime. They included intellectuals; union and student activists; teachers and performers; priests and nuns; journalists writing about the missing; lawyers working on cases of habeas corpus; and family members, friends, and acquaintances.

BACKGROUND TO THE "DIRTY WAR": Unlike its neighbors **Chile** and **Uruguay**, both stable democracies until succumbing to dictatorship, Argentina has had a long history of political violence and civil unrest. When General José Uriburu ousted President Hipólito Yrigoyen in 1930, the country's Supreme Court ruled that the military can legally overthrow an elected government. The military would remove five more elected governments during the century—the last in 1976—and not until 1989 would one civilian president succeed another. On 4 June 1943 the military overthrew President Ramón S. Castillo, replacing him with General Edelmiro Farrell. The dominant force in the administration, however, was Colonel (later General) **Juan Perón**, who had helped engineer the coup. The energetic and eloquent Perón quickly accumulated the titles of secretary of labor and social welfare, minister of war, and vice president. He allied himself politically with urban workers, the *descamisados* ("shirtless ones"), demanding higher wages and the enforcement of labor laws. But his social reforms and growing popularity angered many, and on 9 October 1945, the military, encouraged by the ruling classes, arrested him and removed him from government. His *descamisados* came to his rescue. On 17 October,

thousands of workers demonstrated in the **Plaza de Mayo** next to the presidential palace and forced his release, an event that carried him into the presidency the following year.

Perón's policies were characterized by nationalism and social reform. His first administration (1946–1952) was an economic success, regarded by some as Argentina's golden age. Prosperity was based on capital reserves accumulated during World War II. Investment in national industry increased real wages and expanded the domestic market. Workers benefited from minimum-wage laws, 40-hour workweeks, paid holidays and vacations, and pensions. **Eva ("Evita") Perón**, the president's glamorous wife and political partner, increased his popularity with the working class as founder and director of the Social Aid Foundation. But his rule was also characterized by dictatorship, as the president placed his stamp on every aspect of Argentine life, taking control of universities, newspapers, and organized labor. Opponents of his regime were often jailed and tortured. His second administration (1952–1955) faced a series of problems. Worldwide recession and the depletion of wartime reserves forced him to scale back his economic reforms, and the death of Evita in 1952 decreased his popularity. He also ran afoul of the **Catholic Church** by acts such as replacing religious instruction in the schools with **Peronist** instruction and legalizing divorce and prostitution. On 16 September 1955 General Eduardo Lonardi, a pro-Catholic nationalist, initiated a coup that succeeded three days later when Admiral Isaac Rojas threatened to bombard Buenos Aires. Perón went into **exile**, eventually settling in Spain, where he plotted his return.

The administration of President Lonardi was short-lived. Although he had helped overthrow Perón, he failed to crack down on the Peronist movement itself and was, in turn, overthrown. The palace coup on 13 November 1955, the so-called Liberating Revolution, brought to power General Pedro Aramburu, who set out to eliminate any trace of Peronism. He banned the Peronist party and placed the **Confederación General del Trabajo** (CGT, General Labor Federation)—its major trade organization—under military control. The mere mention of Perón's name was prohibited, and the body of Evita, whom many regarded as a saint, was stolen by the military and secretly reburied in Italy.

Far from removing Perón from popular memory, the harshness of Aramburu's regime awakened Perón's followers. On 9 June 1956 two Peronist generals, Juan José Valle and Raúl Tanco, led an unsuccessful rebellion against the government. The repression that followed—in which Valle and his supporters were shot by firing squad—earned Aramburu the enmity of Peronists and later cost him his life. Peronists also had a hand in deciding the 1958 presidential election, even though they were not allowed to field candidates. The winner, Arturo Frondizi, had secured Perón's endorsement by promising to legalize Peronism. The promise was Frondizi's undoing. Peronist candidates won so many votes in the March 1962 national elections—even capturing the governorship of Buenos Aires—that the outraged military annulled the results and forced him from office.

Following the interim government of José María Guido, Dr. Arturo Illia became president in 1963—again in an election in which Peronists were not allowed to participate. The new administration was widely viewed as illegitimate (Illia had won only 23 percent of the vote) and was vigorously opposed by Peronists, especially the CGT. Like Frondizi, he tried to pacify the opposition by allowing Peronist candidates to run in legislative elections. As in 1962, Peronist victories in 1965 paved the way for a military takeover. Illia further angered the military by refusing to send troops to the Dominican Republic in May to assist the **United States** in fighting **communism**.

The military toppled Illia on 28 June 1966, installing General Juan Carlos Onganía, army commander in chief, as president. Unlike previous military regimes, his administration made no promise to return civilians to power any time soon. The recipient of U.S. counterinsurgency training, Onganía no longer saw the defense of physical borders as the military's primary focus. Instead, fighting internal, ideological enemies—rooting out subversion—became its main concern. Battle lines were formed. The military—long divided into nationalists and liberals, colorados (reds) and azules (blues)—began to close ranks. In contrast, organized labor split into factions. The CGT, controlled by orthodox Peronists in league with the government, gave birth to a left-wing splinter group, CGT de los Argentinos (CGTA, CGT of the Argentines), which protested the regime's probusiness policies. The Catholic Church was divided, too: the traditional hierarchy supported

the military; more progressive Catholics turned to **liberation theology** and aligned themselves with the poor. The government took control of the universities, and as early as 29 July 1966 (the Night of the Long Sticks), police were dispatched to break up assemblies at the University of Buenos Aires. Newspapers, movies, and other media were added to the regime's list of enemies. Opposition to Onganía came to a head on 29 May 1969 when the CGTA organized a labor demonstration in the city of Córdoba. Students, incensed over cuts in higher education, joined the workers in protest, and the result was the *cordobazo*—two days of mayhem that quickly spread to other cities. The army joined the police in quelling the unrest, and two weeks of fighting left more than 100 persons dead or injured.

The *cordobazo* was followed by an increase in armed-guerrilla activity. Guerrilla groups had begun to form in rural Argentina in the late 1950s and early 1960s, inspired by the Cuban Revolution. Early formations, however, like the **Uturuncos** and the **Ejército Guerrillero del Pueblo** (EGP, People's Guerrilla Army), were unsuccessful. By the early 1970s, the death of Che Guevara in **Bolivia** (1967), the *cordobazo* uprising (1969), and the recognition that Argentina was primarily an urban society gave rise to effective guerrilla organizations based in cities. The two principal urban groups—the **Montoneros** and the **Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo** (ERP, People's Revolutionary Army)—quickly established themselves as thorns in the side of the government, carrying out kidnappings, bank robberies, bombings, and attacks on military installations.

Civil unrest, or even its threat, played an important role in deciding who remained in power and who was deposed—the incumbent being judged on the ability to maintain order. The *cordobazo* eventually brought down Onganía. On 8 June 1970 he was replaced by General Roberto Levingston, who, following a second uprising in Córdoba in March 1971, was himself replaced by General Alejandro Lanusse. The task of the new administration was to return Argentina to civilian rule, even if that meant bringing back Perón. The military scheduled a presidential election for March 1973 but disqualified the exiled Perón from being a candidate, citing a residency law. During a brief visit to Argentina in November 1972, however, Perón endorsed the left-leaning **Héctor José Cámpora** to run in his place. Cámpora's victory cleared the way for the return of Perón.

Perón was indeed popular, but his millions of devoted followers were politically divided. The Peronist Movement accommodated both a right wing and a left wing. The right saw Perón as the country's only hope in combating communism; the left saw him as a revolutionary. During his years in exile he managed to maintain both sides of his image. On the one hand, he ignored the entreaties of his representative John William Cooke to forsake the Spain of Francisco Franco for the Cuba of Fidel Castro. On the other hand, he encouraged his "special formations"—the Montoneros and other armed Peronist guerrillas—in their attacks on Peronist traitors and government targets. The movement held together until Perón's return, when each side feared that the other would try to take control. On 20 June 1973, when millions gathered at Ezeiza International Airport to welcome Perón back from exile, rightists opened fire on columns of left-wing marchers. The Ezeiza Massacre portended Perón's drift to the right. In July a right-wing palace coup forced Cámpora to resign, clearing the way for a special presidential election in September, which Perón won with 62 percent of the vote.

Millions had coalesced around the Perón ticket, hoping his victory would heal political division and reverse economic decline. But the rift between the factions only widened, and guerrilla activity continued. Although many guerrillas had laid down their weapons forever after Perón returned, or at least called a cautious truce, others—especially the non-Peronist and traditionally leftist ERP—persisted in armed struggle. The ERP was outlawed in September 1973 after carrying out an attack on an army installation in Buenos Aires. In October the Montoneros were blamed for the killing of CGT head José Rucci, for which they claimed responsibility the following year. Whether the Montoneros were, in fact, Rucci's killer is a subject of dispute (some attribute the act to right-wing Peronists); but belief in their guilt made Perón determined to eliminate the special formations. In January he reformed the penal code so that arms possession could carry a stiffer penalty than murder. Out of the Ezeiza Massacre rose a right-wing **death squad** called the **Alianza Anticomunista Argentina** (AAA, Argentine Anticommunist Alliance), formed by José López Rega (*El brujo*, "the sorcerer") and operated—with implicit state sanction—out of his Ministry of Social Welfare. Although some of its victims were armed insurgents, most were "soft targets"—

leftist politicians and other progressives. Perón made his official break with the leftist Peronists in a May Day speech in 1974.

Despite the seeming finality of that pronouncement, many on the Peronist left remained loyal to the general. Some attributed his position to “error” and hoped he would reverse course; others attributed his public statements to political maneuvering. All hope for negotiation, however, was lost when Perón died on 1 July 1974. **Isabel (“Isabelita”) Perón**, his vice president and third wife, assumed the presidency, inheriting a government facing serious economic decline and increasing political violence. Unlike his second wife, Evita, who was known for her advocacy of the working class, Isabel was associated with the Peronist right. Along with López Rega—her personal secretary, social-welfare minister, and longtime spiritual advisor—she unleashed a wave of repression against the media, universities, and **trade unions**. Guerrilla organizations (primarily the Montoneros and ERP) quickened the tempo of violence in turn, carrying out more operations, some of them spectacular assaults on military targets. In November 1974 Isabel Perón, who made no secret of her enmity toward guerrillas, declared a state of siege, suspending constitutional guarantees. The following year, she placed the armed forces in charge of counterinsurgency, giving them a free hand. They took the opportunity to test “dirty war” tactics that they would put into full production a year later. Meanwhile, the economy continued its downward trend. Inflation, running at a rate of 600 percent in 1975, was expected to reach 1,000 percent by the end of 1976. The peso plummeted, dropping from 36 to the dollar in 1975 to 320 in early 1976. Her administration was also noted for being corrupt. It was in this context of economic and political crisis that the military intervened.

THE “DIRTY WAR” AND ARGENTINA UNDER THE JUNTAS: The coup of 24 March 1976 placed Isabel under house arrest (she was later exiled) and imposed a junta consisting of General **Jorge Rafael Videla**, Admiral **Emilio Massera**, and Brigadier **Orlando Ramón Agosti**—the commanding officers of the army, navy, and air force, respectively. Led by General Videla, the junta dissolved Congress, provincial legislatures, and municipal councils; appointed a cabinet composed of military officers; replaced all members of the Supreme Court and other judges; suspended all political activity and political parties at the national, provincial, and municipal levels; took

control of universities and trade unions; and censored the media. It also maintained the state of siege called by the preceding administration and waged its “dirty war,” or “holy war,” against subversion. The junta argued that armed guerrilla organizations posed a serious threat to national security and that the state was justified in using any means necessary to defend itself. Subversion, however, was broadly defined. In addition to armed insurgents, the term included dissenters of all types. According to General Videla, terrorists were not necessarily those with guns and bombs; they were also those who spread ideas that fell outside the scope of “Western, Christian civilization.” Thought itself became subversive.

Given this wide definition, the war against subversion took both conventional and unconventional forms. Alongside the traditional encounters with armed insurgents was a clandestine campaign of terror waged against the civilian population. Tens of thousands of innocent people were kidnapped off the streets and disappeared. The two levels of warfare continued in tandem. Most of the disappearances occurred in 1976 and 1977, at the height of the military’s antiguerrilla campaign. The number of disappearances decreased sharply in 1978—the ERP and Montoneros having been largely defeated the year before—then tapered off until 1982. The junta, meanwhile, categorically denied any violation of human rights, attributing any disappearances to the work of groups acting independently of the government. The death squads that had operated during the previous Peronist administrations, however, had been absorbed by the new regime and brought under military control.

Despite official denial, the facts became known. A few torture victims survived and related their experiences, and families untouched by violence most likely knew others that lost children or friends. Most people, however, were too intimidated to protest or accepted the explanation that extraordinary methods were needed—that those who had been taken must have been involved in something subversive. Nevertheless, individuals and groups managed to break the silence and attract international attention. In 1977 a group of **women** who later formally organized as the **Madres de Plaza de Mayo** (Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo) began demonstrating every Thursday outside the Casa Rosada (the Pink House, or presidential palace), calling on

the government to account for their missing children or grandchildren. Besides the Madres, several other major Argentine human-rights organizations appeared by the end of dictatorship. The media largely failed to speak out, but there were exceptions. The editors of the *Buenos Aires Herald* (an English-language newspaper) and **Jacobo Timerman**, editor of *La Opinión*, both insisted on publishing the names of the missing (*desaparecidos*), though at great personal risk. (Timerman was abducted and tortured.) Voices outside the country joined in protest of the regime. **Amnesty International** and the **Organization of American States** both reported on the human-rights situation, and President **Jimmy Carter**, at least early in his administration, made human rights integral to U.S. foreign policy.

In March 1981 the junta led by Videla was replaced by a second one, again composed of the commanding officers of the army, navy, and air force: General **Roberto Viola**, Admiral **Armando Lambruschini**, and Brigadier **Omar Graffigna**. Viola's junta was itself replaced in December by another set of commanding officers: General **Leopoldo Fortunato Galtieri**, Admiral **Jorge Anaya**, and Brigadier **Basilio Lami Dozo**. By 1982 a faltering economy and growing labor unrest threatened military rule. The third junta, composed of Galtieri, Anaya, and Lami Dozo, employed a common diversionary tactic: it started a war. On 2 April 1982 it invaded the **Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas**, a group of sparsely populated islands off the coast of southern Argentina. Long claimed by Argentina, the islands were ruled by Britain, which sent troops to recover them. Argentina suffered a swift and humiliating defeat, surrendering on 18 June. General Galtieri, held responsible for the debacle, resigned in disgrace, and representatives from the navy and air force were removed from the junta. On 1 July 1982 General **Reynaldo Benito Bignone** became president and eased the country back to civilian rule. Before leaving office, the military government approved the *Ley de Pacificación Nacional* (Law of National Pacification), which granted amnesty to members of the police and armed forces involved in the "dirty war." In the election of 30 October 1983, **Raúl Alfonsín**, representing the **Unión Cívica Radical** (UCR, Radical Civic Union) party, became president.

AFTERMATH OF THE "DIRTY WAR": Alfonsín set out to fulfill his promises to investigate the disappearances and to bring

those responsible to justice. He repealed the *Ley de Pacificación Nacional* and charged CONADEP, led by **Ernesto Sábató**, with conducting the investigation. The pursuit of justice, however, required caution. Unlike the Nuremberg trials, in which the victors prosecuted the vanquished, criminal prosecutions in Argentina risked the intervention of the ever-present military. Especially troublesome were issues regarding whom to prosecute and where. One of Alfonsín's first acts had been to arrest the nine members of the three juntas and order them to stand trial; but the question remained of how to proceed against those lower in the hierarchy—whether to prosecute the junior officers in charge of abductions and torture and the soldiers ordered to participate in such illegal activities. There was also the question of jurisdiction—whether to prosecute members of the military in military or civilian courts.

Law 23.049, drafted by one of Alfonsín's advisors and passed by the Argentine Congress, assigned original jurisdiction to the military (though with automatic appeal by a civilian court) and absolved junior officers of criminal responsibility unless they participated in atrocities. Human-rights advocates attacked the law, highly skeptical of the military's ability to judge itself. But after months of deliberation, the Supreme Council declared in October 1984 that it could not reach a verdict against the junta members, and as a result, the cases were transferred to a civilian court. On 22 April 1985 the trial of the nine junta commanders began in the Federal Criminal Court of Appeals in Buenos Aires. It lasted five months, during which a panel of six judges heard testimony from several hundred witnesses. Verdicts were handed down on 9 December. The court made it clear that the commanders were being held responsible not for any acts of their own but for the acts of others. And while acknowledging that the army, navy, and air force may have operated independently of one another in conducting the repression, it held each commander responsible for what happened within his own service. Four defendants were acquitted: Leopoldo Galtieri and Jorge Anaya, commanders of the army and navy, respectively, after the repression largely ceased, and Omar Graffigna and Basilio Lami Dozo, commanders of the air force after **Ramón Agosti**. (The air force was thought to be far less active in repression than the other two services.) Life sentences were handed to Jorge Videla and Emilio Massera, commanders of the army and

navy during the height of the “dirty war” (1976–1979). Agosti, who commanded the air force during the first junta, was sentenced to four and a half years in prison. Roberto Viola was sentenced to 17 years, and Armando Lambruschini to eight, having commanded the army and navy, respectively, when state violence had begun to wane. In December 1986 the Supreme Court upheld the convictions, affirming the life sentences given to Videla and Massera and the eight-year sentence for Lambruschini. It made two minor reductions, cutting Viola’s 17-year sentence by six months and reducing Agosti’s four-and-a-half year sentence to three years and nine months.

The search for justice did not stop with the junta commanders. A second level of trials spread responsibility for the repression even further. On 2 December 1986 the former chief of police of Buenos Aires province and four other former police officials were convicted on charges of torture. Two of the defendants, **Ramón Juan Alberto Camps** and Ovidio Pablo Riccheri, held the rank of general. Camps, the torturer of the journalist Jacobo Timerman, was sentenced to 25 years in prison; Riccheri, Camps’s successor as chief of police, was sentenced to 14. It was noteworthy that the trial led to the conviction of those further down the chain of command. **Miguel Etchecolatz**, Camps’s aide, received 23 years; Dr. Jorge Berges, a former police physician accused of assessing the degree to which prisoners could withstand pain, received six; and Norberto Cozzani, a corporal, received four.

By extending criminal responsibility, the second level of trials threatened more than a thousand other junior officers with prosecution. Human-rights organizations advocated a wholesale purging of the military, arguing that it was impossible to decide who had committed which atrocities. After all, many of the victims had been killed, most survivors had been blindfolded, and the dirty warriors had concealed their identities. Yet the government feared that a general prosecution of the military would provoke a military rebellion. Unlike the former junta commanders, who were retired or tainted by the Falklands Islands/Islas Malvinas debacle, junior officers were still in the field. The government sought a way to limit prosecution. In late 1986 it proposed legislation that would allow new cases of human-rights violations to be brought before civilian and military courts—but only within a 60-day period. The *Ley de Punto Final*

(Full-Stop Law), passed on 24 December 1986, set 22 February 1987 as the cutoff date for new cases. Despite the time limitation, about 400 officers were indicted. On 15 April 1987 the approaching judicial proceedings, combined with increasing pressure from human-rights groups, set off a military rebellion known as *Operación Dignidad* (Operation Dignity), led by Lieutenant Colonel Aldo Rico, one of a group of military officers known as the *carapintadas* (literally, “painted faces”). Alfonsín met with the rebels and announced on Easter Sunday that they had agreed to surrender.

One month later the government proposed the *Obediencia Debida* (Due Obedience) Law, which granted an amnesty for all officers below the rank of brigadier general. The new law, passed on 4 June, caused widespread public concern, reducing the number of officers due to stand trial from about 400 to 39. In the September gubernatorial and legislative elections, the **Partido Justicialista** (PJ, Justicialist [Peronist] Party) made significant gains against the UCR. Peronist success was attributed partly to political fallout from *Obediencia Debida* and partly to the government’s austere economic program unveiled in July. In 1988 the government suppressed two more *carapintada* rebellions—one in January led by Rico, and another in December led by Colonel Mohammed Alí Seineldín. The demands were higher pay for soldiers, a larger military budget, and an amnesty for officers due to be prosecuted for their involvement in the “dirty war.” On 23 January 1989 still another rebellion took place, this one led by a leftist organization called the **Movimiento Todos por la Patria** (MTP, Everyone for the Motherland). The group, fearing that the military would escape prosecution altogether, took the infantry garrison at La Tablada. Alfonsín called in the army to suppress the uprising, and in the end 39 lay dead, most of them rebels.

The elections of May 1989 returned the Peronists to power, and on 8 July **Carlos Saúl Menem** assumed the presidency. In September, reports of an amnesty deal between the new government and the military prompted a massive human-rights rally in Buenos Aires. The reports were confirmed the following month. On 8 October the government pardoned 277 officers, including 39 generals due to stand trial for human-rights abuses, the three junta members in power during the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas war (who had received prison terms for negligence), and participants in the recent military

uprisings. Also included in the pardons were 64 Montoneros, who were either exempted from prosecution or set free. Excluded from the pardons were Jorge Videla, Emilio Massera, Orlando Agosti, Roberto Viola, Armando Lambruschini, Ramón Camps, and **Carlos Suárez Masón**, as well as Mario Firmenich, the leader of the Montoneros. The public was told to expect another wave of pardons by the end of 1990, the expectation raising fears that the military would escape punishment altogether. Another *carapintada* uprising in December, the last, was followed later in the month by the announcement of the pardon and release from prison of the remaining officers (including Videla, Viola, and Massera) and Firmenich. They were released on 2 January. The news prompted a demonstration of more than 40,000 in Buenos Aires, and critics rejected Menem's explanation that the pardon was necessary for national reconciliation.

In 1995 the chiefs of the army, navy, and air force publicly expressed regret for crimes committed by the military during the "dirty war." Human-rights issues, however, remained in the political forefront. In January 1998 protesters forced President Menem to halt his plans to demolish the **Escuela Mecánica de la Armada** (ESMA, Navy Mechanics School)—the most notorious torture center operating during the repression—and to erect a monument to national reconciliation in its place; they insisted that the site would better serve as a museum of remembrance. Also in January President Menem asked the navy to punish **Alfredo Astiz**, a retired naval captain and notorious participant in the "dirty war," for comments published in a magazine; Astiz had defended the military's role in the repression and threatened journalists and politicians who insisted on dredging up the past. (He was dishonorably discharged.) In February came the discovery of Swiss bank accounts owned by Astiz and other military officers and believed to contain money stolen from the detained and missing.

Although by now the issue of impunity seemed to be settled, the quest for justice continued on a different front. Among the victims of the "dirty war" were an estimated 500 children. Some of them were abducted with their parents, but many of them were born in captivity—their mothers kept alive until giving birth. Children often disappeared by way of a "baby trade," having been illegally adopted and raised by people connected with the military. In June 1998

Videla was arrested and charged with ordering the abduction and illegal adoption of children—crimes not covered by the pardon. By April 2000, 10 more former officers were arrested in connection with the kidnapping of children, including Massera, Bignone, Lieutenant General Cristino Nicolaidis, and Vice Admiral Rubén Oscar Franco. A seminal but controversial ruling by a federal court in September 1999 strengthened the case against these officers and provided a potential breakthrough in bringing other “dirty war” participants to justice. The court argued that in cases of disappearance, whether of children or of political prisoners, the criminal acts remain in progress until the children or the bodies are identified. As a result, the 11 arrested former officers remain in detention. (Those, like Videla, who are over 70 years old, are allowed by Argentine law the benefit of house arrest.) Meanwhile, since its founding in 1980, the human-rights group **Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo** (Grandmothers of Plaza de Mayo) has identified the biological parents of 100 children.

Another front opened as well. **Baltasar Garzón**, the Spanish judge who in 1998 prevailed on Britain to arrest General **Augusto Pinochet Ugarte** of Chile, turned his attention to Argentina. On 2 November 1999 he indicted 98 military officers on charges of torture, terrorism, and genocide, and requested their extradition to Spain. Among those named in the indictment were Videla, Massera, and Galtieri. Although the claim had a legal basis (an estimated 600 victims of the “dirty war” were Spanish citizens or of Spanish descent), Menem refused to cooperate, arguing that Spain (Argentina’s former colonial master) was interfering in his country’s domestic affairs.

There the matter of justice stood until 2001, when two federal judges, Gabriel Cavallo and Claudio Bonadio, each declared *Punto Final* and *Obediencia Debida* unconstitutional. In October Bonadio ordered the arrest of Massera and five other navy officers on charges of stealing property from people kidnapped during the “dirty war.” (Massera was already under house arrest for his role in the trafficking of children.) In July 2002 Bonadio ordered the arrest of 29 former high-ranking officers on charges of human-rights violations. Among them were Galtieri, Nicolaidis, and Suárez Masón.

In May 2003 Néstor Kirchner was inaugurated president, promising to bring dirty warriors to justice. By late June he had purged the military command of officers from the “dirty war” period and

signed a decree allowing the extradition of Argentine officers to Spain to face human-rights charges. In April 2005 Spain sentenced **Adolfo Scilingo** to 640 years in prison, becoming the first country to convict someone in person (rather than in absentia) for human-rights violations committed beyond its borders. Kirchner then called on Congress and the Supreme Court to scrap *Punto Final* and *Obediencia Debida*, the amnesty laws shielding officers from prosecution. In August 2003 both houses of Congress repealed the laws, winning Kirchner praise both at home and abroad, though the repeal did not take effect until 14 June 2005, when the Supreme Court ruled 7–1 that the laws were unconstitutional. The ruling meant that military officers could again face prosecution. It left intact, however, the pardons issued by Menem in 1989 and 1990, a matter that Kirchner decided to leave in the hands of the courts. Federal courts have since struck down pardons for Videla; Albano Eduardo Harguindeguy, the former interior minister; and **José Alfredo Martínez de Hoz**, the former finance minister. In addition to urging the repeal of the amnesty laws, on 24 March 2004, the 28th anniversary of the military coup, Kirchner signed an order converting ESMA into a museum of memory. In March 2006 he made 24 March a permanent holiday, called the National Day of Memory for Truth and Justice.

One of the first cases reopened after the repeal of the amnesty laws was that of Miguel Etchecolatz, the police chief who had been convicted in 1986 and sentenced to 23 years in prison before being freed by *Obediencia Debida*. On 19 September 2006 he was sentenced to life in prison for kidnapping, torture, and murder. The trial, however, claimed a victim. The day before the sentencing, one of the witnesses, Jorge Julio López, a 77-year-old former construction worker who had been tortured by Etchecolatz, disappeared. He is believed to have been kidnapped by former security agents as a warning to future witnesses. His disappearance spread fear throughout the country, and thousands took to the streets of Buenos Aires in a show of solidarity. López remains among the missing. Next to face trial was **Christian Federico Von Wernich**, a Catholic priest and former army chaplain, who on 10 October 2007 was handed a life sentence for complicity in kidnapping, torture, and murder. Other targets for prosecution include the former president Isabel Perón, arrested in January 2007

in connection with the 1976 disappearance of a student activist, and several members of the AAA death squad.

In June 2008 two retired federal police officers were given life sentences for the 1976 “Fátima massacre,” in which 30 people were kidnapped and executed. In July, retired General Luciano Benjamin Menendez, six other officers, and one civilian collaborator were convicted for the 1977 kidnapping, torture, and execution of four members of the Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores (PRT, Workers’ Revolutionary Party). Menendez and three others were given life terms; the others, terms of 18 or 22 years. In September Menendez was given another life term, along with Antonio Domingo Bussi, for the 1976 kidnapping, torture, and disappearance of a legislator. By the end of 2008, 28 “dirty warriors” had been convicted.

The past also caught up with a couple who illegally adopted a child born to political prisoners. In April 2008 Osvaldo Rivas and María Cristina Gómez were convicted of falsifying documents and concealing the identity of their adopted daughter, María Eugenia Sampallo. Rivas and Gómez were sentenced to eight and seven years in prison, respectively. The case was brought by Sampallo, who, calling her adoptive parents kidnappers, had asked for them to receive the maximum sentence, 25 years. DNA tests in 2001 revealed that Sampallo’s real parents were Mirta Mabel Barragan and Leonardo Ruben Sampallo, left-wing activists who were seized in December 1977 and never seen again.

More than 20 years after the end of the “dirty war,” many cases have gone to the grave, though not all of them through natural causes. On 10 December 2007 Héctor Febres (nicknamed “Savage”), a former coast guard officer awaiting a verdict on torture charges, died in his cell from cyanide poisoning. A judge ruled Febres’s death a murder—Febres had been an administrator at ESMA and could have revealed secrets about the fate of hundreds of babies abducted from prisoners. In February 2008 Paul Navone, a retired military officer on trial for baby trafficking, died from a gunshot wound to the head before he could testify in court. And in November 2008 Mario Ferreyra, a former police chief, shot himself dead during a live television interview—police were on their way to his farm to arrest him on charges of kidnapping and torture. His suicide was attributed to a refusal to testify against former officers.

Despite the intimidation and efforts to impose silence, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, the former first lady, who succeeded her husband as president in December 2007, said she hoped to complete all the trials by the end of her four-year term. She is also expected to oversee the completion, in 2010, of the Museum of Memory, which opened in April 2008 on the site formerly occupied by ESMA. Inspired by Fernández de Kirchner, it is already the largest human-rights museum in Latin America.

ARGENTINE FORENSIC ANTHROPOLOGY TEAM. *See* EQUIPO ARGENTINO DE ANTROPOLOGÍA FORENSE (EAAF).

ARGENTINE LEAGUE FOR THE RIGHTS OF MAN. *See* LIGA ARGENTINA POR LOS DERECHOS DEL HOMBRE.

ARNS, DOM PAULO EVARISTO (1921–). Catholic cardinal, archbishop, **human-rights** advocate, and outspoken critic of **Brazil's** 1964–1985 **military** dictatorship. Born in Forquilha in the southern Brazilian state of Santa Catarina, Arns was ordained a Franciscan priest in 1945. He earned a doctorate in 1952 from the Sorbonne, in Paris, and then returned to Brazil, where he worked as a theology professor and as a journalist. He became a bishop in 1966. Pope Paul VI named him the archbishop of São Paulo in 1970 and then a cardinal in 1973. Within the Latin American Catholic Church, he was identified with the progressive wing, which allied itself with the region's poor. As archbishop, he sold the Palácio Episcopal, his official residence, and used the money to build community centers.

Soon after he became archbishop, the secret police arrested and **tortured** one of his priests. Arns denounced the arrest at the governor's office as well as at the prison itself. After being turned away from the latter, he reported the arrest in the archdiocesan newspaper and radio station and posted a description of the arrest on every church door in São Paulo. He continued to speak out against torture, calling on his fellow bishops to join him. After Vladimir Herzog, a Jewish immigrant and prominent journalist, was tortured to death by a São Paulo **death squad** in October 1975, Arns defied the military by officiating—with Henry Sobel, a rabbi, and Jaime Wright, a Pres-

byterian minister—at an ecumenical service for him at the São Paulo cathedral, which was surrounded by police. Then in 1979 Arns and Wright teamed up to begin **Brasil: Nunca Mais** (BNM, Brazil: Never Again), a top-secret project of photocopying military documents that verified the use of torture to extract confessions. The documents became the basis of the book *Brasil: Nunca mais* (1985), which was published in English under the title *Torture in Brazil* (1986).

Since his retirement in 1998, Arns has been active in UNESCO.

ARPILLERAS. In **Chile**, testimony often took the form of *arpilleras*, woven tapestries depicting scenes of daily life under the rule of **Augusto Pinochet Ugarte**. At first, the making of the *arpilleras*—named for the *arpilla*, or burlap, that backs them—did not attract the **military's** attention—weaving was an activity associated with working-class or rural **women**, often deemed passive and domestic. However, the *arpilleristas*—as the women involved came to be known—soon became powerful voices of dissent with their depiction of the *desaparecidos* (missing), the repression, the food-and-housing shortages caused by the regime's economic policies, and other realities of life under the dictatorship. Generally associated with the social programs administered by the country's **Vicaría de la Solidaridad**, the sale of *arpilleras* abroad generated income for the women while documenting the abuses of **human rights**. In time, the making of these textiles represented a form of empowerment for many of the women, who went on to depict scenes of domestic abuse as well. While the term *arpilleras* remains linked to Chile, the tradition of textually commemorating loved ones is old. It has recently acquired visibility elsewhere with activities such as the AIDS Memorial Quilt.

ASAMBLEA PERMANENTE DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS DE BOLIVIA (APDHB) / PERMANENT ASSEMBLY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN BOLIVIA. A **human-rights** nongovernmental organization in **Bolivia**. It was established in October 1977. Its first leaders were Luis Adolfo Siles Salinas, a former Bolivian president, and Father Julio Tamiri. It had a formal connection with the **United Nations** and sought to reach out to the international human-rights community. An ecumenical organization, the APDHB had the sup-

port of the Bolivian **Catholic Church** as well as the Episcopalians, the Methodists, and the Lutherans, though it was independent of any denomination. In December 1977 it joined a hunger strike led by the activist **Domitila Barrios de Chungara** and three other miners' wives, a strike that, 20 days later, forced General **Hugo Banzer Suárez** to grant an amnesty to 340 political and labor leaders then in **exile**.

ASAMBLEA PERMANENTE POR LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS (APDH) / PERMANENT ASSEMBLY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS. A **human-rights** nongovernmental organization in **Argentina**. The Asamblea was founded in 1975 in response to the right-wing violence and repression that characterized the regime of **Isabel Perón**. During the dictatorship, the Asamblea documented thousands of disappearances—evidence that was forwarded to international human-rights groups like the **Organization of American States** and, once civility was restored, to the government of **Raúl Alfonsín**.

ASOCIACIÓN DE EX-DETENIDOS-DESAPARECIDOS / ASSOCIATION OF FORMER DETAINEES-MISSING. A **human-rights** nongovernmental organization in **Argentina**. The Asociación was founded in 1985 by some of the few survivors of the “**dirty war**.” Members see it as their mission to testify to the sufferings they endured under detention. Although the group was formed after the 1985 trial of the junta commanders, survivors had helped the **Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas (CONADEP)**, or National Commission on the Disappeared, document cases of disappearance. *See also* **DESAPARECIDOS**.

ASOCIACIÓN DE FAMILIARES DE DETENIDOS, DESAPARECIDOS Y MÁRTIRES POR LA LIBERACIÓN NACIONAL (ASOFAMD) / ASSOCIATION OF RELATIVES OF THE DETAINED, DISAPPEARED AND MARTYRED FOR NATIONAL LIBERATION. A **human-rights** nongovernmental organization in **Bolivia**. ASOFAMD was formally established in October 1982, when the country returned to democracy, though it grew out of efforts from 1970 onward to demand humane treatment for captured **guerrillas** and to protest forced disappearances and summary

executions. One of its achievements was bringing a lawsuit against the former dictator **Luis García Meza** and 58 of his collaborators. He and several others were convicted and sentenced to 30 years in prison without parole.

ASOCIACIÓN DE LAS MADRES DE PLAZA DE MAYO. *See* MADRES DE PLAZA DE MAYO.

ASOCIACIÓN NACIONAL REPUBLICANA. *See* PARTIDO COLORADO.

ASSOCIATION OF FORMER DETAINEES-MISSING. *See* ASOCIACIÓN DE EX-DETENIDOS-DESAPARECIDOS.

ASSOCIATION OF RELATIVES OF POLITICALLY EXECUTED PERSONS. *See* AGRUPACIÓN DE FAMILIARES DE EJECUTADOS POLÍTICOS (AFEP).

ASSOCIATION OF RELATIVES OF THE DETAINED-DISAPPEARED. *See* AGRUPACIÓN DE FAMILIARES DE DETENIDOS-DESAPARECIDOS (AFDD).

ASSOCIATION OF RELATIVES OF THE DETAINED, DISAPPEARED AND MARTYRED FOR NATIONAL LIBERATION. *See* ASOCIACIÓN DE FAMILIARES DE DETENIDOS, DESAPARECIDOS Y MÁRTIRES POR LA LIBERACIÓN NACIONAL (ASOFAMD).

ASTIZ, ALFREDO (c. 1951–). Known as “the Blond Angel of Death.” A navy lieutenant and the leader of a “**death squad**” that brought suspected subversives to the **Escuela Mecánica de la Armada** (ESMA), or Navy Mechanics School, an infamous **torture** and detention center active during the “**dirty war**” in **Argentina**. The squad was a unit of the navy task force GT-3/32. He had several aliases—“*Angel*,” “*El rubio*,” “Blondie,” “Crow,” “Eduardo Escudero,” and “Gustavo Niño.” He used his boyish good looks to infiltrate the **Madres de Plaza de Mayo** (Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo), a **human-rights** group formed by **women** in search of their

missing children and grandchildren. Joining in 1977 under the name Gustavo Niño and pretending to be in search of a real missing person, he betrayed about a dozen members and supporters, who were kidnapped by his squad and never seen alive again. Among them were two French nuns, Sister Alice Domon and Sister Leonie Duquet, whose bodies were discovered two months later.

After the return to civilian government, he was accused of the murder of the two nuns as well as that of Dagmar Hagelin, a 17-year-old Swedish girl. (His boss, **Jorge Eduardo Acosta**, ordered the killing.) None of these victims was associated with any terrorist activity. He escaped trial and punishment, however, benefiting from the controversial amnesty law *Obediencia Debida* (Due Obedience), which exonerated junior officers. But because several of his victims were international citizens, other countries have taken an interest in prosecuting him. In 1990 a French court sentenced him to life in prison in absentia for the murder of Sisters Domon and Duquet.

Astiz was cashiered from the navy in 1998 for remarks he made in an interview published in the magazine *Tres Puntos*. (An English translation of the interview appeared in *Harper's*.) Astiz told the journalist, Gabriela Cerruti, that **torture** was not in his job description but that he would have tortured if the navy had asked him to do so. He also claimed to be the best-trained man in Argentina to kill a politician or journalist who provoked the **military**. The comments outraged President **Carlos Saúl Menem**, who asked the navy to punish Astiz.

In 2001 Italy sought his extradition, charging him with the abduction, torture, and disappearance of three Italian citizens—Angela Maria Aieta and Giovanni and Susanna Pegoraro. Argentina refused to extradite him. On 14 March 2007 an Italian court sentenced him and four other officers, including Acosta, to life in prison in absentia for the murders. He is also wanted in Spain and Sweden and could face prosecution in Argentina—the amnesty laws that shielded him and other officers have since been struck down by the Supreme Court.

AYLWIN AZÓCAR, PATRICIO (1918–). President of **Chile** (1990–1994). On 14 December 1989 Aylwin Azócar, representing the **Partido Demócrata Cristiano** (PDC, Christian Democratic Party), was elected to the presidency with the help of some 16 left and center

parties. When he took office in March 1990, he was charged with managing the country's return to democracy. He faced opposition from the armed forces, the Chilean court system, and legislators appointed during the regime of **Augusto Pinochet Ugarte**. Despite these challenges, Aylwin Azócar was able to exert his authority on an issue that concerned the majority of voters—the investigation of **human-rights** abuses committed by the state under Pinochet Ugarte. Aylwin Azócar appointed the **Comisión Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliación** (National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation), an apolitical group of investigators with legal and human-rights expertise, and charged it with uncovering the truth. Although the Commission, under the direction of Raúl Rettig, compiled extensive documentation of human-rights abuses, including evidence presented in a lengthy report, it was cut short in its attempts to assign culpability or to seek justice for the victims of state violence.

AZULES (BLUES). *See* PARTIDO LIBERAL.

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BACHELET, MICHELLE (1951–). **Chilean** socialist, **torture** victim, pediatrician, and **human-rights** activist, who in January 2006, a single mother of three, was elected the first female president of Chile—one of the few **women** to be elected president anywhere in the Western Hemisphere.

She was born Verónica Michelle Bachelet Jeria on 29 September 1951 in Santiago. Her mother, Angela Jeria, was a housewife who became an archaeologist; her father, Alberto Bachelet Martínez, was an air force officer. She grew up on **military** bases all across Chile and lived most of 1962–1963 in the **United States**—her father having been assigned to the Chilean Embassy in Washington, D.C. In the late 1960s she began her study of medicine and joined the youth wing of the **Partido Socialista de Chile** (PS, Socialist Party of Chile). In the early 1970s her father, who had become a general, worked closely with the leftist government of **Salvador Allende Gossens**, overseeing the rationing and distribution of food. After the military coup of 11 September 1973, a coup led by General **Augusto Pinochet**

Ugarte, her father was viewed as a traitor. Although he was given a chance to go into **exile**, he refused. He was imprisoned, and in March 1974 died of a heart attack while being **tortured**.

Security forces then arrested Bachelet and her mother, detaining them in **Villa Grimaldi**, where they were tortured separately. They were released in 1975 thanks to their air force connections and went into exile, first in Australia and then in East Germany. In 1979 they returned to Chile, where Bachelet completed medical school, graduating near the top of her class. Because of her family's association with left-wing politics, however, she had trouble finding a job, and spent the 1980s working in a clinic, treating the children of torture victims. After the return to democracy in 1990, she worked in programs on AIDS and epidemiology, was active in the PS, and served as an advisor in the health ministry. In 1996, in memory of her father, she entered a program at the military academy, graduating at the top of her class and winning a scholarship the following year to study at the Inter-American Defense College in Washington, D.C., where she earned a master's degree.

In January 2000 Ricardo Lagos was elected president—Chile's first socialist president since the fall of Allende Gossens. Bachelet was named minister of health. In 2002 she became the country's first female minister of defense. The following year, General Juan Emilio Cheyre, the army commander, declared that the military would never again overthrow a democratic government in Chile.

As president, she has vowed never to support any amnesty for military personnel accused of violating human rights during Pinochet Ugarte's dictatorship.

BAÑADOS, ADOLFO. Supreme Court justice in **Chile**. Appointed by President **Patricio Aylwin Azócar** after the return to civilian rule, Bañados was one of the first appointees to a high court dominated by judges from the **military** regime of **Augusto Pinochet Ugarte**. In 1993 Bañados presided over the case of **Orlando Letelier del Solar's** assassination, the first case excluded from Pinochet Ugarte's **amnesty law of 1978**. Bañados sentenced two former military officers from the **Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional** (DINA, Directorate of National Intelligence), Chile's secret police. General **Manuel Contreras Sepúlveda** received a seven-year term, and Brigadier General **Pedro Espinoza Bravo** received a six-year

term, for planning the 1976 murders of Letelier del Solar and his assistant, Ronni Moffitt, with a car bomb in Washington, D.C.

BANZER SUÁREZ, HUGO (1926–2002). Army general, right-wing **military** dictator (1971–1978), and democratically elected president (1997–2001) in **Bolivia**. He was one of the few Latin American dictators to be later elected president. According to one expert on Bolivia, he was the only Latin American general to be elected president after taking part in a “**dirty war**.”

Banzer Suárez was born on 10 May 1926 in Concepción, the capital of the eastern province of Santa Cruz, the most prosperous region in Bolivia. He was of German descent and grew up in a family of ranchers and landowners—the country’s ruling elite. The son of an officer, at age 14 he entered the Colegio Militar del Ejército, the national military academy, where he excelled, graduating in the late 1940s as a cavalry lieutenant. In 1955 he was sent to the U.S. Army’s School of the Americas in the Panama Canal Zone (also known as the “school for coups”), where military personnel from Bolivia and other Latin American countries received tactical training, especially in counterinsurgency. After additional training in 1960 at the Armored Cavalry School in Fort Hood, Texas, Banzer Suárez, then a colonel, was put in charge of the Bolivian Fourth Cavalry Regiment. He visited the **United States**, developing a fluency in English and forming ties with U.S. military officers.

Banzer Suárez served in the administration of General René Barrientos Ortuño, first as the minister of education (1964–1967) and then as the military attaché in the Bolivian embassy in Washington, D.C. (1967–1969). After Barrientos Ortuño died in a helicopter crash in April 1969, military officers from across the political spectrum struggled for power. The vice president, Luis Siles Salinas, a civilian, succeeded to the presidency but was ousted on 26 September 1969 by General Alfredo Ovando Candia, the commander in chief of the army and a left-wing nationalist. Banzer Suárez was recalled from Washington and appointed the director of the Colegio Militar del Ejército. On 6 October 1969 Banzer Suárez helped topple Ovando Candia in a right-wing military coup led by the army chief of staff, General Rogelio Miranda. The next day, however, a military counter-coup toppled Miranda and installed the left-wing General **Juan José Torres González** as president.

On 4 January 1971 Banzer Suárez, having supported the losing side, was relieved of his position at the Colegio Militar and assigned to an isolated military post. Within a week, at odds with Torres González's leftist agenda, he launched a coup, taking control of the army's headquarters in La Paz. Although Torres González quashed the attempt and sent Banzer Suárez into **exile in Argentina**, Banzer Suárez, backed by Bolivia's neighbors and the United States, continued to plot, secretly entering Bolivia to meet with supporters—military officers, businessmen, and political-party leaders. He made a second attempt on 18 August 1971. His arrest in Santa Cruz alerted his followers that the coup was under way. They secured Santa Cruz, and military installations in most of the other provinces followed suit. His supporters, however, met stiff resistance in La Paz from the Presidential Guard Battalion, students, and **trade unionists**. After four days of fighting, 120 people were dead and 700 wounded. By 22 August Torres González was defeated. Torres González went into exile in Peru, and Banzer Suárez became president.

Banzer Suárez's eight-year military dictatorship—known as the *banzerato*—is often likened to the rule of General **Augusto Pinochet Ugarte** in **Chile**. Both regimes began in the early 1970s and were characterized by censorship, anticommunism, free-market capitalism, and repression. Although the level of repression under Banzer Suárez never reached that of Chile or Argentina—not as many people in Bolivia were politically active—his regime collaborated with other South American military dictatorships in **Operation Condor**, a top-secret network that eliminated political opponents living in exile. One of Condor's victims was Torres González, murdered in Argentina in 1976.

Unlike Pinochet Ugarte, Banzer Suárez managed to polish his image and win the presidency in a democratic election. In 1979 he founded a right-wing political party, the Acción Democrática Nacionalista (ADN, National Democratic Action), and then ran for president six times. In 1985 he captured the most votes (about 29 percent), but less than a majority, so Congress decided the election, which handed victory to Víctor Paz Estenssoro. After losing again in 1993, he retired from politics, grieving over the death of his two sons in separate accidents. Coaxed out of retirement, he ran for the last time in 1997, again capturing most of the votes. This time, Congress elected him president.

His past, however, came back to haunt him. In October 1998 Pinochet Ugarte was arrested in London at the request of the Spanish judge **Baltasar Garzón**, who wanted him extradited to Spain to face charges in connection with the recently discovered Operation Condor. A month later, a Bolivian commission, appointed by the Chamber of Deputies, began investigating connections between Condor and Banzer Suárez. It found evidence but, under government pressure, never turned it over to Judge Garzón. Banzer Suárez, therefore, never faced charges. He resigned from the presidency in August 2001 after being diagnosed with lung cancer. On 5 May 2002 he died at his home in Santa Cruz, from a heart attack.

BARNES, HARRY (“DIRTY HARRY”). Ambassador from the **United States to Chile**, replacing **James Theberge** in 1986. Theberge’s pro-junta stance ran counter to that of the second administration of **Ronald Reagan**, which supported the opposition movement’s demands for a return to constitutional government. The appointment of Barnes, a **human-rights** advocate, riled General **Augusto Pinochet Ugarte**, who dubbed Barnes “Dirty Harry,” after the movie character played by Clint Eastwood.

BARRIOS DE CHUNGARA, DOMITILA (1937–). **Bolivian** labor activist and author. An indigenous Aymara woman from the Potosí region in the Bolivian highlands, Barrios de Chungara was born into a family of miners and **trade unionists** in an area renowned historically for the mineral richness of its soil and the profound poverty of most of its inhabitants. Mined since the time of the Incas, the region of Potosí was one of the most important centers of silver mining during Spanish colonial rule, and in the 20th century, it witnessed the exploitation of tin mines, which represented one of the principal sources of wealth for the landlocked Andean nation.

Married to a miner at 20, Barrios de Chungara experienced a continuation of the deprivation of her youth, when she was kept out of school as the eldest of five to care for her siblings after her mother’s death. The intense cold of the Andean mountains is encapsulated in her description of watching her own urine freeze as a child outside a home that lacked the minimum standards of comfort. She also experienced the oppression common to an indigenous community under

various **military** regimes in her country. With increased militancy, Barrios de Chungara joined the Comité de Amas de Casa (Committee of Housewives) of the Siglo XX mining sector in 1963. The Comité de Amas de Casa, organized in 1961, was initially a grassroots movement created to look after family concerns in the mining sectors which soon itself was battling the patriarchal Indigenous society in an effort to expand their visibility within trade unions.

She has eloquently described her experiences in her testimonial narrative *Si me permiten hablar . . . Testimonio de Domitila, una mujer de las minas de Bolivia* (with Moezza Viezzer, 1977, translated in 1979 as *Let me speak!: Testimony of Domitila, a Woman of the Bolivian Mines*). In her book, she denounced the Massacre of San Juan, an event that occurred in the early morning hours of 24 June 1967, when striking miners and their families were attacked, under orders from General René Barrientos, by military troops following a traditional gathering celebrating the eve of St. John, a **Roman Catholic** festivity. She also described her **torture** at the hands of the military following her detention, which resulted in her imprisonment, during which she went into early labor and miscarried.

Her increased political activism—in a continent all-too accustomed to silence from the *cholas*, the Indigenous women—garnered her an invitation to the International Year of the Woman Congress organized by the **United Nations** in Mexico in 1975. In a memorable moment, Barrios de Chungara exchanged recriminations with the president of the Mexican delegation, who insisted in putting labor issues aside in favor of “purely” feminist issues. On that occasion, Barrios de Chungara’s initial words to the group *si me permiten hablar* (if I’m allowed to speak) and the address to follow revealed the deep racial and class differences that still divide **women** in Latin America and gave the title to her best-selling testimony. Back in Bolivia, Barrios de Chungara and three of her fellow “housewives,” including 20 children, initiated a hunger strike in the offices of the daily *Presencia*, demanding amnesty for some 340 labor and political leaders in **exile**. Soon, thousands of their countrymen joined the strike, among them a delegation from the **Asamblea Permanente de los Derechos Humanos de Bolivia** (APDHB, Permanent Assembly for Human Rights in Bolivia) from Cochabamba and **Luis Espinal Camps**, a Spanish-born Bolivian Jesuit priest who would be murdered by

paramilitary groups in 1980. Twenty-two days later, General **Hugo Banzer Suárez** announced open elections for the following year and declared he would not be a candidate for the next elections. Ironically, Banzer Suárez in later years would rehabilitate his image and return to Bolivian politics as president until 2001, when ill health forced him to resign.

Invited to a conference on women in Denmark in 1980, she was forced to remain in exile following the military coup by General **Luís García Meza**. According to a 1989 interview, for over seven months she ignored the fate of her family. She would remain in Europe, mostly in Sweden, for two and a half years. In 1982, with the return of democracy, Barrios de Chungara returned to the Siglo XX mine, the place she had called home since infancy. Life for her family would become increasingly difficult with the closure of the Bolivian tin mines in 1986. Like thousands of miners soon to be displaced, Barrios de Chungara joined the massive March for Life and Peace demonstration to no avail. Miners, who never owned the deeds to their houses and had 90 days to vacate them should they cease to work for the company, were forced to vacate their homes. Though her husband remained working for a while, Barrios de Chungara was forced to move to the city of Cochabamba. Luckier than many, by her own account, she had been able to purchase land with the proceeds from the sale of her book. She moved into a two-room house, in the poor district of Hayrakasa, with four of her remaining seven children. The following years were difficult for the family as Bolivia was plunged into economic chaos.

A vocal critic of past and present Bolivian administrations, Barrios de Chungara was nominated for a Nobel Peace Prize in 1985. She continues to live in Cochabamba, Bolivia.

BENEDETTI, MARIO (1920–). **Uruguayan** poet, novelist, playwright, lyricist, essayist, and journalist. He was born in Paso de los Toros, in the Tacuarembó province in Uruguay. He attended the Colegio Alemán de Montevideo—from which his father withdrew him in the 1930s after the school made the Nazi salute official—and the Liceo Miranda. In 1945, after a three-year residence in Buenos Aires, **Argentina**, he began his journalistic career in the influential weekly *Marcha*, with which he would collaborate until its closing in 1974. Also in 1945 he published his first volume of poetry. He is grouped

among the writers known as “generación crítica” by the influential critic Ángel Rama.

During the next decade, Benedetti would direct the literary journal *Marginalia* and collaborate with *Número*, one of the most prestigious literary journals of its day. In 1954 he became the literary editor of *Marcha*; his first novel had been published the year before. Two years earlier, in 1952, Benedetti had taken part in protests against the **military** treaty between Uruguay and the **United States**—an action that marked the beginning of his political activism. In the late 1950s he made his first trip to Europe, as correspondent for *Marcha* and *El Diario*, and later visited the United States for several months. During the 1960s he continued his literary trajectory and became a prominent participant in cultural events in Latin America. He was chosen as a judge of the Casa de las Américas award in Havana, Cuba, in 1966; two years later, he founded and directed the Center for Literary Investigations for the Casa de las Américas editorial board.

In 1971 Benedetti became one of the founders of the Movimiento de Independientes 26 de Marzo, which would later merge with the leftist coalition Frente Amplio. That same year he was appointed director of the Department of Latin American Literature at the University of Montevideo. The next year, he participated in the Frente Amplio campaign. Following the military coup of 1973, he resigned his university post and went into **exile** in Buenos Aires. After receiving several death threats from the **Alianza Anticomunista Argentina** (AAA, Argentine Anticommunist Alliance), Benedetti went into exile in Peru and Cuba. In 1980 he settled in Spain. In 1985, with the restoration of democracy in Uruguay, he returned to his native country, although from that point he would divide his residence between Montevideo and Madrid. That year he became a member of the editorial council of the new journal *Brecha*, a continuation of the editorial project of the weekly *Marcha*, closed by the military in 1974.

A prolific writer—his complete works, first edited in 1994, would eventually comprise 36 volumes—Benedetti is perhaps best known as the lyrical author of nearly 20 books of poetry and song lyrics. He is equally prolific as a novelist and short-story writer. His novel *Tregua* (1960) has gone through over 75 editions. Several of his works have been adapted for the stage and screen, notably *Tregua*, directed in 1975 by Sergio Renán and the first Latin American movie nominated

for an Oscar. Some Benedetti works associated with the period of the “dirty wars” are the play *Pedro y el capitán* (1979), an exploration of the psychology of torturers and victims; *Primavera con una esquina rota* (1982), an examination of two sectors of a nation—Uruguayans under the military dictatorship and Uruguayans in exile—united by a thread of hope; and *Recuerdos olvidados* (1988), which examines the theme of exile and the eventual reconciliation of a divided nation. He is also the author of *El desexilio y otras conjeturas* (1985), in which he proposes the term *desexilio* to denote the experience of those unable or unwilling to go into exile and forced to live under military dictatorship.

During a literary career spanning over 50 years, Benedetti has been distinguished by several governments and organizations. In 1982 and 1989, respectively, he received the Order Félix Varela and the Haydeé Santamaría medal awarded by the Cuban government. In 1986 he received the Jristo Botev award from the Bulgarian government. In 1987, in Brussels, he received the Golden Flame award from **Amnesty International** for his novel *Primavera con una esquina rota*. He was invested Doctor Honoris Causa by the University of Valladolid (Spain) and the University of Alicante (Spain) in 1997. Two years later, the University of Alicante created the Mario Benedetti Center for Latin American Studies. In 1999 he also received the VIII Premio Reina Sofía de Poesía Iberoamericana, awarded by the Spanish government.

BIGNONE, REYNALDO BENITO. An army general and the fourth and last president (1982–1983) of the **military** government in **Argentina** during the “dirty war.” Two weeks after General **Leopoldo Fortunato Galtieri**, the previous president, resigned in disgrace following Argentina’s defeat in the **Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas** conflict, General Bignone became president, taking office on 1 July 1982. By then the military government had lost all credibility owing to the country’s economic disarray, the Falklands debacle, and increasing public unrest over disappearances. Bignone saw his role as twofold—to cover up the military’s involvement in **human-rights** violations and to return the country to civilian rule. He gave orders to destroy records related to the detained and missing (*desaparecidos*) and then organized elections—not before adopting the *Ley de*

Pacificación Nacional (Law of National Pacification), which granted immunity from prosecution to members of the military and police for acts committed in combating “subversion.” The law was repealed by President **Raúl Alfonsín** after he took office in October 1983.

BLUES. *See* PARTIDO LIBERAL.

BOAL, AUGUSTO (1931–2009). **Brazilian** playwright, theater director, and theorist. One of Brazil’s most important cultural voices, Boal spent his early years in Rio de Janeiro. In the late 1940s he attended Columbia University in New York, where he was trained as a chemical engineer. Soon after graduation, he returned to Brazil to work with the influential Teatro Arena of São Paulo.

Founded in 1953, with José Renato as its first director, Teatro Arena was one of several experimental troupes in Brazil that sought a more direct relationship with its audience to create a new social and political consciousness. By the late 1940s, companies such as Teatro Brasileiro de Comédias, O Teatro Universitário, Grupo Universitário do Teatro de São Paulo, Teatro de Câmara, and the Companhia Fernando de Barros had revolutionized the Brazilian stage. One of Teatro Arena’s plays, *Eles não usam black tie* (1958, *They Don’t Use Tuxedos*), by Gianfrancesco Guarnieri, garnered them the attention of the theatergoing public with its examination of the plight of the residents of the *favelas* (shantytowns). Like many of its contemporaries, Teatro Arena also emphasized the use of Brazilian Portuguese in its work, as opposed to the more formal Luso-Portuguese that had been considered de rigueur in Brazilian literary circles until well into the 20th century.

Boal joined Teatro Arena at this effervescent moment in Brazilian life and soon made his mark. His earlier comedies, such as *Sortilégio* (1952, *Sortilege*) and *Marido magro, mulher chata* (1956, *Skinny Husband, Nagging Wife*) found appreciative audiences. A more-ambitious work, *Revolução na América do Sul* (1960, *Revolution in South America*), also proved popular with audiences with its satirical depiction of the South American revolutions from a Marxist perspective. It was during his tenure with Teatro Arena that Boal began developing the theater aesthetics that would bring him the attention of theater practitioners worldwide. Building on the Latin American

tradition of inviting audience discussion after a performance, in the 1960s Boal developed a process to bridge the gap between spectator and participant. As part of his early work with theater, audiences were invited to stop the action in a play at the point where the character was experiencing an instance of oppression. Following the suggestions of the audience, the actor would then improvise a response that in most cases challenged the oppressor. According to a biography of the author, during one of these sessions, “in a now legendary development,” a woman in the audience became so outraged when the actor could not understand her recommendations that she joined him on stage to act them out. According to Boal, this was the birth of the *espectador-ator* (the spect-actor) and the theory that through artistic collaboration participating audiences become cognizant that change *is* possible. Thus theater becomes an agent of social change and the means to challenge oppression.

Following the 1964 **military** coup, Boal directed the hugely popular *Shows opinião* (Opinion Shows), which were staged by the group Opinião and which adopted a musical-revue format. Armando Costa, Oduvaldo Vianna Filho, and Paulo Pontes, among others, collaborated in this endeavor. Aimed at middle-class audiences of students and intellectuals, the shows featured singer Nara Leão, one of the undisputed queens of bossa nova. According to Nancy T. Baden, the musical format of the show signaled the increasing importance of popular music in political protest in the following years, when artists such as **Chico Buarque**, Caetano Veloso, and Gilberto Gil voiced their dissent. As a cultural tactic, supporters of the military regime adopted popular music. A significant form of **cultural resistance**, future productions of *Shows opinião* were banned by military censors. Although the consequences of the censorship, according to some scholars, were not immediately felt throughout the Brazilian theater community after 1964, Boal’s cultural activism did bring him to the attention of the authorities, particularly after the regime legitimized censorship in 1968.

In 1971, after Boal directed Bertolt Brecht’s play, *The Resistible Rise of Arturo Ui*, he was kidnapped as he walked home. He was imprisoned, **tortured**, and then **exiled to Argentina**. The news of his arrest spread quickly throughout literary circles in Brazil, signaling one of the most oppressive years of the dictatorship. Boal continued working in his theater theory and participated, in 1973, in adult-

literacy campaigns in Peru, which helped him refine further ideas about the potential of theater to break centuries-long patterns of oppression. In 1976 he moved to Europe, eventually settling in Paris.

In exile Boal published his first major work, *The Theater of the Oppressed*, in Spanish and French; the work would not be published in Brazil until 1988. *The Theater of the Oppressed*, in its title and orientation, references the work of his compatriot Paulo Freire (1921–1997), the noted humanist, educator, and secretary of education, whose seminal *Pedagogia do Oprimido* (1970), written during his political exile in **Chile**, proved to have enormous influence in Latin America, particularly among followers of **liberation theology**. In time, Boal would develop a complete system of exercises, games, and theater techniques grouped under the title Theater of the Oppressed, aimed at furthering the notion of art as a liberating experience and based on the rejection of the theatrical experience as a passive endeavor. Through its many manifestations, Theater of the Oppressed means to establish a human dialogue, in most cases facilitated by a *coringa*—a facilitator or Joker in the English translation—although in Boal’s work the term implies the neutrality of the card in the deck, not necessarily a comic performance. As a neutral participant, the Joker ensures that fairness is observed and that the logistics of the piece are followed.

While in exile, Boal organized the first “International Festival of the Theater of the Oppressed” in Paris in 1981; soon he would have an international following of theater practitioners adapting his theories to local circumstances. In the United States, Boal’s theater theories were disseminated soon after the English translation of his seminal work was available. In 2008 the Department of Theater and Film Studies at the University of Georgia-Athens staged *The Misadventures of Uncle McBuck*, adapted and retitled, for copyright reasons, by the faculty member Robert Moser from the Disney-flavored *As aventuras do Tio Patinhas* (1968, literally, The Adventures of Scrooge McDuck); the staging was probably the first for one of Boal’s plays in that country. The author’s son, Julian Boal, a noted collaborator of Boal Sr., participated in workshops with the students before the production.

In 1986 Boal returned from exile to Rio de Janeiro. He established the Casa do Centro de Teatro do Oprimido (CTO-Rio) and continued

his work. A new stage in his career began in 1992 with his election as Vereador in Rio (the equivalent of a city councilman in the United States), which led him to develop new forms of participatory political theater. He was defeated in the 1996 elections but continued to advocate and lecture worldwide. Nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize on more than one occasion by his admirers, he was the recipient of several recognitions, among them a UNESCO prize and the title Honoris Causa from Queen Mary University in London. Augusto Boal died on 2 May 2009.

BOLIVIA (1971–1982). On 18–22 August 1971 Colonel **Hugo Banzer Suárez** overthrew the leftist General **Juan José Torres González**, establishing a dictatorship known as the *Banzerato* (1971–1978). There are no official estimates of the **human-rights** abuses committed under Banzer Suárez—Bolivia’s truth commission, created in 1982, had a restricted mandate and also never published a final report. But one source, Federico Aguiló’s “*Nunca más*” *para Bolivia* (Never Again for Bolivia) claims that there were 3,059 political prisoners, 65 disappeared persons (*desaparecidos*), 429 deaths at the hands of the **military** and police, 39 political assassinations, and 663 **exiles**. In addition, hundreds are believed to have been raped and **tortured**. At least 80 (or as many as 200) deaths occurred in the Cochabamba Valley in 1974, when the army attacked unarmed Indian peasants protesting food prices. Although the scale of human-rights abuse in Bolivia during this period was small compared with that in **Argentina** or **Chile**, Bolivia belonged to **Operation Condor**, a South American military network whose members tracked down one another’s exiled political opponents. According to human-rights groups, Bolivian security forces arrested six exiled Argentinians and sent them back to Argentina, where they disappeared; Argentine security forces arrested and executed 23 exiled Bolivians. One of Condor’s victims was General Torres González, murdered in Argentina in 1976. Banzer Suárez’s regime also knowingly sheltered the German Klaus Barbie-Altman, the “Butcher of Lyon,” who had been the Gestapo chief in Lyon, France. Under Banzer Suárez, who was known as “El carnicero de La Paz” (“the Butcher of La Paz”), Barbie-Altman held a post in the ministry of the interior.

By the late 1970s, during the administration of **Jimmy Carter**, the **United States** began to pressure Banzer Suárez to return the country to democracy. But the transition was interrupted by the dictatorship of General **Luis García Meza** (July 1980–August 1981) and by other short-lived regimes, both military and civilian. The García Meza regime, coming to power after the so-called cocaine coup, brought another round of human-rights abuse, including thousands of torture victims. It used **death squads** trained by Argentine officers and led by neo-Nazis such as Barbie-Altman, Stefano delle Chiaie, and Pierluigi Pagliai. Barbie-Altman's squad was known as the “Bridegrooms of Death.”

BACKGROUND TO THE “DIRTY WAR”: Following the Chaco Wars (1928–1930, 1932–1935), in which Bolivia was soundly defeated by **Paraguay**, many Bolivians placed responsibility for the debacle on the traditional political parties, which were dominated by the Spanish-speaking elite. New parties emerged, promising economic, political, and social reform. The one with the broadest support to challenge the status quo was the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR, Movement for National Revolution), a popular, middle-class reformist party that would turn increasingly militant and radical.

In the elections of May 1951, the MNR's candidate for president was Víctor Paz Estenssoro, then in exile in Argentina. He won a plurality of the vote, but since he failed to win an outright majority, constitutional procedure called for Congress to elect the president from the top three candidates. Instead, the outgoing president resigned, transferring power to an army junta. The junta nullified the election and banned the MNR, labeling it a **communist** organization. Now committed to taking power by force, the MNR distributed arms to civilians. A popular uprising began on 9 April 1952, and after three days of fighting, in which 600 people died, the junta was defeated, and Paz Estenssoro returned to Bolivia and became president.

Thus began a 12-year period that came to be known as the National Revolution. Arms were in the hands of urban and rural militias, the military had surrendered, and the MNR embarked on a course of profound change. During Paz Estenssoro's first term (1952–1956), the government enacted universal suffrage, abolishing the literacy requirement and thus enfranchising hundreds of thousands of Indian peasants. It reduced the military from 20,000 to 5,000 members and

cut its budget in half. It also approved the creation, by miners, of the Central Obrera Boliviana (COB, Bolivian Workers' Central), a federation of **trade unions**. Although Paz Estenssoro and his vice president, Hernán Siles Zuazo, preferred a moderate course, the COB and the party's left wing, led by Juan Lechín, pressured them into enacting more radical changes. In October 1952 the government nationalized the three biggest tin mines (though promising compensation) and put them under the control of the newly created Corporación Minera de Bolivia (COMIBOL, Bolivian Mining Corporation). Then, in August 1953, it enacted agrarian reform, freeing peasants from indentured labor and expropriating landholdings for redistribution. Although the Agrarian Reform Law affected only the largest landholdings, smaller ones were seized by peasants.

These reforms, however—combined with the post–World War II decline in tin prices—destabilized the economy. Agricultural production fell, and the mines suffered losses. Increased social spending contributed to high inflation—the cost of living rose twentyfold between 1952 and 1956. The bankrupt economy increased tension within the MNR. The left wing, led by the COB and Juan Lechín, called for socializing the economy; the center-right wing, led by Siles Zuazo, opted for another solution—aid from the United States. As early as mid-1953, the government, facing food shortages, sought U.S. financial aid. The United States, in turn, gained access to Bolivia's economy. In October 1953, for example, Bolivia drew up a new petroleum code, which allowed private U.S. investment in Bolivian oil. Under the presidency of Siles Zuazo (1956–1960), U.S. aid would reach an all-time high, and in late 1956 Siles Zuazo accepted a plan, drawn up by the United States and approved by the International Monetary Fund, to stabilize the economy. The plan worked—the budget deficit was cut and inflation brought under control. Yet some of its measures, such as freezing wages and ending food subsidies for miners, alienated the left. By the last two years of his term, Siles Zuazo, facing opposition to MNR policies, reluctantly decided to rebuild the military.

Divisions within the MNR widened during the second term of Paz Estenssoro (1960–1964). He moved to the right, encouraging foreign investment and opposing the COB. He continued rebuilding the military and allowed the United States to train Bolivian officers. In 1964 Paz Estenssoro ran for president a third time—the constitution had

been revised to allow a consecutive term. By then, Paz Estenssoro found himself supported by only two major groups: the peasants, who, after receiving land titles, became staunchly conservative; and the military, now back to its former strength. He picked René Barrientos Ortuño, a general, to be his vice presidential running mate. He won the election, but a few months later, on 4 November 1964, the military removed him from office, establishing a junta led by Barrientos Ortuño.

From then until 1982, the government would remain largely in the hands of the military. Unlike its counterparts in most other Latin American countries, Bolivia's military never developed a common ideology. Rather, the regimes that followed one another during the period were shaped by their leading officers, whose politics ranged from radical left to reactionary right. Still, Barrientos Ortuño set a basic pattern for all the regimes—he supported agrarian reform and allied the military with the peasants. This alliance, combined with a growing economy—COMIBOL made its first profit in 1966—helped him legitimize his position by winning the presidential election in 1966. At the same time, he was hostile to the left, suppressing trade unions, firing miners, and lowering wages. He posted soldiers at the mines, which became scenes of daily conflict, and in June 1967 the army massacred striking miners and their families. The left responded to the repression by forming **guerrilla** groups, though the group that drew the most attention came from outside the country. In 1966 the Argentine-born guerrilla leader Che Guevara entered Bolivia and established a base camp in the southeast. By October 1967, however, Barrientos Ortuño, supported by U.S. advisors, had routed the insurgents, capturing and executing Guevara.

In April 1969 Barrientos Ortuño died in a helicopter crash and was succeeded by his civilian vice president, Luis Adolfo Siles Salinas, who was then ousted on 26 September in a coup led by the commander in chief of the army, General Alfredo Ovando Candia. Espousing a program called “revolutionary nationalism,” Ovando Candia attempted to build a working relationship with the left, expropriating the U.S.-owned Gulf Oil Company of Bolivia, reinstating the COB, and withdrawing soldiers from the mines. He also tried to revive the left wing of the MNR. On 6 October 1970 conservatives in the military, led by General Rogelio Miranda, the army chief of staff,

forced Ovando Candia from office, naming a three-man junta to succeed him. But the following day, a left-wing military counter coup, supported by workers and students, handed the presidency to General Juan José Torres González.

Although he had helped plan the campaign against Guevara, Torres González would become the most radical military leader in Bolivian history. He accepted aid for COMIBOL from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, expropriated U.S.-owned mines and companies without compensation, and expelled the Peace Corps. He also reached out to **Salvador Allende Gossens**, the newly elected Marxist president of Chile. In addition, he allowed the formation of the Asamblea Popular (People's Assembly), which represented trade unionists and peasants, though the former predominated. Led by Juan Lechín, it aimed at becoming a people's congress. It failed to do so—the trade unionists and peasants never came to terms. It did, however, support workers who seized small mines and who took over the newspaper *El Diario*, actions that frightened moderates and conservatives and helped create a climate favorable for a coup. After the Asamblea Popular called for Bolivia to restore diplomatic relations with Cuba, and left-wing officers proposed the creation of a people's army, the military intervened against what it perceived to be the country's move toward communism.

THE “DIRTY WAR” (1971–1982): The military coup of 18–22 August 1971, led by Colonel Hugo Banzer Suárez, was backed by the MNR and the Falange Socialista Boliviana (FSB, Bolivian Socialist Falange), parties that were then anticommunist and middle class. Both parties formed militias that fought alongside rebel military units. Their opponents were student and unionist militias and the Presidential Guard Battalion. On 23 August rebels crushed the last of the opposition. In the end, 120 people were dead and 700 wounded.

Banzer Suárez modeled his military government after Brazil's, instituting authoritarian rule and limiting civilian participation. He moved quickly to ban trade unions and abolish any party to the left of Paz Estenssoro's MNR. Despite its authoritarianism, his government (1971–1978) had wide support during its first four years, owing largely to a booming economy. Rising prices for oil and tin exports, as well as the beginning of exports of agricultural products and natural gas, allowed him to build skyscrapers, paved roads, and an

international airport. A paved road in the Chapare region increased cocaine trafficking, which added to the boom. In late 1974, following the example of **Augusto Pinochet Ugarte**, who had come to power in Chile in September 1973, Banzer Suárez established a military-only government. After this *autogolpe*, or “self-coup,” all cabinet positions were occupied by the military; all political parties, including the MNR and the FSB, were abolished; and Paz Estenssoro was exiled.

By the time of Banzer Suárez, Bolivia had had a long history of political repression. Since its independence from Spain in 1825, it had witnessed 185 coups—including the one in 1971—and opposition leaders would often be imprisoned, exiled, or killed by those taking power. Banzer Suárez widened the scope of repression. Within the first two years of his regime, over 2,000 Bolivians were arrested without charge and held in secret “houses of security.” By the end of his rule, the figure would exceed 3,000. His opponents, whom he labeled “leftists” or “subversives,” were largely trade unionists at first but came to include peasants, students, and progressive members of the **Catholic Church**. The use of torture during interrogations was common. And although far fewer political prisoners died in Bolivia than in Argentina or Chile during the period, Bolivia was one of six original members of Operation Condor, a South American military network that tracked down and eliminated one another’s opponents. One case linked to Condor was that of Graciela Rutilo Artes, an Argentine citizen living in Bolivia and married to a **Uruguayan** man who was a **Tupamaro** guerrilla. In April 1976 she and her nine-month-old daughter were seized by Bolivian and Argentine federal police. Graciela was transferred to Argentina and disappeared; her husband was captured, tortured, and killed in Bolivia; and her daughter was adopted by an Argentine torturer, though in 1985 she was united with her maternal grandmother. Another case linked to Condor was that of General Torres González, who in June 1976 was abducted and killed in Buenos Aires.

By 1974 Banzer Suárez faced political instability, exacerbated by a slumping economy. Even the military’s traditional ally, the peasants, confronted the regime. In January 1974, for example, unarmed peasants blocked highways in Cochabamba Valley in protest over rising food prices. Soldiers removed them, killing at least 80 and possibly

as many as 200. In the mines, workers carried out strikes and acts of violence despite the regime's efforts against organized labor. And in June 1976, students and miners mounted a national protest over Banzer Suárez's decision not to allow General Torres's body to be returned to Bolivia. In late 1977 the unrest, combined with pressure from the Jimmy Carter administration in the United States, led Banzer Suárez to announce that elections would be held the following year. He also repealed his authoritarian decrees and declared he would not be a presidential candidate.

The transition to democracy, however, would take five tumultuous years. In late December 1977 a group of activists, led by **Domitila Barrios de Chungara** and three other miners' wives, began a hunger strike in the offices of the journal *Presencia*, demanding a complete amnesty for some 340 labor and political leaders in exile. Twenty days later, supported by the Catholic Church and joined by thousands across the country, they won their demands. One of the returning exiles was Siles Zuazo, who ran for president representing a loose coalition of parties from the left and center. His main opponent was the military's candidate, General Juan Pereda Asbún. In the election of July 1978, Pereda Asbún claimed victory, but the results were nullified amid charges of vote fraud. He then seized power in a coup, calling Siles Zuazo a tool of international communism. In November Pereda Asbún was himself overthrown by the commander in chief of the army, General David Padilla, who had the support of the left. Pereda not only called for elections but also promised that the military would take no part in them whatsoever.

In the elections held in July 1979, the main presidential candidates were Siles Zuazo, Paz Estenssoro, and Banzer Suárez. Siles Zuazo led the MNR's left faction; Paz Estenssoro led the MNR's center faction; and Banzer Suárez, now a civilian, led a conservative political party, Acción Democrática Nacionalista (ADN, National Democratic Action). Paz Estenssoro won a plurality, though his margin of victory over Siles Zuazo was small. Because no candidate won at least 50 percent of the vote, Congress was given the task of choosing a new president. It decided to call for new elections within a year and to name as interim president Walter Guevara Arce, a longtime MNR member and the head of the Senate. On 1 November 1979, however, Colonel Alberto Natusch Busch staged a right-wing coup, claiming

that Guevara Arce's government lacked legitimacy. On the first day of the coup, known as the Massacre of Todos Santos (All Saints' Day Massacre), the rebels killed 100 and disappeared 140. After two weeks of fighting, in which 500 died, Natusch Busch withdrew, having failed to win popular support or even the full support of the military. Congress then named a new interim president to serve until the elections: Lydia Gueiler Tejada, the head of the Chamber of Deputies, the lower house of Congress.

In the elections of June 1980, the main presidential candidates were the same as the year before: Siles Zuazo, Paz Estenssoro, and Banzer Suárez. This time, Siles Zuazo won a plurality, helped by allegations that Paz Estenssoro had backed the coup in 1979. Siles Zuazo was most likely to be declared the winner in August, when Congress was scheduled to meet. But on 17 July General Luis García Meza, commander in chief of the army, took control of the government, arresting Gueiler Tejada and nullifying the election results.

Although García Meza intervened on the pretext of saving the country from communism, his intervention became known as the cocaine coup because it was financed by Bolivian drug traffickers. "Coca dollars" also paid for the participation of the Argentine military, which used the money to spread its "**dirty war**" to El Salvador. During García Meza's rule (July 1980–August 1981), the value of Bolivia's cocaine exports was estimated at \$1.5 billion, far more than the value of its official exports. García Meza received millions of dollars in kickbacks, and he used some of the money to buy the cooperation of other officers.

In addition to corruption, the regime was characterized by violence. García Meza targeted trade-union and political leaders and journalists for abduction, torture, and killing. Much of the repression was carried out by paramilitary death squads established by Argentine advisors and neofascists such as Klaus Barbie-Altman and Pierluigi Pagliai. One of the death squads, the Servicio Especial de Seguridad (SES, Special Security Service), was trained by Argentine military officers from the **Escuela Mecánica de la Armada** (ESMA, Navy Mechanics School). The Argentines taught the Bolivians how to prolong torture—how to inflict the most pain without killing the victims. On the first day of the coup, some 700 people were arrested. Avoiding arrest were Siles Zuazo and Paz Estenssoro, who went into

hiding. Gueiler Tejada received asylum in the papal nunciature and, in October, was permitted to leave the country. One of those arrested was Marcelo Quiroga Santa Cruz, a socialist leader who had testified before the U.S. Senate against the Banzer Suárez administration and who had documented the existence of Operation Condor. He was tortured during interrogation and murdered. On 15 January 1981 the SES carried out a mass murder, machine-gunning eight leaders of the **Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria** (MIR, Leftist Revolutionary Movement).

Under García Meza, the country was sunk in economic disarray and international isolation. On 4 August 1981 a military junta overthrew him and named General Celso Torrelío Villa president. Facing civil unrest, Torrelío Villa restored trade unions, allowed the return of those exiled by García Meza, and ended the curfew that had been in place since 18 July 1980. He also promised to return the country to democratic rule within three years. But unable to right the economy, he resigned in July 1982, handing over the reins of government to General Guido Vildoso Calderón.

Pressure began to mount for a return to civilian rule. This came not only from peasant organizations, trade unions, and leftist political parties but also from business leaders who had been staunch supporters of military dictatorship. Still, the military was reluctant to hand power back to civilians, fearing punishment for its corruption and violence. Although repression had eased considerably since the end of the García Meza regime, paramilitary units still roamed the streets—the SES had been renamed the Departamento de Investigación Especial (DIE, Special Investigation Department)—and Bolivia continued to shelter Barbie-Altman. Nevertheless, Vildoso Calderón agreed to hold elections in April 1983. Events, however, forced him to act sooner. On 17 September 1982 trade-union leaders staged a nationwide strike, during which Vildoso Calderón resigned, turning power over to the Congress that had been elected in 1980. Congress, charged with electing a new president, chose Siles Zuazo, who was inaugurated in October 1982 for a four-year term.

AFTERMATH OF THE “DIRTY WAR”: Soon after taking office, Siles Zuazo abolished the death squads, banished their Argentine advisors, and purged the military of authoritarian officers. He extradited Barbie-Altman to France, and Pierluigi Pagliai to

Italy. He also established the **Comisión Nacional de Investigación de Desaparecidos** (CNID, National Commission of Inquiry into Disappearances), an eight-member truth commission. As the name suggests, the CNID's mandate was limited—it was charged to investigate disappearances but not other abuses such as illegal detention and torture. The commission collected information on 155 cases of disappearance dating from 1967 to 1982 and managed to recover some remains. But it received little financial or political backing and dissolved three years later, never issuing a final report.

Despite the CNID's dissolution, the search for truth and justice moved forward. In 1986, in Sucre, Bolivia, García Meza and his former minister of the interior, Colonel **Luis Arce Gómez**, were put on trial in absentia for human-rights violations. Supreme Court judges heard the case, which would last seven years and which was known as the Trial of Responsibilities. The two had since gone into hiding. In December 1989 Arce Gómez was discovered on his ranch in the south of Bolivia, arrested, and extradited to the United States to face drug-trafficking charges. The extradition caused a political uproar—no extradition treaty existed between Bolivia and the United States, and Bolivian law stated that no Bolivian could be extradited while on trial in Bolivia. But the extradition was allowed to stand, and in January 1991 Arce Gómez was convicted by a federal court in Miami, Florida, and sentenced to 30 years in prison.

As for García Meza, in April 1993 he was convicted on 36 charges and sentenced to 234 years in prison, though the maximum he could serve under Bolivian law would be 30 years without any chance of pardon. Also convicted were 44 (out of 58) collaborators, who received sentences ranging from one to 30 years. He and Arce Gómez were convicted, along with four paramilitary agents, of the murder of the socialist Quiroga Santa Cruz, a trade unionist, and a member of Congress. He and Arce Gómez were also convicted, along with 12 paramilitary agents, of genocide for the murder of the eight MIR leaders on 15 January 1981. García Meza was arrested in Brazil in 1994 and extradited to Bolivia. His 30-year sentence began in March 1995.

The human-rights abuses of García Meza's regime largely overshadowed those of Banzer Suárez, who, unique among former dictators of the period, improved his image and became a successful civilian politician. Beginning in 1979, Banzer Suárez ran for president six

times, his ADN party consistently garnering 20 percent of the votes. In 1997, allied with the MIR and other parties, he won the congressional runoff election and was named president. But he could not escape his past. In October 1998 General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, Chile's former dictator, was arrested in Britain at the request of the Spanish judge **Baltasar Garzón**, who sought his extradition to Spain to face charges in connection with Operation Condor, which had recently been exposed. Bolivian human-rights groups accused Banzer Suárez of being connected as well. In November 1998 the Chamber of Deputies asked a commission to investigate Bolivia's connection with Condor and to pass any evidence on to Judge Garzón. The evidence was found but, under government pressure, never handed over. In the end, Banzer Suárez never faced charges. He resigned in 2001 because of ill health and died the following year.

BONAFINI, HEBÉ. *See* MADRES DE PLAZA DE MAYO.

BORDABERRY, JUAN MARÍA (1928–). President of **Uruguay** (1972–1976). Bordaberry was born into a family of wealthy landowners and served as the minister of agriculture under President Jorge Pacheco Areco in the late 1960s. In November 1971 he was elected president, representing the Colorado (Red) party. His victory over the Blancos (Whites) and the leftist Frente Amplio (Broad Front) coalition was narrow and widely attributed to electoral fraud. Taking office in March 1972, Bordaberry continued his predecessor's policy of curtailing civil liberties and gave the **military** a freer hand in combating the **Tupamaros**, an urban **guerrilla** organization. By mid-1972 the guerrillas were crushed, and the military, successful in its counterinsurgency campaign, demanded a greater role in government. In February 1973 the service commanders forced Bordaberry to sign the Boisso Lanza agreement, one of the terms of which required him to create the Consejo de Seguridad Nacional (COSENA, National Security Council), which gave the military veto power over his government. The agreement was the first step in a lengthy coup that culminated on 27 June 1973, when Bordaberry closed Congress and established a dictatorship. The events of that day are often described as an *autogolpe*, or "self-coup," since he essentially overthrew himself. On 12 June 1976 Bordaberry was forced out of office

for being too far to the right—he balked at the idea of an eventual return to civilian rule. The military replaced him with another civilian, Dr. Aparicio Méndez Manfredini.

In November 2006 Bordaberry and his former foreign minister, Juan Blanco, were arrested in connection with the kidnapping and murder of the Uruguayan legislators Zelmar Michelini and Héctor Gutiérrez and two suspected guerrillas, William Whitelaw and Rosario Barredo. The crime, which took place in **Argentina**, has been linked to **Operation Condor**. The case is still under litigation.

BORGES, JORGE LUIS (1899–1986). Argentine poet and narrator. Possibly the most important writer in 20th-century **Argentina**. He was born in Buenos Aires into an aristocratic family of Anglo-Spanish heritage, having distinguished connections to the nation's *criollo* past. In his childhood, the Borges family settled in Palermo, a suburb in the northern section of Buenos Aires. Palermo's colorful legacy of violence, tango, and politics would find its way into the early prose of the young writer. In 1914 the family moved to Switzerland, where Borges attended a *lycée* and learned French, German, and Latin. Upon his graduation, his family had an extended stay in Spain, where the young writer soon became a familiar figure among the avant-garde *ultraísta* movement. On his return to Buenos Aires in 1921, Borges immersed himself into the vibrant intellectual life of the Argentine capital and founded an avant-garde journal, *Prisma*. In 1923 he published his first book of poetry, *Fervor de Buenos Aires*. After a yearlong stay in Spain, he returned to Buenos Aires and embarked on a decade of productive literary work. He became associated with the most influential journals of the day, most notably *Martín Fierro*, *Proa*, and, later, *Sur*, edited by Victoria Ocampo. In 1927 he underwent an operation for cataracts, the first of what would be a long series of attempts to save his vision. None would succeed; by the end of his life he would be totally blind. In 1928 Borges campaigned for the reelection of former president Hipólito Yrigoyen. Two years later, Yrigoyen was deposed by a **military** junta, the first of several repressive governments in 20th-century Argentina.

In 1937 Borges accepted a position as First Assistant in the Miguel Cané Branch of the Buenos Aires Municipal Library. It was a job he would hold for nine years and one that he would later describe as a

“menial and dismal existence.” The last years of the 1930s would also bring a series of setbacks to the writer. Earlier, in 1935, his English-born grandmother, Frances Haslam de Borges—a key figure in introducing the young Borges to English literature—died, a death followed in 1938 by that of his father, Jorge Guillermo Borges. Soon after, the writer suffered a head wound—an incident he later retold in his short story “El Sur”—and spent several weeks in the hospital near death from septicemia. He soon began working on his most important stories, collected in *El jardín de senderos que se bifurcan* (1941), which would later be incorporated into another collection and retitled *Ficciones* (1944).

In 1946 **Juan Perón** was elected president of Argentina. Owing to his association with the Yrigoyen campaign and his presidency of the Sociedad Argentina de Escritores (Argentine Writers’ Society), a professional group with anti-Peronist overtones, Borges was demoted to “Inspector of Poultry and Rabbits in the Public Market.” He resigned and soon accepted a number of teaching and lecturing jobs across Argentina and **Uruguay**. In 1951 the first foreign translation of his work—a French edition of *Ficciones*—was published. After the fall of Perón in 1955, Borges was appointed director of the National Library, and soon after, the University of Buenos Aires named him Professor of English and American Literature, a post he would hold for 12 years. In 1956 he won the National Prize for Literature. Worldwide recognition of his work—which had eluded him until then—followed in 1961, when Borges and Samuel Beckett shared the International Publishers Prize (the Formentor Prize), awarded by a group of European and American publishers. That year, he visited the **United States** for the first time as a visiting professor at the University of Texas in Austin, a period followed by travels and lecture across the United States, Europe, and several Latin American countries. In 1967 and 1968 he held the Charles Eliot Norton Chair of Poetry at Harvard University and lectured extensively throughout the United States. As with the earlier visit to the United States, this period was followed by travels in Europe—where he received numerous official honors and was invested a Doctor Honoris Causa by Oxford University—and by visits and lectures in Israel.

In 1973 Borges resigned his post at the National Library following Perón’s return from **exile** and his reelection to the presidency of Ar-

gentina. That same year he received major awards from Mexico and Spain. A one-volume edition of his *Obras completas* was published in 1974, though he would continue to publish new works for a few more years. In 1975, his mother and longtime traveling companion, Leonor Acevedo Suárez de Borges, died at the age of 99. An invitation by the Japanese Ministry of Education to visit Japan in 1976 preceded by a few months the right-wing military coup that overthrew the government of **Isabel Perón**, Juan Perón's widow and successor. Given Borges's stature as perhaps Argentina's most internationally known writer in 1976, the Argentine intellectual community was dismayed at his initial lack of condemnation of the military coup. Although Borges would later denounce what he termed the "absurd war" over the **Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas**, his reputation would suffer a severe blow owing to his apparent endorsement of the regime of General **Jorge Videla** and its tactics. Borges died on 14 June 1986 in Geneva, Switzerland.

BORTNIK, AIDA (1938–). Argentine playwright, screenwriter, and journalist. Born in Buenos Aires, Bortnik was a founding member of **Teatro Abierto Argentino** (Open Theater of Argentina). Her play *Papá querido* (Dear Dad) was one of the works that inaugurated the first cycle of Teatro Abierto Argentino in 1981. Internationally, Bortnik is best known for her screenplay, in collaboration with director Luis Puenzo, for the 1985 movie *The Official Story*, the first Argentine movie to discuss openly the topic of the *desaparecidos* (missing). *The Official Story* was awarded an Oscar for Best Foreign Film, and both Puenzo and Bortnik were also nominated for a "Best Screenplay, Written Directly for the Screen" award by the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences that year.

Bortnik began her career as a playwright and actress. During the early 1970s, the tumultuous years of General Alejandro Lanusse's *dictablanda* (soft dictatorship—a play on words on the Spanish word for dictatorship, *dictadura*), Bortnik's experiences were typical of the intimidation tactics that would soon be employed by the **military** junta led by **Jorge Rafael Videla** against the Argentine citizenry. Scholar Jean Graham-Jones quotes Bortnik as remembering a 1972 staging of her play *Soldados y soldaditos* (Soldiers and Tin Soldiers) in the city of Rosario, Argentina. Audience members had to show

identification to enter the theater, and a row of soldiers, weapons at the ready, was stationed behind the last row of spectators.

In 1974 Bortnik adapted **Mario Benedetti's** novel *La tregua* (The Truce) for the screen. The film, directed by Sergio Renán, was the first Latin American film nominated for an Oscar. Later, she would begin her collaboration as short-story writer with the magazine *Humor*, work that would be translated and anthologized in journals and academic publications in Europe and the **United States**. In the 1970s, she also worked as a journalist and critic for several publications in Buenos Aires, such as the weeklies *Primera Plana*, *Panorama*, *Siete Días*, and the daily *La Opinión*, as well as radio and television outlets. Since 1979, Bortnik has taught screenwriting in several academic institutions in Argentina, most notably the Universidad de Cine and the Universidad de Buenos Aires. She has also participated in screenwriting workshops for the Sundance Foundation in Utah, United States.

In 1986 Bortnik was the first Latin American woman to become a permanent member of the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences. She is credited, alone or in collaboration, for her work as a screenwriter for noted movies such as *Pobre mariposa* (Poor Butterfly, 1986), *Tango feroz: la leyenda de Tanguito* (Fierce Tango: The Legend of Tanguito, 1993), *Caballos salvajes* (Wild Horses, 1995), *Cenizas del paraíso* (Ashes from Paradise, 1997), and *La soledad era esto* (This Was Solitude, 2002), as well as for the 1989 adaptation, co-written and directed by Puenzo, of the novel *Gringo viejo*, by Mexican author Carlos Fuentes, released internationally as *Old Gringo*, which remains her sole Hollywood incursion to date.

Her work has been recognized throughout the United States and Latin America as well as in her native Argentina, where she has been honored by ARGENTORES (Sociedad General de Autores de Argentina/General Association of Argentine Authors). In addition to an Oscar nomination, Aida Bortnik has been the recipient of several awards in major international film competitions in San Sebastián, Berlin, Cannes, Montreal, Toronto, and Havana. Reportedly, her latest project involves a screenplay for a movie titled *Azucena 375 días*, still in production, based on the life of the Argentine activist Azucena de Vicente, the founder of the **Madres de Plaza de Mayo**, who was kidnapped in 1977 along with several other members of the group by a **death squad** under the leadership of **Alfredo Astiz**.

BRASIL: NUNCA MAIS (BNM) / BRAZIL: NEVER AGAIN.

A top-secret project of the Archdiocese of São Paulo to photocopy documents stored in the archive of the Supreme Military Court in Brasília. The documents contained the proceedings of cases tried in **military** tribunals during **Brazil's** dictatorship and included sworn testimony of the use of **torture** to extract confessions from suspected subversives. The project was conceived in August 1979 by lawyers defending political prisoners—lawyers who, because of a recently passed amnesty law, had access to the archives and could check out individual files for 24 hours. They brought the idea to Jaime Wright, a Presbyterian minister and **human-rights** activist whose brother Paulo had been disappeared by the dictatorship. Wright brought the idea in turn to **Paulo Evaristo Cardinal Arns**, the archbishop of São Paulo. The Cardinal approved the project, agreed to sponsor it, and sought additional funding from the World Council of Churches (WCC). The WCC would eventually provide more than \$350,000 in secret funds.

In early 1980, 12 BNM team lawyers began checking out files from the archive and taking them to a rented office building, where team members ran leased photocopiers 10 hours a day, seven days a week. Although the goal was modest—to copy a sampling of the files—the team was never discovered. In three years, it managed to copy the entire archive—more than a million pages on 707 complete trials involving 7,000 defendants. The archive was microfilmed, and the microfilm rolls were smuggled out of the country. The story of the BNM project is detailed in Lawrence Weschler's book *A Miracle, a Universe: Settling Accounts with Torturers* (1990).

The million pages of material, once analyzed, yielded 6,946 pages in 12 bound volumes. The volumes include more than 120 lists and statistical tables, among them a list of 444 torturers. In July 1985, after the return to civilian rule, the archdiocese published a summary of the documents in a book titled *Brasil: Nunca mais*. By the end of the month, after the book was the subject of a three-page article in the magazine *Veja*, it reached the country's best-seller list. An English-language edition was published in 1986 under the title *Torture in Brazil*. In his preface to the Brazilian edition, Cardinal Arns urged the government to sign and ratify the **United Nations** Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment

or Punishment. On 23 September 1985, President José Sarney signed the Convention.

BRAZIL (1964–1985). On 31 March and 1 April 1964 the **military** overthrew the left-wing government of President **João Goulart**, imposing an authoritarian state. A succession of military governments, beginning with that of **Humberto de Alencar Castello Branco** (1964–1967), persecuted individuals and organizations considered a threat to national security. Targeted for persecution were leftists, members of the military sympathetic to Goulart, **trade unionists**, students, politicians, journalists, religious workers, and anyone else thought “subversive.” Thousands were abducted by the military and **tortured** in clandestine prisons called *aparelhos* (Portuguese for “apparatuses,” or “devices”). At least 485 died in military custody. Some of these deaths the military covered up, reporting them as accidents or suicide; others were never accounted for, the victims joining the number of *desaparecidos* (missing). Repression even reached Brazilians who had gone into **exile**. As neighboring countries fell to dictatorship—**Bolivia** in 1971, **Uruguay** and **Chile** in 1973, and **Argentina** in 1976—Brazilians living there were subject to torture by either Brazilian or local agents. This network of cooperation among South American dictatorships, including that of **Paraguay**, was formalized in 1975 under the name **Operation Condor**.

In March 1979, with the inauguration of General **João Baptista de Oliveira Figueiredo** as president, the country began a lengthy transition to civilian rule. Although repression did not end, it eased enough for the **Catholic** Archdiocese of São Paulo to start a project called **Brasil: Nunca Mais** (BNM, Brazil: Never Again). BNM was financed by the World Council of Churches, an ecumenical organization based in Geneva, Switzerland, and was carried out in secret. Project members photocopied more than a million trial-related documents from the archive of the Supreme Military Court. The documents established that the military routinely used torture to extract confessions. In 1985, after the return to civilian rule, the archdiocese published a summary of the documents in a book titled *Brasil: Nunca mais*, which quickly appeared on the country’s best-seller list, where it remained for almost two years. An English-language edition was published in 1986 under the title *Torture in Brazil*. Unlike similar

publications that appeared in other Condor countries after the end of military rule, *Brasil: Nunca mais* was unique in that it established **human-rights** abuse using testimony contained in the military's own documents.

BACKGROUND TO THE “DIRTY WAR”: In 1930, during an economic crisis, Getúlio Vargas came to power in a revolution, replacing a loose confederation of states with a strong central government. A new constitution, ratified in 1934 by a constituent assembly, contained many provisions that were nationalist, calling for the government takeover of mines and mineral resources, the establishment of a minimum wage, and the establishment of free primary education. On 15 July 1934 the assembly elected Vargas president for a four-year term. Although he was elected indirectly, the constitution called for future presidents to be elected directly by the people. The move toward democracy, however, would be halted by a military coup.

The 1930s in Brazil saw much ideological conflict. The Wall Street crash of 1929 and the ensuing world depression had shaken faith in capitalism and, by association, democracy. Brazilians turned instead to groups offering authoritarian solutions. In the early 1930s, Luís Carlos Prestes became head of the **Partido Comunista Brasileiro** (PCB, Brazilian Communist Party). Meanwhile, in October 1932 Plínio Salgado, a right-wing intellectual, had founded the Ação Integralista Brasileira (AIB, Brazilian Integralist Movement), a fascist organization. In 1934 and 1935 leftists and the AIB clashed violently, prompting the government, in early 1935, to enact a national-security law that banned subversive organizations. Nevertheless, in March 1935 leftists formed the Aliança Nacional Libertadora (ANL, National Liberation Alliance), naming Prestes as its president. By July the ANL's membership was between 70,000 and 100,000.

Repressed by the government, the ANL was banned on 11 July 1935, and many of its members were jailed. The PCB then planned an uprising to topple the Vargas government, drawing on support within the lower ranks of the military. In November three barracks revolted. The PCB had the support of Soviet agents from the Comintern office in Montevideo and acted in the hope that the masses would rise up. Instead, the revolts were quashed by loyalist troops, a state of emergency was declared, and thousands were jailed—including many who

were linked to the ANL or to the left but had no role in the uprising. Prestes was arrested in 1936, as were several Soviet agents, some of whom were tortured to death.

The threat of international **communism** provided a rationale for backing away from the plan to hold elections. On 10 November 1937 Vargas and his military commanders staged an *autogolpe*, or “self-coup,” establishing a dictatorship called the Estado Novo (New State). Named after Jose de Oliveira Salazar’s fascist regime in Portugal, it was welcomed by both Mussolini’s Italy and Hitler’s Germany, from which it took its basic principles of authoritarianism and nationalism. It was also welcomed by many of Brazil’s elite, who saw it as a way to modernize and industrialize the country without communist interference. An important question was whether Brazil could best achieve its goals through increased commerce with Germany or with the **United States**. The question became critical in 1941, when the United States entered World War II. Although his military commanders tended to side with the Axis, Vargas aligned the country with the United States in return for economic and military aid. In August 1942 Brazil entered the war on the side of the Allies. Between 30 June 1944 and 2 May 1945, more than 20,000 Brazilian soldiers fought in Italy.

After Brazil entered the war, Vargas’s opponents were quick to point out a contradiction—that a dictatorship modeled after fascism was fighting in support of democracy. Expecting that the war’s end would bring elections, both Vargas and the opposition formed political parties. In 1945, three major ones appeared: the União Democrática Nacional (UDN, National Democratic Union), the Partido Social Democrático (PSD, Social Democratic Party), and the Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (PTB, Brazilian Labor Party). The UDN was anti-Estado Novo and conservative, favoring free trade; the PSD, centrist; and the PTB, leftist. Both the PSD and the PTB were influenced by Vargas, who, lacking support from his top military commanders, reached out to labor, the left, and the middle class. In April 1945 Brazil began diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. Prestes was then released from prison, and the PCB decided to support Vargas, following Moscow’s lead to support any government that was fighting fascism. In mid-1945, labor and the left mounted a “We want Getúlio” campaign, troubling the military, which feared

that Vargas was becoming a populist like Argentina's **Juan Perón**. In October 1945 the military ousted Vargas in a bloodless coup.

In December 1945 the military allowed elections. The two main presidential candidates were the UDN's Eduardo Gomes and the PSD's Eurico Dutra, both generals. Dutra, who had received a last-minute endorsement from Vargas, won by a 20 percent margin. Although Dutra had been pro-Axis during the Estado Novo, he had since become pro-United States. At first, his economic policy was conservative—he favored free trade and removed any restrictions left over from the Estado Novo. But the economy suffered, and by mid-1947 he changed course, pursuing a policy that favored essential imports over consumer ones, a policy that benefited Brazilian industry and increased the GDP. At the same time, he repressed trade unions, and workers saw a decrease in their real wages. Dissatisfaction with Dutra led to early campaigning for the presidential election, whose main candidates were Vargas and Gomes. Vargas ran on a nationalist platform, promising to strengthen industry and raise workers' wages; Gomes vowed to abolish the minimum wage. Vargas won the election of October 1950, getting 49 percent of the votes to Gomes's 30 percent.

By Vargas's second tenure as president (1951–1954), two main political camps had emerged, camps that would become increasingly polarized. On one side were the nationalists, led by Vargas and the PTB. They favored taking control of strategic industries such as oil and iron metallurgy and raising workers' wages. They were wary of foreign investment and U.S. influence. The opposition, led by the UDN and the military high command, favored encouraging foreign investment and controlling inflation. It also favored aligning the country with the United States in the fight against global communism. In early 1954 the military became outraged over the proposal of **João Goulart**, Vargas's labor minister, to raise the minimum wage by as much as 100 percent. In February, under pressure from the opposition press—most notably the Rio de Janeiro journalist Carlos Lacerda—Vargas fired Goulart. But Vargas's troubles continued. Lacerda's newspaper, *Tribuna da Imprensa*, leveled daily attacks at Vargas—both personal and political—and soon the government was reeling from reports of financial scandals. And although Vargas

sought to rouse his working-class base by implementing a 100 percent increase in the minimum wage, he grew politically isolated.

The military began planning a coup and was soon handed a pretext. Unbeknown to Vargas, those in his inner circle plotted to remove his most vocal critic—Lacerda. On 5 August 1954 a hired assassin wounded Lacerda but killed his companion, an air force major. In November, after an air force investigation discovered that the plot originated in the presidential palace, the military demanded that Vargas resign. He refused. Instead, on 24 November he put a bullet through his heart. A suicide note blamed national and international forces for his downfall. The international forces included oil companies that had opposed his plan to nationalize the oil industry, and the United States, which had fought Brazil's efforts to raise coffee prices. His death provoked demonstrations in the cities. Mobs stoned the U.S. embassy and torched the delivery trucks of opposition newspapers. Lacerda fled the country, and the military backed away from a coup.

The next five years in Brazil were a time of optimism. Juscelino Kubitschek, a PSD member and a centrist, was elected president in 1955 for a five-year term. Under the slogan "50 years in five," Kubitschek pursued an ambitious developmental plan. He improved infrastructure, attracted foreign investment in industry, and built the new capital city of Brasília, in the center of the country. His plan contributed to high inflation, yet in 1959 he decided against a stabilization program drawn up by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), a decision blasted by the UDN.

In the presidential election of October 1960—which would be the last direct presidential election until 1989—Jânio Quadros, the UDN's candidate, won by a landslide. Quadros was an eccentric but popular figure who had campaigned with a large broom, promising to rid government of corruption. His victory owed more to his own popularity than to that of the UDN—voters were allowed to split their tickets, and João Goulart, representing the PSD and the PTB, won the vice presidency. Taking office in January 1961, Quadros raised fears he was moving to the left. Although the country was behind in its foreign debt by \$176 million, he rejected a \$100 million loan from the United States. He then signed trade deals with the Soviet Union and announced that he welcomed debate in the **United Nations** over

admitting Communist China. He also awarded the Cruzeiro do Sul medal to Che Guevara, the Argentine-born Cuban **guerrilla**. His actions provoked verbal attacks from Lacerda, but Quadros, though a formidable debater, did not fight back. Instead, in August 1961, after only seven months in office, he suddenly resigned.

The resignation made Goulart the legal president. Quadros's military ministers, however, led by Marshal Odílio Denys, tried to prevent Goulart from taking office, accusing him of communist leanings. Goulart was then on a visit to Communist China, and the ministers threatened to have him arrested if he returned. The manifesto caused a reaction among those who supported his right to assume the presidency, a group that included students, trade unionists, centrist politicians, and prodemocracy military officers. Further support came from his home state of Rio Grande do Sul, where General M. José Machado Lopes, commander of the Third Army, and Governor Lionel Brizola, Goulart's brother-in-law, vowed armed resistance to the ministers. Goulart was finally allowed to return and take office after a compromise was reached—a constitutional amendment that reduced his powers and transformed the presidential system into a parliamentary one. He was inaugurated on 7 September 1961.

Goulart inherited serious problems, including a deficit in the balance of payments and an inflation rate of 39.5 percent (inflation had ranged from 12 to 26 percent between 1949 and 1959). His position strengthened in January 1963, when a landslide victory in a national plebiscite restored the presidential system. In mid-1963, having abandoned an IMF-approved stabilization plan that had alienated his supporters, Goulart adopted radical nationalism instead, a program that included agrarian reform, urban reform, voting rights for illiterates and military enlisted men, and greater state control over the economy. His supporters began to mobilize. Workers created the Comando Geral dos Trabalhadores (General Workers' Command), a communist-led labor confederation; peasant unions proliferated in the countryside (they numbered over 2,000 by 1964); students in the União Nacional de Estudantes (UNE, National Student Union) campaigned for the reforms; and leftist Catholics created the Juventude Universitária Católica (JUC, Catholic University Youth) and the revolutionary Ação Popular (AP, Popular Action). Goulart also won

the support of military enlisted men, who in September 1963 revolted in Brasília.

On the other side, top military officers, many of them schooled in the **Escola Superior de Guerra** (ESG, Higher War College), had adopted the ideology of national security, which identified internal leftists, not external invaders, as Brazil's primary threat. Convinced that Goulart was leading the country toward socialism and threatening the military's hierarchy, some of these officers, coordinated by General Castello Branco, began a conspiracy to overthrow the government. Allied to the military were Lacerda (now the governor of Guanabara, or greater Rio de Janeiro), Governor Adhemar de Barros of São Paulo, and Governor Magalhães Pinto of Minas Gerais; leading newspapers such as *O Globo* and *Jornal do Brasil*; and conservative civilian organizations such as the Instituto de Pesquisas e Estudos Sociais (IPES, Research and Social Studies Institute) and the Instituto Brasileiro de Ação Democrática (IBAD, Brazilian Institute for Democratic Action). IPES and IBAD were funded by the United States. At the same time, the United States reduced aid to the national government.

In early 1964 tension between the two sides reached a climax. The economy was in chaos—the inflation rate had reached 100 percent, and the government, denied credit, was in danger of defaulting on \$3 billion of foreign debt. Unable to gain congressional support for his reforms, Goulart made the fateful decision to bypass Congress entirely. He scheduled a series of rallies at which he would issue decrees. The first took place on 13 March in Rio de Janeiro, where before 100,000 people he decreed agrarian reform. Brizola spoke as well, calling for Congress to be abolished and to be replaced by worker and peasant assemblies. The event spurred the opposition. On 19 March, in São Paulo, conservative Catholic **women** led an anticommunist parade, the *Marcha da Família com Deus pela Liberdade* (the Families' March for God and Liberty), which drew some 500,000 people. The event indicated significant support for a coup, and on 31 March and 1 April 1964 military leaders ousted Goulart. There was little opposition. Governor Brizola tried again to rouse Rio Grande do Sul's Third Army on Goulart's behalf, but failed. Goulart found exile in Uruguay, where by the end of April he was joined by

Brizola. Goulart had not yet left the country when Brazil's military leaders were congratulated by President Lyndon Johnson.

THE “DIRTY WAR” AND BRAZIL’S NATIONAL SECURITY STATE: Unlike earlier coups in Brazil (in 1930, 1937, 1945, and 1961), when the military quickly returned power to civilians, the coup of 1964 led to a military dictatorship. On 2 April the leader of the Senate declared the presidency to be vacant, and in accord with the 1946 constitution, the leader of the Chamber of Deputies became interim president for a maximum of 30 days, during which Congress was to choose a new president. But military hard-liners intervened. Led by Army Marshal **Artur da Costa e Silva**, the commanders of the army, navy, and air force created the *Comando Supremo Revolucionário* (Supreme Revolutionary Command), which gained power when Interim President Ranieri Mazzilli added the three officers to his cabinet.

On 9 April 1964 the *Comando* decreed the first *Ato Institucional* (AI, Institutional Act). (There were many AIs; this entry will mention only the most significant.) Among its provisions, AI-1 allowed Congress to meet, but reduced its power while strengthening the executive. It allowed the president to send bills to Congress, which would have only 30 days to consider them. It also gave the president power to suspend any citizen's political rights for 10 years and to remove legislators from office at the national, state, and municipal levels. In addition, it required Congress to elect a new president within two days of its publication. On 11 April Congress elected as president the military's consensus candidate, General Castello Branco.

By the time of Castello Branco's election, the military had already moved against so-called subversives, arresting between 10,000 and 50,000 people in *Operação Limpeza* (Operation Cleanup). Among them, in Rio de Janeiro, were leaders of student groups and trade unions, leaders of the Catholic groups AP and JUC, members of leftist political parties such as the Moscow-line PCB and the Chinese-line **Partido Comunista do Brasil** (PC do B, Communist Party of Brazil), and members of the military who had supported Goulart. In the Northeast, the Fourth Army arrested members of peasant leagues and rural trade unions. Joining in on the repression were the promilitary governors Lacerda (in Guanabara) and Barros (in São Paulo).

Many detainees were subjected to tortures such as the “parrot’s perch” (the victim beaten or given electric shocks while suspended from a pole, bound to it by ankles and wrists) and near drownings. It is estimated that several hundred were tortured for longer than a day. Principal torture centers during this first phase of the “**dirty war**” were—in addition to the Fourth Army headquarters in Recife—the Centro de Informações da Marinha (CENIMAR, Naval Intelligence Center) and the Departamento de Ordem Político e Social (DOPS, Department of Political and Social Order), both in Rio de Janeiro.

Castello Branco used AI-1 to purge political opponents. The provision for suspending political rights and removing legislators expired on 15 June 1964. By then, it had been used against three former presidents (Goulart, Kubitschek, and Quadros), six governors, 55 federal legislators, and over 300 state and municipal legislators. Another AI-1 provision had suspended job security for civil servants, leading to the firing of 1,400 (a conservative estimate). In June 1964, to coordinate the fight against internal subversion, General Golbery do Couto e Silva created the **Serviço Nacional de Informações** (SNI, National Intelligence Service), which would acquire power rivaling that of the president.

Having established an authoritarian regime, Castello Branco had a free hand to reform the economy. The most pressing problems were inflation and foreign debt. He fought the first by reducing public-sector deficits, tightening private credit, and lowering wages. This commitment to fighting inflation helped solve the second problem, and by mid-1964 Brazil had started to win back foreign creditors. Yet like any strict stabilization plan, this one entailed social costs. One of the measures for reducing public deficits involved cutting subsidies for oil and wheat, a measure that increased bus and train fares as well as the price of bread, gasoline, and utilities.

In the state elections of October 1965, opposition PSD candidates defeated progovernment UDN candidates in Guanabara and Minas Gerais. Castello Branco responded by decreeing AI-2, one of whose provisions abolished all existing political parties. Consequently, the PSD, the PTB, and the UDN disappeared and were replaced by two parties under military control: the **Aliança Renovadora Nacional** (ARENA, National Alliance for Renewal), a progovernment party; and the **Movimento Democrático Brasileiro** (MDB, Brazilian

Democratic Movement), a moderate opposition party. Another AI-2 provision specified that presidents and vice presidents would be elected indirectly—by roll-call vote in Congress. In February 1966 the government decreed AI-3, which specified that governors would be elected indirectly as well—by state legislatures.

Castello Branco was originally meant to serve out Goulart's term of office, which was due to end in January 1966, but the military gave him an additional year. He spent his last few months in office institutionalizing changes to the political structure. On 24 January 1967 Congress approved a new constitution, which incorporated the three AIs. Also in early 1967 he decreed a law giving the government broad powers over the media as well as a national security law aimed at protecting the country against internal enemies.

On 15 March 1967 General Costa e Silva was inaugurated president. Although he had been the preferred candidate of military hard-liners, once in office he tried to soften the dictatorship by consulting civilians. Yet an opposition had begun to grow. Leaders of the Catholic Church openly criticized the government, workers staged strikes, and students demonstrated. At a demonstration in Rio de Janeiro in March 1968, the death of a high school student at the hands of the military police set off further demonstrations, including one in June, in Rio de Janeiro, that drew 100,000 marchers. Also in 1968, some leftist groups—encouraged by the strikes and demonstrations and inspired by the Cuban Revolution—began robbing banks to fund armed resistance. They included the **Ação Libertadora Nacional** (ALN, National Action for Liberation) and **Carlos Lamarca's** Vanguarda Popular Revolucionária (VPR, People's Revolutionary Vanguard).

To hard-liners, these events justified a higher level of repression. Further rationale came in August and September 1968, when **Márcio Moreira Alves**, an MDB congressman, spoke out against police brutality and torture. His speeches offended the military, a violation of the national security law. For Alves to be prosecuted, his parliamentary immunity would have to be lifted. On 12 December, however, Congress surprisingly voted against lifting the immunity, and the next day, Costa e Silva responded by decreeing AI-5. Unlike the previous AIs, this one carried no date of expiration. It gave the president power to close Congress (a power he immediately invoked),

suspend political rights (including habeas corpus), remove legislators from office at all levels, and fire public servants. In March 1969 the government stifled protest further, issuing a decree that banned any criticism of the AIs, the government, or the military.

The decrees and political purges reinforced the conviction among leftist groups that armed struggle was the only option for change. In 1968 about six groups were active—in Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro, and São Paulo. After honing their guerrilla skills in small operations—robbing banks and planting bombs—they turned to major ones. In June the VPR attacked the Second Army's hospital in São Paulo, and four days later, its headquarters. In October the VPR assassinated Charles Chandler, a U.S. army captain, having sentenced him to death for allegedly working with the CIA. In turn, the security forces, which had at first dismissed the groups as a nuisance, began to take them seriously. By early 1969 they were rounding up suspected guerrillas and their sympathizers, torturing them, and then using extracted information to make a new batch of arrests. Tortures included the “parrot’s perch”; the *geladeira*, or “refrigerator” (a five-by-five-foot concrete box that alternated between heat and cold); and the “dragon’s chair” (a metal electric chair). Sometimes young children were tortured in front of their parents, and women were raped in front of their husbands. Some suspects were tortured for up to two months.

The repression further strengthened the guerrillas’ commitment to armed struggle. Groups increased their activities, kidnapping foreign diplomats for ransom. On 4 September 1969, for example, the ALN and the **Movimento Revolucionário 8 de Outubro** (MR-8, 8th of October Revolutionary Movement) kidnapped the U.S. ambassador Charles Elbrick, an event dramatized in the feature film *Four Days in September*. Elbrick was released unharmed on 8 September after the government broadcast the guerrillas’ revolutionary manifesto and released 15 political prisoners, exiling them to Mexico. The day after the kidnapping, the government escalated its repression, decreeing AIs 13 and 14. AI-13 allowed the government to banish any citizen considered a risk to national security. The law was invoked three days later against the 15 political prisoners. AI-14 established capital punishment for anyone engaged in “subversive warfare.” In practice, capital punishment took the form of summary execution or

death under torture. Official reports would then present the victims as having committed suicide or been killed while attempting to escape. Within two weeks of issuing these AIs, security forces arrested 1,800 suspected subversives.

On 25 October 1969 Congress was reconvened to rubber-stamp the military-high-command's choice of General **Emílio Garrastazú Médici** to replace Costa e Silva, who had suffered a stroke on 29 August. He was inaugurated on 30 October. A former head of the SNI, Médici presided over the most repressive period of the dictatorship (1969–1974). In July 1969 the military had created Operação Bandeirantes (OBAN, Operation Pioneer), which integrated the security efforts of the army, navy, air force, and police in São Paulo. In January 1970 the military applied this interservice concept nationwide, creating security units called the Destacamento de Operações Internas—Comando Operacional de Defesa Interna (DOI—CODI, Information Operations Detachment—Operational Command for Internal Defense). A DOI—CODI unit was established in each military region. CODIs were executive branches, operating under the control of the region's army—São Paulo, for example, was under the Second. DOIs were plainclothes **death squads** composed of military and police. Also taking part in the repression were branches of the Departamento Estadual de Ordem Política e Social (DEOPS, State Department for Political and Social Order)—the state versions of DOP—and the federal Polícia Militar (PM, Military Police). São Paulo's DEOP, under the notorious interrogator Sérgio Fleury, competed aggressively with the DOI—CODIs. Within a year, the armed-guerrilla movement would be all but eliminated. Indeed, by early 1972, the DOI—CODIs would face a shortage of suspects. One group of PC do B guerrillas, however, in the Araguaia River basin, would not be eliminated until 1975.

The Médici period was noted not only for its repression but also for its “Brazilian miracle.” From 1969 to 1973, the GDP grew an average of 11 percent a year, and inflation never exceeded 18 percent. The high growth was achieved through a variety of means including low wages and substantial foreign investment. The miracle gave the government a semblance of legitimacy both at home and abroad. Those who benefited from the economic gains—mostly middle- and upper-income groups—were inclined to support the government,

and foreign economists converged on Brazil to observe the miracle firsthand. By 1972, however, the miracle was criticized by the MDB and the World Bank for widening the gap between Brazil's rich and poor. The government had favored industrial growth while neglecting programs in education, health, and housing.

In January 1974 General **Ernesto Geisel** was elected president. He was the first chosen by an electoral college, made up of both houses of Congress plus six delegates from the majority party in each state legislature. He took office on 15 March. Selected for his administrative ability, Geisel, a moderate, set Brazil on a path of political liberalization known as *distensão* (relaxation). His first task was to rein in the hard-liners in the SNI and the DOI-CODIs—they had accumulated so much power that they challenged the traditional military hierarchy. Meanwhile, the Brazilian Bar Association and the Catholic Church had begun speaking out against arbitrary arrests and torture, challenging the government to bring the repressive forces under control. The hard-liners, however, fought *distensão* at every turn. Despite the elimination of the armed-guerrilla movement, they continued to arrest and torture suspected subversives. Some of the arrests were high profile, intended to embarrass the government. In addition, Geisel had eased censorship, and the press began to question official reports that prisoners had committed suicide or been shot while trying to escape. Instead, deaths were now often reported as “disappearances.”

Two deaths were especially embarrassing to the government. In October 1975 Vladimir Herzog, a Yugoslav-born Jewish immigrant and prominent journalist, died under torture at the DOI-CODI in São Paulo. The Second Army presented his death as a suicide, prompting a three-day strike at the University of São Paulo and denunciations from the Brazilian Bar Association, the Journalists' Union, and the Catholic Church. **Paulo Evaristo Cardinal Arns**, the archbishop of São Paulo, even dared to lead an ecumenical service for Herzog at the São Paulo cathedral. In December an all-military panel reviewing the case ruled the death a suicide, a ruling that cast doubt on the government's commitment to liberalization. But in January 1976 Manoel Fiel Filho, a union activist, also died at the hands of the Second Army, and after the death was presented as a suicide, Geisel fired the Army's commander, General Ednardo d'Avila Melo, and

replaced him with a commander who put an end to torture at São Paulo's DOI-CODI. In 1977 **Amnesty International** reported that arrests had begun to decrease.

Besides reining in the hard-liners, Geisel sought to move the country gradually toward democracy, albeit a democracy controlled by the government party, ARENA. In November 1974 direct elections were held for members of Congress, and although congressional seats were openly contested—both ARENA and the opposition MDB had access to radio and television—ARENA candidates were favored to win. The MDB, however, won more than a third of the seats. In July 1976 Geisel tried to slow the opposition by introducing the Falcão Law, which restricted candidates' use of radio and television. Though the law applied to both parties, it posed a greater obstacle to the MDB, which lost its best means of getting its message out. Nevertheless, the MDB made gains in both the municipal elections of November 1976 and the congressional elections of November 1978. Even so, it was prevented from capturing a congressional majority by Geisel's 1977 April Package, a set of constitutional changes that included electoral laws ensuring ARENA's dominance in both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. One law allowed for a third of the senators to be appointed—to be elected indirectly by an electoral college whose makeup favored the government. Opponents would jokingly refer to these senators as the "bionics."

Despite the April Package, there were clear signs of a political opening. In 1977 journalists and students staged demonstrations—the first since 1968. The opening grew larger in October 1978 when Geisel began to remove authoritarian decrees. Constitutional reforms abolished AI-5, reinstated habeas corpus, lifted the censorship of radio and television, and abolished the death penalty. Changes to the National Security Law recognized fewer crimes against national security and reduced their penalties. And at the end of the year, Geisel allowed 120 political exiles back into the country, though exiles strongly disliked by hard-liners—Brizola and Prestes, for example—were excluded. On the other hand, the constitutional reforms granted Geisel wide executive powers—he was allowed, for example, to call a state of siege or a state of emergency and renew it without the approval of Congress. And under the revised National Security

Law, prisoners could be held incommunicado for eight days, which, though down from 10, still held out the possibility of torture.

Geisel's choice to be his presidential successor was General João Baptista de Oliveira Figueiredo. But as early as 1977, General Sílvio Frota, the army minister, challenged Geisel's authority by putting forward his own candidacy. The voice of the military hard-liners, Frota argued that the government was soft on subversion and that liberalization put the country at risk for a communist takeover. Geisel confronted the challenge by sending Frota into early retirement and ending his campaign. On 14 October 1978 the ARENA-dominated electoral college elected Figueiredo president. He took office on 15 March 1979.

Figueiredo continued the process of liberalization, now known as *abertura* (opening). In August 1979 he granted amnesty to those imprisoned or exiled for political crimes. The amnesty allowed all but a few political exiles back into the country, including Brizola and Prestes. The amnesty, however, was a compromise: it included not only those who committed political crimes but also those who committed "connected crimes"—that is, the torturers. Still, opposition leaders thought the compromise was necessary for *abertura*, which could not go forward without the military's cooperation.

Under Figueiredo, as under Geisel, hard-liners fought liberalization, though now they did so clandestinely. Newspaper vendors who sold leftist publications received anonymous threats, and those who continued to sell them saw their kiosks firebombed. A letter bomb killed a woman at the headquarters of the Brazilian Bar Association, a leading advocate for the return of democracy. And on 30 April 1981 one undercover DOI-CODI agent died and another was seriously wounded when a bomb they were transporting went off in their car. The bomb was meant to go off in a Rio theater during a concert to raise money for leftist causes. The government investigated the incident and covered it up.

Although the violence raised concerns that the hard-liners might subvert *abertura*, Figueiredo stuck to the election schedule, which promised municipal, state, and national elections in November 1982. Like Geisel, however, he faced the problem of how to prevent the opposition from coming to power too quickly. The current two-party system favored the opposition: ARENA was associated with repres-

sion, whereas the MDB, the lone opposition party, drew votes from a wide range of the government's opponents. In November 1979, to divide the opposition, Figueiredo scrapped the two-party system and required all new parties to use the word *partido* (political party) in their names. ARENA became the Partido Democrático Social (PDS, Social Democratic Party). The MDB became the Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (PMDB, Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement), annoying the government by retaining the words *Democrático* and *Brasileiro*. But as the government had hoped, the PMDB weakened as other opposition parties emerged. Among them were the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT, Workers' Party), formed by rural and urban trade unionists and led by Luíz Inácio da Silva, or "Lula"; the Partido Democrático Trabalhista (PDT, Democratic Labor Party), founded by Brizola; and the resurrected PTB.

In November 1980 the government, confident in its new strategy, softened the April Package, changing the constitution to allow governors and all senators to be chosen by direct election. The results of the 1982 elections, however, were mixed. The PDS captured most of the governorships but lost in the states of Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro, and São Paulo. The new governor of Rio de Janeiro was Brizola. And although the PDS held majorities in both the Senate (46 to 23) and the electoral college (356 to 330), it lost its majority in the Chamber of Deputies—the four opposition parties outnumbered it by 240 to 235.

Figueiredo found himself in a weak position. Not only had the opposition parties continued to make headway but also the Brazilian miracle had long faded and the country was now in a deep recession. Furthermore, he had health problems—he had suffered a mild stroke in September 1981 and underwent bypass surgery in July 1983. One of the few advantages left to the government was that presidents were still chosen indirectly by the electoral college. In 1983, however, the PT led other opposition parties in calling for a constitutional amendment to have presidents chosen by direct election. "Direct Elections Now" supporters staged huge rallies, including one—in Rio de Janeiro in early April 1984—that drew 500,000 people. On 25 April the amendment came to a vote in Congress, where it needed a two-thirds majority in both houses. It lost in the Chamber of Deputies by 22 votes. Among those voting in favor were 55 PDS deputies.

The next presidential election, scheduled for 1985, would be decided by the electoral college. In August 1984 the PDS nominated Paulo Maluf, a former governor of São Paulo and a member of the Chamber of Deputies. His nomination divided the party. Some appreciated the firm hand he used, as governor, against labor unions and other opponents of the regime; others saw him as a threat to the budding democracy. In July Aureliano Chaves, Figueiredo's vice president and a PDS hopeful, had abandoned his campaign and broken ranks with the PDS. He then joined other PDS dissidents in forming the Partido da Frente Liberal (PFL, Liberal Front Party). The PFL then reached an agreement with the PMDB, forming the Aliança Democrática (Democratic Alliance). The PMDB had nominated as its presidential candidate Tancredo Neves, a father figure and political moderate; the PFL named the ticket's vice presidential candidate, José Sarney, a PDS senator.

On 15 January 1985 Neves and Sarney won in the electoral college, earning 480 votes to Mulaf's 180. Seventeen members abstained, and nine were absent. The opposition had come to power through the ballot box.

AFTERMATH OF THE "DIRTY WAR": Neves never made it to his inauguration. The day before the ceremony, scheduled for 15 March 1985, he went into the hospital—he had been suffering from an intestinal ailment for several months. Sarney was inaugurated in Neves's place and, after Neves's death on 21 April, became president.

Sarney had two political priorities, that of revoking the last of the authoritarian decrees and that of electing a constituent assembly that would write a new constitution. In May 1985 laws reestablished direct presidential elections, gave illiterates the right to vote, and legalized all political parties. In November 1986 elections were held for members of the constituent assembly as well as for governors, senators, and deputies. The PMDB won the governorship in every state but Sergipe and took control of both houses of Congress. And on 5 October 1988 a new constitution took effect, officially bringing the dictatorship to an end.

An important issue remained—whether to bring torturers to justice. Although Figueiredo's 1979 amnesty law seemed to have settled the issue—it amnestied torturers as well as their victims—events in 1985 raised the issue anew. In April nine Argentine military-junta

members went on trial in Buenos Aires for human-rights violations committed during their 1976–1982 “dirty war.” In May the Archdiocese of São Paulo published *Brasil: Nunca mais* (Brazil: Never Again), which, using the military’s own documents, reported on the torture of political prisoners from 1964 to 1979. (Argentina’s truth commission, the **Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas**, had published its report in 1984.) And in November, the authors of *Brasil: Nunca mais* published the names of 444 torturers from the military and police. Yet the 1979 amnesty held. This reluctance to try torturers has been attributed both to a widespread belief among Brazilians that their culture is conciliatory and to the relatively small number of deaths during Brazil’s dictatorship—485 compared with 3,000 in Chile and 9,000 in Argentina (human-rights groups say Argentina’s figure could be as high as 30,000).

Unlike the military in Argentina and Chile, Brazil’s military never apologized. A measure of justice occurred in August 1995 when Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Brazil’s president, established Law 9.140, which acknowledged the military’s responsibility for 136 deaths reported as disappearances, issued death certificates, and awarded each family a one-time payout of between \$108,000 and \$165,000. He also created, within the Justice Department, the Comissão Especial sobre Mortos e Desaparecidos Políticos (CEMDP, Special Commission for the Dead and Disappeared), which handled requests for compensation from the families of other victims—those presumed to have died in military or police custody but whose deaths were reported as suicides, accidents, or shoot-out fatalities.

Although many in the military had hoped that Law 9.140 would put an end to questions about human-rights abuse, the issue did not go away. In April 1996 *O Globo*, a Rio de Janeiro newspaper, published photos—leaked from a military archive—of slain PC do B guerrillas. Those shown in the photos were among the 69 who went missing in the jungles of the Araguaia River region in the early 1970s. Information accompanying the photos described the deaths and disclosed the sites of mass graves, where 25 bodies were later exhumed by government forensic teams.

The location of many other victims of the regime remained unavailable to the public, locked in archives that, though open for a short time in the 1990s, were closed by Cardoso just before he left office in 2003.

Nor was that information available in *Direito à memória e à verdade* (The Right to Memory and the Truth), a 500-page book published by the government in 2007, on the 28th anniversary of the 1979 amnesty law. Prepared by the CEMDP and available free on the World Wide Web, the book details the state's role in torture, rape, and disappearances. Although human-rights groups such as **Tortura Nunca Mais** (Torture—Never Again) argue that a full accounting of the period must await the opening of the archives to the public, they hailed the book's publication as an important step.

BUARQUE, CHICO (1944–). **Brazilian** musician, playwright, and writer. Born Francisco Buarque de Holanda, in Rio de Janeiro, Buarque is one of the towering figures of popular Brazilian music of the 20th century, along with Caetano Veloso, Gilberto Gil, and other figures of the late 1960's *Tropicalista* movement in Brazil. His early years were spent in São Paulo until 1953, when his father, the noted Brazilian historian Sérgio Buarque de Holanda, was invited to lecture at the University of Rome. Upon his return to Rio, he abandoned early studies in architecture at the Universidade de São Paulo in favor of early incursions into the burgeoning bossa nova musical scene initiated by João Gilberto in the late 1950s.

Popular acclaim arrived in 1966 when his song “A Banda” (The Marching Band), interpreted by one of the undisputed queens of bossa nova, Nara Leão, won the well-known Festival de Música Popular Brasileira (Festival of Brazilian Popular Music), transmitted by national television that year. Earlier, Buarque had released a single, “Pedro Pedreiro,” which attracted attention from Brazilian music aficionados for his smooth singing style and his delicate lyrics. Some of the edgier artists of the *Tropicalista* movement had charged him with artistic conservatism until 1968, when Buarque wrote and scored a play, *Roda Viva* (Live Wheel), which garnered him the censure of the **military** dictatorship. Partly a bleak meditation on the destructive nature of the adoration of fans and partly early performance theater, *Roda Viva* concluded with the dismemberment of its pop-star protagonist on stage. Audience members were offered pieces of the artist's flesh to consume—in reality chicken meat—to participate fully in the theater experience. The play debuted in Rio de Janeiro under the direction of José Celso Martinez Corrêa to

limited financial success but soon attracted attention when, during a second staging in São Paulo, a group of soldiers interrupted the performances, destroyed sets, and briefly jailed the artist. Buarque then went into **exile** in Italy. During this time, he wrote songs critical of the dictatorship of General **Emílio Garrastazú Médici** such as “Apesar de você” (Despite You), which was a huge hit with Brazilian audiences and which would later be censored by the government, and “Cálice” (Chalice). He adopted the pseudonym Julinho da Adelaide to compose others. Julinho da Adelaide not only criticized the military dictatorship but also provided the artist with the means to elude censure; reportedly, the alias acquired a national identification card and even granted press interviews before he was detected.

Buarque’s return to Brazil in 1971 represented a new stage in his musical career. During what is considered the most repressive years of the dictatorship, 1969–1974, Buarque released the album *Construção* (Construction), which marked his break with earlier bossa nova and a new music marked by social and political protest. Earlier rifts with other artists such as Veloso and Gil—both previously exiled in England—subsided, and he would go on to record with both of them during this period. He also penned a popular song, “Meu Caro Amigo” (My Dear Friend), included in the 1976 album *Meus Caros Amigos* (My Dear Friends), dedicated to the theater director and politician **Augusto Boal**, who was living in exile after suffering imprisonment and **torture** by the Brazilian military. While Buarque’s popularity at home and abroad increased, his work was severely censored. One music critic has noted that between 1974 and 1975, the censors approved only a handful of Buarque compositions. Among the works that were censored at the time was the play *Calabar o Elogio da Traição* (Calabar or In Praise of Treason), written by Buarque in collaboration with Ruy Guerra, to be directed by noted director Fernando Peixoto. The work, set to be the most ambitious production in Brazil at the time, was prohibited by military censors who, reportedly, went as far as to forbid the public mention of the name Calabar (Domingos Fernandes Calabar), an almost legendary smuggler turned *senhor de engenho* (plantation owner) of Pernambuco, who sided with the Dutch against the Portuguese crown during an attempted invasion by the former in the 17th century. Later dramatic or musical compositions by Buarque would include *Ópera do*

malandro (Scoundrel's Opera), inspired by John Gay's *Beggar's Opera* and Bertolt Brecht and Kurt Weill's *Three-Penny Opera*, as well as by exploratory analyses and workshops on both works conducted by several Brazilian intellectuals of the time, in which Buarque participated.

Throughout his career, Buarque would also devote himself to writing fiction. He is also the author of several books for children. Several of his works for adults have been popular with Brazilian readers, among them the novel *Budapeste*, awarded the Premio Jabuti as the Best Book of Fiction of 2004. In addition, he has composed music for the screen, including the soundtrack for the film *Dona Flor e seus dois maridos*, starring Sonia Braga and based on the novel by the same title by his compatriot **Jorge Amado**.

Chico Buarque lives in Brazil, where he continues to explore different aspects of his artistic trajectory.

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CALLADO, ANTONIO (1917–1997). Brazilian journalist, playwright, and novelist. One of Brazil's leading journalists, Callado was born in Niterói, Rio de Janeiro, into an upper-middle-class family. He finished his law studies in 1939 during Getulio Vargas's "Estado Novo" dictatorship and soon after began working for the BBC in London, for which he would work at intervals until 1947. Toward the end of World War II, he was employed by the Brazilian desk of the Radiodiffusion Française in Paris. On his return to Brazil, he returned to the daily *Correio da Manhã*, for which he had worked as a reporter during his years as a law student. In time, Callado would collaborate with the most important newspapers of Brazil, including *O Globo*, *Correio da Manhã*, where he was chief editor between 1954 and 1960, and *Jornal do Brasil*; for the last publication, he reported on the Vietnam War in 1968. He served short stints as a visiting professor, first in 1974 at the Corpus Christi College in Cambridge, England, and then in 1981 at Columbia University in New York. By then, he had retired from journalism to devote himself to literature, although he would write a weekly column to the end of his life. Hugo Estenssoro from Bolivia, himself a distinguished journalist and liter-

ary critic and a friend of Callado's, described his friend in his obituary as "one of the great newspapermen of the period and a model to follow. His generosity with young colleagues and his professional integrity were legendary."

Callado's literary production began in the 1950s as the author of plays that were received with great critical and public success but that are chiefly remembered as providing the basis for a later film starring soccer superstar Pelé. Literary acclaim as a novelist would come in 1967, with the publication of his novel *Quarup*. The title was taken from a Xingu Indian and demonstrated Callado's interest in the examination of all the constitutive parts of Brazilian nationality. In the novel, its protagonist, a young Franciscan priest named Nando, is transformed from missionary into revolutionary as he witnesses the repression of sugarcane workers in northeast Brazil. The action is initiated with the suicide of the populist Getulio Vargas in 1954 and ends with the stirrings of armed resistance to the **military** coup of 1964. Although later critics have discerned troubling aspects in the dense narrative, it remains a touchstone for proponents of **liberation theology** in Latin America—in the character of the priest/revolutionary—and as a model of the socially conscious novel of the time. A film based on the novel by the same title was filmed by director Ruy Guerra in 1967. According to Estenssoro, Callado first drafted the manuscript while sharing a prison cell with the Brazilian filmmaker **Glauber Rocha**, during the initial days of the dictatorship.

One of the most consistent opponents of the military regime, Callado would also be held under house arrest following the closing of the Brazilian Congress in 1968, although at least one critic, Nancy T. Baden, considers that his fame abroad provided some protection from censorship, as it would his compatriot **Jorge Amado**, particularly during the 1969–1971 period often termed *o sufoco* (the suffocation). His satiric novel *Bar Don Juan*, published in 1971, was saved from military censorship, according to Baden, because it was "common knowledge" in Brazil that the English translation by Knopf was ready to be published in the **United States** in 1972, when the author and his editor asked for permission to print a second Brazilian edition. A first edition had sold out so quickly that only two volumes remained, according to the scholar, when the military police arrived to confiscate it. The novel has been hailed for its parodic view of

the urban **guerrilla** movement in Latin America in the 1960s, as it depicts the misadventures of a cell of inept revolutionaries, mostly middle class, who meet at the bar of the title and whose amorous and drinking activities belie a rigorous revolutionary commitment. For Baden, Callado's "revolutionary cycle" as a novelist ends with the publication of his novel *Sempreviva* in 1981 (translated into English as *Sempreviva* in 1988). Its exiled protagonist, Quinho, returns to Brazil in order to investigate the disappearance, **torture**, and assassination of several people, chiefly his fiancée, Lucinda, pregnant at the time of her torture and death.

Widely admired for his writing and for his brave stance against the dictatorship, Callado received many awards both abroad and in Brazil, where he was elected to the Academia Brasileira de Letras (Brazilian Academy of Letters). Antonio Callado died in Rio de Janeiro on 28 January 1997.

CAMBALACHE / THE SECONDHAND SHOP. One of the best-known instances of censorship of the arts in **Argentina** dealt with the tango "Cambalache," composed in 1935 by famed Buenos Aires composer Enrique Santos Discépolo (1901–1951). The song, an ironic paean to changing social values in a world upended by the world depression of 1929 and by the **military** coup that overthrew the government of Hipólito Yrigoyén in 1930, was variously banned by several dictatorial regimes of Argentina during the 20th century, most notably by the 1976–1983 military juntas, which decried its "defeatist" message. In the Spanish-speaking world, "Cambalache" had long been associated with legendary Argentine tango interpreter Carlos Gardel and the banning of the song, along with other forms of censorship of all types of popular music, such as the harassment of folk singer Mercedes Sosa, which led to her widely publicized **exile**.

A partial rendering of the lyrics, translated by John Kriniauskas for *The Argentina Reader: History, Culture and Politics*, reveals the song's still subversive message: "That the world's always been rotten / don't remind me, it always will be. / In the year 506 and 2000 too! / [. . .] But this twentieth century / has put insolent / evil on show, and that / no one can deny. [...] There's no respect in the windows / of the secondhand stores / where's life's been all mixed up [...]"

This secondhand twentieth century, / feverish and problematic... / in which everything's for sale. / Those that don't cry don't feed, / and those that don't steal are fools."

CÁMPORA, HÉCTOR JOSÉ (1909–1980). Peronist politician and president of **Argentina** from May to July 1973, when he was forced out of office by a right-wing Peronist faction to make room for **Juan Perón** himself, who had recently returned from **exile**. As Perón's handpicked representative in Argentina, Cámpora had been designated to run in his place in the March 1973 presidential election. Perón was barred from being a candidate because of a residency requirement. Cámpora won easily under the slogan "Cámpora in government, Perón in power." Taking office in May, Cámpora, who had ties to the **Montoneros**, an urban **guerrilla** organization, freed all political prisoners, many of them guerrillas, and reopened diplomatic relations with Cuba. The drift toward the left angered Perón, who returned to Argentina in June, engineered Cámpora's resignation, and ran for president himself. After the **military** coup of 24 March 1976, Cámpora took refuge in the Mexican embassy in Buenos Aires with the intention of fleeing to Mexico. The junta, however, refused to let him leave, and he spent most of his remaining years as a refugee in the embassy.

CAMPS, RAMÓN JUAN ALBERTO (c. 1927–1994). Argentine army general who was chief of the Buenos Aires provincial police until his retirement in 1981. Of the 9,000 to 30,000 people who disappeared in **Argentina** during the 1976–1983 "**dirty war**," Camps claimed responsibility for the disappearance of 5,000. His most famous prisoner was **Jacobo Timerman**, who wrote about his imprisonment and **torture** under Camps in his best-selling book *Preso sin nombre, celda sin número* (published in English as *Prisoner without a Name, Cell without a Number*). In 1986, Camps was sentenced to 25 years in prison for **human-rights** crimes but was freed in 1990 under a general amnesty granted by President **Carlos Saúl Menem**. He died on 22 August 1994.

CARABINEROS. Members of the **Chilean** national police force. The primary responsibilities of the carabineros are to maintain public

order, investigate crimes, and patrol the country's borders. After the **military** coup of 11 September 1973, the department carried out a systematic campaign of **human-rights** abuse against Chilean citizens. Under the direction of General **César Mendoza Durán** (until 1985) and then General Rodolfo Stange Oelckers—both of whom served in the ruling junta—the carabineros took part in abduction, illegal detention, **torture**, summary execution, murder, and disappearance. During the first two years of military rule, their principal victims were demonstrators, workers, opposition-party members, and poor urban dwellers. The poor who resided in shantytowns suffered *allanamientos*, or surprise raids, in which people were rounded up while their homes were destroyed. The carabineros would later extend their campaign of state-sponsored terror to include members of local and international human-rights organizations active in recording and denouncing the department's repression. In the 1980s, when popular protests were directed against the government, the carabineros renewed their violent assaults against demonstrators.

CARAPINTADAS. A group of **Argentine** junior army officers, who, from 1987 to 1990, staged a series of revolts against the democratic governments of **Raúl Alfonsín** and **Carlos Saúl Menem**. They were called *carapintadas* (literally the “painted faces”) in reference to their practice of wearing commando fatigues and smearing their faces with black camouflage. The *carapintadas* were angered by civilian attempts to persecute the **military** for waging what they saw as a justified war against subversion.

In April 1987 and January 1988, Lieutenant Colonel Aldo Rico, a veteran of the “**dirty war**” and the **Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas** conflict, led uprisings against Alfonsín. The first uprising, Operación Dignidad (Operation Dignity), began on 15 April 1987, the Thursday of Holy Week. (The uprising is also known as the revolt of *Semana Santa*, Easter Holy Week.) An army major accused of **human-rights** violations had fled prosecution and taken refuge in a military compound in Córdoba. The rebels took over the compound and demanded a general amnesty for all officers facing trial for participating in the “dirty war.” Alfonsín met with the rebels and announced, on Easter Sunday, that they had agreed to surrender. Although he claimed that the rebels had given in without conditions, two months later the

government passed *Obediencia Debida* (Due Obedience law), which exempted all but the most senior officers from prosecution.

Although the *carapintadas* escaped the possibility of standing trial for any involvement in the “dirty war,” they did not escape the army’s efforts to discipline them for their part in the rebellion. In January 1988, Rico, who had been imprisoned since the revolt, resisted the army’s call for his resignation, fled confinement, and led a second uprising, the *Rebelión de Monte Caseros* (Rebellion of Monte Caseros), which was put down by army loyalists. Rico and his followers were sentenced by a military court and imprisoned in Magdalena military prison. In December 1988 a third uprising against Alfonsín took place. This one, at the Villa Martelli military base, was led by Colonel Mohammed Alí Seineldín, a charismatic right-wing figure. Like Rico, Seineldín surrendered and received a prison term. Both were freed on 8 October 1989 in a blanket presidential pardon issued by **Carlos Saúl Menem**. They were still, however, subject to military discipline. Rico was discharged from the army later that month. Seineldín fought any attempt to remove him, and on 3 December 1990 launched another *carapintada* rebellion—the last and most violent. It was crushed by loyalist forces the same day. The rebels were sentenced in a military court to long prison terms, including life sentences for Seineldín and other leading officers.

CARAVAN OF DEATH. A 1973 **military** mission that traveled by Puma helicopter to five provincial cities in **Chile** and executed 75 political prisoners, all without trial. Authorized by General **Augusto Pinochet Ugarte** and led by General Sergio Arellano Stark, the Caravan of Death began on 4 October in Cauquenes and then flew north to La Serena, Copiapó, Antofagasta, and finally, on 19 October, Calama. At each stop, Arellano Stark would examine the list of political prisoners, either toughening their sentences or singling out prisoners for execution. All 75 victims were believed to have been associated with leftist organizations. Arellano Stark’s mission included Lieutenant Colonel Sergio Arredondo González, Major **Pedro Espinoza Bravo**, Major Marcelo Moren Brito, and Lieutenant Armando Fernández Larios. A detailed account of the mission can be found in **Patricia Verdugo’s** book *Caso Arellano: Los zarpaos del*

puma (1989), which was translated in 2001 as *Chile, Pinochet, and the Caravan of Death*.

CARTER, JAMES EARL, JR. (“JIMMY”) (1924–). President of the **United States** (1977–1981). Unlike **Henry Kissinger**, secretary of state under the administrations of presidents Richard Nixon (1969–1974) and Gerald Ford (1974–1977), President Jimmy Carter made the promotion of **human rights** one of the goals of his foreign policy. Whereas Kissinger regarded human-rights concerns as being in potential conflict with the practice of foreign policy, Carter argued that the United States was legally bound—by virtue of its membership in the **United Nations**—to speak out against abuses. The U.S. commitment to human rights, he thought, was especially strong in the Americas—the United States being a member of the **Organization of American States** (OAS) and signatory to the OAS’s American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. He argued further that the pursuit of human rights could coexist with political, **military**, and economic goals in foreign policy; that it could expand democracy abroad, creating a world friendly to the United States; and that it could distance the United States from repression.

One of Carter’s first acts as president was to activate the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, which had been created in 1976 during the final months of the Ford administration. Citing a lack of concern for human rights in U.S. foreign policy, Congress had passed the International Security and Arms Export Control Act, section 301 of which established the bureau and placed it within the State Department. Whereas Ford and Kissinger had disregarded the new agency, Carter appointed **Patricia Derian**, a 1960s civil-rights activist, as its coordinator and empowered her to speak out strongly on human-rights issues. As early as August 1977, Derian’s position was upgraded from coordinator to Assistant Secretary for Human Rights.

The Southern Cone quickly became the main focus of Carter’s human-rights policy. In the context of the region, human-rights abuse was defined as the violation of a person’s physical integrity. Abuses of this type were severe and had been well documented by the UN, the OAS, and private human-rights groups. The administration used a wide range of methods to try to halt abuses. It practiced “quiet

diplomacy” through private channels; issued public statements; compiled “Country Reports” on the status of human rights in the region and around the world; imposed military and economic sanctions; and supported the efforts of the UN, the OAS, and other international organizations to make site visits and publish their findings.

Carter’s policy has been criticized on a number of grounds. First, its legal basis: Some ask whether UN declarations on human rights are legally binding or merely voluntary. Second, its definition of human-rights abuse: Should the emphasis be on violations of personal integrity, or on economic, social, civil, and political rights? Third, its lack of consistency: The policy was applied to “soft” targets rather than to nations perceived to be of more strategic importance to the United States at the time. And although human rights tended to improve during the Carter years, it is unclear whether improvements were due to policy or to the destruction of the perceived leftist threat in the region. Nevertheless, there are indications that the policy was successful: the region’s military governments celebrated Carter’s defeat by **Ronald Reagan** in the 1980 election, and President **Raúl Alfonsín** of **Argentina** asserted that Carter’s policy saved many lives during the repression.

CASTELLO BRANCO, HUMBERTO DE ALENCAR (1900–1967). Army general and president of **Brazil** from April 1964 to March 1967. He was the first of five **military** presidents following the coup that toppled the left-leaning President **João Goulart**. The military ruled until 1985.

Castello Branco was born in Fortaleza, the capital of the state of Ceará, in Brazil’s northeast. The son of a brigadier general, he graduated from a preparatory military academy in Porto Alegre and then began his military career, at age 18, as a cadet at the Escola Militar do Realengo, the national military academy in Rio de Janeiro. His subsequent training included courses at Brazil’s **Escola Superior de Guerra** (ESG, Higher War College), France’s national war college, and the **United States** Army Command and Staff School at Fort Leavenworth. He also fought in Italy in 1944 and 1945 as part of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force.

Castello Branco was a noted intellectual, reading widely in four languages. He was the leader of the “Sorbonne group”—a group of

officers, like generals **Ernesto Geisel** and Golbery do Couto e Silva, who were moderate compared with the hard-liners. Though largely believing in democracy, they saw the need for short-term authoritarian government. They also were strongly associated with the ESG, where, after the success of the Cuban Revolution in 1959, the Brazilian military adopted the concept of “internal war.” The concept identified the greater threat to the country as coming not from outside invasion but from internal, left-wing subversion. In 1963, convinced that Goulart was trying to turn the country into a socialist state, Castello Branco, the army chief of staff, led a conspiracy to overthrow him. The coup took place on 31 March and 1 April 1964. On 15 April, Castello Branco was inaugurated president.

Within the first two weeks of the coup, the military waged a “**dirty war**” against its political enemies. Thousands were arrested, and many were **tortured**. But after the *Correio da Manhã*, a Rio de Janeiro newspaper, published reports on torture (the press was still relatively free), Castello Branco asked Geisel to investigate, and the systematic use of torture stopped—at least for this first phase of military rule. Castello Branco’s government was characterized less by torture than by political purges, especially of leftists. Under Article 10 of the government’s first *Ato Institucional* (AI, Institutional Act), AI-1, he had the power to suspend any citizen’s political rights for 10 years and to remove legislators from office at the national, state, and municipal levels. By 15 June 1964, when Article 10 expired, more than 400 Brazilians had lost their political rights or been removed from office. Among them were former presidents and members of Congress, as well as diplomats, intellectuals, and **trade unionists**. Also purged were civil servants and those military officers who had opposed the coup.

Having subdued his opponents, Castello Branco carried out an economic-stabilization plan that lowered inflation and raised the GDP but that also entailed sacrifices, especially among workers. In October 1965, after opposition candidates won two state governorships, he issued AI-2, one of whose provisions abolished all existing political parties. They were replaced with a two-party system under military control.

On 15 March 1967, Castello Branco was succeeded in office by General **Artur da Costa e Silva**, a hard-liner. On 18 July, Castello Branco died in a plane accident.

CASTILLO VELASCO, JAIME. A Chilean jurist, Castillo Velasco had served as minister of justice under President **Eduardo Frei Montalva** (1964–1970) and as a representative to the Human Rights Commission of the **United Nations**. During the dictatorship, he posed a challenge to the Chilean legal community. He was one of five prominent Chilean lawyers who sent an “open letter” to the **Organization of American States** (OAS) when it met in Santiago in June 1976. The letter deplored the **human-rights** abuses of the junta and the unwillingness of the courts to intervene. Two months later, Castillo Velasco and a second letter writer, Eugenio Velasco Letelier, were abducted by agents of the **Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional** (Directorate of National Intelligence, DINA) and forced into **exile**. A copy of the letter was included in the second supplement to *Final Report of Mission to Chile: Arrests and Detentions and Freedom of Information in Chile*, published in September 1976 by the **International Commission of Jurists**.

CATHOLIC CHURCH. Traditionally, the Catholic Church in Latin America belonged to a triumvirate that included the **military** and the ruling elite. In the 1960s **liberation theology** challenged the Latin American church to abandon its traditional alliances and side instead with the region’s poor. A decade later, during the height of the “**dirty wars**,” the church was further challenged to shift its allegiance from the defenders of the status quo to the victims of repression.

In **Argentina** the church was largely conservative, and many priests and bishops not only supported the coup of 24 March 1976 but also justified the repression. **Christian Federico Von Wernich**, for example, a Catholic priest and police chaplain, was given a life sentence in October 2007 for complicity in kidnapping, **torture**, and homicide. Yet the Argentine church was by no means homogeneous. Many Catholics opposed the military regime and suffered the consequences. Monsignor **Enrique Ángel Angelelli**, the bishop of La Rioja, for example, was assassinated by the air force on 4 August 1976, shortly after the assassination of two of his diocesan priests. Two French nuns disappeared in Argentina on 13 December 1977 because of their involvement with the **Madres de Plaza de Mayo** (Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo). And **Adolfo Pérez Esquivel**, a lay Catholic and leader of **Servicio Paz y Justicia** (SERPAJ, Peace and

Justice Service), was imprisoned for his nonviolent efforts in behalf of the missing (*desaparecidos*).

In **Bolivia** the church hierarchy welcomed the August 1971 coup that ousted the left-wing General **Juan José Torres González** and installed General **Hugo Banzer Suárez**, who saw himself as the defender of Christianity in Bolivia. Within two years, however, the bishops began to adopt a critical stance in the face of the regime's harassment of progressive priests and religious women. In January 1973 the bishops established a Justice and Peace Commission, which began documenting cases of illegal detention, torture, and disappearance. In October 1977 the bishops supported the creation of the ecumenical **Asamblea Permanente de los Derechos Humanos de Bolivia** (APDHB, Permanent Assembly on Human Rights in Bolivia), which participated in the 1977–1978 hunger strike led by the activist **Domitila Barrios de Chungara** and three other miners' wives. The strikers' demands were met—Banzer Suárez proclaimed an amnesty for 340 labor and political leaders then in **exile**. And during the short, but violent, dictatorship of **Luis García Meza** (July 1980–May 1981), the bishops continued to denounce torture and assassinations.

In **Brazil** the hierarchy was ambivalent about the 1964 coup. On the one hand, fearing that the country had been on the road to socialism, it expressed gratitude to the military for taking action. On the other hand, it expressed reservations about authoritarian rule. Nevertheless, the church and the military government managed a peaceful coexistence for the first few years, and conservative bishops could be counted on to celebrate masses of thanksgiving on the anniversary of the coup. By the mid-1960s, however, a rift had begun to appear. As the military hard-line came to power and transformed Brazil into a national-security state, progressive church leaders such as Archbishop Hélder Câmara, **Dom Paulo Evaristo Cardinal Arns**, Aloisio Cardinal Lorscheider, and Bishop Pedro Casaldáliga rose to prominence as advocates for **human rights**. They were also branded as subversive, and left-leaning Catholics were targeted by **death squads**.

Although some members of the hierarchy in **Chile** supported the coup of 11 September 1973, the church emerged as the only institution in the country capable of applying consistent pressure on the military regime of **Augusto Pinochet Ugarte**. Shortly after the

coup, the bishops condemned socialism but stopped short of publicly embracing the new regime. Cardinal Raúl Silva Henríquez, though uncommitted at first, created the **Comité de la Paz** (COPACHI, Committee for Peace) in October to aid victims of the repression. After COPACHI was dissolved by the government two years later, its work was continued by the **Vicaría de la Solidaridad** (Vicariate of Solidarity), established under church protection. In August 1983 Archbishop Juan Francisco Fresno Larraín, Silva Henríquez's successor, urged cooperation, not confrontation, and began hosting secret meetings between opposition groups and representatives of the military regime. This dialogue would result, in August 1985, in the National Accord for a Transition to Full Democracy, a pact that laid the groundwork for Pinochet Ugarte's defeat in the 1988 plebiscite.

The church in **Paraguay** had had a troubled relationship with rulers going back to the colonial period—the Jesuit order was expelled in 1767, the first of several expulsions. In the early years of the **Alfredo Stroessner** regime (1954–1989), the church and the government maintained a fragile working relationship—the church gained financial support, the government moral support. Tensions appeared as early as 1956, when Ramón Talavera, a Paraguayan priest, denounced Stroessner from the pulpit, citing violations of human rights. After Talavera was kidnapped and beaten, the church hierarchy sent him to **Uruguay** for his protection. Although the government never let him return, others followed his example. In the 1960s the Catholic University in Asunción became a center of student activism. Meanwhile, in the countryside, the Jesuit order was raising the political consciousness of peasants by creating cooperatives called Christian Agrarian Leagues. To the government, both the university and the leagues were hotbeds of **communism**. In 1975–1976 it destroyed the leagues and expelled many of the Jesuits.

In Uruguay, bishops opposed the dissolution of Congress on 27 June 1973, which capped a four-month-long coup. Although the bishops often spoke of the need for reconciliation, they openly opposed the military government in a document issued on 30 April 1975. On 1 April 1984, in anticipation of the return to democracy, Monsignor Carlos Partelli delivered a sermon on “the good news of the dignity of man.” Partelli had spent many years defending the Uruguayan branch of SERPAJ against the military government.

CENTER FOR LEGAL AND SOCIAL STUDIES. *See* CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS LEGALES Y SOCIALES (CELS).

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA). A clandestine agency of the **United States** government, responsible for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence. Established by the National Security Act of 1947, the CIA has been used by presidents as a tool of analysis and covert activity. During the Cold War, combating **communism** was the agency's primary mission. In 1954, during the administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower, the CIA staged the overthrow of Jacobo Arbenz, the left-wing president of Guatemala. In 1961, during the administration of President John F. Kennedy, the CIA attempted to oust Fidel Castro of Cuba by directing the Bay of Pigs invasion. Among the agency's Cold War activities were experiments on mind control and (unsuccessful) attempts on the lives of foreign leaders—Castro, in particular.

In 1975 the CIA's covert operations came under the investigation of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. Chaired by Frank Church, the Committee looked into possible CIA involvement in the 1973 coup that deposed the Marxist president **Salvador Allende Gossens** of **Chile**. The CIA had tried for many years to prevent Allende Gossens from gaining the presidency. Once he took office in 1970, the United States reduced aid, curtailed trade, and cut off supplies. The CIA was instructed to sabotage the Chilean economy, following the orders of President Richard Nixon to "make the economy scream." The CIA also carried out Track II—a top-secret plan to instigate a **military** coup. From 1970 to 1973 the CIA spent \$8 million to undermine the Allende Gossens government, supporting the opposition in business, labor, media, and politics. Although the Church Committee found no evidence that the CIA took a direct part in overthrowing Allende Gossens, the agency knew about the plan for the coup and encouraged those who put it into action.

CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS LEGALES Y SOCIALES (CELS)/CENTER FOR LEGAL AND SOCIAL STUDIES. A **human-rights** nongovernmental organization in **Argentina**. CELS was founded in 1978 by a group of lawyers that included the lawyer-educator Emilio F. Mignone, whose daughter Monica had disappeared in May 1976.

During the dictatorship, CELS offered legal defense and documented human-rights abuses. It has since become a civil-rights organization, promoting the rule of law and human rights.

CENTRO DE INFORMAÇÕES DA MARINHA (CENIMAR) / NAVAL INTELLIGENCE CENTER. *See* SERVIÇO NACIONAL DE INFORMAÇÕES (SNI) / NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE.

CENTRO DEMOCRÁTICO. *See* PARTIDO LIBERAL.

CENTRO NACIONAL DE INFORMACIÓN (CNI). *See* DEATH SQUADS; DIRECCIÓN DE INTELIGENCIA NACIONAL (DINA).

CERRUTO, OSCAR (1912–1981). Bolivian poet, novelist, journalist, and diplomat. Born in La Paz, Cerruto is hailed as one of the most important poetic voices of 20th-century Bolivia. He worked for several newspapers in his country and served as ambassador to **Uruguay** in 1965.

He is credited as being the first Bolivian novelist to explore the aftermath of the Chaco Wars (1928–1930, 1932–1935), in which Bolivia was soundly defeated by **Paraguay**. In his novel *Aluvión de fuego* (1935, *Torrent of Fire*), the effects of the conflicts on the population and the concomitant popular movement known as the National Revolution serve as background to understanding the Bolivian “**dirty war**” of 1971–1982. Widely admired by Bolivian intellectuals, he has been described by the *Encyclopedia of Latin American Literature* as “one of the most coherent Marxist voices of the era.”

Cerruto was a member of the Academia Boliviana de la Lengua. In addition to his novel Cerruto published *Cerco de penumbras* (1958, *Circle of Shadows*), a collection of short stories on Bolivian daily life. His poetry was posthumously collected in one volume, *Cántico traspasado*.

CHAMORRO, RUBÉN JACINTO (d. 1986). Nicknamed “Dolphin” or “Máximo.” An **Argentine** navy captain (later rear admiral) who commanded the **Escuela Mecánica de la Armada** (ESMA, Navy Mechanics School), the most notorious of the Centros Clandestinos

de Detención (Secret Detention Centers). Under his command, from 1976 to 1979, at least 5,000 suspected subversives were detained, **tortured**, and murdered, many of them thrown alive into the Atlantic Ocean from navy aircraft. He died of a heart attack on 2 June 1986, at age 61. *See also DESAPARECIDOS.*

"CHICAGO BOYS." The name for a large, diverse group of neoliberal economists, some of whom studied at the University of Chicago. Among them were many Chileans who had received fellowships in the 1960s to study under such Chicago monetarist theorists as Milton Friedman and Arnold Harberger. After the military coup in **Chile** in 1973, the generals wanted to transform the economy but did not know where to begin. Admiral **José Toribio Merino Castro**, the junta member in charge of economic policy, sought the advice of Chile's Chicago Boys, who had produced a massive plan for instituting free-market reforms. The junta was not easily convinced, but after much spirited debate and a visit to Chile by Milton Friedman in 1975 (the first of a series of consultations), the Chicago Boys took control of the economy. Their recommended "shock treatment" called for drastically reducing the supply of money, expanding free trade, and encouraging private investment.

The treatment was painful, especially for the working class. Chilean industry, accustomed to producing for domestic consumption, felt the pressure of foreign competition, and some companies went bankrupt. Industries that did adapt to competition became leaner, wages plummeted, unemployment and self-employment rose, and thousands entered government make-work programs. **Trade unions** lost much of their traditional bargaining power. By the end of the 1970s, however, the Chicago policies resulted in what many described as the "Chilean miracle." Between 1973 and 1980, inflation dropped from 600 to 31 percent, growth was significant, and a fiscal deficit was transformed into a surplus. There was an increase in demand for consumer goods, mostly imports. The economic boom improved the lot of many Chileans. At the same time, its benefits failed to reach the large percentage of people living in poverty, particularly dwellers in Santiago's *poblaciones* (shantytowns).

The boom ended in 1982, a victim of worldwide recession, and the Chicago Boys fell out of favor. The government continued to

embrace the free-market model, but from then on economic policy became less doctrinaire and more pragmatic.

CHILDREN FOR IDENTITY AND JUSTICE, AGAINST OBLIVION AND SILENCE. *See* HIJOS POR LA IDENTIDAD Y LA JUSTICIA, CONTRA EL OLVIDO Y EL SILENCIO (HIJOS).

CHILE (1973–1990). On 11 September 1973 the Chilean **military** overthrew **Salvador Allende Gossens**, a democratically elected Marxist president. Led by General **Augusto Pinochet Ugarte**, the military coup unleashed a reign of terror over the civilian population. The victims included Allende Gossens himself, who died (an apparent suicide, later confirmed) during the air and ground assault on the presidential palace, La Moneda. Pinochet Ugarte began a series of campaigns against leftists and other perceived subversives. **War tribunals** appeared—military courts that detained and executed prisoners without benefit of a trial. The two main sports arenas in the capital city of Santiago—Chile Stadium and National Stadium—became detention centers. Thousands of political prisoners were arrested and subjected to **torture**; many were killed.

Immediately after the coup, a junta was formed consisting of Pinochet Ugarte, commander in chief of the army; Admiral **José Toribio Merino Castro**, commander in chief of the navy; General **Gustavo Leigh Guzmán**, commander in chief of the air force; and General **César Mendoza Durán**, director general of the **Carabineros** (the national police force). The junta was led by Pinochet Ugarte, who declared Chile to be in a state of civil disorder and economic chaos caused by the proliferation of Marxist ideas. The junta had two main objectives: the first was to extirpate Marxism from Chilean society and ensure the return of civilian government; the second was to rescue the government from the economic chaos caused by Allende Gossen's socialist reforms.

To fulfill the first objective, the junta declared a state of siege and implemented a plan of organized repression. During the first few weeks after the coup, thousands of Chilean citizens, refugees from other countries of Latin America, and foreign nationals became the victims of raids, attacks, searches and seizures, arrests and detentions, torture and executions, forced disappearances, and **exile**. The

junta assured the country that once all leftist elements had been eliminated, the military would return the country to civilian rule. Members of the once-powerful **Partido Demócrata Cristiano** (PDC, Christian Democratic Party), many of whom tacitly supported the coup, entertained hopes of leading a new government. Their expectations were cut short by what resulted—the one-man totalitarian regime of Pinochet Ugarte, who would rule for 17 years.

To fulfill the second objective, that of stabilizing the economy, the junta sought the help of a group of economists called the **Chicago Boys**. Drawing on the monetarist ideas of University of Chicago economics professor Milton Friedman, the Chicago Boys believed that the chief impediment to economic growth in Chile was the welfare state. They envisioned replacing it with a model of unrestrained free-market capitalism.

BACKGROUND TO THE “DIRTY WAR”: For much of the 20th century, despite brief military interventions in 1924 and 1931, Chile was one of the most representative democracies in Latin America. From 1932 to 1973, political representation from the center, left, and right parties achieved a fairly even balance, and elections resulted in multiparty alliances.

The government of **Eduardo Frei Montalva**, president from 1964 to 1970, represented an era of social and political advancement for many Chileans. His PDC, traditionally centrist, had aligned itself with the Chilean right in the previous election in order to defeat Salvador Allende Gossens, the candidate representing an alliance of leftist groups. Frei Montalva’s social reforms (in education, labor, and agriculture) expanded opportunities for the middle and working classes. His land-reform program, however, angered the wealthy, who saw their estates converted into farm cooperatives. In the presidential election of 4 September 1970, the right turned against the PDC, allowing Allende Gossens to win a narrow plurality over the two other candidates, the conservative former president Jorge Alessandri and the left-leaning PDC candidate Radomiro Tomic. Allende Gossens promised a peaceful transition to socialism and headed a coalition of leftists and moderates called **Unidad Popular** (UP, Popular Unity). Since Allende Gossens failed to win a majority, Congress was called on to decide between the two front-runners. In past elections, congressional confirmation had been a formality. This time, however,

the leading candidate was a socialist, and conservative members of the PDC tried to block the confirmation.

By early October the two sides had reached a compromise. In return for PDC votes necessary for confirmation, Allende Gossens agreed to sign a Statute of Guarantees, promising to respect democratic principles. Not all of Allende Gossens's opponents, however, were willing to accept his impending confirmation. Two groups within the military were already planning to disrupt the process. On 22 October one of the groups attempted to kidnap General René Schneider, the commander in chief of the army and a strict defender of the constitution. The plan went awry, and Schneider was fatally wounded. Constitutionalist in the military were now in a stronger position to let the process continue. On 24 October Congress declared Allende Gossens president.

Inaugurated on 3 November 1970, Allende Gossens became the first democratically elected Marxist president in the world. He continued implementing his predecessor's reforms while introducing many of his own. He appropriated and redistributed land, purchased banks, and nationalized major industries. He completed the nationalization, begun under Frei Montalva, of Chile's most important industry, copper mining.

Although Allende Gossens enjoyed wide popular support, Congress and members of the right and center parties thought he was going too far with his socialist reforms. Many of his younger supporters, meanwhile, thought he was not going far enough. Some encouraged peasants to seize land illegally; others called for armed struggle. The urban **guerrilla** group **Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria** (MIR, Movement of the Revolutionary Left) and a wing of the **Partido Socialista** (PS, Socialist Party) both advocated revolution as opposed to reform. Allende Gossens tolerated their militant stance in the hope of preserving the UP coalition, though he did denounce the June 1971 murder of the PDC leader Edmundo Pérez Zújovic by the Vanguardia Organizada del Pueblo (VOP, People's Organized Vanguard), a splinter group of the MIR.

Left-wing extremism met with right-wing extremism, especially from the vigilante group Patria y Libertad (PL, Fatherland and Liberty). While leftists sought to create the conditions for revolution, PL sought to provoke a military coup. The right found an ally in the

United States. The administration of President Richard Nixon was openly antagonistic toward Allende Gossens, and the **Central Intelligence Agency** (CIA) worked covertly in an attempt to sabotage the Chilean economy and destabilize the government.

During Allende Gossens's first year in office, the economy grew, and both unemployment and inflation declined. Wage increases, coupled with a freeze on prices, stimulated consumer demand. In the municipal elections of April 1971, the UP was rewarded with more than 50 percent of the vote. But the UP's economic policies also had a downside, leading to decreased production, government deficits, capital flight, and (following another wage increase) high inflation. Between 1971 and 1973, inflation would rise from 22 to 600 percent. By 1972 food and other consumer goods were in short supply. Shortages became more acute in October 1972, when the *gremio* (trade association) representing independent truck owners staged a strike to protest an attempt at bringing the transportation industry under state control. The strike ended when Allende Gossens asked the military for support, inviting three commanders into his cabinet.

More strikes—by bus owners and copper miners—took place in 1973. In the May 1973 congressional elections, the PDC and the conservative National party won 55.7 percent of the vote; the UP, 43.9 percent. The results left Congress deadlocked. On the one hand, the UP lacked the majority necessary to legislate additional reforms; on the other hand, the opposition lacked the two-thirds majority necessary to remove Allende Gossens from office.

The country moved close to civil war. In June young military officers mounted an armored tank rebellion, or *tancazo*. This attempt at a coup, quickly put down by General **Carlos Prats González**, commander in chief of the army, revealed growing public support for military intervention as a possible solution to the economic crisis. More rebellion followed in July, when truck owners, merchants, and white-collar workers organized strikes. Cardinal Raúl Silva Henríquez, the Archbishop of Santiago, tried to help Allende Gossens and the PDC reach an agreement, but negotiations broke off in August. In the opinion of high-ranking members of the military, such civil disorder warranted military intervention.

THE “DIRTY WAR” AND THE REGIME OF AUGUSTO PINOCHET UGARTE: Within the first few days of the 11 Septem-

ber coup, international **human-rights** groups such as **Amnesty International** and the Red Cross began to arrive. As the violence became more systematic (for example, abductions and disappearances under the cover of a dusk-to-dawn curfew), local human-rights organizations were formed not only to provide assistance but also to document and denounce the repression. One was the **Comité de la Paz** (Committee for Peace), which later became the **Vicaría de la Solidaridad** (Vicariate of Solidarity). Both provided medical, legal, and social services despite protest and harassment from the government. Foreign embassies, with the exception of the embassy of the United States, provided refuge and assistance to foreign nationals and Chileans who wanted to leave the country. Although at first Pinochet Ugarte refused attempts by the **United Nations** (UN) to investigate reports of state terror, the UN would eventually observe and document human-rights abuses in Chile.

In the months following the coup, the junta consolidated its power. The courts, including the Supreme Court, generally stood behind the junta and allowed the rulings of military tribunals to take precedence. The junta issued a series of decree laws aimed at bringing the government under military control and replaced officials who had been appointed by Allende Gossens. It authorized the infamous **caravan of death**, a cross-country helicopter tour led by General Arellano Stark, which led to the deaths of 75 political prisoners. The junta closed Congress and burned the official election registries. It suspended political activity and outlawed leftist parties. The military and police then instituted a plan intended to eliminate all members of leftist opposition groups through the detention, interrogation, and execution of political prisoners. In 1974 a secret-police organization appeared, the **Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional** (DINA, Directorate of National Intelligence), followed in 1975 by the Comando Conjunto (CC, Joint Command), a rival **death squad** created by the air force. Both were recruited from the right-wing vigilante group *Patria y Libertad*. Their initial targets were members of the MIR, the Partido Socialista, and the **Partido Comunista de Chile** (PC, Communist Party of Chile).

In December 1977 the UN condemned Chile for human-rights violations. Furious, Pinochet Ugarte called a referendum seeking national support for his policies in the “defense of the dignity of Chile.” In January 1978, 75 percent voted their approval, though the referendum was

conducted without electoral safeguards. Pinochet Ugarte interpreted the results as a mandate and reduced the state of siege (in effect since 1973) to a state of emergency. He also pressured the junta into signing the **amnesty law of 1978**. Promulgated on 19 April 1978, the law absolved the military and the police of human-rights abuses committed from 11 September 1973, the day of the coup, to 10 March 1978. (The amnesty would be partly struck down by the Supreme Court in November 2004.) In September 1980 voters were called to the polls again, this time to endorse a new constitution written by Pinochet Ugarte and scheduled to take effect in March 1981. Approved by 67 percent of the vote in a plebiscite widely considered fraudulent, the constitution of 1981 provided for President Pinochet Ugarte to remain in office until 1989.

In addition to extirpating Marxism, the junta had a second objective: to transform the economy. The subject stirred much debate. The Chicago Boys argued passionately for a free-market model; in contrast, the junta's early economic ministers were influenced by PDC members and business interests who wanted the economy to remain under state management. In the end, the Chicago Boys prevailed and in 1975 took charge of policy. The "shock treatment" they administered caused immediate hardship. Those who escaped unemployment saw their wages drastically reduced. By the end of the decade, however, the treatment began to show positive results—significantly lower inflation and substantial growth. Hailed by many as a "miracle," the economic boom brought many Chileans into the middle class. It also made those who were well off even wealthier. According to theory, this wealth would eventually "trickle down" to the poor. Nevertheless, in 1982 world recession ended the boom, and by the mid-1980s, anywhere from 14 percent (the government's figure) to 45 percent of the population remained in poverty.

By 1983 economic recession was taking its toll in bankruptcies and unemployment. Antigovernment sentiment began to build, taking the form of organized demonstrations and protest marches. Political parties revived, and in June 1983 the PDC formed a coalition of moderate parties, the Alianza Democrática (AD, Democratic Alliance), which called for the resignation of Pinochet Ugarte and a return to democratic rule. The PC and the militant wing of the PS were excluded from the AD because of their refusal to rule out armed struggle as a means of ending the dictatorship. The PC responded by

creating a left-wing coalition called the Movimiento Democrático Popular (MDP, Popular Democratic Movement).

Pinochet Ugarte refused to step down, and protests continued into 1984 and 1985, many of them violent confrontations with security forces. By then a new guerrilla organization had formed, the **Frente Patriótico Manuel Rodríguez** (FPMR, Manuel Rodríguez Patriotic Front), which carried out thousands of operations, including a failed attempt in September 1986 to assassinate Pinochet Ugarte. The incident provoked another state of siege and renewed death-squad activity, especially from the Centro Nacional de Información (CNI, National Information Center), an intelligence agency that had replaced DINA in 1977.

The government announced in mid-1987 that Pinochet Ugarte would be the candidate in a plebiscite scheduled for 1988. A “yes” vote would give him eight more years as president. A “no” vote would mean a general election with a choice of candidates. By mid-1988 the opposition had begun to rally around the Comando por el No (Command for the No), an alliance of some 16 political parties established in February to campaign against Pinochet Ugarte and guard against electoral fraud. That the country was moving toward democracy was evident in the **plebiscite of 1988**, which took place on 5 October. A majority of voters (54.7 percent) rejected another term in office for Pinochet Ugarte and opened the way for national elections the following year. On 14 December 1989 **Patricio Aylwin Azócar**, representing a center-left coalition, was elected president with 55.2 percent of the vote. Hernán Büchi, the government candidate and a former minister of finance under Pinochet Ugarte, came in second with 29.4 percent.

AFTERMATH OF THE “DIRTY WAR”: On 24 April 1990, one month after taking office, President Aylwin Azócar established the **Comisión Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliación** (National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation), which documented deaths and disappearances (but not torture) committed during the dictatorship. Chaired by the judge Raúl Rettig and given nine months to complete its work, the commission issued its report in 1991, having documented almost 3,200 cases of human-rights abuse involving death, more than 1,000 of them missing (*desaparecidos*). The commission’s charge, however, did not extend to naming those responsible, nor was the

commission allowed enough time to identify the victims and find their bodies. Some remains had already been recovered through the efforts of the Vicariate of Solidarity: 15 were found in 1978 in an abandoned lime kiln in Lonquén; 126 were found in 1991 in a Santiago cemetery—many in graves marked NN (*ningún nombre*, no name) and some two to a coffin. The task of completing the commission's work fell to its successor, the Corporación Nacional por la Reconciliación y la Reparación (National Corporation for Reconciliation and Reparation). The corporation was originally established in January 1992 for two years, though Congress would grant it additional time. When it was phased out in 1995, about 1,000 cases remained to be cleared up. It did, however, implement a reparations program recommended by the commission. More than 4,800 survivors of the victims listed in the commission's final report were awarded a monthly payment of a little more than the monthly minimum wage; more than 27,000 others have received education and health care benefits.

An important reason for the lack of progress in clearing up cases was the military's refusal to cooperate. Members of the armed forces and carabineros saw no advantage to getting involved, having been granted amnesty in 1978. Moreover, the administration was careful not to threaten the military for fear of provoking a coup—Pinochet Ugarte remained a force to be reckoned with. After stepping down as president in 1990, he continued to lead the army, and after his retirement in 1998, he took office as senator-for-life, a position provided for him by the constitution of 1981. It seemed as if he were well situated to thwart any attempt at assigning responsibility for the “dirty war” to specific members of the military, including himself. Yet his immunity from prosecution would be challenged when he went abroad.

On 16 October 1998, while in London for back surgery, Pinochet Ugarte was placed under house arrest by British authorities at the request of the Spanish judge **Baltasar Garzón**, who sought his extradition to Spain to face charges of gross human-rights violations. On 28 October the British High Court rejected the request, ruling that Pinochet Ugarte was immune from prosecution for crimes committed while he was head of state. In November, however, a committee of the House of Lords voted 3–2 to reverse that ruling. Extradition proceedings began the following month but were discontinued when

it became known that one of the law lords who had ruled against Pinochet Ugarte had failed to disclose a possible conflict of interest—a link to the human-rights group Amnesty International. A new House of Lords committee was formed in January 1999 to appeal the initial High Court ruling. On 24 March the law lords voted 6–1 to reject the claim of immunity. Extradition proceedings resumed in September, and a court ruled on 8 October that the extradition of Pinochet Ugarte to Spain could proceed. Pinochet Ugarte, however, would be spared a second time. Independent doctors reported that he was medically unfit to stand trial, and in March 2000 he was allowed to return to Chile.

Pinochet Ugarte's detention in Britain had divided Chilean society, prompting demonstrations for and against a trial. Yet even some of his opponents argued that he should be tried not in Spain but in Chile. The likelihood of bringing him to trial increased as a new generation of judges appeared, replacing the old guard as it retired from the bench. The courts began challenging his immunity on a case-by-case basis. In August 2000 the Supreme Court divested Pinochet Ugarte of his immunity, and Judge Juan Guzmán Tapia, known for his independence, pursued a new case against him. On 1 December Pinochet Ugarte was placed under house arrest, indicted on charges of kidnapping and murder in connection with the caravan of death. The Court of Appeals overturned the case on a technicality. The Supreme Court upheld that decision, but ordered Guzmán Tapia to question Pinochet Ugarte. First, however, Pinochet Ugarte was required to undergo a medical examination—required by Chilean law for citizens over 70 years old—to see if he was mentally competent. A medical report suggested he had mild dementia. On 9 July 2001 the Court of Appeals ruled that he was mentally unfit to stand trial, and the effort to bring him to justice appeared to come to an end. In 2002, though, he was forced to step down as senator-for-life when the Supreme Court upheld the ruling of the appeals court.

By December 2003 human-rights advocates were asking the courts to reconsider the decision that Pinochet Ugarte was mentally unfit. They cited an interview that he had recently granted to WDLP-22, an anti-Castro television station in Miami, an interview in which he spoke lucidly and at length. On 28 May 2004 the Court of Appeals, by 14–9, again voted to strip Pinochet Ugarte of his immunity from

prosecution, this time in connection with the murder of political opponents in **Operation Condor**. His lawyers appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that their client, who was 88 years old, was both physically and mentally unfit to stand trial. Pinochet Ugarte did have health problems—in addition to using a pacemaker and having diabetes and arthritis, he had suffered a series of mild strokes since 1998. Yet on 26 August 2004 the Supreme Court upheld the appeals court decision, opening the way for prosecution. On 2 December 2004 the Court of Appeals stripped him of his immunity for a third time. He was being sued in connection with the assassination in 1974 of his political rival General Prats González.

Pinochet Ugarte's legal troubles were not limited to human rights. In 2004 investigators discovered that Pinochet Ugarte held secret overseas bank accounts, most of them in the United States—a discovery that embarrassed his supporters, who had argued that his regime, though tough on subversion, was free of corruption. It would later be found that these accounts numbered over 100 and held as much as \$28 million. On 23 November 2005, two days before his 90th birthday, he was placed under house arrest and indicted on charges that he had failed to pay \$2.4 million in taxes, used false passports to open accounts, and falsely reported his assets. Again, his lawyers argued he was too ill to stand trial, though many in Chile, including court-appointed doctors, alleged that he made his health problems appear more serious than they were.

While the Pinochet Ugarte drama was unfolding, Chile confronted its past in other ways. On 8 November 2004 General Juan Emilio Cheyre, the army commander, published a statement, "The End of a Vision," in the newspaper *La tercera*, saying that the army accepted responsibility for human-rights violations committed during the dictatorship. He called the acts "punishable" and "morally unacceptable." The statement came in anticipation of a report, issued a week later, by the **Comisión Nacional sobre Prisión Política y Tortura** (National Commission on Political Prisoners and Torture). Covering the period from 11 September 1973 to 1989 and based on testimony from 35,000 victims from 40 countries, the 1,200-page report concluded that the dictatorship used torture as a matter of policy to repress and terrorize its opponents. It identified 1,200 torture centers (including the navy's training ship the *Esmeralda*) and 14 methods

of torture, both physical and psychological. The commission recommended compensation for each of the 27,255 torture victims whose testimonies could be verified. President Ricardo Lagos accepted the recommendation, and in mid-December 2004 Congress approved a lifetime pension of 112,000 Chilean pesos a month, about half the minimum monthly salary. Lagos admitted that the amount was “austere” and “symbolic,” calling it a *reconocimiento moral* (a moral recognition).

Although victims welcomed the truth and recognition, many also clamored for justice. Standing in the way, however, was the 1978 amnesty law, which shielded officers from prosecution for abuses committed between 1973 and 1978, the worst years of the repression. On 17 November 2004 this obstacle was partly removed—at least for cases of kidnapping and disappearance—when the Supreme Court ruled that such cases were no longer covered by the amnesty. The court argued that when bodies were never recovered, there was no proof of death, and therefore the crimes were still in progress—well beyond 1978. The ruling upheld the conviction, a year earlier, of five DINA officers for the 1975 kidnapping and disappearance of Miguel Angel Sandoval, a leftist guerrilla. One of the convicted was **Manuel Contreras Sepúlveda**, a retired general and DINA’s former director. In January 2005 the officers began serving their sentences, which ranged from five to 12 years. The ruling also allowed over 300 existing court cases to proceed and opened the way for hundreds of others.

Judge Guzmán Tapia made another attempt to bring Pinochet Ugarte to trial. On 13 December 2004 he placed him under house arrest and charged him with nine kidnappings and one homicide in connection with Operation Condor. But once again Pinochet Ugarte’s lawyers managed to block a trial on the grounds of ill health. On 25 November 2006, his 91st birthday, in a statement read by his wife, Pinochet Ugarte took “political responsibility” for what happened during his rule, saying that he had acted in Chile’s best interests. He died shortly after, on 10 December 2006, neither convicted nor cleared of any of the charges.

Hundreds of other cases have been prosecuted, and though hindered by the lack of cooperation from the military, some have progressed through the courts. On 28 August 2007, for example, the Supreme

Court handed a life sentence to Hugo Salas Wenzel, a retired army general, for participating in the murder of 12 youths in 1987. In April 2008 Judge Eliana Quezada indicted five retired navy officers for the abduction, torture, and killing of Father Michael Woodward, a British priest. He and other suspected leftists were allegedly detained on two navy ships that functioned as torture centers. On 27 May 2008 Judge Víctor Montiglio ordered the arrest of 98 former soldiers and DINA agents in connection with Operation Colombo, in which 42 people were kidnapped and killed. And in July 2008 Judge Alejandro Solís sentenced Contreras Sepúlveda to two life terms for the 1974 murder of General Prats González and his wife, Sofía. By July 2008, 256 former military personnel and civilian collaborators had been convicted, 83 had seen their convictions upheld, and 38 were serving time in prison.

The 1978 amnesty continues to hinder prosecution. President **Michelle Bachelet**, herself a torture victim, has proposed a bill excluding human-rights crimes from amnesties or statutes of limitation, but it remains stalled in Congress.

CHILEAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION. *See* COMISIÓN CHILENA POR LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS.

CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY. *See* PARTIDO DEMOCRATA CRISTIANO (CHILE) (PDC); PARTIDO DEMOCRATA CRISTIANO (PARAGUAY) (PDC).

COLORADO PARTY. *See* PARTIDO COLORADO.

COMANDO CONJUNTO. *See* DEATH SQUADS.

COMISIÓN CHILENA POR LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS / CHILEAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION. A **human-rights** nongovernmental organization in **Chile**. Founded in 1978 by lawyers, the Comisión documented and reported human-rights abuses. The group also established a network of neighborhood human-rights defense committees. Like many other human-rights organizations during the dictatorship, the group was the target of repression. Its president, **Jaime Castillo Velasco**, was **exiled** in 1981, and other

high-ranking members were detained and **tortured** by government security forces.

COMISIÓN NACIONAL DE INVESTIGACIÓN DE DESAPARECIDOS (CNID) / NATIONAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO DISAPPEARANCES. The first truth commission in Latin America, CNID was created in **Bolivia** by President Hernán Siles Zuazo shortly after the country returned to democracy in October 1982. Its eight commissioners represented the justice ministry, the Chamber of Deputies, the Senate, the **military**, the labor federation, the peasants' federation, and the country's two nongovernmental **human-rights** organizations. One of the human-rights organizations was the **Asociación de Familiares de Detenidos, Desaparecidos y Mártires por la Liberación Nacional** (ASOFAMD, Association of Relatives of the Detained, Disappeared and Martyred for National Liberation), whose representative, Loyola Guzmán Lara, served as CNID's executive secretary. CNID was able to hire six support staff but otherwise received little financial or political support. And as its name suggests, its mandate was limited to investigating the *desaparecidos* (missing) as opposed to cases of illegal detention or **torture**. In three years it managed to hear testimony about 155 people who disappeared from 1967 to 1982. It then dissolved without issuing a report.

COMISIÓN NACIONAL DE VERDAD Y RECONCILIACIÓN / NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION. Also known as the Rettig commission. A truth commission established in 1990 by President **Patricio Aylwin Azócar** of **Chile**. It was charged with investigating and documenting **human-rights** violations committed in Chile between 11 September 1973 and 11 March 1990. Judge Raúl Rettig headed the commission, which was composed of six lawyers, a historian, and a civil-rights worker, all representing different political affiliations. The commission reviewed more than 3,000 cases of human-rights violations that resulted in death; more than 1,000 of the victims were among the *desaparecidos* (missing). The Commission's charge stopped short of allocating responsibility to the members of the **military**, including **Augusto Pinochet Ugarte** and other high-ranking officials. The Supreme Court

and the military publicly vilified the commission and its report. Despite the rancor, Aylwin Azócar established the Corporación Nacional por la Reconciliación y la Reparación (National Corporation for Reconciliation and Reparation) to complete the commission's work, which included implementing a reparations program. Survivors of victims listed in the commission's final report receive a symbolic monthly payment of a little more than the monthly minimum wage.

COMISIÓN NACIONAL SOBRE LA DESAPARICIÓN DE PERSONAS (CONADEP) / NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE DISAPPEARED. Also known as the Sábato Commission. A blue-ribbon panel charged with investigating the fate of those who disappeared in **Argentina** during the “**dirty war.**” Formed in 1983 after the return to democracy, CONADEP was asked to hear evidence and to report its findings. Its charge was limited to documenting cases and making recommendations. The task of assigning responsibility for what happened would fall to the courts. Of the 13 CONADEP members, President **Raúl Alfonsín** selected 10, including **Ernesto Sábato**, who headed the commission. These 10 individuals represented a cross section of Argentine society and politics. What they had in common was national and international respect and a commitment to **human rights**. The remaining three members were representatives of the Chamber of Deputies. (Both chambers of Congress had been asked to elect representatives, but only the Chamber of Deputies chose to do so.) Aided by staff and human-rights organizations, CONADEP collected thousands of depositions and testimonies. Its report, summarizing 50,000 pages of information, was published in Spanish in 1984 under the title *Nunca más* (Never Again), which became an instant best seller. In 1986 an English translation appeared under the title *Nunca Más*. The book documents 9,000 cases of *desaparecidos* (missing), though human-rights groups set the actual figure as high as 30,000.

COMISIÓN NACIONAL SOBRE PRISIÓN POLÍTICA Y TORTURA / NATIONAL COMMISSION ON POLITICAL PRISONERS AND TORTURE. A commission created in November 2003 by President Ricardo Lagos of **Chile**. Its charge was to investigate the use of **torture** under the **military** regime of General Au-

gusto Pinochet Ugarte. Led by Bishop Sergio Valech, it consisted of eight civilians, who put together a team of 60 people. The team, which included lawyers, psychologists, and social workers, spent a year interviewing 35,000 victims from 40 countries.

About mid-November 2004 the commission handed President Lagos its 1,200-page report, which was published at the end of the month. Covering the period from 11 September 1973 to 1989, it verified 27,255 torture victims and concluded that the regime tortured detainees as a matter of policy. The report identified 1,200 torture centers (including the navy's training ship the *Esmeralda*) and 14 methods of torture, both physical and psychological. Physical methods included beating, burning, extracting fingernails, immersing in water, and using dogs to perform sexual abuse—almost all the 3,400 women who gave testimony reported being sexually abused. Psychological methods included staging mock executions, keeping prisoners in solitary confinement for long periods, and forcing prisoners to watch family members being tortured. The report also listed the military, police, and intelligence units involved, though not the names of alleged torturers. Based on anonymous testimony, it was never intended to provide evidence for the courts. It was intended to serve historical memory.

The commission recommended that victims be compensated. Lagos accepted the recommendation, and in mid-December 2004 Congress approved a lifetime pension of 112,000 Chilean pesos a month, about half the minimum monthly salary. Lagos admitted that the amount was symbolic, calling it a moral recognition.

COMITÉ DE DEFENSA DE LOS DERECHOS DEL PUEBLO (CODEPU) / COMMITTEE FOR THE PROMOTION AND DEFENSE OF THE RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE. A **human-rights** nongovernmental organization in **Chile**. CODEPU was founded in 1980 to defend those accused of terrorism and expanded to provide legal and psychological assistance to **torture** victims and their families.

COMITÉ DE LA PAZ (COPACHI) / COMMITTEE FOR PEACE. Also known as the Committee of Cooperation for Peace. A **human-rights** nongovernmental organization in **Chile**. COPACHI, established

in October 1973 under the leadership of the Chilean **Catholic Church**, is an example of the strong role that the church played in opposition to the **military** government of **Augusto Pinochet Ugarte**. Although some members of the church hierarchy supported military intervention as a solution to restoring government order before and during the coup, the church denounced the severe repression and human-rights abuses that followed, organizing support for the victims. As a humanitarian organization, COPACHI started with basic programs such as food distribution and medical services but later expanded its scope to include legal services for detainees and sanctuary to those being persecuted. In 1975 COPACHI's practice of providing sanctuary brought the organization under the scrutiny of the **Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional** (DINA, Directorate of National Intelligence), a newly formed state intelligence agency. After the forced **exile** of some of COPACHI's strongest activists, the organization finally acceded to Pinochet Ugarte's constant demands for formal dissolution. Work on behalf of victims of the state was continued by a new religious organization created by one of COPACHI's founders, Cardinal Raúl Silva Henríquez. The **Vicaría de la Solidaridad** (Vicariate of Solidarity) opened its offices in 1976 under the protection of the Catholic Church.

COMMISSION ON POLITICAL PRISONERS AND TORTURE.

See COMISIÓN NACIONAL SOBRE PRISIÓN POLÍTICA Y TORTURA.

COMMITTEE FOR PEACE. *See* COMITÉ DE LA PAZ (COPACHI).

COMMITTEE OF COOPERATION FOR PEACE IN CHILE. *See* COMITÉ DE LA PAZ (COPACHI).

COMMUNISM. Communism—as well as anarchism, socialism, and other variants of the left—has had a long tradition in South America, closely connected with the rise of **trade unions**. The traditional left in **Chile**, dominated by the **Partido Comunista** (PC, Communist Party) and **Partido Socialista** (PS, Socialist Party), was successful politically. In 1970 the PC and PS, as part of the **Unidad Popular** (UP, Popular Unity) coalition, helped elect **Salvador Al-**

lende Gossens to the presidency. In **Uruguay** leftist parties long dominated union elections but regularly lost to the mainstream Colorados (Reds) and Blancos (Whites) in national elections. Not until 1971, with the rise of the Marxist-led coalition Frente Amplio (FA, Broad Front), did leftists gain a significant percentage of the national vote. In **Argentina**, the movement of President **Juan Perón**—intended to be a middle way between communism and capitalism—attracted followers from both the right and the left and became deeply polarized.

In **Bolivia**, communists in 1951 threw their support behind the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR, Movement for National Revolution), a reformist party that also developed a rift between its left and right wings before turning conservative in the early 1960s. Ironically, the left came to power in Bolivia in 1970 through left-leaning generals, especially **Juan José Torres González**. In **Brazil**, the left-leaning **João Goulart** became the de facto president after his predecessor suddenly resigned. Looking for support, he found the left divided between the long-persecuted and politically cautious **Partido Comunista Brasileiro** (PCB, Brazilian Communist Party) and its militant offshoot, the **Partido Comunista do Brasil** (PC do B, Communist Party of Brazil). In **Paraguay**, the **Partido Comunista Paraguayo** (PCP, Paraguayan Communist Party) was small and, more often than not until 1989, illegal.

The left in Latin America was strongly influenced by the Cuban Revolution in 1959, which inspired rural and urban **guerrilla warfare** across the region. Sometimes dismissed by senior party members as amateurism or adventurism, guerrilla movements attracted young people who rejected party bureaucracy for the chance to effect radical change. When “**dirty war**” regimes came to power, guerrillas became prime targets for repression, along with trade unionists.

COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHILE. *See* PARTIDO COMUNISTA DE CHILE (PC).

CONCERTACIÓN NACIONAL PROGRAMÁTICA (CONA-PRO) / NATIONAL PROGRAMMATIC AGREEMENT. A multiparty agreement made in **Uruguay** in 1984, calling for truth and justice. President **Julio María Sanguinetti**, however, who took

office in 1985 after the return to civilian rule, never signed the agreement, allowing it to fade into oblivion.

CONDOR. *See* OPERATION CONDOR.

CONFEDERACIÓN GENERAL DEL TRABAJO (CGT) / GENERAL LABOR CONFEDERATION. The principal labor confederation in **Argentina**. Founded in 1930, the CGT was originally under the control of leftists but was absorbed into the **Peronist** movement during the administration of **Juan Perón** (1946–1955). The succeeding **military** government, as part of its anti-Peronist efforts, took control of the CGT (*intervención*). Nevertheless, in 1957 the CGT split into two factions. Sixty-two unions declared loyalty to Perón; 32 would be led by leftists or independents. Although the exact number would vary, the Peronist faction became known as the “62 organizations.” In 1968 the CGT split again, this time into two separate organizations. A radical group broke away to form the CGT de los Argentinos (CGTA, CGT of the Argentines). The CGTA opposed the efforts of Augusto Vandor to reach an agreement with the military government of Juan Carlos Onganía. Vandor, who had hoped to establish “Peronism without Perón,” was assassinated the following year. The CGTA was banned and its leaders jailed. In 1970 the two organizations reunited, but the CGT, like the Peronist movement itself, remained deeply divided.

CONFEDERACIÓN GENERAL DEL TRABAJO DE LOS ARGENTINOS (CGTA). *See* CONFEDERACIÓN GENERAL DEL TRABAJO (CGT).

CONTI, HAROLDO (1925–1976?). **Argentine** teacher, journalist, actor, playwright, and screenwriter. Born in Chacabuco, a province of Buenos Aires, Conti won early acclaim in the theater with his play *Examinados* (1955). Several later works of fiction were published to critical acclaim. His novel *Mascaró el cazador americano* received the prestigious Casa de las Américas award in 1975. This work, which incorporates realist elements and fantasy, has been described as “a study of freedom.” Earlier Conti was the recipient of several literary awards in Latin America and Spain. His novel *Alrededor de*

la jaula was filmed in 1977 under the title *Crecer de golpe*. Conti was abducted by members of the Argentine secret police on 5 May 1976 and remains among the *desaparecidos*.

CONTRERAS SEPÚLVEDA, MANUEL. A colonel (later general) in the **military** and the director of the **Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional** (DINA, Directorate of National Intelligence), **Chile's** secret police. In 1993, after the return to civilian government, a Chilean court convicted General Contreras Sepúlveda and his former deputy, Brigadier General **Pedro Espinoza Bravo**, of complicity in the 1976 car-bomb assassination of **Orlando Letelier del Solar** and his assistant, Ronni Moffitt, in Washington, D.C. Since the crime had been committed outside the country, the **amnesty law of 1978** did not shield them from prosecution. He was sentenced to seven years and served time in a special military prison. In 2004 the Supreme Court struck down the amnesty in cases of disappearance, a ruling that upheld his conviction for the 1975 kidnapping and disappearance of Miguel Angel Sandoval, a leftist **guerrilla**. He began serving his 12-year sentence in January 2005. In July 2008 Judge Alejandro Solís sentenced Contreras Sepúlveda to two life terms for the 1974 murder of General **Prats González** and his wife, Sofia.

CONY, CARLOS HEITOR (1926–). **Brazilian** novelist and journalist. Born in Rio de Janeiro, Cony was the third of four sons born to Ernesto Cony Jr., a journalist and dreamer, whose grandiloquent vision of life the younger Cony would later chronicle in one of his best-known works, *Quase memória* (Almost a Memoir). Reportedly thought mute by his family until he began speaking at age five, the author suffered from speech impediments throughout his early years, until a successful operation in 1941. One biographer attributes the necessity of communicating in writing to avoid childish taunts as one of the reasons for his early resorting to the written word as a means of communication.

After several years in the Roman **Catholic** Seminary in São José and studies at the Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, which he would abandon, Cony began his journalistic career in 1947 at the *Jornal do Brasil*. Likewise, he began collaborating with Rádio Jornal de Brasil a few years later. In 1956, he entered the national novel competition for

the Prêmio Manuel Antônio de Almeida, sponsored by the prefecture of Rio de Janeiro, with the title *O Ventre* (The Womb), of definite Sartrean inspiration. The novel was admired by the jury but found no editor. He went on to win the prize twice, in consecutive years, with the novels *A verdade de cada dia* (The Daily Truth) and *Tijolo de segurança*, which established his literary reputation as a new voice in Brazilian letters. By 1963, he had published five novels and was a columnist for the daily *Folha de São Paulo*.

As the **military** coup of 1964 progressed during the months of April and May, Cony, known as a writer of ironic fictional critiques of bourgeois life, wrote several pieces critical of the coup, later published in *Ô ato e o fato* (The Act and the Fact). In 1965, on the pages of *Correio da Manhã*, Cony launched an attack on the *Ato Institucional No. 2* (AI-2, Institutional Act No. 2), one of several decrees instituted by the military dictatorship of General **Castello Branco**; this particular act abolished all existing political parties in Brazil. The article placed the author in opposition to the management of the daily, and Cony resigned. The editor, **Antonio Callado**, another foe of the regime, resigned with him. The author then wrote briefly for TV Rio, working on a serial about working-class Rio, but soon ran into problems with military censors and was substituted in the program. In October 1965, along with other Brazilian artists, journalist, and writers, including filmmaker **Glauber Rocha**, he was arrested following a demonstration in front of the Hotel Glória in Rio de Janeiro. This is the first of six periods of imprisonment Cony would suffer for political reasons.

In 1967 he spent a year of **exile** in Cuba. On his return, he was arrested again, reportedly at the airport. By then, he had written eight novels, among them *Pessach: A travessia* (Pessach: The Crossing), a novel that examines the political awakening of a successful writer whose kidnapping by a revolutionary group leads to the abandoning of his former indifferent political posture in favor of a revolutionary commitment as well as an appreciation for his hitherto unacknowledged Jewish heritage. Two of his works, *Matéria de memória* (Matter for Memory, directed by Fernando Coni Campos, with the title *Um homem e sua jaula / A Man and His Cage*) and *Antes o verão* (Before the Summer, directed by Gerson Tavares) were adapted for the screen. Another act by the military regime, AI-5, sent Cony to jail on December 1968, this time for a month.

Earlier, the publisher Adolpho Bloch had invited him to join his weekly magazine, *Manchete*. Cony was associated with Bloch Publications for several years, which, according to scholar Nancy T. Baden, made him suspect in the eyes of some members of the Brazilian left, as Bloch was widely regarded as a supporter of the military. In a series of interviews Baden conducted with a younger generation of Brazilian authors in the 1980s, few were aware of the price Cony had paid for his opposition to the military regime. Cony devoted himself to the writing of nonfiction for several years until the publication of his novel *Pilatos* (Pilate) in 1974, which he declared would be his last. He would return to fiction, to the delight of his many fans, with the 1995 publication of *Quase memória*, which was a huge success in Brazil and was awarded two Prêmio Jabuti as best novel and best book of the year. That year, the Academia Brasileira de Letras (Brazilian Academy of Letters) awarded him the Premio Machado de Assis for his literary trajectory. Soon after, he was made a Chevalier by the Ordre des Arts et des Lettres of France, and in 2000 he was elected to the Academia Brasileira de Letras.

An important author and journalist in Brazil, Cony is the author of over 14 works, none of which have been translated into English. He resides in Brazil.

CORPORATION FOR THE PROMOTION AND DEFENSE OF THE RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE. *See* COMITÉ DE DEFENSA DE LOS DERECHOS DEL PUEBLO (CODEPU).

COSSA, ROBERTO (1934–). Argentine journalist, screenwriter, and playwright. Born in Villa del Parque in Buenos Aires, Cossa first ventured into theater as an actor in 1957, organizing the experimental group Teatro Independiente de San Isidro with a group of like-minded friends. In 1960 he joined **Rodolfo Walsh** as “clandestine correspondent,” in the author’s words, for Prensa Latina, the news agency sponsored by the revolutionary government in Havana, Cuba, a position he would hold for 10 years. He would go on to work for noted Argentine dailies such as *Clarín*, *La Opinión*, and *El Cronista Comercial* until 1976.

His first play, *Nuestro fin de semana* (Our Weekend), debuted in Buenos Aires in 1964 to great audience acclaim. In 1970, amid

the social and political unrest that marked the return of **Juan Perón** to power, Cossa collaborated with **Carlos Somigliana**, Germán Rozenmacher, and Ricardo Talesnik in *El aeroplano negro*, in which Perón's anticipated arrival is depicted as the black airplane of the title. Satirical and steeped in Artaud's "theater of cruelty," this play is a harbinger, according to some critics, of Cossa's best-known play, *La nona* (The Grandmother). *La nona* debuted in 1977 and is characterized by the black humor and penchant for the grotesque that are Cossa's hallmarks as a playwright. According to critics, *La nona* is one of Argentina's most important plays of the 20th century.

Two years later, *La nona* would be adapted for the screen under the direction of Héctor Olivera with a script by the author. Olivera and Cossa would go on to collaborate in 1983 on the script for *No habrá más penas ni olvido* (Funny Dirty Little War), one of the best-known films of the postdictatorship period in Argentina, along with Luis Puenzo's and **Aida Bortnik**'s *La historia oficial* (1985). *No habrá más penas ni olvido* was once again directed by Olivera and adapted from the novel of the same title by Osvaldo Soriano. It won a Silver Bear award at the 1984 Berlin Film Festival. Cossa is the author of several other scripts for Argentine cinema.

Among Latin American theater scholars, Cossa is also recognized as one of the organizers, along with **Osvaldo Dragún** and scores of Argentine theater folk, of **Teatro Abierto Argentino** (Open Theater of Argentina), a cycle of plays beginning in 1981. Teatro Abierto Argentino represents the best example of **cultural resistance** to the dictatorship in Argentina and spurred a score of similar cultural ventures throughout the nation. Cossa's play for that first cycle in 1981, *Gris de ausencia* (translated in 1997 as *Grey Song of Absence*), deals with an Italo-Argentine family in **exile**, a situation unfortunately common in Latin America since the 19th century, aggravated by the years of dictatorship in Argentina.

Cossa has been the recipient of numerous awards in Argentina as well as abroad. Among them is Argentina's Premio Nacional de Teatro, the Premio "El Público y la Crítica" of Spain as well as the "Veinte Años Juntos" (20 years together) award presented by the **Madres de Plaza de Mayo**. Cossa is also a member of the Comisión por la Memoria and is president of the Fundación Carlos Somigliana, founded in support of playwrights. Until 2010, Cossa also presides

over the Sociedad General de Autores de la Argentina (ARGENTORES), Argentina's union for professional authors, musicians, and choreographers.

Roberto Cossa resides in Buenos Aires, Argentina.

COSTA E SILVA, ARTUR DA (1902–1969). The “Old Uncle.” Army marshal and president of **Brazil** from March 1967 to October 1969. He was the second of five **military** presidents following the 1964 coup that toppled the left-leaning President **João Goulart**. The military ruled until 1985.

Costa e Silva was born in the town of Taquarí, in the southern state of Rio Grande do Sul. He graduated from a preparatory military academy in Porto Alegre and then began his military career, in 1921, as a cadet at the Escola Militar do Realengo, the national military academy in Rio de Janeiro. One of his fellow students was **Humberto de Alencar Castello Branco**, another future military president. His subsequent training included a course at Fort Knox in the **United States** and a course for chiefs of staff in **Argentina**. In 1961 and 1962 he commanded the Fourth Army, in Brazil's northeast.

On 31 March and 1 April 1964 Costa e Silva conspired with Castello Branco in the coup against Goulart. Following the coup, Costa e Silva appointed himself the minister of war, and with the leaders of the air force and navy, he created the Comando Supremo Revolucionário (Supreme Military Command). The Comando handed power to Castello Branco, who was sworn in as president on 15 April. In the weeks following the coup, the military engaged in a “**dirty war**” against suspected leftists, arresting thousands, many of whom were **tortured**. The terror subsided, but Castello Branco turned the country into an authoritarian state. He removed political opponents from office and replaced existing political parties with a two-party system under military control.

On 15 March 1967 Costa e Silva succeeded Castello Branco as president. Although he was the preferred candidate of the military hard-line, once in office he adopted a conciliatory stance and held talks with the opposition. This stance was abandoned, however, as the opposition began staging demonstrations and as armed **guerrilla** groups began to appear. On 13 December 1968 Costa e Silva was pressured by hard-liners into decreeing the fifth *Ato Institucional*

(AI, Institutional Act), AI-5, which essentially made Brazil a military dictatorship. The president was still the head of state, but AI-5 shifted much of his power to the country's security forces, whose methods included wiretapping and torture. Events in Brazil would now be monitored by **Amnesty International**.

Costa e Silva suffered a stroke on 29 August 1969 and was succeeded in office, on 30 October, by General **Emílio Garrastazú Médici**. Costa e Silva died on 17 December 1969.

COSTA-GAVRAS (1933–). French director, writer, actor, and producer. Born in Athens, Greece, as Konstantinos Gavras. A graduate of the Institut de Hautes Études Cinématographiques in Paris, Costa-Gavras captured the attention of the U.S. moviegoing public with the first of a trilogy of political thrillers starring Yves Montand. *Z* (1969), a critique of the Greek junta, then in power, was awarded an Oscar for Best Foreign Language Film and earned Costa-Gavras nominations for directing the film and co-writing the screenplay. *Z* was followed by *The Confession* (1970) and *State of Siege* (1973), a critique of U.S. intervention in South America set against the backdrop of **Uruguay**. Costa-Gavras would revisit the politics of South America in his film *Missing* (1982), the first of a string of successful films made in Hollywood. *Missing* examines the issue of the *desaparecidos* following the overthrow of **Salvador Allende Gossens in Chile**. It won Costa-Gavras an Oscar for co-writing the screenplay and a Palme d'or at the Cannes Film Festival. Later films include *Betrayed* (1988), *Music Box* (1990), which won the Golden Bear at the Berlin Film Festival, and *The Little Apocalypse* (1993). Costa-Gavras directed the Cinémathèque française between 1982 and 1987.

COUTO E SILVA, GOLBERY DO (1911–1987). See SERVIÇO NACIONAL DE INFORMAÇÕES (SNI).

CULTURAL RESISTANCE. Acts of cultural resistance are expressions of solidarity and nonviolent protest. During the “**dirty wars**” in South America, protest literature and films were dominant examples of cultural resistance. In other instances, cultural resistance took the form, literally, of preserving culture. In **Bolivia**, Werner Guttentag, a German Jewish émigré, was a leading publisher and the owner of

a network of bookstores called “Los amigos del libro.” During the country’s various **military** regimes, his wares were confiscated and burned, he and his employees were detained and questioned, and he was pressured to promote a book favored by the military. Once, when he refused to remove “subversive” material from his personal library, the military removed all books with red covers. Nevertheless, Gutentag persisted in publishing and publicizing Bolivian writers.

Media bans and censorship moved the production of literature and film underground. To survive, works had to be either allegorical enough to escape the censors or produced in **exile**. A notable exception was the film *La batalla de Chile: la lucha de un pueblo sin armas. 2. El golpe del estado* (*The Battle of Chile: The Struggle of an Unarmed People. 2. The Coup*), made in **Chile** in the direct aftermath of the military coup of 11 September 1973. But Patricio Guzmán, the producer and director, paid a heavy price, as did the four members of his film crew. All were detained by security forces, and one member, the cameraman Jorge Muller-Silva, disappeared.

Yet there were other forms of expression not as easy to control—for example, music, clothing, murals, graffiti, and improvised street theater. In **Argentina**, where many of the victims were young people, *rock nacional*, or national rock, developed into a social movement with a mass following. The movement’s pioneers were Charly García and Nito Mestre. Rock concerts were something more than musical events. They were a means of challenging the values of the dictatorship. In place of violence, authoritarianism, and silence, rock offered peace, freedom, and participation. Within the pages of the thousands of fan magazines spawned by the movement (many of them underground), young people could communicate with one another by way of letters. Many commented on how secure they felt at concerts, confident that no harm could come to them in such large crowds. In Chile, the funeral of prize-winning poet **Pablo Neruda** became a symbol of formalized protest. Another was the performance of songs by traditional folk artists such as Violeta Parra, whose work was embodied in the movement *Nueva Canción Chilena* (New Chilean Song) of the 1960s and 1970s, work later reaffirmed in demonstrations against the regime of **Augusto Pinochet Ugarte**. In 1984, a few days before the anniversary of the coup of 11 September 1973, many paused at noon to sing Parra’s “Thanks

to Life” in a declaration of remembrance. *See also* *ARPILLERAS*; *TEATRO ABIERTO ARGENTINO*.

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DEATH SQUADS. As the left made political gains or turned to **guerrilla warfare**, the right formed paramilitary groups. Among them were the Comando da Caça aos Comunistas (CCC, Anti-Communist Command) and the Movimento anti-Comunista (MAC, Anti-Communist Movement) in **Brazil**, Patria y Libertad (PL, Fatherland and Liberty) in **Chile**, and the **Alianza Anticomunista Argentina** (AAA, Argentine Anticommunist Alliance). During the left-leaning government of **João Goulart** (1961–1964), the CCC and the MAC harassed leftist student leaders. In **Uruguay** in the late 1960s, the administration of Jorge Pacheco Areco enlisted civilian and police organizations to help fight the **Tupamaro** guerrillas. During the socialist government of **Salvador Allende Gossens** (1970–1973), PL engaged in economic sabotage—vandalizing factories and blowing up electrical towers—in the hope of gaining mainstream support for a **military** coup. And from 1973 to 1976, the AAA targeted left-wing **Peronists**, assassinating them or forcing them into **exile**.

When these countries fell to dictatorship, the military-service branches, especially their intelligence operations, often lead the fight against subversion, though in Brazil the **Serviço Nacional de Informações** (SNI, National Intelligence Service) coordinated the efforts of the military branches and the police. In Argentina, groups called *patotas* (gangs), ranging in size from six to two dozen and often traveling in Ford Falcons, made the arrests. *Patotas* were part of larger groups called *grupos de tareas* (GT, task forces). GT 1 was controlled by the federal police; GT 2, the army; GT 3, the navy; and GT 4, the air force. In Uruguay, arrests were made by teams ranging in number from three or four to more than 15, depending on the amount of resistance expected. The army, the other service branches, and the police all took part in making arrests. In Chile, the secret police, the **Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional** (DINA, Directorate of National Intelligence), had both a national and an international component. The national component terrorized the regime’s internal

enemies; its international component became active in the mid-1970s with the formation of **Operation Condor**, which allowed member countries to track down one another's enemies.

Cooperation among the countries was common. Brazilians, for example, taught Chileans how to **torture** more efficiently. A prisoner interrogated in **Paraguay** might hear accents from Brazil and Argentina. And during the regime of General **Luis García Meza** in **Bolivia**, one of the death squads, the Servicio Especial de Seguridad (SES, Special Security Service), was trained by Argentine military officers from the **Escuela Mecánica de la Armada** (ESMA, Navy Mechanics School).

DECREE LAW 2191. *See* AMNESTY LAW OF 1978.

DEGOLLADOS CASE. The term refers to the murders in **Chile** of three members of the **Partido Comunista de Chile** (PC, Communist Party of Chile) by **carabineros** working out of the Dirección de Inteligencia y Comunicaciones de Carabineros (DICOMCAR, Directorate of Carabinero Intelligence and Communication), a separate investigative unit of the national police. In late March 1985, José Manuel Parada, an archivist for the **Vicaría de la Solidaridad** (Vicariate of Solidarity), and Santiago Nattino and Manuel Guerrero, both suspected intelligence agents of the PC, were abducted by DICOMCAR agents and later found in a ditch with their throats slashed. Commonly referred to as the *degollados* (from the verb *degollar*, meaning “to cut the throat of,” “to slaughter”), the crime was reminiscent of the leftist-targeted disappearances and murders following the 1973 **military** coup and contributed to a growing anti-government movement. The *degollados* case was one of the few military crimes investigated by the courts during the regime of **Augusto Pinochet Ugarte**. Judge José Cánovas Robles identified the 14 men responsible for the slayings as DICOMCAR agents. Ironically, the identifications were made with the assistance of the Centro Nacional de Información (National Information Center), the military secret-service agency formed in 1977 to replace the infamous **Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional** (DINA, Directorate of National Intelligence). The case led to the resignation of General **César Mendoza Durán**, the longtime commander of the carabineros, from the junta.

DEMOCRATIC CENTER. *See* PARTIDO LIBERAL.

DEPARTAMENTO DE INVESTIGACIÓN ESPECIAL (DIE) / SPECIAL INVESTIGATION DEPARTMENT.

DEPARTAMENTO DE ORDEM POLÍTICO E SOCIAL (DOPS) / DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ORDER. *See* SERVIÇO NACIONAL DE INFORMAÇÕES (SNI) / NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE.

DEPARTAMENTO ESTADUAL DE ORDEM POLÍTICA E SOCIAL (DEOPS) / STATE DEPARTMENT FOR POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ORDER. *See* SERVIÇO NACIONAL DE INFORMAÇÕES (SNI) / NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE.

DERIAN, PATRICIA (“PATT”). Assistant secretary of state for **human rights** under President **Jimmy Carter** (1977–1981). Born in New York City, she became a registered nurse and then moved to Jackson, Mississippi. There, in the 1960s, she became a civil-rights activist and was threatened by the Ku Klux Klan. She served as Democratic National Committeewoman in Mississippi in 1968, ran George McGovern’s presidential-election campaign in the state in 1972, and served as deputy director of Carter’s national election campaign in 1976. When Carter took office in January 1977, pledging to defend human rights throughout the world, he appointed her coordinator of the revived Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, a State Department position. Within the year, she was promoted from coordinator to assistant secretary.

Derian was an outspoken critic of human-rights violators, and her commitment to the issue put her at odds with others in the State Department. The Bureau was often ignored or ridiculed. Her most vocal critics were Richard Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, and Terence Todman, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, both of whom accused her of promoting human rights to the detriment of national security or economic considerations. Meanwhile, finding it difficult to apply a human-rights policy across the board, the Carter administration adopted a case-by-case approach, and in some countries—most no-

tably China—made human rights secondary to other foreign-policy objectives.

By January 1978 the policy was largely applied to Latin America alone. Derian made several trips to **Argentina**, vehemently protesting the *desaparecidos* and raising the issue of **torture**. She lobbied for the release of **Jacobo Timerman**, who later credited her with saving many lives. But despite her agency's opposition and congressional legislation, she was dismayed that some types of **military** aid (spare parts and support equipment) continued to flow into Argentina, **Chile**, **Uruguay**, and other countries with dismal human-rights records. In 1980 the Carter administration considered renewing military aid to Argentina, hoping to win its cooperation in the U.S.-led grain embargo against the Soviet Union. Derian said she would resign if military aid was restored. The administration decided against the aid, and she remained in her position. Her influence, however, continued to diminish.

DESAPARECIDOS. Spanish and Portuguese for “missing,” or “disappeared.” It refers to forced disappearances, those who vanish while in state custody. The state often refuses to release information about the victims—indeed, often denies ever having had them in custody. The term originated in Guatemala during the 1960s and then became associated with **Argentina** during the 1970s. It was adopted into the English language in its original Spanish version, though the Anglicized version, “disappeared,” is also common. Instances of a transitive use of the verb “disappear” (meaning to cause to disappear) existed in English long before the “**dirty wars**,” but the events of the period have popularized its use, with or without quotation marks (the security force “disappeared” her; he was “disappeared” by the **military**). Disappearances, however, are by no means peculiar to Latin America. They are a common occurrence in national-security states throughout the world and are condemned by the **United Nations** (UN) as a fundamental violation of **human rights**.

In Argentina the **Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas** (CONADEP, National Commission on the Disappeared)—the government truth commission established after the return to democracy in 1985—documented 8,960 *desaparecidos*, though estimates by human-rights groups reach as high as 30,000. One rea-

son for the discrepancy is that the truth commission reported only *documented* cases collected during the short period it was allowed to work—nine months. During that period, it was able to sift through less than half the data it received. Even so, the evidence was strong enough to convict the former junta commanders and middle-ranking officers of human-rights crimes, though they were later pardoned by President **Carlos Saúl Menem**. The evidence also refuted the military's allegation that most of the missing were **guerrillas**. The documentation showed that most of the missing had been abducted at home, 150 were under 15 years old, 125 were over 60, and 268 were pregnant. Some of the victims were physically disabled.

As many as 2,000 of the victims in Argentina were disappeared by being drugged and thrown into the Atlantic Ocean from navy aircraft. An estimated 500 of the missing were children abducted with their parents or born in prison. Many of these children were illegally adopted and raised by military families. Among the local human-rights organizations that were formed in the 1970s to protest the disappearances were the **Madres de Plaza de Mayo** (Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo), who brought international attention to their cause by marching every Thursday outside the Casa Rosada (Pink House, or presidential palace). An offshoot of the Madres, the **Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo** (Grandmothers), set out to trace missing children and reunite them with their biological families. In 1979 the military government attempted to rid itself of the issue of disappearance by pronouncing the missing dead. The Madres and other human-rights groups challenged the attempt and kept the issue in the forefront. Even after the officers convicted of human-rights violations were pardoned and the cause of justice seemed lost, the issue refused to go away. In 1999 a federal court ruled that as long as victims remained missing—bodies unrecovered and children unaccounted for—the crimes of disappearance were still being committed. The ruling gave new life to a case against several former high-ranking military officers, including the junta commanders **Jorge Rafael Videla**, **Emilio Massera**, and **Reynaldo Benito Bignone**, who had been charged in connection with the kidnapping and illegal adoption of children—crimes not covered by their pardons.

Far fewer people disappeared in the other five countries covered in this volume. In **Bolivia** the **Comisión Nacional de Investigación**

de Desaparecidos (CNID, National Commission of Inquiry into Disappearances), investigated 155 cases of disappearance for the period 1967–1982. In **Brazil** the Comissão Especial sobre Mortos e Desaparecidos Políticos (CEMDP, Special Commission for the Dead and Disappeared), identified at least 136 cases of disappearance out of 475 total deaths. In **Chile** the **Comisión Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliación** (National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation) documented 877 *desaparecidos*, though the commonly accepted estimate now is 1,500 (out of more than 3,000 total deaths). **Paraguay** never established a truth commission, but it is believed that 8,000 people were arrested, **tortured**, and murdered between 1954 and 1989. In **Uruguay** the Comisión Investigadora Parlamentaria sobre Situación de Personas Desaparecidas y Hechos que la Motivaron (Commission on the Situation of “Disappeared” People and Its Causes) documented 164 disappearances, many of whom (about 130) disappeared in Argentina, Chile, or Paraguay, presumably victims of **Operation Condor**. Project Disappeared puts the Uruguayan figure at about 300.

In addition to the cases of disappearance, there were many thousands of cases of temporary disappearance—abduction, rape, and torture—also considered by the UN to be gross violations of human rights.

DESCAMISADOS. A small **guerrilla** organization in **Argentina**, **Peronist** in sympathy, formed in 1968 by Horacio Mendizábal and Norberto Habegger. The group took its name from Perón’s working-class supporters (the “shirtless” ones). Mendizábal and Habegger went on to play important roles as members of the **Montoneros**, by whom the group was absorbed in late 1972. *See also* EJÉRCITO NACIONAL REVOLUCIONARIO.

DESTACAMENTO DE OPERAÇÕES INTERNAS—COMANDO OPERACIONAL DE DEFESA INTERNA (DOI-CODI) / INFORMATION OPERATIONS DETACHMENT—OPERATIONAL COMMAND FOR INTERNAL DEFENSE. *See* SERVIÇO NACIONAL DE INFORMAÇÕES (SNI) / NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE.

DIRECCIÓN DE INTELIGENCIA NACIONAL (DINA) / DIRECTORATE OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE. The notorious **Chilean** secret police, established in June 1974 under the dictatorship of General **Augusto Pinochet Ugarte**. The explicit purpose of DINA was to gather information from a variety of sources at the national level. Its implicit purpose, however, was to gather information on political opponents and to eliminate the leftist influence on Chilean society. The gathering of information actually began in November 1973, when a commission was established under Colonel (later General) **Manuel Contreras Sepúlveda**. When DINA was created, Contreras Sepúlveda continued as its director and, to the dismay of other junta officers, reported directly to Pinochet Ugarte. He recruited from the intelligence units of the **military**—the army, **carabineros** (national police), navy, and air force—as well as from **death squads** active against the **Unidad Popular** (Popular Unity) government of President **Salvador Allende Gossens**, especially *Patria y Libertad* (Fatherland and Liberty).

DINA agents worked out of secret detention centers throughout the country, the most notorious of which was **Villa Grimaldi**, a former estate mansion. They abducted their victims under cover of curfew, and using information obtained from **torture**, murdered or disappeared persons perceived as subversives. To eliminate political opponents living in **exile**, DINA participated in a secret regional military network code-named **Operation Condor**. Condor has been linked to the assassination of **Orlando Letelier del Solar**, a former Chilean cabinet official, and his assistant Ronni Moffitt in the **United States**, and to an assassination attempt on Bernardo Leighton, one of the founders of the **Partido Demócrata Cristiano** (Christian Democratic Party), in Rome.

In 1977, under international pressure owing to the murder of Letelier del Solar and Moffitt, Pinochet Ugarte dissolved DINA and replaced it with the Centro Nacional de Información (CNI, National Information Center).

DIRECTORATE OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE. *See* DIRECCIÓN DE INTELIGENCIA NACIONAL (DINA).

“DIRTY WAR” (“GUERRA SUCIA”). Although the term is commonly applied to events in **Argentina** from 1976 to 1983, the concept behind it is by no means peculiar to that country or to Latin America. In a “dirty war,” the state brings the full weight of its **military** and other resources to bear against individuals, groups, or ideas it considers subversive. The phrase is often enclosed in quotation marks or preceded by *so-called*, suggesting that a “dirty war” is not a war in the traditional sense. Unlike a conventional war, in which standing armies contest territorial boundaries, a “dirty war” combats ideological boundaries. “Dirty-war” tactics are designed to root out an enemy that the state regards as hidden and elusive. Suspects are kidnapped, taken to clandestine detention centers, **tortured** and raped, and often “disappeared” or **exiled**. Names of additional suspects extracted during torture sessions lead to further arrests. Those who authorize and commit such acts enjoy not only the resources of the state but also the impunity it provides. There is no attempt to account for the *desaparecidos* (missing)—bodies are buried in secret graveyards or left out in the open as a warning to others. The ensuing climate of terror silences opposition and breeds collaboration.

The “dirty wars” waged by the countries covered in this volume, coming in the throes of the Cold War, were aimed primarily at the left and those perceived to be its supporters. **Guerrilla** movements and left-wing political parties all suffered heavy losses, many of their members killed or forced into exile. But not all the victims were party leaders or guerrillas. Journalists, labor activists, schoolteachers, university professors, progressive church leaders, high school students—anyone whose ideas were perceived to be antithetical to government notions of “Western, Christian civilization”—could join the ranks of the missing.

DISAPPEARED. See *DESAPARECIDOS*.

DISTENSÃO (RELAXATION). See GEISEL, ERNESTO.

DORFMAN, ARIEL (1942–). Chilean playwright, poet, novelist, essayist, cartoonist, memoirist, and professor of Latin American literature. Born in Buenos Aires, **Argentina**, into a family of European

émigrés—themselves survivors of Eastern European pogroms—the young Dorfman followed his family into **exile** in 1944 to the **United States**. In 1954, during the McCarthy era, the family went once again into exile, this time to **Chile**, where Dorfman obtained a Licenciatura in Comparative Literature from the Universidad de Chile, Santiago (1965), and became a naturalized citizen (1967). An early supporter of President **Salvador Allende Gossens**, Dorfman was a member of the Popular Front and advisor to the president's chief of staff. After the 1973 coup, Dorfman went into exile in France, the Netherlands, and the United States. He returned briefly to Chile in 1983 following eased restrictions on exiles. Another attempt to return, in 1986, resulted in his detention and expulsion from the country. He has taught at the Universidad de Chile, the Sorbonne (Paris), and the University of Amsterdam. He is currently the Walter Hines Page Research Professor of Literature and Latin American Studies at Duke University, North Carolina.

Dorfman's plays include *Widows*, winner of a New American Plays Award from the Kennedy Center, and *Reader*, winner of a Roger L. Stevens Award from the Kennedy Center. Several of his works have been filmed, most notably the play *Death and the Maiden*, first performed to critical acclaim in England in 1991 and later directed for the screen by Roman Polanski in 1994. In 1997 he was awarded, in collaboration with his son Rodrigo, a Writer's Guild of Great Britain Award for the short film *Prisoners of Time*. His latest film, *Dead Line*, another father-son collaboration, is based on Dorfman's collection of poetry *Last Waltz in Santiago and Other Poems of Exile and Disappearance* (1988).

Dorfman's literary works have been translated into 27 languages. His early works, which offer a critique of U.S. popular culture, include *The Emperor's Old Clothes* (1983, first published in 1980 as *Reader's nuestro que estás en la tierra*) and perhaps his best-known work, *How to Read Donald Duck* (1984, first published in 1971), the best-selling collection of essays in Latin America in the 1970s. In addition to plays and poetry, Dorfman's works that offer a perspective on the Chilean repression include *Hard Rain* (1990, first published in 1973 as *Moros en la costa*), *Widows* (1983), *The Last Song of Manuel Sendero* (1986), *Mascara* (1988), and *Konfidenz* (1995). In 1998 Dorfman published *Heading South, Looking North: A Bilingual Journey*, a work the author has described as a double memoir—that

of his experiences during the Allende Gossens years and the coup and that of his life in exile.

Haunted by memory and chance survival, Dorfman's work grapples with the themes of justice, overcoming distances, liberation, and resistance.

DRAGÚN, OSVALDO (1929–1999). Argentine playwright and theater director. He was one of the best-known playwrights in Latin America. The son of immigrants, Dragún was born in the province of Entre Ríos in an area settled mostly by Russian Jews known as the *gauchos judíos*—Jewish gauchos—whose existence so captured the national imagination in 20th-century Argentina.

In 1945 his family moved to Buenos Aires, where he eventually joined the independent theater group Teatro Popular Independiente Fray Mocho, one of the first alternative theaters in the Argentine capital. His dramatic trajectory began in 1956 at Teatro Fray Mocho with the premiere of *La peste viene de Melos* (The Plague Comes from Melos), a play based on the **United States'** invasion of Nicaragua. In 1961 he began a long period of residence abroad, which led him to collaborate artistically with theater groups in Mexico, Venezuela, Peru, Colombia, the United States, and Cuba. In 1962 his play *Milagro en el mercado viejo* (Miracle in the Old Market) was awarded the Premio Casa de las Américas in Havana, one of Latin America's most prestigious literary awards. He was awarded it again in 1966 for his play *Heroica de Buenos Aires* (Buenos Aires Heroic). Earlier, in 1957, he had produced one of his best-known plays, *Historias para ser contadas* (Stories for Theater), a series of seemingly simple dramas anchored in the social reality of Buenos Aires in the 1950s. It is one of his most anthologized works. In the 1960s and 1970s, he would produce several works for Argentine television.

An innovative proponent of popular theater, Dragún had early in his career expressed his admiration of U.S. playwright Eugene O'Neill, although he was most often associated with the socially conscious theater of Bertolt Brecht. During the **military** dictatorship, Dragún was one of the early organizers of the **Teatro Abierto Argentino** in 1981, one of Argentina's most important acts of **cultural resistance** of that period. He also became the leader of the collective. For Teatro Abierto, Dragún penned *Mi obelisco y yo* (My Obelisk

and I, 1981), *Al vencedor* (To the Victor, 1982), and *Hoy se comen al flaco* (That's It for the Poor Guy, 1983).

In 1988 he helped found and was named director of the Escuela de Teatro de Latinoamérica y el Caribe (Theater School for Latin America and the Caribbean) in Havana, Cuba, a post he retained until his death. On that occasion, according to reminiscences published at the time of his death, one of the projects of the Cuban school was an exchange workshop between Latin American Theater folk and members of an indigenous Guaraní community in the remote Argentine province of Misiones.

After the end of the military dictatorship, Dragún settled in Cuba and Mexico. It was while residing in Mexico that Dragún was named Director of Teatro Nacional Cervantes, Argentina's national theater, by Mario "Pacho" O'Donnell, earlier a collaborator of Teatro Abierto and then Argentine Minister of Culture. The appointment of Dragún to the post generated controversy, centered mainly on the dependence of the Teatro Nacional Cervantes on the official cultural bureaucracy. The Teatro Nacional Cervantes, a gloriously Baroque-style 1921 building on Plaza Lavalle, very close to the legendary Teatro Colón, was soon granted economic autarchy by the government.

As its director, Dragún organized theater tours to the Argentine interior as well as to the Maratón del Teatro Nacional Cervantes, a theater festival in which 14 theater groups from Buenos Aires and the provinces participated. He was also credited with implementing the Encuentro Iberoamericano de Teatro, which brought Latin American theater groups to Argentina.

Dragún's works have been translated in several languages and presented to audiences in the United States, Spain, France, Sweden, Mexico, Russia, and Bulgaria. Osvaldo Dragún died in Buenos Aires on 14 June 1999. His wake was held at the Teatro Nacional Cervantes.

DUE OBEDIENCE. *See OBEDIENCIA DEBIDA.*

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ECUMENICAL MOVEMENT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS. *See MOVIMIENTO ECUMÉNICO POR LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS (MEDH).*

ECUMENICAL SERVICE FOR HUMAN DIGNITY. *See* SERVICIO ECUMÉNICO DE REINTEGRACIÓN (SER).

ECUMENICAL SERVICE FOR REINTEGRATION. *See* SERVICIO ECUMÉNICO DE REINTEGRACIÓN (SER).

EJÉRCITO GUERRILLERO DEL PUEBLO (EGP) / PEOPLE'S GUERRILLA ARMY. A **guerrilla** organization that appeared in 1963 in Salta, a northern province of **Argentina**. It was led by Jorge Masetti, an Argentine journalist who had spent the previous five years in Fidel Castro's Cuba. From there he slipped into **Bolivia** with three veterans of the Cuban Revolution, and using an intricate recruiting system, attracted young Argentines from the universities and the Communist Party. In September 1963 the group crossed the border into Argentina, hoping to put into practice the ideas of Che Guevara. Its first **military** action was its last. Infiltrated by military agents, the EGP was surrounded by the police and defeated in April 1964. Masetti fled into the jungle and presumably died there.

EJÉRCITO NACIONAL REVOLUCIONARIO (ENR) / NATIONAL REVOLUTIONARY ARMY. An **Argentine** urban **guerrilla** organization credited with only a few operations, among them the assassinations of the labor leaders Augusto Vandor (1969) and José Alonso (1970)—both for alleged crimes against **Peronism**. It was closely allied with the group called the *Descamisados*, for which it may have been a front.

EJÉRCITO REVOLUCIONARIO DEL PUEBLO (ERP) / PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY. The most active of the **guerrilla** organizations in **Argentina** and one of the two principal ones. Unlike the rival **Montoneros**, who were radical **Peronists**, the ERP represented the traditional left. Its roots can be traced to the Trotskyist Palabra Obrera (PO, Workers' Word), which gave rise in 1963 to the Comando Buenos Aires, a fledgling guerrilla group that perished when its apartment, filled with explosives, blew up a year later. The Comando's legacy, however, survived. After the PO merged with the Frente Revolucionario Indoamericano Popular (FRIP, Indo-American Popular Revolutionary Front) in 1965 to become the Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores (PRT, Workers' Revolutionary Party),

the idea of armed struggle was kept alive by Luis Pujals and **Mario Roberto (“Robi”) Santucho**, the leaders of the PRT’s *El combatiente* wing. In 1968 the PRT broke with Trotskyism (though it maintained formal relations with the international Trotskyist movement until 1973), choosing to follow the path of Che Guevara, and in 1970 it established the ERP as its militant wing, though armed operations had begun the year before.

The earliest actions of the ERP were designed to establish links with workers and took the form of “hunger commandos” (seizing food and distributing it in poor neighborhoods), factory takeovers, and the kidnapping of executives as a means of intervening in worker-management disputes. By 1972 its warfare reached a new level. On 10 April a kidnapping received international press when its victim (Oberdan Sallustro, the head of Fiat-Argentina) died in a gun battle between police and guerrillas—President Alejandro Lanusse had refused to negotiate. A few hours earlier, in a joint operation with the **Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias** (FAR, Revolutionary Armed Forces), the ERP assassinated General Juan Carlos Sánchez, who had a reputation for ruthlessness in dealing with strikers and insurgents. The government responded to the escalation with the massacre at Trelew on 22 August 1972, executing 16 political prisoners recaptured after their escape from Rawson prison. The ERP sought revenge in turn. In a joint operation with the FAR and the Montoneros (who also lost comrades at Trelew), it carried out a number of kidnappings and assassinations of **military** officers thought responsible for the massacre.

The presidential election of March 1973 was divisive for the ERP. Part of the group supported the bid of **Héctor José Cámpora** and broke off to form the ERP-22 de agosto faction (ERP-22 August, named after the date of the Trelew incident); a year later, this faction joined the Montoneros. The mainline ERP, however, took a position of critical neutrality toward Peronism, a position that hardened into opposition after the massacre at Ezeiza Airport in June. The group continued to engage in armed struggle. In 1973 it built a war chest of \$30 million from robberies and kidnappings, and on 19 January 1974 launched an attack on an army garrison in the city of Azul. But having failed to build a political base among urban workers—millions of whom had remained loyal to Peron—the ERP moved its struggle to the countryside. In 1974 it opened a rural front in the mountainous,

sugar-producing province of Tucumán, where it tried to replicate the Cuban Revolution. The ERP's rural company was successful at first, fighting only the police. But in February 1975 the government of **Isabel Perón** sent in the army, and General Acdel Vilas carried out "Operation Independence," a "**dirty war**" against the local population. Surrounded by unfriendly countries—**Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay,** and **Uruguay** were all under dictatorship—and deprived of any support in the province, the ERP was easily defeated.

In December 1975 the ERP made a desperate attempt to reverse its losses, attacking the Batallón de Arsenales 601 in Monte Chingolo, Buenos Aires Province. The army was prepared, having been warned by a traitor or infiltrator. About 100 ERP members were killed in the operation, from which the organization never recovered. The coup de grace came in July 1976, when the army killed Mario Santucho and other ERP leaders.

ELTIT, DIAMELA (1949–). Chilean novelist, literary theorist, essayist, and video and performance artist. Born in Santiago, **Chile**, she holds degrees from the Universidad de Chile and the Pontificia Universidad Católica (Chile). Eltit is grouped among the members of the Post-Coup Generation of 1980, those Chilean writers whose works were first published during the years of the dictatorship of **Augusto Pinoche Ugarte**. In the late 1970s, in collaboration with other Chilean artists such as the poet Raúl Zurita and the visual artist Lotty Rosenfeld, Eltit founded the Colectivo de Acciones de Arte, an artistic collective that tested the limits of official censorship through avant-garde and performance-art representations. The group's work has been exhibited in several Latin American countries and Europe. In 1987 Eltit organized the IEI Congreso Internacional de Literatura Femenina Latinoamericana in Santiago. She has promoted literacy campaigns and was a cultural attaché at the Chilean embassy in Mexico City during the presidency of **Patricio Aylwin Azócar**. She was awarded a Guggenheim Fellowship in 1985 and has received several awards and grants in her native Chile. Eltit has lectured on literary theory at Brown University and the Universidad Nacional de Chile and is a frequent speaker in universities in Europe and the **United States**. She is currently a professor at the Universidad Tecnológica Metropolitana in Chile.

Her first novel, *Lumpérica* (1983, translated as *Lumpen* in 1997), sought to dismantle the discourse of authority through the use of extremely experimental and cryptic language. The text makes repeated references to a performance piece, performed at a brothel in the city of Maipu in 1980, where Eltit washed the pavement in front of the brothel, inflicted a series of cuts on her arms, and concluded by reading a portion of the novel. *Lumpérica* received ambivalent reviews from literary critics in Chile, though its use of experimental language is often credited with helping it escape official censorship. Her 1986 novel, *Por la patria* (translated as *For the Fatherland*), offered a critique of the Chilean regime in the form of the protagonist, a woman who has been detained and **tortured** by the government. Later novels—still rooted in linguistic experimentation but closer to traditional narratives—include *El cuarto mundo* (1988, translated as *The Fourth World* in 1995), *Vaca sagrada* (1991, translated as *Sacred Cow* in 1995), and *Los vigilantes* (1993). She has also collaborated in documentary work such as *El infarto del alma* (1995, with the photographer Paz Errázuriz) and *Los trabajadores de la muerte* (1998).

EQUIPO ARGENTINO DE ANTROPOLOGÍA FORENSE (EAAF) / ARGENTINE FORENSIC ANTHROPOLOGY TEAM. A pioneer in using forensics in cases of **human-rights** violations, the EAAF was founded in 1984 in **Argentina** at the behest of human-rights groups such as the **Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas** (CONADEP, National Commission on the Disappeared) and the **Madres de Plaza de Mayo**. A nongovernmental, not-for-profit organization, EAAF has since expanded its work. In 1995–1997 a team of EAAF scientists identified the remains of Ernesto “Che” Guevara and other **guerrillas** in Vallegrande, Bolivia. More recently, EAAF has conducted investigations in the Ciudad Juárez region of Mexico, where over 400 young **women** have disappeared or been murdered in the past few years.

In 1983, with the return of democracy in Argentina, judges began ordering exhumations from cemeteries suspected of containing the remains of the missing (*desaparecidos*). The problem was that Argentine forensic doctors had been trained to exhume and analyze cadavers, not skeletal remains. In some cases, they used bulldozers, which dispersed and destroyed many of the remains. Moreover,

many of the supervising forensic doctors had worked for the previous police and judicial systems, leading in some instances to charges of complicity in the crimes they were being asked to investigate.

At this point, Argentine human-rights groups appealed for help from the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS). The Science and Human Rights Program of the AAAS soon organized a delegation that traveled to Argentina. Among the members was Dr. Clyde Snow, one of the world's authorities on forensic anthropology. Dr. Snow helped found the EAAF, and under his aegis, a group of archaeologists, anthropologists, and physicians began analyzing the human remains.

The EAAF undertook legal proceedings on behalf of the family members of *desaparecidos*, making use of a peculiarity in the **military** dictatorship's treatment of its victims—the unusually detailed level of documentation given to bodies buried in so-called paupers' graves. Many of the victims executed by military authorities were abandoned in public places. The local police, alerted by anonymous telephone calls, would then recover the bodies and tag them as “unidentified.” Unidentified bodies were fingerprinted, photographed, and, in some cases, perfunctorily examined by police or forensic physicians, who would then issue a death certificate leading to an official burial certificate. The information contained in those police dossiers has aided EAAF in identifying the regime's victims.

Following the Argentine initiative, other forensic-anthropology groups were founded in Latin America, such as the Peruvian Forensic Anthropology Team and the Guatemalan Forensic Anthropology Foundation. Both groups labor to identify cases of human-rights violations in their countries. In Argentina, the latest initiative of the EAAF has led to a massive effort to identify human remains found in cemeteries in the Buenos Aires and Córdoba provinces. In November 2007 the Iniciativa Latinoamericana para la Identificación de Personas Desaparecidas (LIID, Latin American Initiative for the Identification of the “Disappeared”) began a national media campaign, which includes the participation of journalists, actresses, and actors in popular television and radio spots aimed at encouraging relatives of *desaparecidos* to donate blood samples. In June 2008 the drive was expanded to Spain, where the Argentine Embassy in Madrid, as well as consulates in Barcelona, Vigo, Cadiz, and Tenerife, has acted

as a temporary collection center. EAAF currently works to establish its own genetic laboratory in Buenos Aires as part of its mission to identify victims of human-rights violations.

Current members of the EAAF include Carlos “Maco” Somigliana, a former **Montonero** (not **Carlos Somigliana** the playwright), and Mercedes Doretti, cofounder of EAAF and recipient of a 2007 “genius grant” from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. In addition, EAAF received a 2008 Konex Award for its contribution as a Science and Technology Organization in Argentina.

ESCOLA SUPERIOR DE GUERRA (ESG) / HIGHER WAR COLLEGE. A **Brazilian** war college that helped shape the anticommunist views of General **Humberto de Alencar Castello Branco** and the other conspirators behind the 1964 **military** coup. The ESG was established in 1949 by President Eurico Dutra, a general. **United States** military advisors had a strong hand in its creation, and it was modeled after the U.S. National War College. After the Cuban Revolution of 1959, the ESG adopted the theory of internal war, which identified anticommunist subversion, not external invasion, as the greater threat to the country. Combating subversion, according to ESG teaching, required strong, hierarchical government and a total national commitment. Although the military would direct the fight, it needed the cooperation of civilian elites. Hence the opening of the ESG curriculum to leaders from across society—not only military officers but also industrialists, legislators, judges, and professionals.

ESCUELA MECÁNICA DE LA ARMADA (ESMA) / NAVY MECHANICS SCHOOL. An **Argentine** naval technical school in the heart of Buenos Aires, ESMA was transformed during the repression into an infamous **torture** center, where some 5,000 people disappeared. ESMA is considered the Auschwitz of Argentina’s “**dirty war**.”

The school consisted of 35 buildings—whitewashed, colonnaded, red-tile roofed—surrounded by trees and well-tended lawns. One of the buildings, the officers’ quarters, was put to use in the war against suspected subversives. The cellar contained interrogation rooms, an infirmary, and a photographic laboratory. On the main level, intelligence officers analyzed information extracted from interrogations

and planned their operations. On the second and third floors were officers' rooms. The third floor also contained the *Capucha* (hood), an area divided into small cubicles where prisoners lived, and a storeroom, which held furniture, clothes, and other goods taken as spoils of war from prisoners' homes. At the end of 1977, part of the storeroom became the "fishbowl," a series of glass offices where some prisoners were allowed to work. On the top floor was the *Capuchita* (little hood), which held interrogation rooms and more prisoner cubicles.

After the return to democracy, **Carlos Saúl Menem** (president: 1989–1999) planned to demolish ESMA and erect in its place a monument to national reconciliation. But in January 1998 protestors forced him to abandon his plans, insisting that the site would better serve as a museum to the *desaparecidos* (missing). On 24 March 2004 President Néstor Kirchner signed an order turning ESMA into a Museum of Memory, which opened in April 2008. Already the largest **human-rights** museum in Latin America, it is due to be completed in 2010, the 200th anniversary of Argentina's independence. The completion will be overseen by Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, the former first lady, who in December 2007 succeeded her husband as president.

ESPINAL CAMPS, LUIS (1932–1980). Spanish-Bolivian priest and film critic. Born in the town of San Fruitós de Bagés, in the region of Catalonia, Spain, Luis Espinal joined the Society of Jesus, popularly known as the Jesuits, in 1949. He was ordained in 1962 and went on to receive a degree in journalism and film at the Università del Sacro Cuore in Milan, Italy. He worked briefly in Spanish television until 1968, when he was sent by the order to La Paz, Bolivia.

In Bolivia Espinal Camps, popularly known as "Lucho," would join the daily *Presencia* and *Última hora*, as well as develop a national television program. He also taught film at the Universidad Mayor de San Andrés and the Universidad Católica de La Paz and worked for Radio Fides, one of the oldest Catholic radio stations in Latin America and perhaps the oldest in Bolivia, a country where radio stations played a key role in the labor movements, particularly among miners. In addition, he authored 10 books on film, joined the film-production group Ukamu, and directed the weekly magazine

Aquí until his death. In the 1970s he was one of the best-known critics of film, television, and radio in Bolivia.

Espinal Camps, who had acquired Bolivian citizenship in 1970, was also known for denouncing **human-rights** abuses in his adopted country. In 1976 he helped found the **Asamblea Permanente de los Derechos Humanos de Bolivia** (APDHB, Permanent Assembly for Human Rights in Bolivia). On December 1977 he joined the hunger strike led by **Domitila Barrios de Chungara** in the offices of *Presencia*. He continued his political activism until 22 March 1980, when he was kidnapped, **tortured**, and executed. Bound and gagged, he was left on the road to Chacaltaya and discovered by peasants the next day. APDHB blamed paramilitary groups, although to date no individual or groups have been charged with the crime.

Several published reports hold that more than 70,000 people attended his funeral, an act construed as a denunciation of the regime. After his death, *Oraciones a quemarropa* (Point-blank Prayers), a book of poetic prose and prayers authored by Espinal Camps, was published. In his youth, he had translated the poetry of fellow Jesuit Gerard Manley Hopkins. The Society of Jesus in Catalonia maintains the Luis Espinal Camps Foundation in his memory.

ESPINOZA BRAVO, PEDRO. A major (later brigadier general) in the armed forces and chief of operations of the **Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional** (DINA, Directorate of National Intelligence), the secret police in **Chile**. In October 1973 he took part in the **caravan of death**, a cross-country helicopter tour that resulted in the deaths of 75 political prisoners. In November 1993 Espinoza Bravo was convicted by a Chilean court of complicity in the September 1976 murders of **Orlando Letelier del Solar** and Ronni Moffitt in Washington, D.C. Because the crime had been committed outside the country, the **amnesty law of 1978** did not apply. He received a sentence of six years and served time in a special **military** prison.

ETCHECOLATZ, MIGUEL. Chief inspector for the Buenos Aires Police during the “**dirty war**” in **Argentina**. Reporting to General **Ramón Camps**, Etchecolatz was in charge of 21 secret detention centers throughout Buenos Aires. He is known to have participated in the “**Night of the Pencils**,” an operation in which 10 high school

students were abducted. On 2 December 1986, he was convicted in federal court on charges of **torture** and sentenced to 23 years in prison. He served only a short time, going free under *Obediencia Debida* (Due Obedience), an amnesty law passed in June 1987. But after the Supreme Court overturned the amnesty law in 2005, he was convicted again, in 2006, for murder, torture, and kidnapping and sentenced to life in prison. He was already serving a seven-year sentence, handed down in 2004, for abducting babies born to political prisoners, a crime not covered by the earlier amnesty law.

EVERYONE FOR THE HOMELAND. *See* MOVIMIENTO TODOS POR LA PATRIA (MTP).

EXILE. Exile during the “**dirty wars**”—and the years leading up to them—took many forms. Some people, fearing state persecution, sought diplomatic asylum or left the country unofficially. Others, though leaving voluntarily, did so not out of fear, but out of defiance. Still others were forced to leave—led to the border or put on a plane by security forces, sometimes with nothing but the clothes on their backs. Not all forced exile, however, was external. In **Chile** some political prisoners were banished to remote villages—an internal exile called *relegación*. *Relegación* usually lasted up to three months, more than enough time to ruin lives—people lost their jobs or were expelled from school.

It is difficult to know the true number of exiles. One source of statistics is the **United Nations** (UN), but many people never registered with the UN as refugees, having left their own countries unofficially. Still, by some estimates the number for **Argentina** ranges from 500,000 to two million; for **Bolivia**, about 650 during the seven-year rule of **Hugo Banzer Suárez** and 1,500 during the 11-month rule of **Luis García Meza**; for **Brazil**, about 5,000; for Chile, almost a million, which does not include those escaping economic recession from 1982 onward; for **Paraguay**, about half of its population; and for **Uruguay**, from 300,000 to 500,000 (between 20 and 30 percent of its population).

Refuge in another country did not necessarily mean safety. **Operation Condor**, a network of Latin American **military** regimes, claimed victims not only throughout the region but also farther afield—the **United States**, for example, and Italy.

FALKLAND ISLANDS / ISLAS MALVINAS. Islands off the coast of **Argentina**, 900 miles southeast of Buenos Aires. Although sparsely populated, cold, and windswept, the Falkland Islands (known as the Islas Malvinas, or Malvinas, in Argentina) have been a subject of dispute between Argentina and Britain since 1833. In that year, the British occupied the islands, which Argentina had claimed as an inheritance from Spain. In 1982 General **Leopoldo Fortunato Galtieri**, the leader of the third junta, made the decision to take back the islands—an attempt to divert attention from the country’s domestic problems. Diplomatic talks failed, and Argentina turned to force. On 11 March an Argentine construction crew on South Georgia Island (a Falklands dependency) created a diplomatic incident by raising the Argentine flag. Shortly after, events in Argentina persuaded Galtieri to accelerate plans for an invasion. On 18 March the **Madres de Plaza de Mayo** (Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo) staged their largest Thursday vigil yet, and on 30 March the **Confederación General del Trabajo** (CGT, General Labor Confederation)—revived but illegal—led thousands in a demonstration that was suppressed with violence. On 2 April Argentina invaded the islands.

At first, the move was popular in Argentina. The demonstrations against the junta a few days earlier were replaced with rallies in support of the invasion. Even the labor movement set aside its grievances. The Madres, however, continued their protest, though the Thursday vigils attracted fewer marchers. Outside Argentina, however, the junta found itself virtually isolated. The invasion was condemned by the **United Nations** Security Council and elicited, at most, only lukewarm support from Latin American countries. The **United States** sided with Britain, its ally in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Domestic support faded, too, when it became clear that Britain intended to recapture the islands. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher sent a fleet to the south Atlantic, including eight destroyers, two aircraft carriers, and two nuclear submarines. Because their invasion plan had been hastily drawn up, the Argentines found themselves at a disadvantage. The occupying force, the Third Army Brigade, was made up largely of recent conscripts who lacked

training and equipment. It was no match for the experienced British force, and the Argentines surrendered on 14 June.

The next day, when Galtieri reported Argentina's defeat to a crowd assembled in the **Plaza de Mayo**, the crowd hurled insults at him and the other junta members and began rioting in the streets. On 17 June Galtieri was forced to resign. He was replaced by **Reynaldo Benito Bignone**, a retired general, who would return the country to civilian rule the following year.

FAMILIARES / RELATIVES. A small **human-rights** nongovernmental organization in **Uruguay**. Founded in 1977, the group was originally called the Madres y Familiares de los Uruguayos Desaparecidos en Argentina, or Mothers and Relatives of Uruguayans Who Disappeared in Argentina. Owing to repression within Uruguay, the group concentrated most of its efforts at first on those who disappeared in **Argentina** but expanded its efforts to Uruguayan victims a few years later. The group collaborated with **Servicio Paz y Justicia** (SERPAJ), or Peace and Justice Service, and participated in the **Concertación Nacional Programática**.

FAMILIARES DE DESAPARECIDOS Y DETENIDOS POR RAZONES POLÍTICAS / RELATIVES OF THE DETAINED AND DISAPPEARED FOR POLITICAL REASONS. A **human-rights** nongovernmental organization in **Argentina**. Familiares was founded in 1977. Unlike the **Madres de Plaza de Mayo** (Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo) and the **Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo** (Grandmothers), two other human-rights groups formed by family members of the missing (*desaparecidos*), Familiares included male relatives and directed more attention to political prisoners in the official prison system, trying to secure their release and improve the conditions under which they were held.

FATHERLAND AND LIBERTY. *See* DEATH SQUADS.

FERREIRA, JOAQUIM CÂMARA (d. 1970). Member of the **Ação Libertadora Nacional** (ALN, National Action for Liberation), an urban **guerrilla** organization in **Brazil**. He was one of the "big

three” — the guerrilla leaders most prominent in the armed opposition to Brazil’s **military** dictatorship. The others were **Carlos Lamarca** and **Carlos Marighella**. Ferreira and Marighella had been active in the **Partido Comunista Brasileiro** (PCB, Brazilian Communist Party), but after the 1964 military coup that ousted the left-leaning President **João Goulart**, they grew impatient with the PCB’s passive stance. In 1967, Marighella founded the ALN as a PCB offshoot committed to armed struggle, and Ferreira became his chief ally.

In November 1969, Ferreira became ALN’s leader after Marighella died in an ambush set by Sérgio Fleury, a notorious **torturer**. Ferreira died in October 1970, one of Fleury’s torture victims.

FIGUEIREDO, JOÃO BAPTISTA DE OLIVEIRA (1918–1999).

Army general and president of **Brazil** from March 1979 to March 1985. He was the last of the five **military** presidents following the 1964 coup that toppled the left-leaning President **João Goulart**.

Figueiredo was born in Rio de Janeiro. He graduated from a Rio de Janeiro military school and then began his military career, in 1935, as a cadet at the Escola Militar do Realengo, the national military academy in Rio de Janeiro. He finished first in the military academy, the junior officers’ school, and the army command and staff school. He then taught at the Agulhas Negras military academy, the Escola Militar do Realengo, the officers’ graduate school, and the army command and staff school. His subject of expertise was military intelligence.

After the coup of 1964, which he helped plan, he was appointed the head of the Rio de Janeiro section of the newly created **Serviço Nacional de Informações** (SNI, National Intelligence Service). He served as the head of the military cabinet during the administration of **Emílio Garrastazú Médici** (1969–1974), and the head of the SNI under the administration of **Ernesto Geisel** (1974–1979).

On 5 January 1979 Geisel named Figueiredo to succeed him as president. Geisel was the first military president to name his successor, bypassing the military high command. Over the objection of hard-liners, Geisel had begun a process of political liberalization known as *distensão* (relaxation), and Figueiredo, who took office on 15 March 1979, completed the process, then known as *abertura* (opening). In August 1979 Figueiredo issued an amnesty to all

those imprisoned or exiled for political crimes during the dictatorship—though as a concession to the hard-line, the amnesty covered the **torturers**, as well. He also returned Brazil to civilian rule: on 15 January 1985 Tancredo Neves, an opposition candidate, was elected president. Figueiredo died on 24 December 1999.

FILÁRTIGA V. PEÑA-IRALA. A landmark **human-rights** case, decided in 1980 in a U.S. federal court. It recognized the right of non-citizens to sue in U.S. courts for human-rights violations, even when the alleged violations took place outside the **United States**. It has served as precedent for many successful cases seeking punishment for those responsible for **torture**, rape, disappearance, and summary execution, cases brought by people from South and Central America, Africa, and Asia.

In March 1976 Joelito Filártiga, a 17-year-old Paraguayan, was tortured to death in a police station in Asunción, **Paraguay**. The torture was directed by Américo Peña-Irala, the inspector general of police, who wanted information about the victim's father, Dr. Joel Filártiga, a physician, artist, and longtime critic of the regime of General **Alfredo Stroessner**. When Joelito died unexpectedly from cardiac arrest, Peña-Irala and the other officers made the murder look like a crime of passion. The body was taken to Peña-Irala's house and placed in the bed of the 17-year-old daughter of Peña-Irala's mistress. The daughter's husband was then beaten until he agreed to the story that he had found Joelito in bed with his wife and murdered him. Such a crime would be excused by Paraguayan law.

The Filártigas, however, knew what had happened and who was responsible. Peña-Irala, who lived next door to the Filártigas, had summoned Joelito's sister, Dolly, to collect the body, ordering her to keep quiet about the incident. Dr. Filártiga easily recognized the marks of torture—he himself had been tortured by the police. And three independent autopsies revealed that Joelito had been whipped and beaten and that his death was caused by electric shocks. Far from keeping quiet, the Filártigas displayed Joelito's tortured body in public, drawing so much public sympathy that 2,000 people attended his funeral. They also tried to bring murder charges against Peña-Irala, but nothing came of the case. Their lawyer was arrested and then disbarred, they received threatening phone calls, and Dolly and her mother spent a day in jail.

In June 1978 Peña-Irala fled to Brooklyn, New York, where Dolly tracked him down. She was joined by her father, and in 1979 they sued Peña-Irala under the Alien Tort Claims Act of 1789, which allows noncitizens to file suit in U.S. courts for human-rights abuses that violate international law. The law, passed by the first Congress, was intended to counter piracy. On 14 May 1979 a federal judge ruled that U.S. courts had no jurisdiction but left the way open for appeal. On 30 June 1980, in *Filártiga v. Peña-Irala* (28 U.S.C. § 1350), the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in New York recognized the Filártigas' right to sue, ruling that state-sponsored torture violated international law. Two years later, the same court awarded the Filártigas \$10 million in damages.

Peña-Irala was deported, and the Filártigas never collected—suing dictators or torturers in U.S. courts seldom results in money. Nevertheless, the Filártigas' main concern was not money, but justice.

The story of the Filártigas is told in Richard Alan White's book *Breaking Silence: The Case That Changed the Face of Human Rights* and in the documentary *One Man's War*.

FIRMENICH, MARIO EDUARDO. *See* MONTONEROS.

FORD, GERALD. *See* KISSINGER, HENRY; UNITED STATES.

FOUNDATION FOR THE PROTECTION OF CHILDREN INJURED BY STATES OF EXCEPTION. *See* FUNDACIÓN PARA LA PROTECCIÓN DE LA INFANCIA DAÑADA POR LOS ESTADOS DE EMERGENCIA (PIDEE).

FREI MONTALVA, EDUARDO (1911–1982). President of **Chile** (1964–1970). Representing the **Partido Demócrata Cristiano** (PDC, Christian Democratic Party), he was elected president in 1964 under the slogan “Revolution in Liberty.” His administration was reformist—he partially nationalized the copper industry, for example—though his reputation suffered after he forcibly put down strikes in 1966 and 1968. Prevented by the constitution from running for president again in 1970, he was elected to the Senate in 1973. Although he supported the coup that toppled his successor, **Salvador Allende Gossens**, he would later turn against the **military** regime.

He died in a hospital in January 1982—from an infection after a hernia operation. His funeral drew thousands of mourners.

In May 2006 retired army generals told Judge Alejandro Madrid that Frei Montalva had been murdered. The infection that killed him, they said, was caused by a bacterial agent designed by Eugenio Berrios, an operative in **Pinochet Ugarte's** secret biochemical-warfare program. They also told the judge that Pinochet Ugarte had ordered Berrios to be disappeared. Berrios was discovered shot dead in 1995 on a beach in Montevideo, **Uruguay**, and an investigation by the Chilean journalist Jorge Molina showed that Chilean and Uruguayan security agents had been complicit in his kidnapping and murder. Pinochet Ugarte died in December 2006.

FRENTE PATRIÓTICO MANUEL RODRÍGUEZ (FPMR) / MANUEL RODRÍGUEZ PATRIOTIC FRONT. An urban **guerrilla** movement in **Chile**. It was formed in 1983 as an offshoot of the **Partido Comunista de Chile** (PC, Communist Party of Chile). Named after an independence hero, the group conducted thousands of bombings and other operations but is best known for Operation Twentieth Century, its plot to assassinate General **Augusto Pinochet Ugarte**. On 7 September 1986, 25 FPMR commandos directed machine-gun and rocket fire on the general's motorcade. Five bodyguards were killed, but the general escaped—the rocket that hit his car never exploded. The regime retaliated by arresting hundreds of leftists, including nine of the commandos involved in the attack. In March 1990 FPMR tried to assassinate General **Gustavo Leigh Guzmán**, who was hit at close range by five 9 mm bullets and lost an eye.

FRENTE UNIDO POR LA LIBERACIÓN NACIONAL / UNITED NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (FULNA). A **Paraguayan** armed **guerrilla** organization that, in 1960, fought the dictatorship of **Alfredo Stroessner**. Funded by the **Partido Comunista Paraguayo** (PCP, Paraguayan Communist Party) and Fidel Castro's Cuba, FULNA attracted young militants from two **exiled** political parties: the **Partido Liberal** (Liberal Party) and the **Partido Revolucionario Febrerista** (PRF, February Revolutionary Party). Liberal and Febrerista party elders, however, disapproved of FULNA's communist ties and threatened its members with expulsion.

On 3 May 1960 a group of 17 FULNA guerrillas crossed from **Brazil** into Paraguay, attacking the village of Capitán Bado. They were beaten back by police and then wiped out by the **military** before they could get back across the border. FULNA then sent about 200 guerrillas into Paraguay to establish a base camp. They were soon discovered by the military and defeated, their bodies thrown into the Paraná River. FULNA's final invasion, on 20 December 1960, like the previous ones, ended in disaster. *See also* MOVIMIENTO 14 DE MAYO PARA LA LIBERTAD PARAGUAYA; VANGUARDIA FEBRERISTA.

FUERZAS ARMADAS PERONISTAS (FAP) / PERONIST ARMED FORCES. An **Argentine** urban **guerrilla** organization, formed in 1968 under the leadership of Envar El Kadri. Inspired by the Cuban Revolution, it began as a rural insurrection, or *foco* (literally “center,” “nucleus”). It abandoned the countryside, however, after a defeat in September at Taco Ralo, Tucumán, where police surprised and captured the group's first detachment, the “17th of October” (named in solidarity with the workers who freed **Juan Perón** in 1945). By 1970 the group had moved its operations to the cities. In late 1970, it came to the aid of another Peronist group, the **Montoneros**, sheltering it from government persecution. It changed its militant strategy after Perón's return from **exile** in 1973, when many of its members put down their weapons in favor of political activity aboveground, including organizing workers. A splinter group, the Comando Nacional, continued armed struggle, later merging with the Montoneros.

FUERZAS ARMADAS REVOLUCIONARIAS (FAR) / REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES. A militant organization begun in 1966 as the **Argentine** branch of Che Guevara's **guerrillas**. Che's death in 1967 and the popular uprising in Córdoba (the *cordobazo*) led the group, under the leadership of Carlos Enrique Olmedo and Roberto Jorge Quieto, to initiate urban struggle in 1969. The FAR originally described itself as Marxist-Leninist-Peronist, but by 1971 had shifted to **Peronism**. It had a reputation for technical expertise, earned in such operations as the 1969 bombing of a supermarket chain owned by Nelson Rockefeller and the July 1970 capture of

the small town of Garín (population 30,000) near Buenos Aires. The group's development was hampered by the capture of several members in 1970 and 1971 and the resulting disclosure of vital information. Protected by the **Fuerzas Armadas Peronistas** (FAP, Peronist Armed Forces), FAR survived and continued to conduct operations, often with other guerrilla groups, until their merger with the **Montoneros** in October 1973.

FULL STOP. *See PUNTO FINAL.*

FUNDACIÓN DE AYUDA SOCIAL DE LAS IGLESIAS CRISTIANAS (FASIC) / CHRISTIAN CHURCHES SOCIAL ASSISTANCE FOUNDATION. A **human-rights** nongovernmental organization in **Chile**. Founded in 1975 by Protestant churches, especially the Evangelical Lutheran Church, FASIC collected cases of **torture**, **exile**, political prisoners, and those who returned from exile. It also provided legal assistance and medical and psychiatric treatment to victims.

FUNDACIÓN PARA LA PROTECCIÓN DE LA INFANCIA DAÑADA POR LOS ESTADOS DE EMERGENCIA (PIDEE) / FOUNDATION FOR THE PROTECTION OF CHILDREN INJURED BY STATES OF EMERGENCY. A **human-rights** nongovernmental organization in **Chile**. It was founded in 1979 with assistance from the **Fundación de Ayuda Social de las Iglesias Cristianas** (FASIC, Christian Churches Social Assistance Foundation). PIDEE provided assistance—medical, psychological, and educational—to children and teenagers who suffered directly from the repression or whose parents had been disappeared or executed.

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GABEIRA, FERNANDO (1941–). Born in the northern state of Minas Gerais, Fernando Paulo Nagle Gabeira is a **Brazilian** politician, author, journalist, and former **guerrilla**. A federal deputy for the state of Rio de Janeiro since 1995, in October 2008 Gabeira was narrowly defeated—by 1.4 percent of the votes—in the runoff elec-

tion for mayor of Rio. A longtime supporter of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Gabeira broke with his former political ally in 2003. He is one of the founding members of the Brazilian Green Party and an outspoken and colorful politician, widely seen—during his mayoral candidacy—as a reformer.

Gabeira's initiation in Brazilian politics stems from his participation on 4 September 1969 in the kidnapping of Charles Elbrick (1910–1983), the **United States** ambassador to Brazil. Ambassador Elbrick was held prisoner for four days by members of the **Ação Libertadora Nacional** (ALN, National Action for Liberation) and the **Movimento Revolucionário 8 de Outubro** (MR-8, 8th of October Revolutionary Movement) and released unharmed. Hugely embarrassed by the incident, the military regime of **Artur da Costa e Silva** had published the guerrillas' manifesto as demanded and freed 15 guerrillas, who were then flown to Mexico. According to Elbrick's daughter, Valerie, in an interview in October 2008, Ambassador Elbrick—who distinguished himself through the ordeal by his calm, courageous demeanor—felt a “strange admiration” for his kidnapers. She is reported to have declared, “he had tears in his eyes when they let him go, because he knew they'd be hunted down and **tortured.**” Indeed, the day after the kidnapping, the regime decreed several acts of banishment and capital punishment for anybody involved in “subversive warfare.”

As a result of the crackdown by **military** forces, Gabeira was arrested, tortured, and **exiled**. He spent time in **Chile**, where he was forced to seek asylum at the **Argentine** Embassy in 1973, during the coup against **Salvador Allende Gossens**, and later in Europe. His return from exile in Sweden in 1979, after renouncing political violence, and the publication of his memoir, *O que e isso companheiro?* (What Is This, Comrade?), transformed him into a hugely popular figure among the Brazilian public, then thirsting for accounts of the years of dictatorship. In a matter-of-fact, journalistic voice laced with occasional personal revelations, Gabeira's memoir recounted his transformation from journalist with the popular daily, *Jornal do Brasil*, to a member of an armed-guerrilla group, though the author denied ever firing a weapon. The narrative, gripping and even humorous at times, reveals the romanticized view of revolution that attracted many young people to armed struggle in Latin America

during the late 1960s. In an interview cited by the scholar Nancy T. Baden, for example, Gabeira admitted that it was only after exile that he had become familiar with Marxist texts. The memoir concluded with an account of prison and torture, although, as Baden remarked, it lacked the “ornamental horror” of many of the narratives of the time.

An instant best seller in Brazil, with an unprecedented number of editions, *O que e isso companheiro?* was adapted for the screen by the director Bruno Barreto in 1997, with Alan Arkin in the role of Ambassador Elbrick. The movie was released in the United States as *Four Days in September* and was nominated for an Oscar as Best Foreign Language Film the following year. In 2007 Silvio Da-Rin released the documentary *Hércules 56*, in which former political foes of the military dictatorship, as well as some of the guerrillas released as a result of the Elbrick kidnapping and flown to Mexico in the Hercules 56 aircraft of the title, spoke about that moment in Brazilian political life. In a move perhaps revelatory of the political atmosphere in Brazil at the beginning of the new millennium, in October 2008 the Brazilian Embassy in Washington, D.C., chose *Hércules 56* for inclusion in its Reel Time Brazil—First Brazilian Documentary Film Week.

GALEANO, EDUARDO (1940–). Uruguayan journalist, essayist, and historian. Born in Montevideo into a middle-class family of Welsh, German, Spanish, and Italian ancestry as Eduardo Hughes Galeano. In 1954 he began his career in journalism as a political cartoonist for the socialist weekly *El Sol*. He signed his cartoons “Gius,” a word play on the difficult pronunciation of his paternal surname, Hughes, in Spanish. In the 1960s he published his first articles, adopting his maternal surname, Galeano, as nom de plume. From 1960 to 1964 he was editor-in-chief of the influential weekly *Marcha* and editor of the daily *Época*. From 1965 to 1973 he was editor-in-chief of the University Press in Montevideo. He was jailed in the months leading to the 1973 coup. Upon his release, he went into **exile** in **Argentina**. In Buenos Aires he founded and edited the cultural magazine *Crisis*. After the Argentine **military** coup in 1976, Galeano went into exile in Barcelona, Spain. He returned to Uruguay in 1985 after the restoration of democracy and the election of **Julio**

María Sanguinetti as president. He is presently editor-in-chief of the editorial house El Chanchito.

A vigorous critic of capitalist models, Galeano's best-known work is *Las venas abiertas de América Latina* (1971, translated as *Open Veins of Latin America*), an economic analysis of five centuries of exploitation in Latin America. *Las venas* was a best seller in Latin America and was routinely banned in several countries. Galeano continued his trajectory in the trilogy *Memoria del fuego* (1982–1986, translated as *Memory of Fire* in 1985–1988). Translated into more than 20 languages, *Memoria del fuego* weaves fiction and history, folklore, and memoirs into a narrative that defies easy classification. In 1978 he published *Días y noches de amor y de guerra* (translated as *Days and Nights of Love and War* in 2000), which one critic has described as “a testimony to the power of fear to silence a population . . . a testimony to the courage of those who refuse to be silenced.”

The author of more than 30 books, Galeano received the prestigious Casa de las Américas award in 1975 and 1978. In 1993 Danish editors honored him with the Aloa award. In 1989 *Memoria del fuego* received awards from the Uruguayan Ministry of Culture and the American Book Award from Washington University. In 1999 the Lannan Foundation of New Mexico awarded its first Cultural Prize for Freedom to Galeano in recognition of his work.

GALTIERI, LEOPOLDO FORTUNATO (1926–2003). General, army commander, and the president of the third junta (December 1981 to June 1982) during the “dirty war” in **Argentina**. He graduated in 1949 from the **United States’** School of the Americas in Panama. On 2 April 1982, to distract public attention from the country’s economic and social unrest, he ordered the invasion of the **Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas**, which were governed by Britain. On 17 June 1982, after Argentina’s defeat at the hands of the British in the brief Falklands War, Galtieri resigned from the presidency in disgrace, replaced by **Reynaldo Benito Bignone**. In the 1985 trial of the nine former junta commanders, Galtieri was acquitted of **human-rights** crimes—the third junta had taken office after the worst of the repression was over. In May 1986, however, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, the nation’s highest **military** tribunal, convicted him of negligence during the Falklands War. He was sentenced to 12

years in prison and stripped of his rank but was released in October 1989 following a blanket pardon decreed by President **Carlos Saúl Menem**.

GAMBARO, GRISELDA (1928–). **Argentine** novelist and playwright. Born in Buenos Aires, Gambaro began her literary trajectory as a novelist, a career she combined with that of a playwright. Although she began to write early, amid a variety of jobs and occupations, her first works were not published until the 1960s. In 1965 her play *El desatino* was first performed in the Sala de Experimentación Audiovisual del Instituto Di Tella in Buenos Aires, under the direction of Jorge Petraglia. Three years later, her play *El campo* debuted in the Teatro Sha in Buenos Aires, under the direction of Augusto Fernández. *El campo*, rooted in the tradition of Artaud’s “theater of cruelty,” presents a stark vision of life in a concentration camp and is often read as a presage to the Argentine situation under the **military** regime. In 1977 her novel *Ganarse la muerte* was banned by the government of General **Jorge Rafael Videla** as being “against the institution of the family” and “against the social order.” The ban, and the increasing political repression, sent Gambaro into **exile** in Barcelona, Spain.

In 1981 Gambaro’s play *Decir que sí* (Saying Yes) was staged in the first cycle of **Teatro Abierto Argentino** (Open Theater of Argentina), the best-known example of **cultural resistance** to emerge during the years of the military regime. She would go on to garner national and international acclaim with her 1982 work *La malasangre* (Bad Blood), first staged in the Teatro Olimpia under the direction of Laura Yusem. In line with other plays from the Teatro Abierto Argentino, the works offer an oblique commentary on the political situation in Argentina during the “**dirty war**.”

A prolific playwright and novelist—with nearly 30 plays and novels to her credit—Gambaro has had her plays staged abroad in England, France, Belgium, and Mexico. Some of her works have also been adapted for the radio by the BBC of London, Sverige Radio, and France Culturel. In 1982 she was the recipient of a Guggenheim Fellowship. She has received numerous awards in her native Argentina for both her dramatic and narrative work, notably the Argentores Award on four occasions (1976, 1990, 1992, and 1996) and the

Academia Argentina de Letras award of 1997/1999 for her collection of short stories *Lo mejor que se viene*. She has also received several distinctions abroad, most notably in Spain and Mexico, where she has lectured on theater. A frequent lecturer abroad, Gambaro has participated in symposia at Dartmouth College in 1987, Universidad de Valencia (Spain) in 1992, University of Bordeaux (France) in 1992 and 1994, and the Universidad de Cuenca (Spain) in 1998.

GARCÍA MEZA, LUIS. The “cocaine dictator.” **Bolivian** general, army commander, and ruler. He came to power in a violent coup on 17 July 1980, bent on removing every trace of suspected leftist subversion. He decreed martial law, imposed censorship, outlawed **trade unions**, rounded up perceived enemies—between 1,500 and 2,000 by September—and drove 1,500 people into **exile**. His collaborators included **Argentine** advisors and paramilitary **death squads** led by neo-Nazis from **Argentina, Chile**, France, Germany, and Italy. Modeling himself after General **Augusto Pinochet Ugarte** in Chile, García Meza was determined to remain in power indefinitely, but his regime, condemned worldwide for **human-rights** abuse and cocaine trafficking, was ousted in August 1981 by dissident officers. In the end, at least 50 people were dead, more than 20 were *desaparecidos* (missing), and thousands had been **tortured**. After the return to democracy in October 1982, victims’ relatives, human-rights organizations, and trade unionists brought a case against García Meza’s “delinquent dictatorship,” and in 1986 he went on trial with **Luis Arce Gómez**, his former minister of the interior, and 57 others. By then, he and Arce Gómez had gone into hiding. In 1993 he was convicted in absentia for murder, theft, and violating the constitution, and in 1994 he was discovered in **Brazil**, arrested, and extradited to Bolivia, where the following year he began serving 30 years in prison without parole.

GARZÓN, BALTASAR. Spanish magistrate who initiated the arrest of General **Augusto Pinochet Ugarte** for crimes against humanity. On 16 October 1988 Garzón instructed Interpol to place Pinochet Ugarte under armed guard at the private clinic in London where the general was recuperating from back surgery. Pinochet Ugarte’s name appeared often in the jurist’s investigation of the **torture** and murder

of Spanish nationals in **Chile**. Among the more high-profile victims named in the investigation was Carmelo Soria, a **United Nations** employee and Spanish citizen. Garzón's case would be further supported with evidence from the files of Juan Garcés, an author and a former **Unidad Popular** (Popular Unity) official. Like Garzón, Garcés had spent several years documenting the Pinochet Ugarte government's abuse of Spanish citizens. Garzón's indictment was welcomed by **human-rights** organizations and by victims of the Pinochet Ugarte regime. For more than a year, the British House of Lords debated whether to extradite Pinochet Ugarte to Spain to face formal charges. In the end, however, doctors declared Pinochet Ugarte medically unfit to stand trial, and he returned to Chile on 3 March 2000.

Garzón exposed the international terror network centered in Chile and operating under the code name **Operation Condor**. He also investigated the murder and disappearance of hundreds of Spanish citizens during the repression in **Argentina** and sought the extradition of Argentine officers to Spain to face charges. In April 2005 a Spanish court sentenced **Adolfo Scilingo** in person to 640 years in prison, establishing a precedent by convicting a human-rights violator in person (not in absentia) outside the country where the violations took place.

GEISEL, ERNESTO (1908–1996). Army general and president of **Brazil** from March 1974 to March 1979. He was the fourth of five **military** presidents following the 1964 coup that toppled the left-leaning President **João Goulart**. The military ruled until 1985.

Geisel was born in the town of Bento Gonçalves, in Rio Grande do Sul. He began his military career in 1925 as a cadet at the Escola Militar do Realengo, the national military academy in Rio de Janeiro. In 1938 he graduated from the Escola de Armas. In the mid-1940s, he took courses at the **United States** Army Command and Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, and in 1949 he cofounded the **Escola Superior de Guerra** (ESG, Higher War College). With his fellow generals **Humberto de Alencar Castello Branco** and Golbery do Couto e Silva, he was a member of the “Sorbonne group”—a group of moderate officers associated with the ESG. After the coup of 1964, which he helped plan, he held positions under a succession of military presidents: head of the military cabinet under Castello Branco

(1964–1967), head of the Supreme Military Court under **Artur da Costa e Silva** (1967–1969), and president of Petrobras, the state petroleum company, under **Emílio Garrastazú Médici** (1969–1974).

Geisel was sworn in as president on 15 March 1974. Unlike Médici, who had presided over the most repressive period of the “**dirty war**,” Geisel presided over a period of political liberalization known as *distensão* (relaxation). He eased censorship, reduced the power of **death squads**, and laid the foundation for a transition to democratic rule—a transition that would be completed by his successor, General **João Baptista de Oliveira Figueiredo** (1979–1985). Geisel died in Rio de Janeiro on 12 September 1996.

GELMAN, JUAN (1930–). **Argentine** poet and journalist. Born in Buenos Aires, the child of Ukrainian immigrants—his father participated in the Russian Revolution of 1905—Gelman spent his childhood in the historic *porteño* neighborhood of Villa Crespo. An early member of the literary group El Pan Duro, Gelman published his first book of poetry, *Violín y otras cuestiones*, in 1956. In the 1970s Gelman began his career in journalism. He directed the cultural supplement of the newspaper *La Nación*, was editor-in-chief of the newspaper *Noticias*, and was the Spanish-language editor of the journal *Ceres*, published by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the **United Nations**.

An early opponent of **Peronism**, Gelman abandoned the Communist Party in favor of the **Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias** (FAR, Revolutionary Armed Forces), which in 1973 joined the **Montoneros**. He served as Montonero press secretary for Europe until his break with the organization in 1979. In 1976 the **military** invaded his home with orders to arrest him. Instead, they arrested his son, Marcelo, and his daughter-in-law, Claudia Irueta, then pregnant. The younger Gelman was killed in captivity, and his wife was transported to an Uruguayan prison as part of **Operation Condor**. There, Claudia gave birth to a daughter and was executed. Juan Gelman’s granddaughter was located and identified in **Uruguay** in March 2000 following the intervention of Uruguayan president Jorge Batlle Ibáñez. The filmmaker Elena Bravo’s award-winning documentary *¿Quién soy yo?* (Who am I?, 2007) contains interviews with Macarena, Gelman’s granddaughter, and other children kidnapped during Argentina’s “**dirty war**.”

Exiled in 1976, Gelman spent 12 years in several European and Central American countries. In 1989 he settled in Mexico City. In 1987 he received Argentina's Premio Nacional de la Poesía, and in 2000 received the Premio Juan Rulfo, Latin America's most prestigious award for poetry.

The author of over 20 volumes of poetry translated into 10 languages, Gelman is hailed as one of Argentina's most important contemporary poets. Themes of family and lost friends, Argentina, his beloved tango, his Jewish heritage, exile, **torture**, and disappearances, and an almost obsessive need to remember are all present in his oeuvre. In 1997 a compilation of his poetry, translated into English, was made available in the **United States** under the title *Unthinkable Tenderness*. He is also the author, with Mara La Madrid, of the collection of essays *Ni el flaco perdón de Dios / Hijos de desaparecidos* (1997).

GOLDENBERG, JORGE (1941–). **Argentine** screenwriter, playwright, and acting teacher. Born in the city of San Martín, in the province of Buenos Aires, to Jewish immigrants, Goldenberg has evoked the milieu of his childhood in one of his best-known plays, *Krinsky*. His parents' travels and migrations read like a map of the Eastern European Jewish experience in the 20th century. His father was born in then-czarist Russia, in a town that would later become part of Romania and is now in the Republic of Moldavia. The elder Goldenberg emigrated in 1928 and was soon active in the socialist and labor movements in Argentina. He served several stints with the great Yiddish theater companies that periodically toured Argentina in the pre-World War II years. Jorge's mother, born in what was then Poland, now Belarus after the breakup of the Soviet Union, immigrated to Argentina in 1936. Her family, except for a sibling, would all perish in the Holocaust. Speaking of his childhood, Goldenberg has revealed in an interview that his middle name, Víctor, expressed his parents' hope for an Allied victory in Europe.

A student at the Instituto de Cine at the Universidad Nacional del Litoral in Santa Fé, he saw his studies interrupted by the 1966 **military** coup that brought General Juan Carlos Onganía to power. Goldenberg then moved to Buenos Aires, where he won a research fellowship from the Fondo Nacional de Arte. There, he also worked

on several award-winning Argentine films. After a 1969 stint in Paris, he returned to his work as a screenwriter, particularly in collaboration with the playwright Oscar Viale, with whom he would write *No toquen a la nena* (Don't Touch the Girl, 1973, directed by Juan José Jusid); *Juan que reía* (Juan Who Laughed, 1976, directed by Carlos Galletini); and *Plata Dulce* (Sweet Silver, 1982, directed by Fernando Ayala).

As a playwright, critical notice arrived with his play *Argentine Quebracho Company*, which premiered at the Teatro Lasalle in Buenos Aires in 1973. In 1975 he would be awarded the prestigious Casa de las Américas prize for his play *Relevo 1923* (Change of Guard, 1923), which tells of a political assassination within the Argentine anarchist movement of the early 20th century. His 1983 play, *Knepp*, addressed the issue of the *desaparecidos* (missing) in a metaphorical examination of the tensions between memory and oblivion, as personified by the experience of the seemingly deserted wife, María Elena, who is given the opportunity by a mysterious man to contact her husband once a week. The play has been translated into English, French, Italian, and Russian and staged abroad on numerous occasions.

In 1983, Goldenberg collaborated in the third cycle of **Teatro Abierto Argentino**, perhaps the best-known example of **cultural resistance** to emerge from Argentina during the “dirty war.” Included in the cycle were three of his monologues, *El padre* (The Father), *Maquillaje* (Makeup), and *Otseifinan*. In later years, he would further explore “dirty war” topics in films in which he collaborated with the noted director María Luisa Bemberg. In the 1986 film *Miss Mary*, Bemberg and he shared screenplay credits, as they would do in the 1993 film *De eso no se habla* (*We Don't Talk about That*) along with Aldo Romero and Julio Llinás.

Also in 1983, a prolific year, Goldenberg wrote what is perhaps one of his best-known plays, *Krinsky*, staged in 1986. The play is based on the historical figure of Adolfo Krinsky, an eccentric inhabitant of the author's native city, Santa Fé. Krinsky made a precarious living as a librarian in a Jewish community center and as an itinerant photographer. According to Goldenberg, many legends grew around Krinsky, particularly as a raggedy coat, lined with old peso notes, was discovered among his possessions after his solitary death.

Although the author says his plays do not deal directly with Jewish themes, *Krinsky* explores themes of displacement in the figure of the old Jewish immigrant who looks back on a failed socialist utopia. In the play—as in life—Krinsky is also a Yiddish poet, a circumstance that the author uses to explore the “zone of radical otherness” for which language is a conduit. Goldenberg, who is himself fluent in Yiddish—which he describes as a “language that expresses catastrophe” (“una lengua que expresa una catastrophe”)—uses it to describe the longing for *un hogar* (a home) forever lost, in this case the world of Eastern European Jewry, which was destroyed by the Holocaust.

Goldenberg wrote many critically acclaimed movies, many of which have found success with worldwide audiences. They include *La película del rey* (distributed in 1986 as *A King and His Movie*), *El entusiasmo* (Enthusiasm, 1999), *Francisca* (2002), and *Perder es cuestión de método* (distributed in 2004 as *The Art of Losing*). His latest screenplay was for *Morirse está en hebreo* (distributed in 2008 as *My Mexican Shivah*), a cross-cultural slapstick comedy set in Mexico City’s Jewish community. In addition to his work as playwright and screenwriter, he conducts theater seminars in Europe and Argentina, where he often collaborates with his theater-director wife, Berta. He has also adapted several classics for the Buenos Aires stage, including Shakespeare’s *Measure for Measure*.

Goldenberg has received numerous awards at home and abroad, as well as for his participation in film festivals in Sundance, Biarritz, Mar de Plata, and Havana. He lives in Buenos Aires.

GOROSTIZA, CARLOS (1920–). Argentine playwright and novelist. He was part of the **Teatro Abierto Argentino** (Open Theater of Argentina), an arts initiative that was perhaps the best example of **cultural resistance** to the **military** dictatorship in Argentina.

Born in Buenos Aires to immigrant Basque parents, Gorostiza grew up in the suburb of Palermo. His first world experiences came in 1926, when the family settled briefly in his father’s town of Sestao, in northern Spain. Economic reverses, however, forced the return of the Gorostiza family to Argentina.

His father, Fermín Gorostiza, a commercial traveler and one of the earliest pilots in Argentina, would soon abandon the family. In 2002, reminiscing about his 1990 play *Aeroplanos* (Airplanes), Gorostiza

recalled being on flights with his father, who dropped publicity brochures for a local beverage company from the cockpit. A few years later, in his memoirs, Gorostiza also recalled meeting a then-unknown half-sister, noted Spanish actress Analía Gadé (née María Esther Gorostiza Rodríguez).

Gorostiza wrote his first play, *La clave encantada* (The Enchanted Cipher), for puppet theater in 1943. A year earlier, he had debuted as a professional actor with the theater group La Máscara, a continuation of activities that began as early as 1937, when the then-adolescent Gorostiza directed and acted in plays sponsored by the Patronato Español de Ayuda a las Víctimas Antifascistas (Spanish Aid Committee to Antifascist Victims), an association of Spanish **exiles** loyal to the Republican government.

As a playwright, his earliest success came with of *El puente* (The Bridge), which took Buenos Aires by storm in its premiere in 1949. *El puente*, staged by legendary director and producer Armando Discépolo (1887–1971), ran for an unprecedented two years on the Buenos Aires stage. Set in Buenos Aires, the play links two families, one working class and the other upper middle class, linked by the fate of two characters—Andrés, a young worker, and Luís, a well-to-do engineer, both killed in an accident centered on the bridge of the title.

With this first venture into socially relevant drama, Gorostiza's name was linked in Argentine dramatic circles to that of Spaniard Antonio Buero Vallejo, whose play *Historia de una escalera* (1949, History of a Staircase) also dealt with working-class characters in Francisco Franco's Spain, and U.S. dramatist Arthur Miller, whose play *Death of a Salesman* similarly debuted the same year. Gorostiza's *El puente* was both hailed and derided for the inclusion of the argot of lower-class *porteños* from Buenos Aires.

Subsequent plays, such as *El pan de la locura* (1958, The Bread of Madness), would garner him greater success in the Argentine theater scene of the 1950s and 1960s. In recent years, both *El puente* and *El pan de la locura* have been successfully restaged in Argentina and abroad; the latter was staged to great acclaim in Spain in 2006, when the Asociación de Autores Teatrales Españoles named Gorostiza an Honorary Member.

El puente was also adapted for the Argentine cinema with a screenplay by the author in 1950. Gorostiza was an early contributor to the Argentine television industry; his play *Vivir aquí* (Living Here, 1963) depicts the experiences of an upper- to middle-class family forced by economic circumstances to allow their living room to be transformed into a television studio—a premise that seems to pre-date contemporary obsessions with celebrity and reality shows. For Argentine television, Gorostiza also wrote a series, *Los otros* (The Others), which received a Martín Fierro Award in 1963, but was canceled, according to the author, “por mostrar que había pobres” (for showing that the poor exist).

He was a member of the “Generation of the 60s,” which included **Roberto Cossa**, Sergio De Cecco, **Ricardo Halac**, Jacobo Langsner, Julio Mauricio, **Carlos Somigliana**, Ricardo Talesnik, Oscar Viale, and **Rodolfo Walsh**. Gorostiza is also the author of plays such as *Los prójimos* (1966, The Others); *¿A qué jugamos?* (1968, What Are We Playing At?); *El lugar* (1970, The Place); *Los hermanos queridos* (1978, Dear Brothers); *Cuerpos presentes* (1981, Literally Present); *Matar el tiempo* (1982, Killing Time); *Hay que apagar el fuego* (1982, The Fire Must Be Put Out); *El patio de atrás* (1994, The Back Patio); and *A propósito del tiempo* (1997, Concerning Time).

Between 1960 and 1962, Gorostiza worked as a theater professor in Caracas, Venezuela, an occupation he would continue until 1976 on his return to Argentina. That year, his first novel, *Los cuartos oscuros* (Darkened Rooms) was published in Buenos Aires as winner of the Premio Nacional de Novela (National Novel Award). Rather than marking a temporary incursion into another literary genre, Gorostiza would go on to garner recognition as a novelist as the author of *Cuerpos presentes* (1981, Literary Bodies), *El basural* (1988, The Garbage Dump), *Vuelan las palomas* (1999, Flight of Doves), and *La buena gente* (2001, Good People), as well as a volume of memoirs and poems titled *El merodeador enmascarado* (2004, The Masked Marauder).

As part of the first cycle of Teatro Abierto Argentino, Gorostiza—by then an established playwright in Argentine theater circles—contributed *El acompañamiento* (The Accompaniment). A film adaptation of *El acompañamiento* premiered in 1991 in Buenos

Aires. With the return of democracy following the years of military dictatorship, Gorostiza was named first Secretary for National Culture by President **Raúl Alfonsín**. In his new post, according to Gorostiza, he lasted for a little over two years, his tenure marred by bureaucratic obstacles and controversy.

A respected cultural figure in his native Argentina, Gorostiza has received numerous theater awards, in addition to the Premio Planeta for Best Novel for *Vuelan las palomas*; a Fulbright Fellowship; and numerous recognitions by theater circles in Spain and Latin America. Carlos Gorostiza lives in Buenos Aires, Argentina.

GOULART, JOÃO (1918–1976). Known as “Jango.” President of **Brazil** from 1961 to 1964, when he was ousted in a **military** coup. He was the last civilian president until 1985. Born in the southernmost state of Rio Grande do Sul, Goulart grew up on his father’s cattle ranch. A neighboring ranch belonged to Getúlio Vargas, who would become his political inspiration. After receiving a law degree in 1939 from Pôrto Alegre University, where he led a leftist student movement, he returned home to manage the ranch. In 1945 he joined the Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (PTB, Brazilian Labor Party), a newly formed leftist party, and a year later, he began his political career, winning election to the state legislature of Rio Grande do Sul. In 1950 he supported Vargas’s successful bid for the presidency and was elected to the Chamber of Deputies. (Vargas had ruled the country as dictator from 1930 to 1945.) In 1953 as the chair of the PTB, Goulart was named by President Vargas as the minister of labor, in which role he outraged the military, in early 1954, by proposing that the minimum wage be increased by as much as 100 percent—military pay was then decreasing. In February 1954 Vargas fired Goulart under pressure from the opposition press and the conservative União Democrática Nacional (UDN, National Democratic Union). Shortly after, though, Vargas decreed the 100 percent increase.

In November 1954 Vargas committed suicide amid reports of scandal, and on 3 October 1955 Goulart was elected vice president on the PTB ticket. At that time, election laws permitted split tickets, and Juscelino Kubitschek was elected president representing the centrist

Partido Social Democrático (PSD, Social Democratic Party). The two presided over a period of economic growth similar to the military regime's "Brazilian miracle" of 1969–1973. Goulart was reelected in October 1960. The president-elect, Jânio Quadros, though representing the UDN, was an eccentric figure who, on taking office in January 1961, raised concerns that he was moving to the left. Quadros came under attack from the opposition press and, on 25 August 1961, resigned without explanation.

The resignation put Brazil on the brink of civil war. On the one hand, Goulart was entitled by the constitution to succeed Quadros as president. On the other hand, military leaders opposed the succession, troubled by his leftist sympathies. To complicate matters, Goulart was then on a visit to Communist China, praising Mao Tse-tung. The ministers of the army, navy, and air force, led by Marshal Odílio Denys, issued a manifesto warning that a Goulart presidency would lead to chaos, and Denys threatened to arrest Goulart if he returned. There was also a threat to shoot down Goulart's plane.

The manifesto and threats mobilized support for Goulart's right to assume office. The support came mostly from students and **trade unionists** but also from centrist politicians and prodemocracy military officers. And in Rio Grande do Sul, Governor Lionel Brizola, Goulart's brother-in-law, and General M. José Machado Lopes, commander of the Third Army, threatened armed resistance to Denys. Goulart returned to Brazil on 1 September 1961 and became president after a compromise was reached—a constitutional amendment handing most executive power to a congressional cabinet. (In January 1963 a national plebiscite restored his presidential powers.) He was inaugurated on 7 September 1961.

Goulart's presidency was characterized by left-wing populism. He advocated a package of nationalist reforms, including agrarian reform, and built a following of peasants, workers, students, leftist **Catholics**, and noncommissioned military officers, all of whom began to mobilize. Aligned against him were rural landowners, the business community, and the military hierarchy. Goulart had inherited a bad economy, and by 1964 it was worsening—the inflation rate was 100 percent. Unable to get his reforms through Congress, Goulart decided to sidestep Congress and to schedule a

series of rallies at which he would decree his reforms. This decision was seen not only as a threat to the constitution but also as an attempt to organize a mass movement. On 31 March and 1 April 1964 the military removed him from office, an act supported by the **United States**, which had helped destabilize the Goulart government by reducing aid and loans.

On 7 December 1976 Goulart died in **exile** on his ranch in northern **Argentina**. The military president **Ernesto Geisel** called for three days of mourning and allowed him to be buried in his hometown of São Borja.

GRAFFIGNA, OMAR D. Brigadier general, commander of the air force, and member of the second junta (March to December 1981) during the “**dirty war**” in **Argentina**. (The other members of the junta were **Roberto Viola** and **Armando Lambruschini**.) Graffigna was acquitted in the 1985 trial of the nine former junta commanders.

GRAN CLUB (GREAT CLUB). *See* PARTIDO LIBERAL.

GRANDMOTHERS OF THE PLAZA DE MAYO. *See* ABUELAS DE PLAZA DE MAYO.

GRIFFERO, EUGENIO (1936–). **Argentine** playwright and psychoanalyst. Born in Buenos Aires, Griffero first attracted the attention of theatergoing audiences in the 1970s, when one critic hailed him as the author of “cruelly humorous monologues.”

An early participant in the first cycle of **Teatro Abierto Argentino**, Griffero again received critical acclaim in 1982—during the less-successful second cycle—for his work *Príncipe azul* (Blue Prince). Along with works by **Carlos Gorostiza**, **Carlos Somigliana**, and **Roberto Cossa**, *Príncipe azul* was selected to represent Argentina at the Caracas Theater Festival in 1983. In addition, his works have been performed in Spain and **Uruguay**.

“**GUERRA SUCIA.**” *See* “DIRTY WAR.”

GUERRILLA WARFARE. The success of Fidel Castro's Cuban Revolution in 1959 inspired guerrilla movements across Latin America, as did the teachings of such revolutionary theorists as Regis Debray and the **Argentine**-born Che Guevara. The movements drew heavily from the urban middle class, and most of the members were young—under 30 and sometimes under 20. Of groups that operated in urban settings, a large percentage of members were **women**. Young people were attracted to the cause, not only by the romance of being revolutionaries but also by a number of material issues that included bleak employment prospects, sensitivity to social injustice, and the growing abandonment of hope for peaceful social change. Although some groups purported to be Castroist, Trotskyist, **Peronist**, or some combination, ideology seems not to have been an important factor in the decision of which group to join. Indeed, the most successful groups, the **Montoneros** in Argentina and the **Tupamaros** in **Uruguay**, were known for ideological impurity.

Groups first appeared in the late 1950s and the 1960s. **Paraguayan** groups—the **Movimiento 14 de Mayo para la Libertad Paraguaya** (M-14, 14th of May Movement for Paraguayan Liberty), the **Vanguardia Febrerista** (February Vanguard), and the communist **Frente Unido por la Liberación Nacional** (United National Liberation Front, FULNA)—were composed of young **exiles** who waged war against the regime of General **Alfredo Stroessner** from across the border in Argentina and **Brazil**. Early Argentine groups, following the Cuban example, also took their struggle to the countryside. Among them were the **Uturuncos** (“Tigermen”), the **Ejército Guerrillero del Pueblo** (EGP, People's Guerrilla Army), the **Fuerzas Armadas Peronistas** (FAP, Peronist Armed Forces), and the **Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias** (FAR, Revolutionary Armed Forces). These rural movements failed, however, as did their counterparts in **Bolivia** and Ecuador. They were no match for the military and police trained in counterinsurgency and were often betrayed by local informants. One of the victims of local informants was Guevara himself, who on 8 October 1967 was executed in Bolivia.

Guevara, like Castro, had been a cult hero of the guerrilla movement. His death, though by no means diminishing his mystique, led

many guerrillas to rethink their rural strategy. By 1970 the FAP and the FAR had moved their operations to the city. Meanwhile, the Montoneros, the Tupamaros, and the Chilean **Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria** (MIR, Movement of the Revolutionary Left) had been established as urban organizations. Most of the Brazilian groups were urban as well, including the **Ação Libertadora Nacional** (ALN, National Action for Liberation), **Carlos Lamarca's** Vanguarda Popular Revolucionária (VPR, People's Revolutionary Vanguard), and the **Movimento Revolucionário 8 de Outubro** (MR-8, 8th of October Revolutionary Movement). Unlike their rural counterparts, urban guerrillas could take part in operations (bombings, bank robberies, kidnappings, assassinations) and then blend back into society. Exceptions to this change in strategy were the Argentine **Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo** (ERP, People's Revolutionary Army), which, Guevarist at heart, returned to the countryside, and a rural front created by the **Partido Comunista do Brasil** (PC do B, Communist Party of Brazil). Of the Brazilian guerrillas, the PC do B group, only 69 members strong, gave the military the most trouble, holding out for three years.

The urban guerrillas built impressive organizations. By 1975 the Montoneros fielded anywhere from 3,000 to 10,000 combatants. (Their military adversaries estimated their numbers to be higher.) During the same period, their tactical operations increased in frequency, technical expertise, and scale and were eventually directed at military targets. The Tupamaros took a similar route, making leaps (*saltos*) to increasingly higher levels of warfare. In the end, however, the guerrillas, both rural and urban, never attracted a mass following and found themselves fighting a lost cause.

GUEVARA, ERNESTO (“CHE”). *See* GUERRILLA WARFARE.

GUMUCIO DAGRÓN, ALFONSO (1950–). **Bolivian** writer, filmmaker, photographer, journalist, and specialist in developmental communications. Born into a family with deep roots in the cultural and political life of Bolivia, Gumucio Dagrón is the son of Alfonso Gumucio Reyes (Cochabamba, 1914–1981), a prominent leader in the **Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario** and one of its founders.

As a young man, Gumucio Dagrón first went into **exile** following the 1971 coup of **Hugo Banzer Suárez**. He studied at the Institut des Hautes Études Cinématographiques and the Université de Vincennes in France. Earlier, he had done stints as a student at the Universidad Mayor de San Andrés in Bolivia. As assistant director and screenwriter, he collaborated with **Jorge Sanjinés** and Antonio Eguino, who have made significant Bolivian contributions to the film output of Latin America. The first film Gumucio Dagrón directed was *Señores generales, señores coroneles*, a 1976 documentary detailing the part played by the Bolivian **military** and the CIA in Banzer Suárez's coup. He would go on to film over nine socially conscious documentaries, including one on **Domitila Barrios de Chungara** and a 1983 film, co-directed with Eduardo Barrios for UNESCO, on the radio stations of the mining communities in Bolivia, a key component of the **cultural resistance** in this country during various periods of dictatorship.

A multifaceted man, Gumucio Dagrón is also the author of *La máscara del gorila*, a narrative of Bolivian dictatorship that was awarded the 1982 Premio Nacional de Literatura (National Prize of Literature) of the Instituto Nacional de Bellas Artes of Mexico, where the author spent two years of exile following the coup of **Luis García Meza**. Other publications, totaling more than 20, include poetry, film studies, and communications, as well as a book on the life and work of **Luís Espinal Camps**, the Spanish-Bolivian priest murdered during the first days of the García Meza regime. He has also exhibited his photography on several occasions and published numerous journalistic articles. In various capacities as a journalist, he has collaborated with several publications in Latin America and abroad.


As a consultant on developmental communications, he has traveled around the globe for organizations such as UNESCO, UNICEF, the Rockefeller Foundation, and AusAID, a nonmilitary aid program of the Australian government, as well as worked for the Bolivian nongovernmental organization Centro de Investigación y Promoción del Campesinado (CIPCA) in the late 1970s. He continues to work in the field of journalism and communications as managing director of programs at the Communication for Social Change Consortium.



General Jorge Rafael Videla (center), Admiral Emilio Massera (left), and General Orlando Ramón Agosti (right), the members of the first junta in Argentina. The photo was taken in Buenos Aires on 24 March, 1976, the day of the coup. AFP/Getty Images.



Members of the Madres de Plaza de Mayo (Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo) demonstrating outside the presidential palace in Buenos Aires, Argentina. Desaparecidos means "missing"—their missing sons and daughters. The photo was taken around 1980. AFP/Getty Images.





Navy lieutenant Alfredo Astiz, also known as “the blond angel of death.” The photo was taken in Buenos Aires in November 1985. AFP/Getty Images.



*A celebration in the Plaza de Mayo in Argentina on 10 December 1983, when the country returned to democracy.
AFP/Getty Images.*



The former junta commanders on trial for human-rights violations. From top to bottom: Admiral Armando Lambruschini, General Jorge Rafael Videla, Admiral Emilio Massera, and General Omar Graffigna. The photo was taken in Buenos Aires in September 1985. AFP/Getty Images.



Villa Grimaldi, the notorious torture center under the regime of Augusto Pinochet Ugarte in Chile (1973–1990). © Patrick Zachmann/Magnum Photos.

– H –

HALAC, RICARDO (1935–). Argentine playwright, scriptwriter, journalist, and theater teacher. Born in Buenos Aires, Halac was attracted to the theater at an early age. An avid reader of drama while still in his teens, at age 17 he reportedly attended a production of Bertolt Brecht's *Mother Courage* in his native city that instilled in him the determination to become a playwright.

His desire to familiarize himself with Brecht's work led him to enroll in German classes at the Goethe Institute, an international cultural association sponsored by the German government. Three years later, he received a scholarship to study theater in Berlin and Munich. Halac then abandoned his studies in economics at the University of Buenos Aires for a one-year stay in Europe, a stint that afforded him the opportunity to visit other European cities.

While abroad, Halac began working on his first drama, *Soledad para cuatro* (Loneliness for Four). After his return to Buenos Aires and further rewrites, the play debuted at the Teatro La Máscara in 1961. From the beginning, he was hailed as one of the initiators of a neorealist movement in Argentine drama. The movement incorporated satire, black humor, and the grotesque into a theater steeped in social concerns, and its practitioners are often included under the designation Generation of the 1960s. Other Halac plays of the period include *Estela de madrugada* (Estela at Dawn) and *Fin de diciembre* (End of December), both in 1965, and *Tentepié I and II* (Pick Me Up, 1969).

Along with his theater work, Halac began working as a print and broadcast journalist in Buenos Aires. His first incursion in print journalism was for the daily *El Mundo*. In 1965 the World Press Institute granted him a fellowship that took him to the **United States**, where he briefly resided in St. Paul, Minnesota, and worked as a reporter in New York. During this period, Halac also joined the program *Historias de jóvenes* (Stories of Young People) for Channel 7 on Argentine television, where he collaborated with the writers Paco Urondo, David Viñas, and **Oswaldo Dragún**. In the 1980s Dragún would lead the **Teatro Abierto Argentino**, in which Halac would participate.

In the early 1970s, **Horacio Verbitsky** approached Halac with an offer to join the original staff of *La Opinión*, directed by **Jacobo Timerman**. Halac began writing for the paper's cultural supplement—

a section then edited by **Juan Gelman**—along with Verbitsky, Osvaldo Soriano, Tomás Eloy Martínez, and Carlos Ulanovsky, among others. That period also marks his participation in the television program *La noche de los grandes* (Night of the Greats), along with **Roberto Cossa, Carlos Somigliana**, and Juan Carlos Gené. Because some of the programs were perceived to be controversial by the more conservative sectors of Argentine society, all the collaborators earned the enmity of the feared **Alianza Anticomunista Argentina** (AAA, Argentine Anticommunist Alliance). David Stivel, the director, and all the writers were threatened with death. Halac, a Jew, was the object of particularly virulent **anti-Semitic** threats in a series of anonymous, late-night telephone calls. Soon after, Halac left for **exile** in Mexico.

On his return, and following the **military** coup of 1976, a new dramatic direction began for Halac with the premiere of the plays *Segundo tiempo* (Second Chance, 1976, translated in 1982 as the *Last Latin Lover*), *El destete* (The Weaning, 1978), and *Un trabajo fabuloso* (A Fabulous Job, 1980). In a work that is perhaps an early exploration of the economic ruin that would soon beset the country, *Un trabajo fabuloso* is the absurdist tale of a man, Francisco, who, unable to support his family with several jobs, transforms himself into a transsexual to supplement his income as a prostitute for wealthy foreign businessmen. The play was unpopular with both critics and audiences. It represents, however, the beginning of an authorial exploration of the social circumstances surrounding the years of the military dictatorship.

This period also represents a time of intense activity for the author, who combined his dramatic and journalistic work with the teaching of theater, both in private workshops and in educational institutions in Buenos Aires. In addition, Halac wrote the script for the film *El soltero* (The Bachelor, 1977), directed by Carlos Borcosque and based on a short story by Halac. A later incursion in film would result in the script, cowritten with David Lipszyc and Juan Carlos Cernadas Lamadrid, for the historical drama *La Rosales* (The Rosales, 1984), directed by Lipszyc and based on the 1892 sinking of an Argentine navy ship of the same name.

In 1981 Halac was among the participants of the first cycle of Teatro Abierto Argentino, the best-known example of **cultural resistance** to

emerge from Argentina during the military's "**dirty war.**" His play *Lejana tierra prometida* (Distant Promised Land) explores the hopes of a trio of characters who plan a trip to a new land of promise, while three spectral female characters haunt the scenic space. The **women** are designated as Vieja 1, Vieja 2, and Vieja 3—perhaps a dual use of the word "vieja" (old woman) to signify age and an affectionate nickname for one's own mother—and are united in their anguished waiting for their vanished children. Their presence is an eloquent reminder of the **Madres de Plaza de Mayo** and of all those who, like them, awaited the return of their *desaparecidos*.

Halac went on collaborate with other cycles of Teatro Abierto Argentino. For the 1983 cycle, he produced *Ruido de rotas cadenas* (Sound of Broken Chains); for the 1984 cycle, he wrote *El dúo Sosa-Echagüe* (Duet Sosa-Echagüe). The 1984 cycle was canceled, however, and *El dúo Sosa-Echagüe* would not be staged until 15 years later.

With the return of democracy, Halac intensified his teaching and his work for television. He collaborated with Cernadas Lamadrid in the 1983 miniseries *Compromiso* (Commitment) and in a series of documentaries for the program *Yo fui testigo* (I Witnessed), which would garner the author's criticism—though no death threats this time—for programs on controversial topics such as **Isabel ("Isabelita") Perón**. Between 1985 and 1987, for example, he traveled to the Argentine provinces to conduct theater workshops under the sponsorship of the Dirección Nacional del Teatro.

He continued his work for the Argentine stage with the plays *La perla del Plata* (The Pearl of the River Plate, 1987), a musical-theater piece that Halac, dissatisfied, has removed from circulation; *Viva la anarquía!* (Long Live Anarchy! 1992); *Mil años, un día* (A Thousand Years, One Day, 1983); *Aquellos gauchos . . .* (Those Gauchos . . . , 1995, in collaboration with Cossa and with José Luis Castiñera de Dios, who wrote the music), a play that references Alberto Gerchuroff's 1910 classic, *Los gauchos judíos* (*The Jewish Gauchos*); and *Frida Kahlo, La pasión* (Frida Kahlo: The Passion, 1996).

The new century saw the staging of new Halac plays such as *Metejón, guarda con el tango* (Metejón: The Guardian of Tango, 2001), *Luna gitana* (Gypsy Moon, 2001), and the one-act dramatic comedy *Perejiles* (Parsley, 2003), as well as the restaging of *Soledad para*

cuatro at the Teatro Nacional Cervantes 39 years after its premiere. In 2006 Halac also published *Escribir teatro: Dramaturgia en los tiempos actuales* (Writing Theater: Playwright for Contemporary Times).

Halac's work has been translated into English, and he has received numerous awards including the María Guerrero Theater Award for the play *Mil años, un día*, which explores the expulsion of the Jews from Spain in 1492 and which has its genesis in memories of news of the European Holocaust, news that his father had culled from Argentine newspapers during the author's childhood.

In his later years, Halac has been involved in several cultural directorates. Since 2002, he has headed the theater workshop sponsored by Argentores (Sociedad General de Autores de la Argentina, General Society of Argentine Authors), for which he was vice president in 2001 and 2004. Previously he had served as the director of the Teatro Nacional Cervantes in 1989 and 1992 as well as the director of the Centro Cultural Marc Chagall of the Asociación Mutual Israelita Argentina (Israeli Mutual Association of Argentina) between 1993 and 1996. Ricardo Halac lives in Buenos Aires.

HIJOS POR LA IDENTIDAD Y LA JUSTICIA, CONTRA EL OLVIDO Y EL SILENCIO (HIJOS) / CHILDREN FOR IDENTITY AND JUSTICE AGAINST OBLIVION AND SILENCE. A

human-rights nongovernmental organization in **Argentina**. It was founded in 1995 by the children of people who were disappeared or **exiled** by the **military** during its "**dirty war.**" Its first objective is to find the children who were kidnapped with their parents or born to political prisoners. It was not uncommon for **women** in captivity to be killed after giving birth and their children illegally adopted by military personnel—sometimes the very people who **tortured** and killed the parents. The idea behind the practice was to ensure that the children would not be raised by people the military considered subversive. HIJOS is aided in its work by young people who come forward and by telephone leads. If evidence suggests that someone is the offspring of *desaparecidos*, it will inform that person of its suspicions.

HOLY WEEK REVOLT. *See* CARAPINTADAS.

HORMAN, CHARLES. One of two **United States** citizens killed in **Chile** by the regime of **Augusto Pinochet Ugarte**. Charles Horman, 31, and his friend Frank Teruggi, 24, the second victim, were leftist supporters of the overthrown Marxist president **Salvador Allende Gossens**. Both worked as journalists, contributing to a newsletter that criticized U.S. policy. On 17 September 1973, security forces abducted Horman from his apartment; he was last seen alive at the Estadio Nacional (National Stadium), which had been converted into a detention center. On 20 September, security forces abducted Teruggi and his roommate, David Hathaway, who were also taken to the Estadio Nacional. Hathaway was released; the bodies of Teruggi and Horman turned up in a morgue. Unlike Teruggi's body, which was quickly returned to the **United States**, Horman's was not released until March 1974. It is plausible that U.S. officials and the Chilean **military** delayed releasing Horman until the body was too decomposed for an autopsy to reveal evidence of **torture**. The story of the two men's deaths is told in the book *Missing* (1982), by Thomas Hauser (originally published in 1978 as *The Execution of Charles Horman*), and dramatized in the film *Missing* (1982), directed by **Costa-Gavras**.

Owing to State Department internal reviews conducted in 1976 and the recent declassification of U.S. documents on Chile, there is wide conjecture about a possible **Central Intelligence Agency** (CIA) involvement in the killing of Horman and Teruggi. The CIA might have either supplied information on the two men to the Chilean government, information that led to their being labeled subversive, or, aware of the danger they were in, failed to prevent their deaths. In his book, Hauser suggests that Horman may have been perceived as especially dangerous to Chilean and U.S. interests. On the day of the coup, Horman was at the coastal resort of Viña del Mar, where he met some U.S. military officers and may have come across evidence that the United States was involved in the overthrow of Allende Gossens. It is now known that **Henry Kissinger**, then secretary of state, knew of Horman's arrest.

In December 2000 Joyce Horman, Charles's widow, filed a criminal suit against Pinochet Ugarte, who had recently been stripped of his immunity from prosecution. Although Pinochet Ugarte was declared unfit to stand trial, the investigation continued, and on 10

December 2003 Judge Jorge Zepeda Arancibia indicted Colonel Rafael González Verdugo, a former military-intelligence officer, as an accomplice to the murder of Charles Horman. The case is still being litigated.

HUMAN RIGHTS. Inalienable human rights that states are called on to recognize and defend. According to this definition, states do not grant rights; instead, they guard rights that already exist. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the **United Nations** (UN) in 1948, proclaims a wide range of rights—civil and political, economic, social, and cultural. Among them are the right to an adequate standard of living; the right to leave the country, and to return; the right to obtain and deliver information; the right to participate in government; and the right to the integrity of the person, or due process (freedom from extralegal detention, **torture**, and execution). Human-rights advocates tend to regard the right to the integrity of the person as fundamental. During the “**dirty wars**,” the **military** regimes violated any number of rights—they banned political parties, censored the press, and forced people into **exile**. The most common and serious violation, however, was abducting and torturing people, many of whom were never seen again.

In Latin America the concept of human rights is reinforced by the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, which is similar to the UN declaration and was adopted by the **Organization of American States** (OAS) in 1948. The OAS document preceded the UN declaration by several months and was the first to recognize that rights are inherent in humanity and not granted by states. Neither document is legally binding, but in 1967 the OAS adopted a protocol making the American Declaration the standard for member nations. Both the UN and the OAS helped draw world attention to human-rights violations in South America. But both organizations, composed of states, were put in the awkward position of investigating crimes committed by some of their own members. Human Rights Nongovernmental Organizations (HRNGOs), in contrast, are independent of government control and therefore freer to investigate and report abuses. HRNGOs such as **Amnesty International** and the **International Commission of Jurists** (ICJ) are accredited with the UN, and in the 1970s supplied it with evidence that helped to build

cases against **Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay**. At the regional level, the HRNGO **Servicio Paz y Justicia** (SERPAJ, Peace and Justice Service) lent support to victims of state violence (especially the poor) throughout Latin America. The branches of SERPAJ in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay were among many local HRNGOs that came into existence during the “dirty wars.”

– 1 –

INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL AND SOCIAL STUDIES. *See* INSTITUTO DE ESTUDIOS LEGALES Y SOCIALES (IELSUR).

INSTITUTO DE ESTUDIOS LEGALES Y SOCIALES (IELSUR) / INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL AND SOCIAL STUDIES. A **human-rights** nongovernmental organization in **Uruguay**. The Instituto was officially founded in 1984, though its activities had begun a few years earlier. Because of the lack of human-rights activity from the Colegio de Abogados—the country’s traditionally conservative lawyers’ association—a group of progressive lawyers joined forces with the **Servicio Paz y Justicia** (SERPAJ, Peace and Justice Service) to provide legal assistance to human-rights victims. IELSUR still exists and is active in public-interest law.

INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS. *See* ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES (OAS).

INTER-AMERICAN DEFENSE COLLEGE (IADC). *See* UNITED STATES.

INTERNAL EXILE. *See* RELEGACIÓN.

INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS (ICJ). An international **human-rights** nongovernmental organization, established in Berlin in 1952 and composed of legal professionals. Six months after the **military** coup of 11 September 1973 in **Chile**, the ICJ sent a three-member team to examine the human-rights conditions under the junta led by General **Augusto Pinochet Ugarte**.

From 19 April to 28 April 1974, the team, led by ICJ secretary-general Niall MacDermot, interviewed state officials, members of the bar, the Supreme Court, and the leaders of human-rights organizations, among them Cardinal Raúl Silva Henríquez. The team's findings were published in the *Final Report of Mission to Chile, April 1974, to Study the Legal System and the Protection of Human Rights* and in the *Supplemental Report* of January 1975. The reports revealed a pattern of repression that denied basic rights such as the freedom of assembly and due process, and criticized the courts for not intervening.

A second supplement, published in September 1976, included a copy of an "open letter" sent by five prominent Chilean jurists to the **Organization of American States**, which had met in Santiago earlier in the year. The letter deplored the human-rights abuses of the junta and the lack of legal protection. Among the five were Eugenio Velasco Letelier, a law professor, and **Jaime Castillo Velasco**, the former minister of justice and former representative to the **United Nations Human Rights Commission**.

– J –

JARA, VICTOR (1938–1973). Chilean composer and folk singer, most closely associated with the *Nueva Canción Chilena* (New Chilean Song). He is best remembered for his song "Plegaria a un labrador" ("Prayer to a Laborer"). A former seminarian, he later attended drama school, where he trained as an actor and stage director. He joined **Chile's** Juventud Comunista (Communist Youth) in 1964. In 1966 he joined the Peña de los Parra, a group largely composed of members of the Parra family of songwriters, singers, and poets. A prominent cultural figure under the **Unidad Popular** (UP, Popular Unity) government of **Salvador Allende Gossens**, he was arrested in the days following the 1973 coup against Allende Gossens and brought to the National Stadium in Santiago, where he was **tortured** by members of the national police and murdered.

JEWISH MOVEMENT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS. See MOVIMIENTO JUDÍO POR LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS.

JOINT COMMAND. *See* DEATH SQUADS.

JUSTICIALISMO. *See* PERONISM.

– K –

KIRKPATRICK, JEANE (1926–2006). **United States** ambassador to the **United Nations** under President **Ronald Reagan** (1981–1989). A political scientist and professor, Kirkpatrick published the controversial article “Dictatorships and Double Standards” in the November 1979 issue of *Commentary*. The article criticized the **human-rights** policy of President **Jimmy Carter**, arguing that it was applied inconsistently and therefore led to hypocrisy. She argued that the policy was directed at right-wing authoritarian allies as opposed to left-wing totalitarian adversaries. In the name of human rights, she said, the policy helped undermine our allies (Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua and the Shah of Iran), replacing them with extremist regimes unfriendly to the **United States** (the Sandinistas and the Ayatollah Khomeini). She was especially troubled when the authoritarians were replaced with regimes having ties to **communism**. She argued further that, unlike communist regimes, which never evolve into democracies, right-wing authoritarian regimes sometimes do—under the right circumstances. Kirkpatrick concluded that the United States should be more careful about distinguishing between its friends (**Argentina** and **Chile**) and its enemies (the Cuba of Fidel Castro). The article, reflecting Kirkpatrick’s strong anticommunist sentiment, impressed the presidential candidate Ronald Reagan, who in 1980 would appoint Kirkpatrick ambassador to the United Nations.

The neoconservative ambassador supported the Reagan administration’s policies toward improving U.S. relations with **military** governments in South America, including the Chilean dictatorship of General **Augusto Pinochet Ugarte**. **Jaime Castillo Velasco**, a lawyer and human-rights activist, noted that after Kirkpatrick commented favorably on the Chilean government during a tour of Latin America in August 1981, Pinochet Ugarte renewed his assault on political dissidents, jailing and exiling members of human-rights organizations. Throughout her term, Kirkpatrick accused the UN of

applying a double standard. In 1983, when the General Assembly adopted resolutions against Chile, El Salvador, and Guatemala for human-rights violations, Kirkpatrick protested that the criticism was unwarranted because there were other Latin American countries with worse records of human-rights abuse. She noted, for example, that although Chile monitored its **trade unions**, Cuba did not allow trade unions at all.

In 1985, the beginning of Reagan's second term, Kirkpatrick left the UN, replaced by Richard Schifter, a moderate. Jeane Kirkpatrick died on 7 December 2006.

KISSINGER, HENRY (1923–). **United States** secretary of state and head of the National Security Council under Presidents Richard Nixon (1969–1974) and Gerald Ford (1974–1977). His open dislike for **communism** led him to devise a covert strategy to prevent the election of the Marxist presidential candidate **Salvador Allende Gossens in Chile**, or, if he was elected, to undermine his government. The operation was coordinated by the “Committee of Forty,” a secret group of officials from the Nixon administration, including the director of the **Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)**. (“Forty” referred not to the number of members but to the directive that established the committee.) The committee, which Kissinger chaired, was responsible for funding opposition parties and anti-Allende Gossens propaganda and for engaging in economic sabotage and other activities designed to destabilize the government. The CIA developed its own strategy, which included generating economic crises and encouraging civil unrest. Allende Gossens was overthrown in a **military** coup in 1973.

Although there is no evidence that the United States supported the coup that toppled President **Isabel Perón in Argentina** in 1976, recently declassified U.S. State Department documents reveal that the military government was convinced it had U.S. approval for its “**dirty war**.” In October 1976, at the height of the government's campaign against subversion, the U.S. Ambassador Robert Hill reported that Admiral César Guzzetti, the Argentine foreign minister, was in a state of euphoria after meeting in Washington with Kissinger, Vice President Nelson Rockefeller, and other high-ranking state department officials. According to Hill, Guzzetti came away

with the understanding that the United States would refrain from criticizing Argentina for **human-rights** violations, though Guzzetti was urged to get the “dirty war” over quickly—by December or January. The conservative Hill, a human-rights advocate, complained about Kissinger’s handling of the issue, arguing that the secretary of state undermined his diplomatic efforts to stop the violations.

KORRY, EDWARD M. (1922–2003). **United States** ambassador to **Chile** from 1967 to 1971. Korry was falsely implicated in the covert plan to prevent the establishment of the leftist-oriented **Unidad Popular** (UP, Popular Unity) government in Chile or to ruin the government if elected. The plan was formed by a secret group of White House officials in the administration of Richard Nixon, a group known as the “Committee of Forty,” chaired by **Henry Kissinger**, chair of the National Security Council. Although Korry protested the accusation that he was involved in undermining the UP government of President **Salvador Allende Gossens**, it was not until the discovery of **Central Intelligence Agency** (CIA) documents that the ambassador’s claims were substantiated. The documents revealed that despite Korry’s direct involvement in anti-Allende Gossens activities such as funding media propaganda and channeling funds to opposition parties, he did not participate in activities leading to the **military** takeover of 11 September 1973. He did, however, keep U.S. officials informed of the situation in Chile through a series of memos dubbed “korrygrams.” In September 1971 Korry was replaced as ambassador by Nathaniel Davis.

Edward M. Korry died on 29 January 2003.

– L –

LABOR UNIONS. *See* **TRADE UNIONS.**

LAMARCA, CARLOS (d. 1971). **Brazilian** army captain who, in January 1969, defected to the Vanguarda Popular Revolucionária (VPR, People’s Revolutionary Vanguard), an urban **guerrilla** organization. He was one of the “big three”—the guerrilla leaders most prominent in the armed opposition to Brazil’s **military** dictatorship. The others were **Joaquim Câmara Ferreira** and **Carlos Marighella**.

A marksman—his army job had been to train bank guards to shoot—Lamarca brought to the VPR a large stock of weapons. Six months after joining, Lamarca led the VPR in a guerrilla “expropriation”—a robbery to fund operations. The guerrillas knew the location of a 500-pound safe owned by Adhemar de Barros, the corrupt former governor of São Paulo and a supporter of the military coup of 1964. Barros kept it at his mistress’s house in Rio de Janeiro. Posing as federal agents, the guerrillas stormed the house and appropriated the safe, which yielded \$2.5 million in U.S. currency. In early December 1970, Lamarca led the kidnapping of Giovannia Enrico Bucher, the Swiss ambassador, who was held for 40 days and released. The VPR received as ransom the release of 70 specified prisoners, whom the government **exiled to Chile**.

By the early 1970s, government **death squads** had all but eliminated the VPR and other guerrillas, having gathered information about them through **torture** and government infiltrators. Marighella had been ambushed and killed in 1969, and in October 1970 Ferreira had been captured and tortured to death. Lamarca, urged by his comrades to flee the country, instead left the VPR for the **Movimento Revolucionário 8 de Outubro** (MR-8, 8th of October Revolutionary Movement), aiming to build a rural guerrilla presence. But in mid-May, after the capture of MR-8’s leader, Lamarca fled to the northeastern state of Bahia with his mistress, the guerrilla Yara Iavelberg.

They were pursued by death squads. Iavelberg, pregnant with Lamarca’s child, fled to Salvador, the state capital, where, quickly tracked down and surrounded, she shot herself. Lamarca fled to the state’s interior, where he was tracked down in mid-September 1971 and shot.

LAMBRUSCHINI, ARMANDO. Admiral, commander of the navy, and a member of the second junta (March to December 1981) during the “**dirty war**” in **Argentina**. (The other two junta members were **Roberto Viola** and **Omar D. Graffigna**.) In the 1985 trial of the nine former junta commanders, Lambruschini was sentenced to eight years in prison for his role in the repression. He had served four when he was released in December 1989 by a blanket pardon by President **Carlos Saúl Menem**.

LAMI DOZO, BASILIO A. I. Brigadier general, commander of the air force, and a member of the third junta (December 1981 to June

1982) during the “**dirty war**” in **Argentina**. In the 1985 trial of the nine former junta commanders, Lami Dozo was acquitted of **human-rights** crimes—the third junta had taken office after the worst of the repression was over. In May 1986, however, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, the nation’s highest **military** tribunal, convicted him of negligence during the Falklands War. He was sentenced to eight years in prison and stripped of his rank. He was released in October 1989 following a blanket pardon decreed by President **Carlos Saúl Menem**.

LA TABLADA. *See* MOVIMIENTO TODOS POR LA PATRIA (MTP).

LAW 23.049. **Military-justice** reforms passed by the **Argentine** Congress after the country’s return to democracy and promulgated on 14 February 1984. The law was largely written by Carlos Santiago Nino, an advisor to President **Raúl Alfonsín** and a law school professor at the University of Buenos Aires. Two of the articles state the government’s position on the two most sensitive issues related to prosecuting participants in the “**dirty war**”: jurisdiction (whether the defendants should be tried in **military** or civilian courts) and criminal responsibility. In Article 10 the law assigned original jurisdiction to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, the military’s highest appellate court, but made the court’s decisions subject to automatic civilian review by the Federal Chamber of Appeals. The Supreme Council would have six months to complete its hearing of any case or else explain to the Federal Chamber why it failed to reach a conclusion. The Federal Chamber would then have the option of either sending the case back to the Supreme Council for a fixed period or—if it found evidence of delay or negligence—assuming jurisdiction over the case itself. As events turned out, the military court failed to reach a verdict in the cases of the nine commanders of the three juntas, and their cases were handed to the civilian court.

The law also settled the issue of who could be prosecuted. Article 11 declared that, unless there was evidence to the contrary, members of the military who lacked decision-making authority could be absolved of wrongdoing on the assumption that they were following orders they considered legitimate, though exceptions would be made

if they had committed atrocities. This meant that high-ranking officers, the decision makers, could be held criminally responsible, since they were not entitled to the defense that they were merely following orders. Junior officers, however, would be entitled to the defense—unless it could be proved that they participated in rape, **torture**, murder, or robbery (abduction was not considered an atrocity).

LAW FOR THE DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACY.

LEIGH GUZMÁN, GUSTAVO (1920–1999). Chilean air force general and one of four commanders who on 11 September 1973 overthrew the Marxist president **Salvador Allende Gossens**. Leigh Guzmán ordered the bombing of La Moneda, the presidential palace, by Hawker Hunter jets—one of the most enduring images of the coup. After the coup, **Leigh Guzmán** and the other three commanders formed the ruling junta. An anticommunist hard-liner, he appeared on television the night of the coup, telling the Chilean public that the coup was necessary to “extirpate the Marxist cancer.” To that end, he pursued **trade unionists** and other suspected leftists, many of whom joined the ranks of the *desaparecidos* (missing).

Despite his reputation as a hard-liner, he believed that once the **military** had eliminated the perceived communist threat, it should return power to civilians as soon as possible. On this and other issues he had a falling-out with General **Augusto Pinochet Ugarte**, who in July 1978 engineered his removal from the junta. Once out of government, Leigh Guzmán ran a real-estate business and kept a low profile. In March 1990 he survived an assassination attempt by the **Frente Patriótico Manuel Rodríguez** (FPMR, Manuel Rodríguez Patriotic Front), a communist **guerrilla** organization, an attack in which he was hit by five bullets and lost an eye. Shortly before his death on 29 September 1999, he joined other former members of the military regime to protest Pinochet Ugarte’s detention in Britain. *See also* CÉSAR MENDOZA DURÁN; JOSÉ TORIBIO MERINO CASTRO.

LETELIER DEL SOLAR, ORLANDO (1932–1976). Foreign minister under President **Salvador Allende Gossens** (1970–1973) of **Chile** and former ambassador to the **United States**. Immediately

following the coup of 11 September 1973, Letelier del Solar was detained at Dawson Island with other officials from the **Unidad Popular** government. Released, he went into **exile** in Washington, D.C., where he joined the Institute for Policy Studies. He was killed on 21 September 1976 when his car exploded as he was traveling along Washington's Embassy Row. Ronni Karpen Moffitt, a staff member at the institute, also died in the explosion. An investigation revealed that Letelier del Solar, a critic of the **military** dictatorship of **Augusto Pinochet Ugarte**, had been targeted by the **Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional** (DINA, Directorate of National Intelligence), Chile's secret police.

The bomb had been made and planted by Michael V. Townley, a U.S. citizen working for DINA. The story began to unfold in 1978, when a Chilean judge, investigating a case of false passports, discovered a trail leading from Townley to two DINA officials, General **Manuel Contreras Sepúlveda** and Colonel **Pedro Espinoza Bravo**. Turned over to U.S. authorities in 1978, Townley cooperated, confessing to his role in the crime and stating that Contreras Sepúlveda and Espinoza Bravo had ordered the assassination. Townley was convicted and served five years in prison. In 1979 the United States asked Chile to extradite the two DINA officials, but Chile refused, saying that Chilean law did not allow evidence obtained through plea bargains. The United States renewed its extradition request in 1987, prompted by the voluntary confession of Major Armando Fernández Larios, a DINA agent, who told U.S. authorities that he had participated in the assassination by tracking Letelier del Solar's whereabouts in Washington. Again, Chile rejected the request.

A small measure of justice came in 1993, when a Chilean court convicted Contreras Sepúlveda and Espinoza Bravo for their role in the murders of Letelier del Solar and Moffitt. They were sentenced to seven years and six years, respectively, and served time in a special military prison.

LEY DE PRESUNCIÓN DE FALLECIMIENTO / "PRESUMPTION OF DEATH" LAW. *See* MADRES DE PLAZA DE MAYO.

LIBERAL PARTY. *See* PARTIDO LIBERAL.

LIBERATION THEOLOGY. A radical theology that arose in the Latin American **Catholic Church** during the 1960s. Unlike the traditional church in the region, which had aligned itself for centuries with the **military** and the wealthy elites, practitioners of liberation theology aligned themselves with the region's poor. Liberation theology emerged from the intersection of the social sciences and changes within the wider Catholic Church. Sociology—especially Marxist sociology—provided progressive members of the Latin American church with the analytical tools to understand the region's economic and social underdevelopment. Out of this analysis came the theory of dependency, which saw Latin America as an economic satellite of the **United States**, just as the region had been a satellite of Spain or Portugal and then, after independence, of other European countries like Britain. According to this view, Latin America was not only a source of raw materials and cheap labor for U.S. industry but also a market for its finished products, including arms. U.S. loans and foreign investment were seen as having an opposite effect than the one intended. Instead of leading to an economic boom, which would help prevent the region from falling to **communism**, U.S. involvement brought only dependency and suffering.

Equally important to liberation theology were the changes in Catholicism that emerged out of the Second Ecumenical Council, or Vatican II (1962–1965). Convened in Rome by Pope John XXIII with the intention of modernizing the church, the Council situated the church squarely within this world and invited laity to full participation alongside priests and bishops. Meeting in 1968, in Medellín, Colombia, the bishops of Latin America committed the church to social justice, breaking the institution's long-standing relationship with the rich and powerful. The Medellín conference had the blessing of the new pope, Paul VI, who had traveled to Colombia to open the discussion and whose encyclical *Populorum Progressio* had promoted social, economic, and political rights.

Having charted a new course, the church in Latin America placed a premium on liberating the masses through education. Drawing on the techniques of Paulo Freire, a noted **Brazilian** philosopher of education, church members developed educational programs aimed at helping people understand their plight. *Comunidades de base* (base

communities) were formed, where small groups of people (a dozen or so) could live and work together and organize for grassroots change. Although the bishops at Medellín had stopped short of calling for revolution, many young priests and nuns chose to participate in left-wing causes, some even joining armed **guerrilla** organizations. The priest Camilo Torres Restrepo, for example, who had joined the guerrillas in his native Colombia, died in combat on 15 February 1966. The following year a small group of students calling itself the Comando Camilo Torres was formed in **Argentina**. This group would later become the **Montoneros**, one of the most powerful guerrilla organizations in Latin America.

LIGA ARGENTINA POR LOS DERECHOS DEL HOMBRE / ARGENTINE LEAGUE FOR THE RIGHTS OF MAN. The oldest **human-rights** nongovernmental organization in **Argentina**. The Liga was founded in 1937 following the overthrow of President Hipólito Yrigoyen and the ensuing political repression. During the dictatorship, it concentrated on providing legal support for political prisoners.

LITTÍN, MIGUEL (1942–). **Chilean** filmmaker, screenwriter, and novelist. Miguel Littín is a noted practitioner of the *nuevo cine latinoamericano* (New Latin American cinema) along with **Glauber Rocha** of **Brazil**, **Jorge Sanjinés** of **Bolivia**, and Tomás Gutiérrez Alea of Cuba, among others. Born into a family of Palestinian and Greek immigrants in Palmilla, Colchagua Province, in the wine-growing north of Chile, he is one of Latin America's best-known film directors for his work as well as for his personal odyssey under the regime of **Augusto Pinochet Ugarte**.

He began his artistic trajectory in Chilean theater as a graduate of the Theater School of the Universidad de Chile. His first professional jobs were as director and producer for Chilean television and stage, where he also worked briefly as an actor. During 1964–1967, he worked as an assistant on several films but soon migrated to film direction. His 1969 movie, *El chacal de Nahueltoro* (released in the **United States** as *The Jackal of Nahueltoro*), chronicles the horrific crimes and eventual redemption of a murderer. The film earned its director the attention of the critics and the public alike and remains one of his best-known works.

In 1970 he was appointed the director of Chile Films, the national film production company, by president **Salvador Allende Gossens**. During his tenure, he made weekly newsreels and completed two other films, *Compañero presidente* (1971, Comrade President) and *La Tierra Prometida* (1972, released in the United States as *The Promised Land*), for which he also wrote the scripts. *La Tierra Prometida*, which was begun in Chile but had to be finished abroad, tells of the brief socialist government in Chile in 1932. Soon after the ouster of Allende Gossens by the **military** in 1973, Littín went into **exile** first in Cuba and then in Mexico. In exile he went on to direct and write the script for such well-known movies of the period as *El Recurso del Método* (1978, released internationally as *Recourse to the Method*), based on the novel by the same title by the Cuban Alejo Carpentier; *Actas de Marusia* (1975, released in the United States as *Letters from Marusia*); and *Alsino y el Cóndor* (1982, released in the United States as *Alsino and the Condor*). All these films brought the young director great international acclaim.

In *Actas de Marusia*, Littín returns to Chilean history, this time in filming the 1907 rebellion of a mining town, an event that ended in the town's destruction. The film was based on the novel by the same title by Chilean writer Patricio Manns, who reportedly had based his work on eyewitness accounts. The movie was enormously successful abroad and won its director a nomination as Best Movie at the Cannes Film Festival and as Best Foreign Movie at the Oscars. *Alsino y el condor*, also nominated for Best Foreign movie at the Oscars in 1983, was an ambitious Cuban-Nicaraguan-Costa Rican-Mexican production loosely based on the novel *Alsino*, by the Nicaraguan writer Pedro Prado. Littín filmed it in Nicaragua after the Sandinista revolution as an allegorical tale of a popular **guerrilla** movement rising against a dictatorial government. Some hailed it for its use of poetic imagery and magic; at one point, the young boy of the title turns into a condor. Others condemned it as an example of heavy-handed political propaganda.

Littín had already earned a significant place among Latin America's filmmakers when in 1985 he set out on a project that has earned him almost mythical status in the continent. In 1985, after discovering his name on a list of 5,000 people banned from returning to Chile by Pinochet Ugarte, he decided to risk the return in order to document life

under the regime. Posing as a Uruguayan businessman, he conducted three European camera crews into the country. For six weeks, Littín, his Dutch, Italian, and French crews, joined by six Chilean crews staffed mostly by young people, filmed with impunity throughout the length of Chile, at one point even filming inside the presidential palace. The work resulted in a four-part documentary for television and a movie released in 1986 as *Acta General de Chile* (General Letter from Chile). The works documented interviews with victims of detention and **torture**, relatives of *desaparecidos*, and other citizens working covertly in opposition to the government in keeping alive the memory of enemies of the regime, such as the poet **Pablo Neruda**, whose home was then kept closed to the public by the junta. Other highlights include an interview with an opposition leader, recuperating in a clandestine hospital after being rescued from a public hospital following an assassination attempt. The work concludes with a reenactment of the last hours of President Allende Gossens's last stand in the presidential palace.

The daring incursion received even greater publicity when the Nobel prize winner Gabriel García Márquez—who has said he heard the details of the story from Littín himself—opted to write an account of the incursion, published in 1986 as *La aventura de Miguel Littín, clandestino en Chile*. Told as a first-person account by the García Márquez—who in his early years had worked as a journalist—it completed the work of thoroughly embarrassing the Pinochet Ugarte regime. To date, *La aventura de Miguel Littín, clandestino en Chile* has been translated into all major European languages, as well as Arabic, Chinese, Croatian, Japanese, Korean, and Persian—testimony to García Márquez's popularity and his status as a perennial best seller worldwide. It was no doubt the international aspect of the incident that reportedly led to the burning of 15,000 copies of the first Spanish edition in Valparaiso, Chile, in 1986, allegedly under orders by Pinochet Ugarte himself.

With the return of democracy, Littín returned to Chile, where he located his film *Naufragos* (1994, released in the United States as *The Shipwrecked*), an exploration of the effects of the years of military junta on Aron, a Chilean exile whose father had died while he was away and whose brother remains among the missing. His latest films have returned the director to his Palestinian roots. In the 2001

documentary *Crónicas palestinas: Los caminos de la ira* (Palestinian Chronicles: Paths of Anger), he examines the Middle Eastern conflict through the perspective of a child engaged in rock throwing against Israeli tanks. His 2005 film, *La última luna*, posits the possibility of Israeli-Palestinian solidarity through the story of a young Palestinian, Soliman, and his friendship with a young Jew, Jacob, as they attempt to build a house; the story is set in Turkish-occupied Palestine in 1918. As is customary, Littín wrote the scripts for his latest films and in *La última luna* worked with his son, Miguel I. Littín-Menz, acting as director of photography. A published novelist, Miguel Littín has earned accolades internationally in the Cannes, Moscow, and Venice Film Festivals, as well as recognition from the Cuban Fundación de Nuevo Cine Latinoamericano, of which he is a founding member. He also holds an Ariel, Mexico's leading film award.

Miguel Littín lives in Chile and continues to work on the project that first moved him to return to Chile clandestinely: “recuperar la patria por dentro” (recover the homeland from the inside). His latest film, *Isla 10*, tells the story of an infamous detention camp of the Pinochet Ugarte era, Dawson Island, in southern Chile.

LÓPEZ REGA, JOSÉ. *See* ALIANZA ANTICOMUNISTA ARGENTINA (AAA); PERÓN, ISABEL (“ISABELITA”).

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MACDERMOT, NIALL. *See* INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS (ICJ).

MADRES DE PLAZA DE MAYO / MOTHERS OF THE PLAZA DE MAYO. A **human-rights** nongovernmental organization that first appeared on 30 April 1977 in **Argentina**, though it did not become a formal organization until 1979. It arose out of the anger and frustration felt by **women** in their attempts to gather information about their missing children. A disproportionate number of *desaparecidos* were young, between the ages of 18 and 30. When inquiries at public offices, police precincts, and **military** barracks brought no results, some mothers decided to take their protest to the streets. On

Saturday, 30 April 1977, at 11 o'clock in the morning, 14 women led by Azucena Villaflor de Vicenti met at the **Plaza de Mayo** in the hope of drawing attention to their cause. The plaza, situated next to the Casa Rosada (the Pink House, or presidential residence) had been the site of many political demonstrations, though theirs was the first demonstration since the coup. On this particular day, however, the Plaza was deserted, and they eventually settled on Thursdays at 3:30 in the afternoon for their weekly meetings. At first, the Madres were ignored by the junta, or at most dismissed as *las locas de Plaza de Mayo* (the madwomen of the Plaza de Mayo). They were mothers and hence perceived as politically insignificant. At the same time, their status as mothers afforded them protection. At the request of the Madres, fathers did not march alongside them. It was thought that men would surely be kidnapped and disappeared.

But the Madres' growing number—by June they had reached a hundred—and their increasing activism soon made them a political force. By the end of 1977 they presented writs of habeas corpus on behalf of 159 persons; met with **Patricia Derian**, the assistant secretary of the Bureau of Human Rights under **Jimmy Carter**; and demonstrated when Terence Todman, assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs, traveled to Buenos Aires to meet with General **Jorge Rafael Videla**. They had also formed alliances with other human-rights groups, such as the **Movimiento Ecuménico por los Derechos Humanos** (MEDH, Ecumenical Movement for Human Rights). As the Madres crossed the boundary between traditional motherhood and political activism, they became targeted as subversives. On 8 December 1977 a task force (kidnapping squad) from the **Escuela Mecánica de la Armada** (ESMA, Navy Mechanics School) broke up a meeting between the Madres and other relatives of the missing, abducting nine women, including Alice Domon, a French nun. Two days later—on 10 December, Human Rights Day—Azucena Villaflor and Léonie Renée Duquet, another French nun, were abducted from their homes. All of them were taken to ESMA and disappeared.

In spite of the loss, the Madres persisted in their protest. In 1978 their marches were largely free of disruption. The junta was preoccupied much of the year with hosting the World Cup soccer tournament and enjoying the national frenzy that followed Argentina's first

cup victory. The respite ended on 28 December, when the police took control of the plaza, ejecting about a thousand women by force. The police disrupted the marches throughout 1979 and prevented them outright throughout much of 1980. When the Madres could not march, they gathered in churches. In 1979 they made their organization formal in the hope of keeping the movement intact. Under Hebé Pastor de Bonafini, their first president, they established relationships with other human-rights groups both at home and abroad, requested interviews with foreign presidents and legislators, and testified during the hearings held in 1979 by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the **Organization of American States** (OAS).

Although the repression associated with the “dirty war” had begun to ease in 1978, the Madres remained a threat to the military government. An improved human-rights record could not silence the Madres as long as their children remained unaccounted for and their abductors unpunished. In August 1979 the government attempted to put an end to the matter, announcing the *Ley de Presunción de Fallecimiento* (Presumption of Death Law), which would permit relatives of the missing to seek rulings from judges declaring the missing persons to be dead. The new law would apply to those who had disappeared between November 1975 and the date that the law was promulgated. The Madres, joined by other human-rights groups and the governments of several countries, attacked the law as a government effort to sidestep accountability. The fate of the *desaparecidos* remained an issue.

As the government gradually loosened its hold, the Madres continued to demonstrate. On 12 March 1981, 68 mothers were arrested and held for several hours. On 7 July Pastor de Bonafini and María Adela Antokoletz, the president and vice president of the Madres, were detained for two hours at Ezeiza Airport; they had arrived from Houston, Texas, where they had accepted the Rothko Chapel award for human rights. (The award was confiscated.) The Madres were one of the few sectors of Argentine society to protest the **Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas** conflict in 1982, and on 10 December, Human Rights Day, they staged a 24-hour march in which hundreds of supporters (men and women) participated.

In 1986 the Madres split into two factions—the Línea Fundadora and the Asociación de las Madres de Plaza de Mayo (the Hebé Pastor

de Bonafini line). In addition to the Rothko Chapel award, the Madres have received numerous honors. *See also* ABUELAS DE PLAZA DE MAYO.

MADRES Y FAMILIARES DE LOS URUGUAYOS DESAPARECIDOS EN ARGENTINA. *See* FAMILIARES.

MALVINAS. *See* FALKLAND ISLANDS / ISLAS MALVINAS.

MANUEL RODRÍGUEZ PATRIOTIC FRONT. *See* FRENTE PATRIÓTICO MANUEL RODRÍGUEZ (FPMR).

MARIGHELLA, CARLOS (1911–1969). Founder of the **Ação Libertadora Nacional** (ALN, National Action for Liberation), a leftist urban **guerrilla** organization in **Brazil**. He was one of the “big three”—the guerrilla leaders most prominent in the armed opposition to Brazil’s **military** dictatorship. The others were **Joaquim Câmara Ferreira** and **Carlos Lamarca**.

Marighella, who had been active in the **Partido Comunista Brasileiro** (PCB, Brazilian Communist Party) since the 1930s, was imprisoned for two months after the 1964 military coup that ousted the left-leaning president **João Goulart**. After his release, he became impatient with the PCB’s passive line, and in 1967 formed the ALN, a PCB splinter group committed to armed struggle.

In 1968 the ALN began robbing banks, small operations that provided not only funding but also (according to Marighella) practice for larger operations. On 4 September 1969 the ALN and the **Movimento Revolucionário 8 de Outubro** (MR-8, 8th of October Revolutionary Movement) kidnapped the U.S. ambassador Charles Elbrick, an event dramatized in the feature film *Four Days in September*. Elbrick was released unharmed on 8 September 1969 after the government broadcast the guerrillas’ manifesto and released 15 political prisoners and **exiled** them to Mexico. On 4 November 1969 the government revenged the kidnapping: Sérgio Fleury, a notorious **torturer**, ambushed Marighella in São Paulo and shot him to death.

Marighella was succeeded by Ferreira, who in October 1970 was abducted in São Paulo and tortured to death by Fleury.

MARRA, NELSON (1942–). **Uruguayan** short-story writer, poet, novelist, and journalist. Born in Montevideo, Nelson Marra alternated the teaching of literature in secondary schools with the practice of literary journalism in publications of various Latin American countries until 1974, when his short narrative “El guardaespaldas” was awarded the first literary prize by the Uruguayan weekly *Marcha*. The work was deemed “pornographic” and “subversive” by a **military** junta that read in it a thinly disguised account of the execution of one of its most notorious members—then recently murdered by the **Tupamaros**, an urban **guerrilla** organization. Marra was condemned to four years in prison. Upon his release, he went into **exile** in Sweden. Among his works—none of which has been translated into English—is *El guardaespaldas y otros cuentos* (1985). In 1981 he settled in Spain, where he still resides.

MARTÍNEZ DE HOZ, JOSÉ ALFREDO. Finance minister in **Argentina** during the first junta (1976–1981). A descendant of the landowning oligarchy and a leading figure in the banking industry, Martínez de Hoz reversed the economic policy of his **Peronist** predecessors, setting the economy on a free-market course. Like the **Chicago Boys** in **Chile**, he lowered protective barriers and opened the economy to outside competition. Implementing the new policy involved repressing organized labor, the traditional Peronist political base. Unions were intervened (placed under **military** control), and many of their leaders and members, labeled subversive, were disappeared. Martínez de Hoz kept the peso overvalued, ushering in a period of *plata dulce* (sweet money), when affluent Argentines went abroad for vacation or shopping. Many local companies, however, unable to compete with foreign imports, went bankrupt.

MARXISM. *See* COMMUNISM.

MASACRE EN SAN PATRICIO / MASSACRE AT SAN PATRICIO. On 4 July 1976 the parish of San Patricio, in Belgrano, **Argentina**, was the site of the assassination of five members of the Irish-Argentine Pallotine religious order. Three of the victims were priests—Pedro Duffau, 65, Alfredo Leaden, 57, and Alfredo Kelly, 40. The others were seminarians—Salvador Barbeito, 29, and Emilio

Barletti, 23. Their bodies, riddled with bullets on that Sunday morning, were discovered by the church organist after parishioners found the church's door closed at Mass time.

According to the journalist Eduardo Kimel, the author of *Masacre en San Patricio*, witnesses reported slogans scrawled at the scene, including “Estos zurdos murieron por ser adoctrinadores de mentes vírgenes y son M.S.T.M.” (These lefties died because they indoctrinated virgin minds and because they belonged to the M.S.T.M. [the acronym for the Movimiento de Sacerdotes para el Tercer Mundo/ Priests for the Third World]). Newspaper stories have revealed that over Barbeito's body somebody had placed a poster, torn from the wall of one of the rooms in the rectory, showing a comic strip by the popular Argentine humorist Quino. The comic strip depicted the well-known character Malfada pointing to a policeman's baton with the caption: “Este es el palito de abollar ideologías” (This is the little stick that dents ideologies). Although the murders remain unsolved, Kimel's investigations and those of the documentarians Juan Pablo Young and Pablo Zubizarreta point to a **death squad** from the **Escuela Mecánica de la Armada** (ESMA, Navy Mechanics School) as the perpetrators.

On the evening before the killings, a young neighbor of the priests—the son of the **military** governor of Neuquén province—alarmed by the sight of a Peugeot 504 stationed near the church and fearing a **guerrilla** attack, called the police to report suspicious activities. A patrol car was dispatched, and after speaking to the occupants of the Peugeot, the officer in charge advised the policeman guarding the military-governor's residence to ignore the situation—an operation was being conducted “para reventar a unos zurdos” (to bust up some lefties). Soon after, armed men were observed entering the church.

The Pallotine priests and seminarians were counted among the more progressive members of the Buenos Aires clergy. Earlier in 1976, Father Kelly, the pastor of San Patricio—situated in one of Buenos Aires's most prestigious neighborhoods—incurred the ire of his congregation by preaching against the alleged practice of profiting from the sale of possessions taken from *desaparecidos* (missing), a practice in which he implied members of his congregation were implicated. Soon after, a letter circulated, calling for his removal and accusing him of being a communist.

On two occasions since 1976, Argentine legal authorities have investigated the case of the murdered Pallotines. In 1976 Guillermo Rivarola, the ruling judge, found no suspects in the case. In 1984, however, new declarations by people present at the scene the night of the murders demonstrated inconsistencies in the Rivarola investigation. Witnesses' declarations—also gathered in the report *Nunca más* (*Never Again*), published in 1986 by the **Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas** (CONADEP, National Commission on the Disappeared)—stated that Lieutenant Antonio Pernía, a member of GT-3/32, a notorious ESMA task force, had bragged about participating in the murders. According to *Nunca más* and the **Movimiento Ecuménico por los Derechos Humanos** (MEDH, Ecumenical Movement for Human Rights), 18 priests, 10 seminarians, two nuns, and 30 lay workers were assassinated during the years of the military dictatorships in the Southern Cone.

After *Masacre en San Patricio* appeared in 1986, Judge Rivarola sued its author, Kimel, accusing the book of “libeling, slandering and dishonoring him,” according to the Committee to Protect Journalists, a U.S. nongovernmental press-advocacy group. Argentine courts found for Rivarola under Argentina’s broad legal definition of slander and libel and fined Kimel. In May 2008 the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, based in San José, Costa Rica, took up Kimel’s case, urging Argentina to void a criminal-defamation sentence against Kimel and to reform its defamation laws.

To date, no members of the former ESMA or the Argentine military have been charged in the murder of the Pallotines. Meanwhile, the Vatican has initiated the process of canonization for all the slain. The Pallotine order maintains two sites—one in Rome and one in Buenos Aires—in their memory.

MASSACRE AT SAN PATRICIO. *See* MASACRE EN SAN PATRICIO.

MASSERA, EMILIO (1926–). Admiral, commander of the navy, and member of the first junta (1976–1981) during the “**dirty war**” in **Argentina**. As navy commander, he was responsible for the **torture** and murder of at least 5,000 political prisoners held in the **Escuela Mecánica de la Armada** (ESMA, Navy Mechanics

School), an infamous detention center. He was also responsible for appropriating goods—companies and houses, furniture and clothing, television sets and washing machines—stolen from the missing (*desaparecidos*). In the 1985 trial of the nine former junta leaders, Massera was sentenced to life in prison but was released in December 1990 under an amnesty declared by President **Carlos Saúl Menem**.

MÉDICI, EMÍLIO GARRASTAZÚ (1905–1985). Army general and president of **Brazil** from October 1969 to March 1974. He was the third of five **military** presidents following the 1964 coup that toppled the left-leaning president **João Goulart**. The military ruled until 1985.

He was born in the town of Bagé, in the southern state of Rio Grande do Sul. He graduated from a preparatory military academy in Porto Alegre and then began his military career, in 1927, as a cadet at the Escola Militar do Realengo, the national military academy in Rio de Janeiro. In the 1950s, he served as an intelligence officer on the staff of **Artur da Costa e Silva**, who commanded Rio Grande do Sul's Third Army and with whom he formed a close friendship. In 1964, at the time of the coup, he was head of the military academy at Agulhas Negras. Although he did not take part in the coup, he was a hard-liner and approved of the results. From 1964 to 1966, he served as military attaché to the Brazilian embassy in Washington, D.C. After returning to Brazil, he was named head of the **Serviço Nacional de Informações** (SNI, National Intelligence Service) and then, in 1969, commander of the Third Army. In mid-October 1969 he was selected by the military high command to be president. He was inaugurated on 30 October, succeeding Costa e Silva, who had been incapacitated by a stroke.

Médici's rule—under the banner “security and development”—marked the height of the “**dirty war**.” **Death squads** held almost unlimited power, and thousands of the government's perceived enemies were arrested and **tortured**. Rural and urban **guerrilla** groups, which had emerged in the late 1960s, were all but eliminated. An estimated 170 people were either summarily shot or tortured to death. On the other side, the Médici years were known for the “Brazilian miracle,” a period of rapid economic growth, and for ambitious development

projects such as the Trans-Amazonia Highway. Critics argued, however, that the “miracle” and the projects were achieved at the expense of the environment and the quality of life.

Médici was succeeded on 15 March 1974 by General **Ernesto Geisel**, a moderate who began a process of political liberalization that eventually led to the return of civilian rule. Médici died in Rio de Janeiro on 9 October 1985.

MENDOZA DURÁN, CÉSAR (d. 1996). Chilean general who commanded the **Carabineros**, the national police force. He was one of four commanders who on 11 September 1973 overthrew the Marxist president **Salvador Allende Gossens**. The leader of the coup, General **Augusto Pinochet Ugarte**, would later praise Mendoza Durán’s performance, which involved controlling the large cities, particularly the slums, where Allende Gossens had strong support. After the coup, Mendoza Durán and the other three commanders formed the ruling junta, under which the Carabineros played a part in systematically violating **human rights**. In 1985 14 Carabineros were implicated in the *degollados* case, in which three members of the then-illegal **Partido Comunista de Chile** (PC, Communist Party of Chile) were assassinated, and Mendoza Durán was forced to resign from the junta. He died at age 78 on 13 September 1996. *See also* GUSTAVO LEIGH GUZMÁN; JOSÉ TORIBIO MERINO CASTRO.

MENEM, CARLOS SAÚL (1930–). Peronist politician and president of **Argentina** (1989–1999). Menem’s election to the presidency on 14 May 1989 marked the first time since 1928 that one Argentine civilian president succeeded another. In 1995 he won a second term in office, the constitution having been revised the previous year to allow two consecutive presidential terms and to reduce the term from six years to four. Carlos Saúl Menem was born on 2 July 1930 in Anillaco in La Rioja province. His parents were Syrian immigrants, and he and his three brothers were raised as Sunni Muslims, though he would later convert to Roman **Catholicism**. As a college student he became involved in politics, and in 1955 founded the Juventud Peronista, a Peronist youth group. In 1956 he was jailed briefly for supporting an effort to bring back **Juan Perón**. After earning a law degree from the University of Córdoba in 1958, he practiced law in

La Rioja, the provincial capital, and served as advisor to the **Confederación General del Trabajo** (CGT, General Labor Federation), a Peronist stronghold. He was elected governor of La Rioja province in 1973 (the year Juan Perón returned), an office he would win again in 1983 and 1987. After the 1976 **military** coup that removed **Isabel Perón** from power, Menem was imprisoned until 1978, and then kept under house arrest until 1982.

In the presidential election of 1989, Menem, heading a Peronist coalition, defeated Eduardo Angeloz, representing the **Unión Cívica Radical** (UCR, Radical Civic Union). Although Menem was scheduled to take office on 10 December, the incumbent president **Raúl Alfonsín**, facing a severe economic crisis, resigned five months before the end of his six-year term, and Menem assumed the presidency on 8 July. Shortly after taking office, he floated the idea of granting a pardon or an amnesty for military officers and **guerrillas**. Although public opinion polls indicated that a majority of Argentines were opposed to any show of mercy toward the armed forces, on 8 October 1989 Menem pardoned 277 persons, including 64 guerrillas. Among those remaining in prison, however, were the three commanders of the first junta (**Jorge Rafael Videla**, **Emilio Massera**, and **Orlando Ramón Agosti**) and the **Montonero** leader Mario Firmenich. Despite the pardons, lower-ranking officers, who had rebelled three times under Alfonsín, remained restive. One of the pardoned officers was Colonel Mohammed Alí Seineldín, who had been jailed for leading a rebellion in 1988. Rejecting the army's effort to discipline him for his role in that operation, the charismatic Seineldín urged his many followers to stage still another rebellion, aimed at overthrowing the government. Menem had anticipated the action, however, and had shored up support among loyalists in the army by promising a second round of pardons and ordering a pay raise for officers. The coup of 3 December 1990 was put down the same day. By the end of December, Menem pardoned the remaining officers and guerrilla leaders. *See also* CARAPINTADAS.

MERINO CASTRO, JOSÉ TORIBIO (d. 1996). Chilean admiral and one of four commanders who on 11 September 1973 overthrew the Marxist president **Salvador Allende Gossens**. One of the original plotters, Merino Castro persuaded General **Augusto Pinochet**

Ugarte, the army commander, to join the coup, telling him the night before that the navy would remove Allende Gossens with or without the help of the army. After the coup, Mendoza Durán and the other three commanders formed the ruling junta, under which the navy played a part in systematically violating **human rights**. Although the composition of the junta would change over the 17 years of **military** rule, Merino Castro stayed on, the only one of the original members to serve until the end. When Pinochet Ugarte left the junta in 1980 to become president, the junta began serving a legislative role. Merino Castro became its chief, giving weekly news conferences that reported on its resolutions. Known for his humor and outspokenness, he was popular with journalists. He died at age 80 on 30 August 1996. *See also* GUSTAVO LEIGH GUZMÁN; CÉSAR MENDOZA DURÁN.

MILITARY. Latin American militaries have traditionally regarded themselves as the final arbiters of society. Closed institutions, they share values and beliefs common to other militaries—order and honor, discipline and duty, and respect for hierarchy. In addition, as arbiters, they believe that it is their mission to intervene and to restore order when they perceive society to be out of control—torn by unrest and political rivalry. “Order” is usually defined in terms of Western civilization, Christianity, and anticommunism. Throughout the 20th century, the military in **Argentina** intervened numerous times—the first in 1930, the last in 1976. From 1928 to 1989, not one constitutionally elected administration succeeded another. By contrast, during the same period, the military in **Chile** intervened only briefly in 1924 and 1931 and not again until 1973, when it ruled for 17 years; the military in **Uruguay** did not intervene until 1973, when it ruled for 12 years. (The “soft” Uruguayan dictatorship of 1933–1942 had been a civilian affair.)

Yet even in Argentina, with its succession of coups, early interventions by the armed forces—those before 1960—were short, lasting at most a couple of years. The military specialized in warfare and preferred to leave government in the hands of politicians. By the early 1960s, however, the military began to see its role in broader terms. Successful revolutions in Algeria, China, and Cuba prompted the military to shift its emphasis from traditional warfare to internal defense. It also

took a greater interest in government, having been trained in economics and administration as well as counterinsurgency. By the mid-1960s, the military was prepared to intervene for extended periods. Whereas before it was content to restore order, return government to civilians, and retreat to the barracks, it was now interested in reforming society and the economy with the aim of preventing insurrection.

MITRIONE, DANIEL. *See* TUPAMAROS.

MOFFITT, RONNI KARPEN. *See* LETELIER DEL SOLAR, ORLANDO.

MONTE CASEROS. *See* CARAPINTADAS.

MONTI, RICARDO (1944–). Argentine playwright, acting teacher, and director. Born in Buenos Aires, Monti first ventured into theater as a student in courses sponsored by the Nuevo Teatro and Fray Mocho theater groups. He soon abandoned an acting career in favor of writing for the stage. He is considered one of Argentina's premier acting teachers because of his widely acclaimed group and individual acting workshops.

His first play, *Una noche con el Sr. Magnus & Hijos* (A Night with Mr. Magnus & Sons), premiered in the Teatro del Centro in Buenos Aires in 1970, under the direction of Hubert Copello, and was well received by the critics, garnering him several awards. In 1971 Jaime Kogan, the director of the Payró Theater, staged Monti's next play, *Historia tendenciosa de la clase media argentina, de los extraños sucesos en que se vieron envueltos algunos hombres públicos, su completa dilucidación y otras escandalosas revelaciones* (Tendentious History of the Argentine Middle Class, of the Strange Events in Which Some Well-Known Men Were Involved, Its Complete Elucidation and Other Scandalous Revelations).

International acclaim arrived in 1976, when Monti received the Carlos Arniches Award in Spain for his play *Visita* (Visit), once again directed by Jaime Kogan (1937–1996), who remains the director most closely associated with Monti's work. In addition to the earlier plays, he would go on to direct *Marathon* in 1980 and *La obscuridad de la razón* (1993, translated in 2004 as *Reason Obscured*).

The late 1970s witnessed brief incursions by Monti into Argentine cinema. In 1977 he collaborated with the director Ricardo Wullicher in the script for the movie *Saverio el cruel* (Saverio the Cruel), adapted from the novel by the same title by Roberto Arlt. The following year, he would collaborate with Wullicher and Vlady Kociancich in the script for the film *Borges para millones* (Borges for Millions).

In 1981 Monti collaborated in the first cycle of **Teatro Abierto Argentino** (Open Theater of Argentina) with his play *La cortina de abalorios* (The Glass-Bead Curtain). Teatro Abierto Argentino is the best-known example of **cultural resistance** to emerge from Argentina during the years of the **military junta**.

Monti's plays have been translated into English, French, German, and Portuguese, and his works have been staged in Europe and Latin America. Some of his best-known works have been adapted for Argentine television, such as the 2001 *Visita* (adapted and directed by Mario Sábato), *Marathon* (directed by Kogan), and *La obscuridad de la razón*. Both *Visita* and *La obscuridad de la razón* have been adapted for the opera, with music by Pompeyo Camps, in 1990 and 1995, respectively.

A self-described loner, in a 1999 interview Monti eloquently called his theater “un escudo contra la muerte” (a shield against death). Critics have also hailed him as a practitioner of the “tradición del teatro-circo” (theater-circus tradition) because of the “style and world vision of his plays.”

In addition to the titles mentioned above, he is the author of *Una pasión sudamericana* (A South American Passion), a 1989 play dealing with the turbulent life of Camila O’Gorman. An earlier, unrelated version of the O’Gorman story—with echoes to the military junta in the 19th-century regime of the caudillo Juan Manuel de Rosas—was brought to Argentina in 1985 by María Luisa Bemberg (1925–1985) as *Camila*.

Monti is also the author of the historical monologue *Asunción* (1992); *No te soltaré hasta que me bendigas* (1999, I Won’t Let You Go until You Bless Me, translated into French as *Hotel Columbus*, 1999); *Finlandia* (2002, Finland); and *Apocalipsis mañana* (2003, Apocalypse Tomorrow). He is also known for his 1994 stage adaptation of Julio Cortázar’s seminal novel *Rayuela* (Hopscotch) and for

the translation and stage adaptation of *Le visiteur*, by Eric-Emanuel Schmitt, in 1999.

He is the recipient of numerous awards in his native Argentina as well as abroad. Ricardo Monti lives in Buenos Aires.

MONTONEROS. Of the many **guerrilla** organizations active in **Argentina** during the 1960s and 1970s, the Montoneros were the largest and most powerful. Unlike the other principal guerrilla group, the **Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo** (ERP, People's Revolutionary Army), which was more traditionally leftist, the Montoneros were militant Peronists. Organized in 1968 during the authoritarian regime of General Juan Onganía, they called themselves Montoneros after the gauchos who fought in the war of Argentine independence (*monton* being Spanish for "mob"). The name captured a romantic past and evoked the memory of **Evita Perón**, a cult figure for many Argentines. A common Montonero slogan was "¡Si Evita viviera, sería montonera!" ("If Evita were alive today, she would be a Montonero!").

The group's ideology was a mixture of **Catholic** nationalism, **liberation theology**, and **Peronism**. Most Montoneros had been active in conservative Catholic movements like Acción Católica (Catholic Action) and the right-wing Tacuara. Three founding members—Fernando Abal Medina, Carlos Gustavo Ramus, and Mario Firmenich—started their political careers in a branch of Catholic Action called the Juventud Estudiantil Católica (Catholic Student Youth). Later they were converted to Peronism and radical Catholicism through the teaching of Father Carlos Mugica and Juan García Elorrio. From García Elorrio they were introduced to the ideas of the Colombian priest-guerrilla Camilo Torres Restrepo, who had fused Christian faith with revolutionary struggle. In 1967 the three went underground to form the Comando Camilo Torres, an armed group that evolved a year later into the Montoneros.

Many of the actions claimed by the Montoneros were rich in symbolism, directed in retaliation for alleged offenses against Peronism. The first public act attributed to them is the kidnapping and murder on 29 May 1970 of former **military** president Pedro Aramburu, charged with the execution of Peronist rebels after the failed coup attempt of Juan José Valle in 1956. Whether the Montoneros actually did the

killing, however, has become a subject of debate. In his book *Dossier Secreto: Argentina's Desaparecidos and the Myth of the "Dirty War,"* Martin Edwin Andersen suggests that Aramburu and other high-profile victims claimed by the Montoneros—José Rucci, for example, the head of the Confederación Nacional del Trabajo (General Labor Federation)—may have been killed by the military with an aim toward justifying the use of force against leftist organizations. Linked to the theory is the further suggestion that Mario Firmenich, who became Montonero chief after the deaths of Abal Medina and Ramus in the repression following the murder of Aramburu, was a double agent working as an informant for the military.

Regardless of questions surrounding Aramburu's murder and Firmenich's loyalties, the group was persecuted for the act and almost destroyed. The group showed remarkable resiliency. The survivors found refuge in the Peronist Movement, especially the Peronist Youth. And the group's claim of responsibility for the murders of Aramburu and other targets, far from branding them as terrorists, earned them much popular support. Mergers with other Peronist left organizations followed, and they replenished their ranks from the *Descamisados*, the **Ejército Nacional Revolucionaria**, the **Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias**, and a wing of the **Fuerzas Armadas Peronistas**. In 1971 and 1972, the Montoneros increased their operations against the military government—including bank robberies, kidnappings, and bombings.

They called a truce in May 1973 when **Héctor José Cámpora**, Perón's left-leaning personal representative, took office. Working aboveground, they recruited followers from the ranks of university and secondary students, **trade unionists**, shantytown dwellers, and **women**. Their efforts paid off—so much so that during the period 1973–1974 their rallies sometimes drew as many as 100,000 people. In the September 1973 presidential election, the Montoneros supported the candidacy of Juan Perón, despite early signs—the Ezeiza Airport massacre and the right-wing palace coup that removed Cámpora—that he was moving to the right. Far from reversing direction, Perón snubbed the Peronist left, officially breaking ties in a speech in May 1974. Nevertheless, the Montoneros remained loyal to Perón until his death in July.

The ascendancy of **Isabel Perón** to the presidency, however, removed any hope for a leftward shift and, in September, the Montoneros

resumed armed struggle. Despite their earlier truce, political repression against them had continued after May 1973, increasing dramatically after Perón's death. Still, drawing on the base of support they had established while aboveground, they built themselves into one of the most powerful guerrilla organizations in Latin America. Their kidnapping in September 1974 of the leaders of the multinational corporation Bunge and Born netted a ransom of over \$60 million, which they used, in late 1975, to launch frontal attacks against the military—the most spectacular being their assault in October on an army garrison in Formosa. The government responded by finally banning the group (the ERP having been banned in 1973) and by giving the armed forces a free hand in combating subversion.

With the military coming to power in the March 1976 coup and institutionalizing its “**dirty war**” against subversion, the Montoneros quickly declined. Their leader, Mario Firmenich, avoided becoming a *desaparecido*, escaping to **Brazil**. In 1984, after the return to civilian rule, he was extradited to Argentina and imprisoned. He was later freed in the amnesty granted by President **Carlos Saúl Menem** in 1990.

MOREIRA ALVES, MÁRCIO. *See* MOVIMENTO DEMOCRÁTICO BRASILEIRO (MDB).

MOTHERS OF THE PLAZA DE MAYO. *See* MADRES DE PLAZA DE MAYO.

MOTLEY, LANGHORNE. Assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs under President **Ronald Reagan**. Langhorne Motley was the sole envoy sent in February 1985 to review the political situation in **Chile**. In contrast to the strongly focused **human-rights** advocacy of President **Jimmy Carter**, the Reagan administration had generally practiced a policy of noninvolvement in Chilean affairs of state. Now, in the face of a growing opposition movement on the part of nonviolent and armed resisters, the regime of General **Augusto Pinochet Ugarte** had unleashed a wave of repression similar to the days and weeks following the September 1973 **military** coup. The Reagan administration feared that renewed repression might result in a resurgence of the left. Motley's visit consisted of social

functions with Pinochet Ugarte and his officials as well as meetings with human-rights leaders. The representatives of local political and human-rights organizations had expected Motley to be as critical of Pinochet as the recently released Department of State report detailing human-rights abuses and the unresponsiveness to the people's desire for a return to democracy. Instead, they found him a staunch advocate of Pinochet Ugarte, publicly declaring the military state to be "in good hands." Motley ended his five-day state visit without offering any clarity to the situation regarding U.S. relations with the Pinochet government; however, as the first official visitor after years of enmity with the Carter administration, the assistant secretary of state reestablished the presence of American involvement with human rights and democracy in Chile.

MOVEMENT FOR NATIONAL LIBERATION. *See* TUPAMAROS.

MOVEMENT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY LEFT. *See* MOVIMIENTO DE LA IZQUIERDA REVOLUCIONARIA (MIR).

MOVIMIENTO CONTRA LA TORTURA SEBASTIÁN ACEVEDO / SEBASTIÁN ACEVEDO MOVEMENT AGAINST TORTURE. A **human-rights** nongovernmental organization in **Chile**. It was established in 1983 when the budding *Movimiento contra la Tortura* (Movement against Torture) renamed itself in memory of a man from Concepción. Unable to bear the thought of his two abducted children being **tortured** by security forces, Sebastián Acevedo set himself on fire outside the city's **Catholic** cathedral. The children were later released.

The Sebastián Acevedo Movement protested torture by staging public performances, sometimes outside known detention centers, fully aware that the **carabineros** (national police) would intervene by beating and arresting them. The intention was to convince bystanders that human-rights violations were taking place in Chile.

MOVIMIENTO DE LA IZQUIERDA REVOLUCIONARIA (MIR) / MOVEMENT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY LEFT. Also known as the *Movimiento Izquierdista Revolucionario*. A leftist urban

guerrilla organization in **Chile**. The MIR was formed in 1965 by a youthful faction that split from the **Partido Socialista** (PS, Socialist Party). Led by Miguel Enríquez, the group focused on grassroots political activities in the *poblaciones* (shantytowns), as opposed to the progressive reform programs undertaken by the government of **Eduardo Frei Montalva** (1964–1970). When the **Unidad Popular** (UP, Popular Unity) government of **Salvador Allende Gossens** began in 1970, the MIR agreed with much of the UP agenda—particularly land redistribution and the takeover of manufacturing concerns—but rejected the government’s main goal of achieving social reforms through democratic means. Like other urban guerrilla organizations in the Southern Cone, the MIR viewed itself as a revolutionary vanguard and advocated armed resistance against government oppression. Yet President Allende Gossens, eager to build a leftist coalition, formally recognized the group and opened a line of communication with its leaders, one of them his own nephew, Andrés Pascal Allende. By 1973 the MIR openly supported the PS and UP. In the violence and chaos that accompanied severe economic recession, however, the MIR went underground, prepared to take up arms. It resisted the coup of 11 September 1973 but was no match for the **military**. Once in power, the junta singled out the MIR for destruction. By 1974 the MIR was decimated—its leaders dead or in **exile**.

MOVIMIENTO DE LIBERACIÓN NACIONAL. *See* TUPAMAROS.

MOVIMENTO DEMOCRÁTICO BRASILEIRO (MDB) / BRAZILIAN DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT. The legal opposition political party during the **military** dictatorship in **Brazil** (1964–1985). It was created in 1965 as part of a strict two-party system. Its rival, created at the same time, was the **Aliança Renovadora Nacional** (ARENA, National Alliance for Renewal), a progovernment party. Both parties existed until November 1979, when the two-party system was scrapped.

Although the government expected the MDB to be moderate in its opposition, a group of MDB congressional members, known as the *auténticos*, were harsh critics of the military government. The most prominent among them was the former journalist Márcio Moreira

Alves, who in 1968 spoke out against the government's use of repression and **torture**. In particular, he proposed Operation Lysistrata, named after the play by Aristophanes and calling, facetiously, for Brazilian **women** to withhold sex from members of the military until the political violence ended. The military, however, was unamused. The government, intending to prosecute Moreira Alves for insulting the military, demanded that Congress remove his congressional immunity. Surprisingly, on 12 December 1968 the ARENA-dominated Congress voted 216 to 141 (with 15 abstentions) against the government's demand. Nevertheless, Moreira, a marked man, went into voluntary **exile**, where he remained until President **João Baptista de Oliveira Figueiredo** decreed a general amnesty in August 1979.

Although the MDB would remain the minority party, by the mid-1970s it was making electoral strides and threatening to take control of Congress. In 1979, to break up the opposition, Figueiredo dismantled the two-party system, insisting that each new party use the word *partido* (party) in its name. The MDB became the Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (PMDB, Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement). On 15 January 1985 the electoral college met to elect a civilian president, thus ending military rule. To the military's dismay, Tancredo Neves, an opposition candidate representing the PMDB, won the election.

MOVIMIENTO ECUMÉNICO POR LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS (MEDH) / ECUMENICAL MOVEMENT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS. A **human-rights** nongovernmental organization in **Argentina**. MEDH was founded in 1976 by progressive members of the **Catholic** clergy (with assistance from **SERPAJ**-Argentina) to give support to victims of the **military** dictatorship. It affiliated itself with the World Council of Churches as opposed to the more conservative Argentine Catholic Church, which during the dictatorship was largely supportive of the military regime.

MOVIMIENTO 14 DE MAYO PARA LA LIBERTAD PARAGUAYA (M-14) / 14TH OF MAY MOVEMENT FOR PARAGUAYAN LIBERTY. An armed **guerrilla** group that, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, waged war against **Paraguay's** dictator, **Alfredo Stroessner**. It was also known simply as the 14 de Mayo

(14th of May)—a reference to Paraguay's Independence Day. Led by Benjamín Vargas Peña and composed of young militants from the then-exiled **Partido Liberal** (Liberal Party), the M-14 operated from bases in neighboring **Argentina**. It carried out its first operation on 1 April 1958, when it crossed the Paraná River and attacked the police garrison in the small southern town of Coronel Bogado, capturing weapons and ammunition. It then united briefly with another Paraguayan guerrilla group, the **Vanguardia Febrerista** (February Vanguard), led by Arnaldo Valdovinos—a union that fell apart after a leadership struggle between Vargas Peña and Valdovinos. The M-14 splintered further when an impetuous guerrilla named Juan José Rotela, inspired by Fidel Castro's revolution in Cuba, broke away and took more than 1,000 guerrillas with him. On 12 December 1959 he led an attack on Encarnación, a city in southern Paraguay. The military repelled it, killing almost the entire force, including Rotela. The original M-14 launched an attack of its own, in April 1960, and suffered the same fate. *See also* FRENTE UNIDO POR LA LIBERACIÓN NACIONAL.

MOVIMIENTO JUDÍO POR LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS / JEWISH MOVEMENT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS. A **human-rights** nongovernmental organization in **Argentina**. It was founded in 1982, though its members had been working together informally since 1977. During the dictatorship, Argentina's Jewish community suffered repression out of all proportion to its numbers. The *Movimiento Judío*, led by the journalist Herman Schiller, gave a distinctive voice to the resistance, often relating the events of the period to the Holocaust. *See also* ANTI-SEMITISM.

MOVIMIENTO PERONISTA DE LIBERACIÓN. *See* UTURUNCOS.

MOVIMIENTO POPULAR COLORADO (MOPOCO) / POPULAR COLORADO MOVEMENT. One of five political parties that opposed the dictatorship of General **Alfredo Stroessner** in **Paraguay**. The others were the **Partido Comunista Paraguayo** (PCP, Paraguayan Communist Party), the **Partido Demócrata Cristiano** (PDC, Christian Democratic Party), the **Partido Liberal** (Liberal

Party), and the **Partido Revolucionario Febrerista** (PRF, February Revolutionary Party).

MOPOCO was formed in the 1950s by two **exiled** factions of Stroessner's ruling **Partido Colorado** (Red Party): the democráticos and the epifanistas. The latter was a democrático faction led by Epifanio Méndez Fleitas, a progressive and one of Stroessner's chief rivals. MOPOCO favored a socialist program, including aggressive land reform and government by workers and peasants. It also denounced the support of Stroessner by the **United States**. In 1979, while still in exile, MOPOCO joined the PDC, the PRF, and a left-wing Liberal breakaway party in an opposition front called the **Acuerdo Nacional** (National Accord). Unlike the Liberals and the PRF, which Stroessner had allowed to return from exile in the 1960s, MOPOCO would not be allowed to return until 1984. Even then, its leaders were kept under surveillance, harassed, and detained by the police.

MOVIMENTO REVOLUCIONÁRIO 8 DE OUTUBRO (MR-8) / 8TH OF OCTOBER REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT. A leftist urban **guerrilla** organization in **Brazil**. It was named in memory of the **Argentine**-born Cuban revolutionary Che Guevara, who was executed in **Bolivia** on 8 October 1967. On 4 September 1969, the MR-8 and the **Ação Libertadora Nacional** (ALN, National Action for Liberation) kidnapped the U.S. ambassador Charles Elbrick, an event dramatized in the feature film *Four Days in September*. Elbrick, held in a rented house in the hills of Rio de Janeiro, was released unharmed on 8 September 1969 after the government broadcast the guerrillas' revolutionary manifesto and released 15 political prisoners, **exiling** them to Mexico.

In 1970 the MR-8 carried out armed operations in Rio de Janeiro, but like other guerrilla groups, by 1971 it would be largely eliminated by government **death squads**. In May 1971, though, it received some new members—the well-known guerrilla leader **Carlos Lamarca** and other former members of the Vanguarda Popular Revolucionária (VPR, People's Revolutionary Vanguard). By mid-May, however, Lamarca was forced to flee when Stuart Jones, the MR-8 leader, was captured. In September 1971, Lamarca was tracked down in the northeastern state of Bahia and killed.

The group dissolved in 1972, and its members fled to **Chile**.

MOVIMIENTO TODOS POR LA PATRIA (MTP) / EVERYONE FOR THE MOTHERLAND. Also known as Todos por la Patria (TPP). A leftist, grassroots, **human-rights** organization in **Argentina**, composed of human-rights activists, former members of the **Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo** (the ERP, or People's Revolutionary Army), and progressive **Catholics** inspired by **liberation theology**. Formed in the 1980s, it began as a peaceful organization but turned to **guerrilla** warfare after a series of *carapintada* revolts by junior officers threatened either a return to **military** rule or at least a vindication of the military for its role in the "**dirty war.**" On 23 January 1989 the MTP attacked and occupied the army garrison at La Tablada. The garrison was retaken the following day after President **Raúl Alfonsín** authorized the army to intervene. The toll was 39 dead (28 of them guerrillas) and 62 wounded.

MUSEUM OF MEMORY. *See* ESCUELA MECÁNICA DE LA ARMADA (ESMA).

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NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE DISAPPEARANCE OF PERSONS. *See* COMISIÓN NACIONAL DE INVESTIGACIÓN DE DESAPARICIÓN DE PERSONAS (CONADEP).

NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION. *See* COMISIÓN NACIONAL DE VERDAD Y RECONCILIACIÓN.

NATIONAL INFORMATION CENTER. *See* DIRECCIÓN DE INTELIGENCIA NACIONAL (DINA).

NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT. *See* TUPAMAROS.

NATIONAL REPUBLICAN ASSOCIATION. *See* PARTIDO COLORADO.

NATIONAL REVOLUTIONARY ARMY. *See* EJÉRCITO NACIONAL REVOLUCIONARIO (ENR).

NAVY MECHANICS SCHOOL. *See* ESCUELA MECÁNICA DE LA ARMADA (ESMA).

NERUDA, PABLO (1904–1973). Chilean poet and political activist.

One of the major poets in any language of the 20th century, he was born into a working-class family—his father was a train conductor—in Parral, in the rural center of **Chile**, as Neftalí Ricardo Reyes Basoalto. He spent his childhood in southern Chile, in Temuco, amid railroad workers and miners, an experience he would movingly recount in his memoirs, *Confieso que he vivido*—published posthumously in 1974—and which would fuel his political activism. In Temuco he also established a lifelong friendship with his teacher Gabriela Mistral (nee Lucila Godoy Alcayaga, a poet and the winner of the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1945).

While still in his teens, Neruda was awarded a government scholarship to study French in Santiago, Chile, with the object of becoming a provincial teacher. Instead, the publication of his second book of poetry, *Veinte poemas de amor y una canción desesperada* (1924, translated as *Twenty Love Poems and a Song of Despair* in 1969) anointed him one of Latin America's most famous young poets. He was appointed to the Chilean consular service and served in several Asian capitals from 1927 to 1932. The neoromanticism of his early poetry was abandoned in favor of surrealist verse of startling imagery and political content. To this period correspond two volumes of *Residencia en la tierra* (1933 and 1935). In 1934 he arrived in Spain as Chilean consul, first in Barcelona and then in Madrid. In Spain he was hailed as one of the most important voices of poetry in Spanish by the most important voices of the Generación del 27, led by Federico García Lorca. With the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939), Neruda identified with the cause of the Spanish Republic. With the publication of *España en mi corazón* (1937), the earlier hermetic verse of his surrealist stage was abandoned in favor of a direct language that identified itself with the politically dispossessed.

Neruda abandoned the diplomatic service in 1944, and in 1945 joined the Partido Comunista de Chile (PC, Communist Party of Chile). He served in the Chilean Senate from 1945 to 1948. In 1948 the Communist Party was outlawed in Chile, and Neruda went into exile, first in the Soviet Union, then in Europe and Mexico. During this period he published his ambitious—and politically controversial—*Canto*

general (1950, translated as *Canto General* in 1991). In a monumental style and with a sonorous voice, Neruda portrayed the history and geography of Latin America in an epic mosaic that extends for a thousand pages and 15 cantos. The publication of *Odas elementales* (1954, translated as *Elementary Odes* in 1961) and *Nuevas odas elementales* (1955) marked yet another stage in the literary trajectory of the poet. Written in direct, lyrical language—bereft of political overtones—the poems hailed the simplicity of such everyday objects as an onion, a dictionary, a tomato, and a pair of socks. Published in the columns of a daily in order to reach a wider readership, the *Odas elementales* won another set of admirers for the poet who was already hailed as “the poet of America.”

In 1952, the ban on the Communist Party having ended, Neruda returned to his native Chile. In this final stage of his career, he returned to the love poetry of his youth and adopted an intimate, introspective voice that sometimes gently mocked his public persona. The period saw the publication of *Estravagario* (1958); the love poetry of *Los versos del capitán* (1952) and *Cien sonetos de amor* (1959); and the five volumes of *Memorial de Isla Negra* (1964), a melancholy return to the places, travels, and political commitment of his youth.

In 1970 Neruda was the Communist Party’s candidate for president during the **Unidad Popular** campaign. The resulting election saw the triumph of **Salvador Allende Gossens** as president of Chile. Neruda was appointed ambassador to France from 1970 to 1972. In 1971 he was awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature, the capstone to a distinguished career that saw him receive, among other honors, Chile’s National Literature Prize in 1945 and the Stalin Prize for Peace in 1953. In 1973, just a week after the **military** coup that ended the Allende Gossens presidency, Neruda died at his house in Isla Negra, Chile.

“NIGHT OF THE PENCILS.” On 16 September 1976, 10 **Argentine** high-school students were abducted from their homes by security forces. Labeled subversive for having signed a joint petition in favor of student-rate bus fares, the students were taken to secret detention centers and **tortured**. Three of the students were eventually released; the rest remain among the missing (*desaparecidos*).

NIXON, RICHARD M. *See* HENRY KISSINGER; UNITED STATES.

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OBEDIENCIA DEBIDA / DUE OBEDIENCE. Legislation passed in June 1987 in **Argentina** during the administration of President **Raúl Alfonsín**. The law specified that only commanding officers could be held legally responsible for **human-rights** violations committed during the recent **military** dictatorship. Lower-ranking officers (those below brigadier general) were exempt from prosecution on the theory that they were following orders that they took to be legitimate. On 14 June 2005 the Supreme Court ruled 7–1 that the law was unconstitutional, opening the door for lower-ranking officers to face prosecution.

ONETTI, JUAN CARLOS (1909–1994). Uruguayan novelist, short-story writer, and journalist. Born in Montevideo, Onetti has often been described as **Uruguay's** literary master of the 20th century. In his early 20s he moved to Buenos Aires, **Argentina**, where he worked briefly as a movie reviewer for the journal *Crítica* and began publishing in, among other periodicals, the literary supplement of the newspaper *La Nación*. On his return to Montevideo, he became editor of the newly founded journal *Marcha*, a post he held until 1942, and also editor for Reuters News Agency. During a second stay in Buenos Aires, between 1943 and 1955, he continued his work for Reuters and edited the journal *Vea y lea*. In 1957, after a brief stint in an advertising agency, he was named director of the Municipal Libraries of Montevideo.

With the publication of his novel *El pozo* in 1939, Onetti was hailed as a truly original voice in the Latin American literary scene for his fusion of fantasy and realism, though his work attracted little critical attention outside his native **Uruguay**. Critical acclaim would follow, however, with the publication over the years of his *Santa María* saga, a series of short stories and novels set in the fictional city of Santa María. The city is a nightmarish composite of Buenos Aires and Montevideo, fraught with the alienation and chaos of the modern

urban experience. The series includes *La vida breve* (1950), *El astillero* (1961), *Juntacadáveres* (1964), and *La muerte y la niña* (1973). Although the political situation of Uruguay is alluded to in many of his works, Onetti made it explicit in the 1978 short story “Presencia,” where a coup imposes a **military** presence in the city. The cycle was brought to a conclusion by the destruction by fire of Santa María in his 1979 novel *Dejemos hablar al viento*.

In 1974 Onetti—then Uruguay’s most prominent writer—was named a jury member for a literary contest organized each year by *Marcha*, at that time one of the oldest and most highly regarded literary journals in Latin America. The first prize in the short-story category went to “El guardaespaldas,” by **Nelson Marra**, a work that the military considered “pornographic” and “subversive.” Arrested were Onetti; several members of the jury; Marra; the publisher of the journal, Carlos Quijano; and the editor of the journal, Hugo Alfaro. The journal was confiscated and its publication banned by order of the military. Despite the international outcry that ensued, Onetti was detained in a psychiatric institution for several months.

Upon his release, Onetti went into **exile** in Spain, where he became a citizen in 1975. He was the recipient of several prestigious awards, among them the Uruguayan Premio Nacional de Literatura in 1962, the William Faulkner Foundation Ibero-American Award in 1963, the Casa de las Américas prize in 1965, and the Premio Cervantes, the most prestigious literary award in Spain, in 1980. Onetti died in Madrid in 1994.

OPERAÇÃO BANDEIRANTES (OBAN) / OPERATION PIONEER. See SERVIÇO NACIONAL DE INFORMAÇÕES (SNI) / NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE.

OPERACIÓN DIGNIDAD. See *CARAPINTADAS*.

OPERATION CONDOR. A clandestine Latin American **military** network whose charter members, in 1975, were **Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay,** and **Uruguay.** Ecuador and Peru would join in 1978. Condor was formed by Colonel (later General) **Manuel Contreras Sepúlveda**, head of the **Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional** (DINA, Directorate of National Intelligence), Chile’s secret

police. Condor allowed the militaries of these countries to share information on political opponents and to cooperate in their capture. Consequently, refugees escaping repression in their own countries could no longer find asylum in neighboring countries. They would be tracked down and either returned to their own countries or executed in the countries to which they fled. In addition, Condor allowed the assassination of high-level political leaders perceived to be a threat to the current military regimes. Among its victims were the Chilean **Orlando Letelier del Solar** and his associate Ronni Karpen Moffitt, in Washington, D.C., and the Uruguayan legislators Zelmar Michelini and Héctor Gutiérrez, in Buenos Aires. Although the existence of Condor had long been suspected, proof began to emerge only in 1992, when **Martín Almada**, a Paraguayan educator and **torture** victim, discovered in Asunción, Paraguay, Condor's secret archives, a collection of documents now known as the Archives of Terror.

OPERATION DIGNITY. *See* CARAPINTADAS.

OPERATION TWENTIETH CENTURY. *See* FRENTE PATRIÓTICO MANUEL RODRÍGUEZ (FPMR).

ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES (OAS). Chartered in 1948, the OAS in May of that year adopted its American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. Like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which the **United Nations** (UN) would adopt a few months later, the American Declaration is based on the principle that individuals derive rights from the fact of being human, not from the fact of being citizens. In other words, states do not grant rights but rather recognize already existing rights. Also like the Universal Declaration, the American Declaration was not legally binding—there was not enough agreement to make it so. In 1967, however, the OAS adopted a protocol making the American Declaration the standard by which member states would be judged. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), which was formed in 1960 and which became part of the OAS in 1967, was empowered to investigate and report on **human-rights** violations committed by OAS member nations. The IACHR published reports on **Argentina** (1980), **Bolivia** (1981), **Chile** (1974, 1976, 1985), **Paraguay** (1978,

1987), and **Uruguay** (1978). Two of the reports were based on site visits—the IACHR visited Chile in 1974 and Argentina in 1979. Today, all IACHR reports, past and present, are available—in English, Spanish, French, and Portuguese—on the organization’s Web site at www.cidh.oas.org.

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PARAGUAY (1954–1989). On 5 May 1954 General **Alfredo Stroessner** seized power in a **military** coup, ending years of political instability and initiating a personal dictatorship that lasted 35 years. With the support of the **Partido Colorado** (Red Party) and the military, he won eight rigged elections before being ousted by another general, Andrés Rodríguez. When Stroessner came to power, the country had been under a state of siege since 1947. Except for a few brief periods, he kept the state of siege in force until 1987, renewing it every 90 days. Thus for most of his rule, constitutional guarantees were almost continually suspended. In addition, in 1955 he buttressed the state of siege with the Law for the Defense of Democracy, which, though aimed at combating **communism**, illegalized any oppositional group or ideology. The result was that the police and the military had unlimited power, and arbitrary arrests, detentions, **torture**, **exile**, and disappearances were common. Stroessner’s regime was the prototype for other military dictatorships that sprouted up across South America—in **Brazil** (1964), **Bolivia** (1971), **Uruguay** (1973), **Chile** (1973), and **Argentina** (1976). Indeed, in 1975 all six countries became charter members of **Operation Condor**, a secret military network that tracked down one another’s political opponents. Stroessner’s Paraguay was also notorious for sheltering Nazis such as Josef Mengele, the “Angel of Death,” and for granting asylum to the former Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza Debayle.

BACKGROUND TO THE “DIRTY WAR”: In its Chaco Wars with Bolivia (1928–1930, 1932–1935), Paraguay emerged victorious but suffered heavy losses. Criticized for its handling of the war, the ruling **Partido Liberal** (Liberal Party) was ousted on 17 February 1936 by Colonel Rafael Franco in what has become known as the Febrerista (February) Revolution. Franco’s political party, the Febreristas—

officially known as the **Partido Revolucionario Febrerista** (PRF, February Revolutionary Party)—was a heterogeneous group from across the political spectrum, including socialism and nationalism. The Febrerista government, though short-lived, managed to introduce social reforms. It expropriated 200,000 hectares of land, distributing it to 10,000 peasant families; created ministries for agriculture, health, and labor; established a labor code, giving workers the right to strike and to bargain collectively; established an eight-hour workweek; and formed the *Confederación Paraguaya de Trabajadores* (CPT, Paraguayan Workers' Confederation).

In August 1937 Franco was overthrown in a counterrevolution led by Liberal military officers, and after a two-year interim government, the Liberals put forward as president Marshal José Félix Estigarribia, who had led the country to victory in the Chaco War. A nationalist and a reformer, Estigarribia was obstructed in his political agenda by a Liberal-dominated Congress. In 1940 he closed Congress, appointed younger party members (“New Liberals”) to his cabinet, and wrote a new constitution. Unlike the constitution of 1870, which was *laissez-faire*, the new one, taking effect in August 1940, was authoritarian. It concentrated power in the president, who would be advised by a Council of State. It also allowed for a unicameral legislature, though the president had enough power to rule as a virtual dictator. Estigarribia, however, would never fulfill his agenda—on 7 September 1940 he died in a mysterious plane crash.

Nationalist military officers installed General Higinio Morínigo, Estigarribia's war minister, as interim president. At first, Morínigo was regarded as easily controlled, and the traditional Liberals were poised for a return to power. But Morínigo soon dashed their hopes, establishing a nonparty military dictatorship. He banned the Liberal party, imprisoned or exiled his opponents, and suppressed trade unions. In addition, like other South American dictators during World War II, he supported the Axis. Still, his regime enjoyed popular support because of wartime prosperity.

After the Axis was defeated in 1945, the trend in Latin America was toward democracy, and Morínigo promised political liberalization. He fired pro-Axis military officers and, in 1946, sought political support from a coalition government composed of Febreristas and members of the *Partido Colorado*. He also scheduled congressional

elections for 1947 and proclaimed a general amnesty for exiles. The effort to establish democracy, however, would be undermined by political unrest. The Febreristas clashed with the Colorados, demanding a majority of cabinet seats in the new government. Meanwhile, the Liberals and the **Partido Comunista Paraguayo** (PCP, Paraguayan Communist Party), under the guise of preparing for the elections, were plotting to take power by force. On 12 January 1947 Morínigo dissolved the coalition government, replacing it with a government composed only of Colorados. The Colorados harassed the opposition, and the Febreristas, the Liberals, and the PCP went underground or fled the country.

On 7 March 1947, in an attempted coup, a small group of Febreristas attacked the police station in Asunción. The attack was repelled but ignited a civil war in which the Febreristas, led by Colonel Franco, were joined by Liberals, the PCP, and a majority of military officers. In August the Colorados crushed the rebellion, relying on peasant troops called the *py nandí* (Guaraní for “barefoot ones”) and on an artillery regiment led by Alfredo Stroessner. The Colorados had also received arms from General **Juan Perón**’s Argentina.

The Colorados, now in control of the government, were split into two factions. Federico Chávez, open to sharing power with other political groups, led the democráticos. Juan Natalicio González, who favored authoritarian rule, led the guionistas, having founded a band of storm troopers called the Guión Rojo (Red Banner). In November 1947, after the Guión Rojo disrupted the Partido Colorado convention, Natalicio González wrested the presidential nomination from Chávez, and in February 1948 he was elected president unopposed. Before he took office in August, however, Felipe Molas López, the leader of a guionista dissident faction, began plotting against him. In June, with the help of Colonel Stroessner and other officers, Molas López deposed Morínigo, Natalicio González’s ally, and in October, again with the help of Stroessner, tried to depose President Natalicio González himself. But this second coup failed, and Stroessner briefly went into exile in Brazil.

Natalicio González had only a weak hold on the presidency—the military had forced him to appoint supporters of Molas López to his cabinet. In January 1949 he was ousted in a bloodless coup. The new president, General Raimundo Rolón, was ousted a month later

by Molas López, who was supported by the democráticos as well as by Stroessner. In return for their support, President Molas López promoted Stroessner to brigadier general and appointed democráticos to his cabinet. Molas López then plotted to rid his government of the democráticos. But when the conspirators presented the plot to Stroessner, he leaked it to the democráticos, who, in September 1949, arrested the conspirators and forced Molas López to resign. Chávez, the democrático leader, became interim president. He rewarded Stroessner with a number of promotions, naming him, in 1951, commander in chief of the army.

Chávez served the remainder of the 1948–1952 presidential term and then, in 1952, was elected to a second term amid the military’s concerns about the state of the economy and about his age—he was 73. The military began plotting, at the center of which was Stroessner. Hearing rumors of a coup, Chávez strengthened the police force and put a loyal Colorado in charge of it. On 4 May 1954 he moved against Stroessner by ordering the arrest of one of the general’s supporters, an army major. Stroessner, declaring the action an insult to the military, demanded that Chávez resign and ordered the army to march on Asunción. The police put up stiff resistance—100 people died and buildings were destroyed—but Chávez resigned on 5 May, and Tomás Romero Pereira, a long-standing Colorado politician, became interim president. Real power, however, belonged to Stroessner, who on 11 July 1954 ran unopposed as the Colorado candidate. He was inaugurated on 15 August 1954.

THE “DIRTY WAR” AND THE DICTATORSHIP OF ALFREDO STROESSNER: At first, General Stroessner had only a tenuous hold on the presidency—he was young, 41, and politically inexperienced. But he moved against his opponents, citing the threat of communist subversion. Article 52 of the 1940 constitution allowed the president to declare a state of siege in times of “domestic disturbance or foreign conflict.” A state of siege had been in effect since 1947, but Stroessner bolstered it with the Law for the Defense of Democracy, which was passed by the Chamber of Deputies in October 1955. The law was intended to help the president fight communism. It curtailed the right of communists and their sympathizers to meet, distribute literature, and use the media. Communism, however, was so loosely defined that the law could be used against any party or ideology. Its

first use was against the Liberals, who in 1955 were rounded up and imprisoned. The Febreristas would fall victim a year later.

Stroessner then proceeded to take full control of the Partido Colorado. Molas López had died in exile in Buenos Aires, and Natalicio González, having returned from exile under an amnesty for Colorados, was made ambassador to Mexico. Stroessner's chief rival was now Epifanio Méndez Fleitas, a dissident, progressive *démocratico*, whose followers, the *epifanistas*, began plotting a coup set for December 1955. Méndez Fleitas enlisted the aid of Edgar Ynsfrán, the new leader of the *guionistas*. He found Ynsfrán a job in police intelligence, and Ynsfrán kept Stroessner and his followers under surveillance. Ynsfrán, however, suspecting that he would end up on the losing side, shifted his allegiance to Stroessner. Méndez Fleitas was now the one under surveillance. On 20 December 1955 Stroessner scotched the coup, removing disloyal military commanders and arresting dozens of conspirators. During the next four months, he purged *epifanistas* from the military and the party, and in May he had them arrested. Some, including Méndez Fleitas, were allowed to go into exile; the rest were imprisoned.

Stroessner's position, however, was still insecure. The economy, hit hard by the 1947 civil war, had worsened during the intervening years of political instability. In 1956, in return for emergency aid, Stroessner agreed to an austerity plan drawn up by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), a plan that drew complaints from the military and party leadership, the business and farming community, and the **trade unions**. But any discontent was squelched by Ynsfrán, the new minister of the interior. By the late 1950s, the Stroessner regime also had to contend with **guerrilla** groups—composed of young exiles—that had formed across the border and that made frequent forays into Paraguay. One group was the **Movimiento 14 de Mayo para la Libertad Paraguaya** (M-14, 14th of May Movement for Paraguayan Liberty), largely made up of Liberal militants; another was the **Vanguardia Febrerista** (February Vanguard). Stroessner responded by creating army *antiguerrilla* units and deploying the *py nandí*, the Colorado peasant troops. Most captured guerrillas were shot immediately; others, after being tortured.

Meanwhile, Ynsfrán and Colonel Ramón Duarte Vera, the police chief, arrested the friends and relatives of exiles. Torture was rou-

tine. The various methods included *el sargento* (the sergeant), or flogging a prisoner with a lead-tipped cat-o'-nine-tails; *la pilera* (the swimming pool), or plunging a prisoner's head in a tub of water—sometimes containing excrement—to the point of near suffocation; *el murciélagó* (the bat), or hanging a prisoner upside down by the ankles; *el cajón* (the crate), or confining a prisoner in a box for an extended period; and applying electric shocks to sensitive parts of the body. **Women** prisoners were often beaten and sexually abused. Those who died under torture were thrown into the Paraguay or Paraná River; Argentine and Uruguayan newspapers published photographs of bodies that had come ashore in Argentina.

At the end of the 1950s, Stroessner faced his last rival in the Partido Colorado—the democráticos. Amid nationwide complaints about the economy and the police-state climate, the democráticos and some military officers pressured Stroessner into changing his policies. On 1 April 1959 he announced the lifting of the state of siege. He promised to end censorship, release all political prisoners, investigate charges of torture by the police, and hold an election for a constitutional convention—an election that would be open to all parties. Opposition leaders returned from exile, but the democratic opening was short-lived. When student protests, encouraged by the opposition, turned violent, Stroessner reimposed the state of siege and closed the Chamber of Deputies. The police arrested the protesters and democráticos. By 4 June 1959, Paraguay had returned to a police state, and Stroessner had taken full control of the Partido Colorado.

In 1960 guerrilla operations became more frequent—not only by the M-14 and the Vanguardia Febrerista but also by the communist **Frente Unido por la Liberación Nacional** (United National Liberation Front, FULNA). The government increased the level of repression. Partly because of U.S. military aid, partly because of its growing experience, the army conducted more effective antiguerrilla operations, and by the end of the year, the guerrilla movement had been largely eliminated.

By the mid-1960s, the regime had sought to improve its image. Not only had peace been restored but also the IMF austerity measures had begun to take effect, and a strengthened economy—low inflation and a rise in production and exports—dampened criticism,

especially in the business and ranching communities. In addition, the regime could point to a legal, though token, opposition—exiles who had reached an agreement with Stroessner. In 1963 a group of Liberals calling themselves the Renovationists returned from exile and participated in that year's general elections. They were rewarded with seats in the Chamber of Deputies and with sole ownership of the name Partido Liberal (Liberal Party). They were followed by the Febreristas, legalized in 1964, and then by the traditional Liberals, legalized in 1967 as the Partido Liberal Radical (PLR, Radical Liberal Party). The PCP, however, never received an amnesty from Stroessner, and the **Movimiento Popular Colorado** (MOPOCO, Popular Colorado Movement), a party composed of exiled epifanistas and democráticos, would not be allowed back until 1984.

In 1967 Stroessner promulgated a new constitution. He was then in his third term as president, having been reelected unopposed in 1958 and then with token opposition in 1963—the defeated Liberal Party candidate, Ernesto Gavilán, was named ambassador to England. Although his third term was technically in violation of the 1940 constitution, which allowed presidents to serve only two terms, he argued that his first (1954–1958) was merely the completion of Chávez's second term. The 1967 constitution allowed him two more terms, and in February 1968 he was reelected with about 70 percent of the vote. The new constitution also reestablished a bicameral legislature—a Senate and a Chamber of Deputies—allotting two-thirds of the seats to the majority (Colorado) party and one-third to the opposition. He was reelected in 1973, and by 1977 he was up against the constitutional limit for reelection, so the Colorados revised the constitution to allow him unlimited terms. Running unopposed or against token opposition, he would be reelected by large margins, in 1978, 1983, and 1988. The last would set in motion events leading to his ouster.

In the late 1960s, Stroessner faced opposition from the Paraguayan **Catholic Church**, which, especially after the historic conference of Latin American bishops in Medellín, Colombia, in 1968, had committed the regional church to social justice. The Catholic University, a private, church-run institution, became a center of resistance, and Jesuit priests began organizing peasants and creating Christian Agrarian Leagues. The military and the police cracked down on the church's activities. Student demonstrations were violently repressed,

priests were arrested and exiled, and in 1969 the Jesuit-run newspaper, *Comunidad*, was closed. Tensions increased in 1970 when Ismael Rolón, a progressive, became the archbishop of Asunción. To signal his displeasure with the regime, Rolón started the practice of delivering his Christmas message at the cathedral rather than at the traditional site, the presidential palace. In addition, he gave up his right to sit on the state council, a right bestowed by the constitution. Stroessner responded by harassing priests. In February 1971, for example, the police tortured and deported a Uruguayan priest, Uberfil Monzón, alleging that he had connections with the **Tupamaro** guerrillas of Uruguay. When a Uruguayan bishop, Andrés Rubio García, flew to Paraguay to investigate, he was attacked at the airport by policewomen. Rolón, in turn, excommunicated the minister of the interior, Sabino Montanaro, and the chief of police, Francisco Brítez. It was their second excommunication—the first had been lifted.

The government's prime church targets were the Catholic University and the Christian Agrarian Leagues. The University's walls were filled with anti-Stroessner graffiti, banners, and posters, and the leagues, which had begun as communal settlements, were becoming more active—occupying churches and seizing private property. On 12 September 1972 the police broke up a protest meeting at the University, clubbing protesters and tearing down posters. In 1975 and 1976 the military and the *py nandí* destroyed the leagues, rounding up almost 3,000 peasants and holding them in concentration camps. The government then moved against the Jesuits, many of whom, accused of communist subversion, were expelled from the country. In April 1976 10 Jesuits were charged with supporting terrorism and expelled. They were alleged to have ties to the Organización Político Militar (OPM, Political Military Organization), an armed guerrilla group. That month, a shoot-out between the police and the OPM left five police and 30 guerrillas dead. The police then arrested more than 1,500 suspects.

When **Jimmy Carter** became U.S. president in 1977, the United States joined the Catholic Church in criticizing Stroessner, and in 1978 the U.S. State Department described Paraguay as one of the worst human-rights violators in the Western Hemisphere. Although Stroessner expressed disdain for the idea of human rights, calling it a “Trojan horse of international communism,” he gave in to the

criticism. He lifted the state of siege across the country except for Asunción, and over the next few years he released all but 20 of more than 1,000 political prisoners. The Carter administration also supported the creation, in February 1979, of the **Acuerdo Nacional** (National Accord), an agreement reached by four opposition parties: the Partido Liberal Radical Auténtico (PLRA, Authentic Radical Liberal Party), a left-wing splinter from the PLR; the Partido Demócrata Cristiano (PDC, Christian Democratic Party); the Febreristas; and MOPOCO. Only one of the parties, the Febreristas, had legal recognition. Among its demands, the Acuerdo called for an end to political violence, an amnesty for political prisoners, and the establishment of democratic rule.

On 17 September 1980 General Anastasio Somoza Debayle, the former Nicaraguan dictator who had been granted asylum by Stroessner, was gunned down in Asunción by Argentine guerrillas. Stroessner, doubting his own safety, restored the state of siege. After **Ronald Reagan** took over the U.S. presidency in January 1981, the United States softened its criticism of Paraguay's human-rights record, and Stroessner resumed his repression and torture of political opponents. Luis Alfonso Resck, the leader of the PDC, was expelled in June 1981. He was followed by Domingo Laíno, the leader of the PLRA, in December 1982.

By the early 1980s, the regime showed signs of weakening. Most of the legal opposition boycotted the 1983 presidential and legislative elections, allowing Stroessner to capture more than 90 percent of the votes. Even the Partido Colorado and the military, the regime's main supporters, began envisioning a Paraguay without Stroessner. The Colorados divided into the *militantes* (militants) and the *tradicionalistas* (traditionalists). The *militantes* wanted Stroessner's regime to continue, though with a new leader, such as Mario Abdo Benítez, Stroessner's private secretary (hence the alternative name for the *militantes*, the *marioabdistas*). The *tradicionalistas*, on the other hand, arguing that the party pre-dated Stroessner, pledged its allegiance not to Stroessner but to the party. Within the military, several names were floated as possible successors, including General Andrés Rodríguez, commander of the First Cavalry Division. The business community, another formerly staunch supporter of the regime, became restless, too. The economic boom of the 1970s had faded, and

the Federation of Production, Industry, and Commerce (FEPRINCO) published reports, in 1981 and 1984, criticizing the government's economic policies.

Beginning in the mid-1980s, opposition to the regime gathered momentum. The regime had little international support. Its neighbors Argentina and Brazil had returned to civilian rule, and the Reagan administration, during its second term (1985–1989), relaxed its support and urged Stroessner to move toward democracy. In January 1984, under international pressure, Stroessner finally allowed the leaders of MOPOCO to return from exile. The following month they joined other members of the Acuerdo Nacional in a protest in downtown Asunción, an event that drew 2,000 people. The Acuerdo, now united, staged a prodemocracy rally on 14 May 1985, and then teamed up with the Catholic Church in a call for political liberalization. Social groups began to mobilize, as well. Peasants demanded more land for subsistence agriculture; trade unionists and university students created organizations that paralleled the government-approved ones.

Despite the internal and international pressure for political liberalization, Stroessner ran for reelection in February 1988 and claimed 89 percent of the vote, though opposition members denounced the election as a fraud. On 3 February 1989 he was ousted in a coup led by his second in command, General Andrés Rodríguez.

AFTERMATH OF THE “DIRTY WAR”: After his ouster, Stroessner went into exile in Brazil. Although the Paraguayan courts wanted to try him on charges of homicide—Brazil and Paraguay had an extradition treaty—the new government never brought him to justice or established a truth commission. Nevertheless, the truth began to emerge. In 1991 the Centro de Estudios Paraguayos “Antonio Guasch” (CEPAG), a nongovernmental organization, published *El precio de la paz* (The Cost of Peace), edited by José María Blanch. It documented Stroessner's violations of **human rights**. In 1992 **Martín Almada**, a Paraguayan educator and torture victim, discovered what has become known as the Archives of Terror, a collection of documents that detailed the workings of Operation Condor. Stroessner never left Brazil out of fear of being arrested, and on 15 August 2006, he died in a hospital in its capital, Brasília.

PARTIDO COLORADO / RED PARTY. One of the two dominant political parties of **Paraguay**—the other is the **Partido Liberal** (Liberal Party). Along with the **military**, the Partido Colorado was a pillar of support for the dictatorship of General **Alfredo Stroessner**, who ruled Paraguay from 1954 to 1989.

Officially known as the Asociación Nacional Republicana (National Republican Association), the Partido Colorado was founded in 1887 by General Bernardino Caballero. Its roots, however, go back to the period following the War of the Triple Alliance (1865–1870), in which Paraguay, led by the dictator Francisco Solano López, was handed a humiliating defeat by the allied armies of **Argentina**, **Brazil**, and **Uruguay**. The war left Paraguay devastated, and two political clubs emerged, each blaming the other for the devastation. The forerunner of the Partido Colorado was the Club del Pueblo (People's Club), also known as the Colorados (Reds) because of the red neckties and ponchos worn by its supporters. Its rival was the Gran Club (Great Club), also known as the Azules (Blues). The Gran Club would evolve into the Partido Liberal—liberal in the sense of *laissez-faire*.

The Colorados evoked the memory of Solano López, who had died in battle. They took pride in knowing that General Caballero had fought alongside him. The Liberals, in contrast, had spent the Solano López years in **exile**, considered Solano López a tyrant, and fought against him in the war. The Colorados labeled the Liberals unpatriotic; the Liberals labeled the Colorados ultraconservative. But despite their differing opinions of Solano López, the two parties largely pursued the same conservative policies. Membership in a party or party faction was based not on loyalty to an ideology but on loyalty to a *patrón*, or protector, who would maneuver himself into power and reward his supporters with a share of the spoils.

The Partido Colorado first gained the presidency in 1878 and controlled it until 1904, when the Liberals came to power in a revolution. The Colorados began to climb back into power in 1946 after General Higinio Morínigo, who had ruled as a nonparty dictator since 1940, established a coalition government composed of Colorados and members of the **Partido Revolucionario Febrerista** (PRF, February Revolutionary Party). In January 1947 Morínigo disbanded the coalition government and formed a new government

supported only by the **military** and the Colorados. He imposed a state of siege—which, except for brief periods, would remain in effect for 40 years—and drove the Liberals and the Febreristas into exile. His actions provoked a civil war that lasted from March to August 1947, a war that pitted the Febreristas, the Liberals, and the **Partido Comunista Paraguayo** (PCP, Paraguayan Communist Party) against Morínigo. Morínigo prevailed, relying heavily on the Colorados and their peasant militia, the *py nandí* (Guaraní for “barefoot ones”).

The Colorados emerged from the 1947 civil war in full control of the government. By then, the Colorados had split into two factions. The democráticos, led by Federico Chávez, were willing to work with other parties; the guionistas, led by Juan Natalicio González, opposed any collaboration. Indeed, Natalicio González had formed a band of storm troopers, the *Guión Rojo* (Red Banner), to help him seize power. In November 1947 he used the *Guión Rojo* to disrupt the Partido Colorado convention and then forced the party to nominate him for president. He won the February 1948 election unopposed but was overthrown in January 1949. A series of coups followed, and Alfredo Stroessner, an army officer who had helped the Colorados win the 1947 civil war, was involved in all of them. After ousting Federico Chávez on 5 May 1954, Stroessner won the presidency on 11 May 1954, running unopposed as the Colorado candidate.

Stroessner gradually shaped the Partido Colorado to his will, purging it of all rivals, including the democráticos. Stroessner was the supreme party *patrón*, and remained so for 35 years, rewarding his supporters in the party and the military with spoils from the country’s thriving business in contraband. Although, beginning in the early 1960s, Liberals and Febreristas were tolerated as a loyal opposition and allowed to participate in elections, the Colorados remained the dominant party and were assured of the vast majority of legislative seats. Moreover, only Colorados could be civil servants. After Stroessner was overthrown on 3 February 1989 by General Andrés Rodríguez, Colorado dominance—as well as corruption—continued. On 20 April 2008 Fernando Lugo, a former bishop and a non-Colorado, was elected president, ending 62 years of the Colorados’ hold on the presidency.

PARTIDO COMUNISTA BRASILEIRO (PCB) / BRAZILIAN COMMUNIST PARTY. The PCB was founded in 1922, inspired by the 1917 Russian Revolution. By the late 1950s, however, following the ideas of Nikita Khrushchev, it had adopted a peaceful strategy for achieving socialism. Seeing national capitalism as a preliminary stage, it sought to unite workers, peasants, and the middle class in opposition to the wealthy landowners. Until 1985, it would spend all but brief periods of its existence as an illegal party. Its original name, the Partido Comunista do Brasil (Communist Party of **Brazil**), led it open to charges that it was a tool of international **communism**, so in 1961 it took the name PCB to emphasize that it's a Brazilian organization. In 1962, some PCB leaders, impatient with the peaceful strategy, broke away and formed a party using the original name, the **Partido Comunista do Brasil** (PC do B, Communist Party of Brazil).

After the 1964 **military** coup that toppled the left-leaning government of **João Goulart**, the PCB suffered in the first wave of repression, Operação Limpeza (Operation Cleanup), when thousands of the regime's perceived enemies were arrested, many of them **tortured**. By the late 1960s, when armed **guerrilla** groups appeared in Brazil—inspired by the Cuban Revolution of 1959 and Che Guevara's efforts in **Bolivia**—the PCB considered but then rejected the idea of armed struggle. Instead, it opted to work with the legal opposition party, the **Movimento Democrático Brasileiro** (MDB, Brazilian Democratic Movement). This decision helped it survive the most repressive years of the dictatorship (1969–1974), which largely targeted the armed opposition. The PCB was, however, hit by repression in the years 1974–1976, when **death squads** were still operating and looking for suspected subversives. The two famous victims during this period—the journalist Vladimir Herzog and the **trade-union** activist Manoel Fiel Filho—were accused of having ties to the PCB. Both were tortured to death in São Paulo, their murders provoking demonstrations and strengthening the opposition.

The PCB became legal in May 1985, in legislation passed by the civilian government of President José Sarney. But by then the dominant labor party was the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT, Workers' Party), created by Luíz Inácio da Silva, or "Lula." *See also* AÇÃO LIBERTADORA NACIONAL; MARIGHELLA, CARLOS.

PARTIDO COMUNISTA DE CHILE (PC) / COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHILE. Founded in 1922, the PC established a strong electoral base among the working classes. Though the party was subject to repression—it was banned from 1948 to 1952—it had by the 1970s grown to 250,000 members, becoming the largest **communist** party in Latin America. The PC exerted a moderating influence on the **Unidad Popular** (UP, Popular Unity) coalition of President **Salvador Allende Gossens** and was committed to achieving revolution through peaceful means. After Allende Gossens was deposed in the 1973 coup led by General **Augusto Pinochet Ugarte**, the party debated the reasons for the fall of the UP government. At first it blamed the militant stance of the **Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria** (MIR, Movement of the Revolutionary Left) and the **Partido Socialista de Chile** (PS, Socialist Party of Chile) for the UP's loss of mainstream support. In 1977, however, it blamed the Allende government itself for not defending itself militarily—a charge leveled by radical leftists and the Soviet Union. Yet the party continued its policy of nonviolence in the belief that the government of Pinochet Ugarte would fall on its own.

That policy would soon change. As senior party leaders were arrested, they were replaced by a younger generation committed to removing Pinochet Ugarte by force. In 1980 the party announced a strategy of popular protest that did not exclude violence. Some members resisted the shift and resigned in protest, but others fell in line, emboldened by the fall of the Shah of Iran and the success of the leftist revolution in Nicaragua, both in 1979. The hard-liners were now in command, and in 1983 the party gave rise to the **Frente Patriótico Manuel Rodríguez** (FPMR, Manuel Rodríguez Patriotic Front), an urban **guerrilla** organization. Still, the party recognized the need for a broad alliance and reached out to other opponents of the regime. But its refusal to rule out violence alienated many in the **Alianza Democrática** (AD, Democratic Alliance), a multiparty coalition formed in 1983 to seek a negotiated return to democracy. Excluded from the AD, the PC formed the **Movimiento Democrático Popular** (MDP, Popular Democratic Movement), a militant left-wing coalition.

PARTIDO COMUNISTA DO BRASIL (PC DO B) / COMMUNIST PARTY OF BRAZIL. The PC do B was founded in 1962 as a splinter organization of the **Partido Comunista Brasileiro** (PCB,

Brazilian Communist Party). The founders, objecting to the peaceful strategy of the Moscow-line PCB, adopted the ideas of the Chinese revolutionary Mao Tse-tung. In 1966, it took up arms against the **military** dictatorship, but unlike other **Brazilian guerrilla** movements, which were largely urban, the PC do B thought peasant participation crucial to success and opened a rural front. It selected a site in the Araguaia River region, a tropical rain forest in the northern state of Pará. There, 69 guerrillas settled, working with the peasants and gaining their trust.

In 1972, the guerrillas were discovered by military intelligence. Besieged by army troops untrained in counterinsurgency, the guerrillas, now calling themselves the Araguaia Guerrilla Forces, won the early battles. The army withdrew, returning with counterinsurgency teams, which waged a “**dirty war**” against both the militants and the peasants. Although the teams were well equipped—they had an airport, a heliport, five barracks, and an interrogation center—it wasn’t until 1975 that the last of the militants had been eliminated.

The 69 militants were among the missing (*desaparecidos*) until April 1996, when *O Globo*, a Rio de Janeiro newspaper, published photos—leaked from a military archive—of the slain guerrillas. Information accompanying the photos described the deaths and disclosed the sites of mass graves, where 25 bodies were later exhumed by government forensic teams.

PARTIDO COMUNISTA PARAGUAYO (PCP) / PARAGUAYAN COMMUNIST PARTY. One of the political parties that opposed the dictatorship of General **Alfredo Stroessner**, who ruled **Paraguay** from 1954 to 1989. Founded in 1928, the PCP is a Stalinist party active with **trade unions**. Except for brief periods (1946–1947, for example), it has been illegal for much of its existence. During the 1947 civil war, the PCP joined militants from the **Partido Liberal** (Liberal Party) and the **Partido Revolucionario Febrerista** (PRF, February Revolutionary Party) in an attempt to oust the dictator Higinio Morínigo. After the attempt failed, all three parties were **exiled**. Unlike the Liberals and the Febreristas, however, which were later granted amnesty by Stroessner and allowed to participate in politics as the loyal opposition, the PCP remained illegal until Stroessner’s fall in 1989. Although it was never a large party—it had about 3,000

members during the Stroessner years—its members were targets of Stroessner’s “**dirty war.**” One of its leaders, Miguel A. Soler, was arrested in 1977 in Asunción, Paraguay. Another, Antonio Maidana, was arrested in 1980 in **Argentina.** Both remain among the missing (*desaparecidos*).

PARTIDO DEMÓCRATA CRISTIANO (CHILE) (PDC) / CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY. A centrist political party in **Chile.** Founded in 1957 from the merger of the National Falange and the Social Christian Conservative Party, the PDC has taken a position between the conservative capitalism of the Chilean right and the social collectivism of the Chilean left. By 1970 it had greatly expanded its membership, attracting a majority of the middle class, professionals, and, in the 1960s, voters from the Partido Radical (Radical Party).

The PDC reform government of President **Eduardo Frei Montalva** initiated social policies that benefited many Chileans, especially the middle class and professionals. The PDC, however, did not anticipate the strength of the **Unidad Popular** (UP, Popular Unity) coalition, which in 1970 helped elect the Marxist president **Salvador Allende Gossens.** The result was a bitter, interparty rivalry that continued over the next three years, the PDC using its majority in the Congreso Nacional (National Congress) to bring legislative pressure on Allende Gossens. During the 1973 congressional election campaigns, the PDC formed a coalition with the Partido Nacional (National Party), a major political organization on the right, and other, smaller opposition parties, creating the Confederación Democrática (CODE, Democratic Confederation). The main objective of CODE was to win enough congressional seats to impeach Allende Gossens or at least block his socialist agenda. The resulting impasse between the executive and legislative branches of government paralyzed the UP in the face of fiscal chaos and civil disorder. Several high-placed PDC officials openly called for **military** intervention to depose the government. When the armed forces rebelled on 11 September 1973, the PDC did not intervene, hoping to fill a leadership role once order was restored. When it became clear, however, that a primary objective of the military regime of General **Augusto Pinochet Ugarte** was to subvert all political parties, the PDC took a lead role in opposing the dictatorship.

PARTIDO DEMÓCRATA CRISTIANO (PARAGUAY) (PDC) / CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY. One of five political parties that opposed the dictatorship of General **Alfredo Stroessner** in **Paraguay**. The PDC was formed in the early 1960s. Despite its name, it has no formal connection with the **Catholic Church**, though many of its members—middle-class intellectuals on the faculty of the Catholic University—adhere to the Church's social teachings. The PDC never gained legal recognition under the dictatorship—Stroessner challenged the party's claim that it had gained the requisite 10,000 signatures. Therefore, unlike the **Partido Liberal** (Liberal Party) and the **Partido Revolucionario Febrerista** (PRF, February Revolutionary Party), legally recognized members of the loyal opposition, the PDC could not participate in elections or gain congressional seats. In 1979 it joined the newly formed **Acuerdo Nacional**, a united front against Stroessner. *See also* MOVIMIENTO POPULAR COLORADO (MOPOCO); PARTIDO COMUNISTA PARAGUAYO (PCP).

PARTIDO DEMOCRÁTICO SOCIAL (PDS) / SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY. *See* ALIANÇA RENOVADORA NACIONAL (ARENA).

PARTIDO DO MOVIMENTO DEMOCRÁTICO BRASILEIRO (PMDB) / PARTY OF THE BRAZILIAN DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT. *See* MOVIMENTO DEMOCRÁTICO BRASILEIRO (MDB).

PARTIDO JUSTICIALISTA (PJ). The official name of the **Peronist** party. *See also* PERÓN, JUAN; PERONISM.

PARTIDO LIBERAL / LIBERAL PARTY. One of the two dominant political parties of **Paraguay**—the other is the **Partido Colorado** (Red Party). Beginning in the 1960s, the Partido Liberal formed part of the loyal opposition to the dictatorship of General **Alfredo Stroessner**, who ruled from 1954 to 1989.

The party was founded in 1887 as the Centro Democrático (Democratic Center), though it would adopt the name Partido Liberal in 1893—liberal in the sense of *laissez faire*. Its roots, however, go back

to the period following the War of the Triple Alliance (1865–1870), in which Paraguay, led by the dictator Francisco Solano López, fought the allied armies of **Argentina**, **Brazil**, and **Uruguay**. Solano López died in battle, Paraguay was soundly defeated, and political clubs emerged to compete in a new political environment. The forerunner of the Partido Liberal—the Gran Club (Great Club), also known as the Azules (Blues)—was founded by Paraguayan **exiles** who had been living in **Argentina** during the dictatorship and who had fought alongside the allies. Their rival, the Club del Pueblo (People’s Club), would evolve into the Partido Colorado. The parties differed largely in their attitude toward Solano López—the Liberals considered him a tyrant; the Colorados considered him a hero. Beyond that, little separated them. Both were conservative, and membership in a party or party faction was based not so much on ideology as on loyalty to a strongman, or caudillo, who would maneuver himself or his friends into power.

Liberal administrations dominated the immediate postwar period, but the Colorados took control in 1878. The Liberals made a political comeback in 1904, coming to power in a revolution. Their downfall would be the Chaco Wars (1928–1930, 1932–1935) with **Bolivia**. Although Paraguay was victorious, the Liberals were criticized for their handling of the war, and discontent grew rampant within the **military**. When General Higinio Morínigo became president in 1940, he removed the Liberals from his government and sent their leaders into exile. In 1947, after the Colorados had eased themselves into the Morínigo administration, the Liberals joined two other exiled parties—the **Partido Revolucionario Febrerista** (PRF, February Revolutionary Party) and the **Partido Comunista Paraguayo** (PCP, Paraguayan Communist Party)—in a rebellion against Morínigo. The Colorados helped him crush the rebels and then took power for themselves, power they would retain until 2008, when Fernando Lugo, neither a Colorado nor a Liberal, was elected president.

When Alfredo Stroessner established his dictatorship in 1954, supported by the Colorados and the military, the Liberals, like other Colorado opponents, were imprisoned or exiled. By the late 1950s, young militant exiles had formed **guerrilla** organizations, initiating armed struggle against Stroessner along the border with Argentina and Brazil. Liberals, for example, had formed the **Movimiento 14**

de Mayo para la Libertad Paraguaya (M-14, 14th of May Movement for Paraguayan Liberty). But the M-14 and their counterparts from other parties were quickly eliminated by the military, and by the early 1960s, some groups of exiles sought accommodation with Stroessner. In 1963 the Renovationists, a Liberal splinter group led by Carlos and Fernando Levi Ruffinelli, were allowed to return and to participate in elections as a loyal opposition. They were rewarded with seats in Congress and with sole ownership of the name Partido Liberal. They even provided a token presidential candidate, Ernesto Gavilán, to run against Stroessner. After losing, Gavilán was named ambassador to England.

Although the Renovationists were regarded as traitors, other exiled groups joined the loyal opposition as well. The Febreristas were legalized in 1964. The traditional Liberals followed in 1967, legalized as the Partido Liberal Radical (PLR, Radical Liberal Party).

In February 1977 left-wing PLR members formed the Partido Liberal Radical Auténtico (PLRA, Authentic Radical Liberal Party), which, unlike the PLR, fell outside the loyal opposition. In 1979 the PLRA and three other parties formed the **Acuerdo Nacional** (National Accord), calling for democratic rule. The leader of the PLRA, Domingo Laíno, lived in forced exile from 1982 to 1987. During that period, he made five unsuccessful attempts to reenter the country; each time he was violently turned away. On his fifth attempt, on 24 June 1986, he was accompanied by Robert White, the ambassador to Paraguay during the administration of President **Jimmy Carter** (1977–1981), and by Roberto Asianin, a Uruguayan legislator. Police beat all three with truncheons.

PARTIDO LIBERAL RADICAL (PLR) / RADICAL LIBERAL PARTY. *See* PARTIDO LIBERAL.

PARTIDO LIBERAL RADICAL AUTÉNTICO (PLRA) / AUTHENTIC RADICAL LIBERAL PARTY. *See* PARTIDO LIBERAL.

PARTIDO REVOLUCIONARIO FEBRERISTA (PRF) / FEBRUARY REVOLUTIONARY PARTY. A social-democratic political party in **Paraguay**. Beginning in 1964, it formed part of the loyal

opposition to the dictatorship of **Alfredo Stroessner**, who ruled from 1954 to 1989.

The Febreristas were founded by Colonel Rafael Franco after he came to power in the 1936 February Revolution, in which he overthrew a government controlled by the **Partido Liberal** (Liberal Party). A heterogeneous mix of anti-Liberals from across the political spectrum, including socialists and nationalists, the Febreristas managed to bring about a few social reforms before being ousted in a counterrevolution in August 1937. In the 1940s the Febreristas built support among students and **trade unionists**, hoping to rival the two dominant political parties in Paraguay—the Partido Liberal and the **Partido Colorado** (Red Party). Indeed, in 1946 a coalition government, formed by the dictator Higinio Morínigo, consisted of Colorados and Febreristas. The coalition, however, dissolved a year later after the two parties quarreled over cabinet seats, and the Colorados forced the Febreristas into **exile**. In March 1947 the Febreristas joined forces with two other exiled parties—the Partido Liberal and the **Partido Comunista Paraguayo** (PCP, Paraguayan Communist Party)—in a rebellion against Morínigo and the Colorados, but by August the Colorados had crushed the rebellion, and the Febreristas returned to exile.

When Stroessner came to power, supported by the Colorados and the **military**, he repressed all opposition, and the Febreristas went into exile once again. In the late 1950s, young exiles from the opposition parties tried to overthrow Stroessner through armed insurrection, forming **guerrilla** groups that attacked Paraguayan outposts from across the border with **Argentina** and **Brazil**. Febrerista guerrillas formed the **Vanguardia Febrerista**, which, like its counterparts from the other parties, was quickly crushed by the military. By the early 1960s, the guerrilla option having failed miserably, the Febreristas and the Liberals reached an agreement with Stroessner—they would be allowed to return home and participate in elections as the loyal opposition. Together, the opposition parties would be allotted one-third of the seats in Congress, each party's number depending on the received vote. The ruling party, the Colorados, would be allotted two-thirds. The Febreristas returned in 1964, but after so many years in exile, they lacked a strong political base and did poorly in elections. Weakened by infighting, the party fell under the control

of student radicals, who ousted the older, less-extreme socialists. In 1973 the party stopped participating in elections against Stroessner.

PARTIDO SOCIALISTA DE CHILE (PS) / SOCIALIST PARTY OF CHILE. Founded in 1933, the PS provided an option for leftists opposed to the strong Soviet influence over the **Partido Comunista de Chile** (PC, Communist Party of Chile). The PS was divided from the beginning. Some members were committed to taking power through peaceful means; others called for armed struggle. After the Cuban Revolution, the party drifted to the left, and in 1967 it proclaimed itself Marxist-Leninist. Yet divisions persisted into the years of the **Unidad Popular** (UP, Popular Unity) government of President **Salvador Allende Gossens** (1970–1973). Carlos Altamirano, the party secretary-general, advocated mass rebellion; **Clodomiro Almeyda Medina**, a socialist and high official in the UP government, urged moderation. After the 1973 **military** coup, the party, owing to its reputation for militancy, became a target of the **Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional** (DINA, Directorate of National Intelligence), the secret police.

As PS leaders disappeared or were **exiled**, the party broke into more than a dozen factions. Altamirano and Almeyda Medina, both in exile in East Germany, competed for control of the party, and, by the late 1970s, had pulled it in opposite directions. Altamirano, rejecting his earlier militancy, now renounced violence and favored social democracy. Almeyda Medina, in contrast, moved from reformism to militancy. The Altamirano camp—later under the leadership of Carlos Briones, interior minister in the UP government—aligned itself with the mainstream coalition Alianza Democrática (AD, Democratic Alliance); the Almeyda Medina camp, under the Marxist-Leninist banner, aligned itself with the leftist coalition Movimiento Democrático Popular (MDP, Popular Democratic Movement). By 1988 the Almeydistas moved to the center, joining in the “no” vote against eight more years of rule by **Augusto Pinochet Ugarte**.

PASTOR DE BONAFINI, HEBÉ. *See* MADRES DE PLAZA DE MAYO.

PATRIA Y LIBERTAD. *See* DEATH SQUADS.

PAVLOVSKY, EDUARDO (1933–). Known familiarly as “Tato,” Pavlovsky is an **Argentine** playwright, writer, and psychoanalyst. He is also a stage and film actor. His play *Tercero incluido* (translated in 1997 as *Third Person Included*) was one of the works presented in 1981 as part of the first cycle of **Teatro Abierto Argentino** (Open Theater of Argentina), a cultural venture that represents perhaps the best example of **cultural resistance** to the **military** dictatorship in Argentina.

Pavlovsky was born in Buenos Aires into a family that would produce at least two generations of prominent physicians. His grandfather, Alejandro (c. 1865–1934), emigrated from then-Russian Rostov (Ukraine) to Argentina, where he became a noted writer, journalist, and, for a time, director of the Buenos Aires Zoo.

In 1957 Pavlovsky began his training in psychoanalysis in Buenos Aires. He also trained in psychodrama in New York. He soon focused on the treatment of children and adolescents. In 1968 he would publish *Psicoterapia de grupo de niños y adolescentes* (Group Psychotherapy for Children and Adolescents), the first work of its kind to be published in Spanish in Argentina. A prolific writer and theoretician, he has published over 15 works on the theme of psychodrama and theater-as-therapy.

An amateur actor from early on, Pavlovsky has spoken about the impact that Samuel Beckett’s *Waiting for Godot* had on his development as a playwright. He formed the Yenesí Theater Group (1960–1966), noted for introducing works by Beckett, Eugene Ionesco, and Harold Pinter to Argentine audiences, as well as for staging works by Fernando Arrabal, Anton Chekhov, **Griselda Gambaro**, Luigi Pirandello, and Sean O’Casey.

His work debuted on the Argentine stage in 1962. He would achieve first international recognition with the publication of *La mueca* (The Grimace) in 1970 in Havana, Cuba. His best-known work, *El señor Galíndez* (Mr. Galíndez), premiered in 1973. *El señor Galíndez* along with the 1977 work *Telarañas* (Cobwebs) would earn Pavlovsky the censure of the military junta. In 1978, after a failed kidnapping attempt, he went into **exile** in Spain, where he remained two years.

The dramatic exploration of the psychology of **torture** features prominently in his work as a playwright. One early critic said of his

work, “Pavlovsky no es un escritor que escribe ‘para’ el teatro, sino un psiquiatra que hace teatro” (Pavlovsky is not a writer who writes “for” the theater, but a psychiatrist who does theater). His belief that many torturers share a commonplace mentality toward their activities—a mentality that led Hannah Arendt to coin her well-known phrase, “the banality of evil”—has earned him the censure of those who insist in depicting torturers as monstrous exceptions to the human condition, peculiar only to regimes to the right of the political spectrum.

Repeatedly, in plays such as *El señor Galíndez*, *El señor Laforgue* (Mr. Laforgue, 1982), *Potestad* (Paternal Authority, 1985), and *La muerte de Margarita Duras* (The Death of Margarita Duras, 2001), Pavlovsky has explored the theme of torture while presenting recognizable characters to his audiences. *El señor Galíndez*, for example, depicts two sadomasochistic torturers who are joined by a third man who has been identified by the author as a stand-in for **Alfredo Astiz**. Unlike his two colleagues, this third man appears to have made a cool study of the applications of torture and is not compelled by psychological urges. Similarly, in *El señor Laforgue*—set, according to the author, in Duvalier’s Haiti to deflect the attention of a military junta that employed similar methods to deal with the disappearance of prisoners—another seemingly normal man participates in the *vuelos de la muerte* (death flights), drugging prisoners and pushing them to their death over the Atlantic Ocean. This is a clear reference to the actions of Lieutenant Commander **Francisco Scilingo** as detailed to **Horacio Verbitsky** in his book *El vuelo* (*The Flight: Confessions of an Argentine Dirty Warrior*).

In addition to his work as a playwright and psychoanalyst, Pavlovsky has earned acclaim in his native Argentina and abroad as a screen actor. He has acted in several of the best-known movies of the postdictatorship period, such as *Cuarteles de invierno* (*Winter Barracks*, directed by Lautaro Murúa, 1983); *Tangos: el exilio de Gardel* (*Gardel’s Exile*, directed by Fernando Solanas, 1984); *Los chicos de la guerra* (*The Boys of War*, directed by Bebe Kamín, 1984); and *Miss Mary* (directed by María Luisa Bemberg, 1986). He has also acted in two versions of his own work, *La nube* (*The Cloud*, adapted for the screen by the author from his play *Rojos lobos rojos*, directed by Fernando Solanas, 1998) and *Potestad* (directed by Luís

César D'Angelillo, 2001). His work in the former won him the Best Actor Award at the Festival de Cine y Cultura de América Latina in Biarritz, France.

Pavlovsky is a frequent contributor to international theater festivals—*Potestad* has been staged in over 40 festivals. His plays are popular with theatergoing audiences and critics in Latin America, the United States, and Europe. He is the recipient of numerous awards at home and abroad. Eduardo Pavlovsky lives in Buenos Aires, Argentina.

PEACE AND JUSTICE SERVICE. *See* SERVICIO PAZ Y JUSTICIA (SERPAJ).

PEOPLE'S GUERRILLA ARMY. *See* EJÉRCITO GUERRILLERO DEL PUEBLO (EGP).

PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY. *See* EJÉRCITO REVOLUCIONARIO DEL PUEBLO (ERP).

PÉREZ ESQUIVEL, ADOLFO (1931–). Argentine sculptor, architect, and **human-rights** advocate. Pérez Esquivel was born in Buenos Aires and educated at the National School of Fine Arts of Buenos Aires and La Plata. In the 1950s he taught architecture at the Manuel Belgrano National School of Fine Arts. He also produced works of art, and his sculptures were widely exhibited throughout **Argentina**. In 1971 he joined with liberal **Catholic** clergy and laypersons to found **Servicio Paz y Justicia** (SERPAJ, Peace and Justice Service), an organization that advocated nonviolent social reform. SERPAJ had chapters across Latin America, and in 1974 he became its general coordinator. After the **military** dictatorship in Argentina in 1976, he continued his activism, speaking out against the disappearances. He was imprisoned from April 1977 to May 1978. After his release, he remained under house arrest until 1980. In 1979 he gave testimony to the visiting Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the investigating arm of the **Organization of American States**, whose report on Argentina appeared in 1980. For his nonviolent struggle Pérez Esquivel was awarded the 1980 Nobel Peace Prize. *See also* **DESAPARECIDOS**.

PERI ROSSI, CRISTINA (1941–). Uruguayan journalist, poet, and novelist. Born in Montevideo, **Uruguay**, Peri Rossi began her professional life as a middle-school teacher and journalist. She later published several collections of poetry and short stories while in her twenties. She collaborated in the weekly *Marcha*, closed by the **military** in 1970. In 1972, as a member of a coalition of left-wing parties in Montevideo, she was forced into **exile** in Spain, where she still resides. She has been the recipient of several honors, among them the 1992 Ciudad de Barcelona award for *Bábel bárbara*, judged the best volume of poetry published in Spanish in 1991.

A prolific writer of over 18 collections of short stories and poetry, as well as novels, Peri Rossi used symbolism and allegory to explore the repression in Uruguay through such works as *Ship of Fools* (1984), perhaps her best-known novel. In it she examines the fragility of the human psyche and offers a feminist critique of patriarchal society. In works that combine the fantastic, the erotic, and the political, Peri Rossi's narrative suggests the possibility that an escape from the rational might be in itself an escape toward individual freedom.

PERMANENT ASSEMBLY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS. *See* ASAMBLEA PERMANENTE POR LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS (APDH).

PERMANENT ASSEMBLY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN BOLIVIA. *See* ASAMBLEA PERMANENTE DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS DE BOLIVIA (APDHB).

PERÓN, EVA DUARTE DE (“EVITA”) (1919–1952). Charismatic **Argentine** political leader and the cofounder of **Peronism**. Evita was born on 7 May 1919 as María Eva Duarte. Her father died when she was seven, and she grew up in poverty. Leaving home at 15, she went to Buenos Aires and found work in radio soap opera and the movies. She soon had her own radio show. At 25 she met **Juan Perón**, a young colonel who, like her, had great ambition. She advised him, in his position as the secretary of labor and welfare, to build a political following among urban workers and **trade unionists**, a relationship that would become the foundation of Peronism. When Perón was jailed by political rivals in October 1945, Evita rallied his supporters

and helped set him free. Evita and Perón were soon married, and they campaigned together for the presidency the following year. As the president's wife and political partner, she established the *Fundación de Ayuda Social María Eva Duarte de Perón* (Eva Perón Social Aid Foundation), a welfare fund. She lobbied for **women's** suffrage, which became a reality in 1947. After the constitution was modified (at Perón's request) to allow presidents to succeed themselves, Peronists made an effort to put Evita on the ballot as a vice-presidential candidate. She had become sick, however, and after Perón was re-elected in 1951, Evita Perón died of cancer, on 26 July 1952.

Although the ruling classes despised Evita, the workers venerated her. Indeed, many campaigned to have her canonized as a saint. So strongly did she symbolize Peronism that, following the coup that ousted Perón in 1955, her body disappeared. It was later discovered in Italy and was returned to Argentina in 1975. Her memory inspired the **Montoneros** and other Peronist **guerrillas**, who saw her as an example of the revolutionary potential within the movement. Today, the memory of Evita continues to evoke great passions.

PERÓN, ISABEL (“ISABELITA”) (1931–). President of **Argentina** (1974–1976) and the first woman president of any country. Born María Estela Martínez Cartas on 4 February 1931 in La Rioja, a provincial capital in northwest Argentina. Her family moved to Buenos Aires when she was very young. She quit school after the sixth grade and studied piano, ballet, and French. She also developed a passion for romantic Spanish poetry. In 1952 she set off on a career as a dancer, taking Isabel as her professional name. Three years later, working as a nightclub dancer in Panama City, Panama, Isabel met **Juan Perón**, who had been overthrown as president of Argentina only a few months before and was now in **exile**. Soon she became his personal secretary and live-in companion, moving with him from country to country before they settled, in 1960, in Madrid. They were married in 1961. From Madrid Perón directed his Peronist movement and plotted his return from exile. Isabel became his envoy and made several trips to Argentina, where she attended rallies, endorsed candidates, and entered talks with the administration of President Alejandro Lanusse. She accompanied her husband on a monthlong visit to Argentina in November 1972—legal restrictions against him being temporarily

waived—and then returned permanently with him in June 1973 after the restoration of civilian government. The new president, **Héctor José Cámpora**, Perón's stand-in during the recent elections, resigned in July at Perón's behest. New elections were called, and there was little doubt that Perón would be the winning candidate. The only question was whom he would select as his running mate—an important matter considering his advanced age (77) and his poor health.

To everyone's surprise he named Isabel, who told a Peronist convention crowd, "I cannot offer you great things. I am only a disciple of Perón." The couple won by a landslide on 23 September 1973, defeating the Radical party candidate Ricardo Balbín. Many thought Perón the only leader influential enough to solve the country's economic and political problems. The economy improved at first, but by the middle of the following year, it deteriorated amid strikes, high inflation, and a black market. The country's long tradition of political unrest persisted. Right- and left-wing Peronists struggled for control of the movement (Perón sided with the right), and the Marxist **Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo** (People's Revolutionary Army) continued its campaign of violence. On 1 July 1974 Perón died, and Isabel became president. In September the leftist Peronist **Montoneros**, whose hope for any revolutionary potential in Peronism died with Perón, ended their truce and resumed urban **guerrilla** activities. The country moved further to the right as Isabel came under the influence of José López Rega, her spiritual-advisor-turned-minister-of-social-welfare. Government repression against leftists intensified. Meanwhile, the economy continued to worsen. In 1975, under intense pressure, Isabel took lengthy leaves of absence. Her cabinet resigned in July after labor called a general strike. Soon after, her advisor López Rega was forced into exile by organized labor, old-guard Peronists, and the **military**. In November, convalescing after a gall bladder attack, she faced charges of corruption. Despite repeated calls for her resignation, she remained determined to serve out her term of office, scheduled to end in May 1977.

Few were surprised when the military removed her from power on 24 March 1976 and placed her under house arrest. Released in 1981, she went into exile in Spain. She came back to Argentina in 1983 after the return to civility. She has remained in the background ever since.

PERÓN, JUAN (1895–1974). President of **Argentina** (1946–1955, 1973–1974). Born Juan Domingo Perón Sosa on 8 October 1895 in Lobos, a small town in the province of Buenos Aires. His family was rural middle class. In 1913 he graduated from the Colegio Militar de la Nación, the country's **military** academy, with the rank of sub-lieutenant. In 1924 he graduated from officers' school and held the rank of captain. He then received advanced training at the Escuela Superior de Guerra, where, from 1930 to 1936, he was a professor of military history. During those years, he wrote several books on military strategy. In 1938 his first wife, Aurelia Tizón, whom he married in 1925, died of cancer. From 1939 to 1941, as head of a military mission, he traveled in Europe and was reported to have become impressed with the regimes of Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini.

In 1941 Perón, now a colonel, returned to Argentina. He joined the Grupo de Oficiales Unidos (GOU, Group of United Officers), composed of army officers with fascist sympathies. On 4 June 1943 the GOU deposed President Ramón Castillo. The new president, Arturo Rawson, was ousted a few days later in favor of General Pedro Ramírez, in whose government Perón became undersecretary of war and director of the National Department of Labor. The department—which Perón transformed into the Secretariat of Labor and Welfare—was the key to his rise to power. As Argentina became increasingly industrialized, the working classes became a potential political base. Perón captured that base, bestowing on his *descamisados* (“shirtless ones”) pay raises, bonuses, improved working conditions, and other benefits. He also took control of the labor movement. In February 1944 Ramírez resigned at the request of Perón. General Edelmiro Farrell, vice president under Ramírez and a close friend of Perón's, became president. Perón was now vice president, minister of war, and secretary of labor and welfare.

Farrell, though president, was a mere figurehead. Power resided in Perón, who faced opposition both at home and abroad. His opponents in the military feared his popularity with the workers. The country's commercial and industrial elites resented his social reforms. And the Allied powers in World War II were troubled by Perón's pro-Axis leanings. Although Argentina, under Ramírez, had recently severed diplomatic relations with Germany and Japan, the new regime was looked on with suspicion. Indeed, the Allies concluded that Ramírez

was ousted out of fear that he might take the next step and declare war on the Axis. On 9 October 1945 Perón's military rivals, resenting his popularity, forced Perón to resign and put him in jail. When word of his imprisonment got out, thousands of his *descamisados* demonstrated in his behalf in the **Plaza de Mayo**. The generals backed down, and, on 17 October, released him. Soon after, Perón married María Eva Duarte—Evita—a young movie actress and radio soap-opera star who had helped organize the demonstrators.

PERÓN'S FIRST AND SECOND TERMS AS PRESIDENT (1946–1952, 1952–1955): On 24 February 1946 Perón, buoyed by the display of popular support from the year before, won the presidential election, though by a narrow margin. The charismatic Perón, influenced by his second wife, **Eva Perón (“Evita”)**, presided over a period of prosperity. Aided by an economic surplus from the export of foodstuffs during World War II, the couple gained a huge following among the masses, their popularity reaching the point of religious veneration. Perón, following the pattern of Francisco Franco, Adolf Hitler, and Benito Mussolini, transformed Argentina into a corporate state, nationalizing industries and utilities and taking control of the **Confederación General del Trabajo** (General Labor Confederation), which coordinated **trade unions** throughout the country. Perón called his political philosophy *justicialismo*, which he described as a “middle way,” or a “third way”—an alternative to either capitalism or **communism**. His rule was also characterized by corruption and repression. In 1949 Perón cowed Congress into rewriting the constitution to allow presidents to serve consecutive terms. In November 1951, with the aid of the popular Evita, he won reelection by a wide margin. Repression intensified during his second term in office (1952–1955), when, Evita dead from cancer (1952) and the coffers depleted, the country descended into chaos. When Perón was deposed by the military in 1955, the economy was in ruins, and thousands had been imprisoned and tortured.

PERÓN IN EXILE (1955–1972): Perón spent his first five years of **exile**, successively, in **Paraguay**, Nicaragua, Panama, Venezuela, and the Dominican Republic. In 1960 he settled in Spain, which was under the dictatorship of Francisco Franco. From his villa in Madrid he led his Peronist movement, which still had many loyal followers in Argentina. This following the military was bent on crushing, first

under General Pedro Aramburu (1955–1958) and again—after two intervening civilian administrations that the military thought too soft on Peronism—under General Juan Carlos Onganía (1966–1970). Peronism, however, proved resilient, largely because of Perón’s charismatic personality and his ideological ambiguity. Belonging neither to the right nor to the left, the movement included supporters across the political spectrum, accommodating both traditional anticommunist labor leaders and a younger generation inspired by the Cuban revolution and the exploits of Che Guevara. Perón himself was not above playing one group off against another.

Staying in contact with his traditional support base, he also called for the creation of special formations—revolutionary Peronist **guerrilla** groups that, through force of arms, would strive to return him to power. Among the victims of these special formations were not only longtime enemies of Peronism (General Aramburu, for example, whose execution is commonly ascribed to the **Montonero** urban guerrillas) but also longtime Peronists—for example, the labor chief Augusto Vandor. The assassination of Vandor, carried out in 1969 by the **Ejército Nacional Revolucionario** (National Revolutionary Army), came in response to Vandor’s growing independence—his attempts to reach an agreement with the current military regime in the hope of establishing Peronism without Perón. Meanwhile, the governments that ruled Argentina after Perón ironically contributed to a clamoring for his return. None could right the country’s economy, and the Onganía regime, which for the time being eliminated any hope that change could be effected through the ballot box, persuaded many young people to follow a revolutionary course. As the economy worsened and guerrilla violence increased, many Argentines from all levels of society came to remember the Perón years with growing nostalgia and began to see the return of Perón as the country’s only hope.

PERÓN’S THIRD TERM AS PRESIDENT (1973–1974): The Peronist party (**Partido Justicialista**, Justicialist Party) received legal recognition in January 1972, and Perón was allowed to return from exile. To ease the mind of the military, he at first ruled indirectly through President **Héctor José Cámpora**, who was elected in March 1973 under the banner of the Frente Justicialista de Liberación Nacional (FREJULI), a Peronist coalition. From Spain Perón had

directed the *Cámpora* campaign, whose slogan was “*Cámpora* in government, Perón in power.” Before the end of the year, however, Perón forced *Cámpora* to resign and ran for president himself. With his third wife, **Isabel Perón** (“*Isabelita*”), as his vice-presidential running mate, he won by a landslide. No longer needing his special formations that helped return him to power, he distanced himself from the revolutionary elements within Peronism and moved the country sharply to the right, a trend that continued after his death on 1 July 1974. The new president, *Isabelita*, possessing little formal education or political experience, faced serious problems, including an economy near collapse and a rise in guerrilla violence. Her administration was characterized by incompetence, corruption, and repression. Still, the military was hesitant about removing her, waiting almost two years before staging a coup. Although she lacked the appeal of *Evita*, *Isabelita* was the symbol of Peronism, a movement not easily eclipsed. In 1978, at the World Cup soccer tournament in Buenos Aires, crowds called for its return by chanting, “We want the thieves back!”

Today, Peronism lives on.

PERÓN, MARÍA ESTELA MARTÍNEZ DE. *See* PERÓN, ISABEL (“*ISABELITA*”).

PERONISM. The political ideology of **Juan Perón**, the president of **Argentina** from 1946 to 1955 and also from 1973 to 1974. Known officially as *Justicialismo*, it gave rise to a movement and a political party (the **Partido Justicialista**, PJ) and was described by Perón as a middle way, or third way, between capitalism and **communism**. An amorphous ideology, hard to classify in political terms, Peronism attracted adherents from both the right and the left. Its principal characteristics were populism and nationalism.

PERONIST ARMED FORCES. *See* FUERZAS ARMADAS PERONISTAS (FAP).

PERONIST LIBERATION MOVEMENT. *See* UTURUNCOS.

PIGLIA, RICARDO (1941–). Argentine novelist, essayist, literary critic, and screenwriter. Born in Androgué (Buenos Aires), Piglia

spent much of his youth in Mar del Plata, where he attended the Universidad de la Plata. In his twenties he worked for several Argentine editorial houses. His first published collection of short stories, *La invasion* (1967), was awarded the prestigious Casa de las Américas prize in Havana, Cuba. After the **military** coup in **Argentina** in 1976, Piglia spent several periods abroad as visiting professor at various U.S. universities. In 1980 he published his first novel, *Respiración artificial*, hailed as one of the most representative narratives of the new Argentine fiction in the last decades of the 20th century. The theme of political repression that is obliquely touched on in the first novel is openly addressed in *La ciudad ausente* (1992). Shortly after, Piglia adapted *La ciudad ausente* for the opera, with a musical score by Gerardo Gandini. The work had its premiere in the famed Teatro Colón of Buenos Aires during the season of 1995.

A prolific literary critic, Piglia has published several studies on Argentine writers as well as edited literary compilations. During the 1960s he edited the Serie Negra series, which introduced to Argentine readers authors such as Dashiell Hammett and Raymond Chandler. On several occasions Piglia has written for the screen. In 1992 he collaborated with **Brazilian** director Hector Babenco in the script for *Corazón iluminado*, based on boyhood memories the two shared of the seaside resort town of Mar del Plata, where the Argentine-born Babenco lived until his family moved to São Paulo, Brazil. In addition, Piglia collaborated in the script for *Comodines*, by Argentine director Jorge Nisco, one of Argentina's box-office successes in 1997, and *La sonámbula* (1998), by Argentine director Fernando Spiner. He has also adapted works by Julio Cortázar and **Juan Carlos Onetti** for the screen.

In 1990 Piglia returned to Buenos Aires, where he still resides. His latest novel, *Plata quemada*, inspired by an actual police case in Buenos Aires, became a best seller in Argentina and received the Premio Planeta as the best novel of the year. In 1999 he published a compilation of brief narratives entitled *Formas breves*. His works have been translated into several languages, and his latest works have been published simultaneously in U.S. and Brazilian editions. Piglia alternates his duties as professor at the Universidad de Buenos Aires with a visiting professorship at Princeton University in New Jersey.

PINOCHET UGARTE, AUGUSTO (1915–2006). General, army commander, and head of state in **Chile**. He led the coup that toppled the elected government of the socialist president **Salvador Allende Gossens** on 11 September 1973, establishing a **military** dictatorship that lasted 17 years. His regime deprived thousands of Chileans of their constitutional rights. Although credited with introducing economic reforms, he authorized **human-rights** abuses that drew international condemnation.

Augusto Pinochet Ugarte was born on 25 November 1915 into an upper-middle-class family in Valparaíso, Chile. He graduated from the Escuela Militar (military academy) in 1936 with the rank of second lieutenant and from the Academia de Guerra (War College) in 1952. In 1954, then a major, he joined the faculty of the Academia, teaching courses on geography and artillery. He left two years later to serve in the **United States** and in Ecuador. After commanding an infantry regiment in Chile in the early 1960s, he returned to the Academia in 1964, teaching geopolitics and geography and serving as assistant director. He made visits (in 1965, 1968, and 1972) to the U.S. Army's School of the Americas in the Panama Canal Zone, where military personnel from Chile and other Latin American countries received tactical training, especially in counterinsurgency. During the administration of President **Eduardo Frei Montalva** (1964–1970), Pinochet Ugarte became a colonel (1966) and then a brigadier general (1968).

During the administration of President Allende Gossens (1970–1973), Pinochet Ugarte earned a reputation for loyalty. In December 1971 he was in charge of the army garrison in Santiago when rioting broke out between supporters of the **Unidad Popular** (UP) government and opposition groups. Allende Gossens declared a state of emergency. General Pinochet Ugarte ordered a curfew and arrested more than a hundred people. He threatened to use violence if necessary, declaring that “coups do not occur in Chile.” In November 1972, following a strike by independent truck owners, Allende Gossens attempted to stabilize his government by appointing several military officers to his cabinet. General **Carlos Prats González**, commander in chief of the army, was named minister of the interior, and Pinochet Ugarte was named Prats González's temporary replacement. On

24 August 1973 the president made Pinochet Ugarte's appointment permanent. Prats González, a longtime friend of Pinochet Ugarte's, assured the president that Pinochet Ugarte was loyal to the constitution. A strict constitutionalist, Prats González had defeated Colonel Roberto Souper's tank rebellion (*tancazo*) of 29 June. Neither Prats González nor Pinochet Ugarte was aware of the plot for a military coup being planned by the remaining commanders of the armed forces: General **Gustavo Leigh Guzmán** of the air force, General **César Mendoza Durán** of the **Carabineros** (national police), and Admiral **José Toribio Merino Castro** of the navy. Pinochet Ugarte was informed of the plans less than a week before the proposed coup of 11 September 1973.

Although Pinochet Ugarte was the last man to sign on to the coup, on 11 September he directed the ground and air assault on the presidential palace, La Moneda. Within a few hours La Moneda was destroyed, Allende Gossens committed suicide, and UP officials were captured as they left the burning building. In a radio broadcast, Pinochet Ugarte claimed victory, declaring that order had been restored. Two days later, the four generals established a ruling junta. Pinochet Ugarte was named president, an office that—according to plan, at least—each of the four was to occupy in turn.

Pinochet Ugarte and the junta believed they had rescued Chile from social and economic chaos. Pinochet Ugarte declared a stage of siege, dispensed with the rule of law, issued decrees, suspended all political parties, and declared war on communists. The extirpation of Marxism from Chile had been the main objective of the coup. The government systematized a plan to identify, arrest, and execute or force into **exile** all opponents of the ruling junta, especially members of the UP government and leftist sympathizers. Pinochet Ugarte then applied himself to restoring the country's economy. He put together a team of consultants who advocated the free-market policies espoused by the University of Chicago economics professor Milton Friedman. The group, known as the **Chicago Boys**, developed a program that included cutting many of the social-service programs instituted by the Allende Gossens government, returning expropriated businesses to their previous owners, removing price controls, and—all union activity having been

disbanded by the junta—holding down wage levels. These policies revived the economy and benefited the upper and middle classes, who, in turn, gave the junta their support.

Although Pinochet Ugarte’s military regime had achieved local success, foreign governments and human-rights organizations condemned it. These “interventionists”—as Pinochet Ugarte described them—were concerned about the abuse of political prisoners, many of whom were in clandestine detention centers and whose numbers had reached as high as 10,000 at the end of 1973. In June 1974 Pinochet Ugarte organized a covert intelligence agency to eliminate his opponents at home and abroad. He trusted the command of the **Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional** (DINA, Directorate of National Intelligence) to one of his former students from military school, Colonel **Manuel Contreras Sepúlveda**. Contreras Sepúlveda reported directly to Pinochet Ugarte, bypassing the other junta commanders. Although based in Chile, DINA operated abroad through the terrorist network known as **Operation Condor**.

Within a year following the coup, Pinochet Ugarte floated the idea of taking full control of the nation, arguing that he commanded the largest branch of the armed forces, the army. The idea met resistance from Leigh Guzmán, the senior member of the junta. Yet on 20 June 1974 Pinochet Ugarte signed Decree 527, granting himself supreme authority. The decree, which did not require the approval of the other junta commanders, relegated them to subordinate roles. He would now rule as *jefe supremo de la nación* (supreme chief of the nation), while remaining head of the junta.

With the assistance of DINA, Pinochet Ugarte continued his plans to eliminate Marxist influences from Chile. After decimating the **Partido Socialista** (PS, Socialist Party) and the **Partido Comunista de Chile** (PC, Communist Party of Chile), he turned his attention to other political opponents, including the members of local human-rights groups such as the **Vicaría de la Solidaridad** (Vicariate of Solidarity). Civilians who were merely suspected of political activity were detained, **tortured**, and released as examples to would-be dissidents. Pinochet Ugarte also enlisted the help of DINA in eliminating his three greatest political opponents living in exile: Bernardo

Leighton, one of the founders of the **Partido Demócrata Cristiano** (PDC, Christian Democratic Party) and former official in the Frei Montalva government; **Orlando Letelier del Solar**, a lawyer who had served as defense minister in the Allende Gossens government and who was now working in the United States; and his old friend and colleague Prats González. Pinochet Ugarte assigned the task to Contreras Sepúlveda, who coordinated the assassinations: Letelier del Solar and Prats González were killed; Leighton was severely incapacitated.

In December 1977 the **United Nations** passed a resolution condemning the military government for human-rights abuses. Pinochet Ugarte responded by calling a referendum in January 1978 to seek support for his policies. He received the endorsement of more than 75 percent of the voters, though opponents claimed the results were fraudulent. He then pressured the junta into signing an amnesty law absolving the military and the police of human-rights abuses committed from 11 September 1973, the day of the coup, to 10 March 1978. In addition, he charged a committee with drafting a new constitution, which would contain provisions guaranteeing his future leadership. Approved in a 1980 referendum (also considered fraudulent) and taking effect the following year, the constitution of 1981 designated Pinochet Ugarte president for eight years following his swearing in on March 1981. The constitution also called for a plebiscite to be held at the end of the eight-year term. A yes vote would award a junta-appointed presidential candidate (most likely Pinochet Ugarte) another eight years in office; a no vote would give rise to a general election with a slate of candidates.

The **plebiscite of 1988** would be Pinochet Ugarte's downfall. In the 1980s, economic decline contributed to a growing demand for a return to democracy, and state repression, which had subsided after the 1978 referendum, increased in response to protest movements. Although DINA had been replaced in 1977 with the low-key Centro Nacional de Información (CNI, National Information Center), human-rights abuses continued. In 1986, for example, CNI agents seized and tortured hundreds of leftists following the attempted assassination of Pinochet Ugarte by the urban **guerrilla** group **Frente Patriótico Manuel Rodríguez** (FPMR, Manuel Rodríguez Patriotic

Front). In 1988 a group of some 16 political parties formed a coalition, the *Comando por el No* (Command for the No), to lead the opposition against Pinochet Ugarte, who had been named the sole presidential candidate.

Pinochet Ugarte was defeated in the plebiscite of 5 October 1988 and was not allowed to run as a presidential candidate in elections the following year. In March 1990 he handed the presidency over to **Patricio Aylwin Azócar**, a Christian Democrat. Despite losing his seat of authority, he was in position to wield considerable power, which would protect both him and the military from prosecution. The constitution of 1981 allowed him to remain commander in chief of the army for eight more years and then, upon his retirement from active duty, to assume the position of senator-for-life. His lifetime appointment began in March 1998, but he would soon discover that his legal defenses did not protect him abroad. In October 1998 he traveled to London for back surgery. The Spanish judge **Baltasar Garzón** asked British authorities to arrest Pinochet Ugarte and extradite him to Spain for crimes against humanity. Pinochet Ugarte was under house arrest while British courts debated whether he was immune from prosecution as a former head of state. Although the extradition order was finally upheld, Pinochet Ugarte was allowed to return to Chile in March 2000 after independent doctors reported that his health was too poor for him to stand trial.

Supporters of Pinochet Ugarte were elated—the likelihood of his facing prosecution in Chile seemed remote. Yet a new generation of judges began removing obstacles to putting him on trial. In June 2000 he was stripped of his parliamentary immunity, a decision later confirmed by the Supreme Court. Judges also began arguing, like judges in Argentina, that amnesty laws did not cover cases in which the missing (*desaparecidos*) were still missing: if the remains have not been discovered, the crime was still being committed. On 1 December 2000 Juan Guzmán Tapia indicted Pinochet Ugarte on charges of kidnapping and murder in connection with the **caravan of death**, a 1973 helicopter tour that resulted in the deaths of 75 political prisoners. The charges were reduced the following March—from responsibility for the episode to conspiracy to conceal it. The case never went to trial. A medical report suggested he had mild dementia from a series of strokes, and an appeals court

ruled on 9 July 2001 that Pinochet Ugarte was mentally unfit to face prosecution.

In December 2003 the courts reevaluated his fitness to stand trial, noting his lucidity, especially during a recent interview he had granted to a Miami television station. In 2004 the courts divested him of his immunity from prosecution in two criminal cases—Operation Condor and the murder of Prats González. The following year, he was put under house arrest and indicted on tax and corruption charges, challenging his supporters' contention that he was an honest dictator. But he was never convicted or cleared on any of the charges. His lawyers managed to block any trials on the grounds of ill health, though many, including court-appointed doctors, alleged that he made his health problems appear worse than they were.

He died on 10 December 2006. He opted for cremation instead of burial for fear that his enemies would desecrate his tomb.

PLAN Z. (Also, Plan Zeta.) One of five alleged conspiracies that the **military regime of Augusto Pinochet Ugarte** claimed to have uncovered. Plan Z was supposedly a plot by the **Unidad Popular** (Popular Unity) government of **Salvador Allende Gossens** to assassinate military leaders and form a dictatorship. The regime cited the plan as justification for its coup of 11 September 1973.

PLAZA DE MAYO. The main public square in Buenos Aires, the capital city of **Argentina**. Situated near the Casa Rosada, or presidential palace, the plaza has been the traditional spot for listening to presidential speeches and making public protests. It was there in October 1945 that thousands of demonstrators gathered in support of the jailed **Juan Perón**. The **Madres** (Mothers) and **Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo** (Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo) chose to demonstrate there as well.

PLEBISCITE OF 1988. A referendum that was conducted in **Chile** on 5 October 1988. As stipulated in the Chilean constitution of 1981, voters were asked whether they would approve an eight-year presidential term for the candidate put forward by the **military government**. The candidate was General **Augusto Pinochet Ugarte**, who had ruled the country since 1973. Voters voted against Pinochet

Ugarte. Instead, an open presidential election was held in December 1989, won by **Patricio Aylwin Azócar**.

POPPER, DAVID H. **United States** Ambassador to **Chile** during the regime of **Augusto Pinochet Ugarte**. Although the administration of President Richard Nixon was generally supportive of Pinochet Ugarte and communicated this policy to its embassy in Santiago, Popper is remembered for publicly denouncing the Chilean government's treatment of its citizens. His remarks earned him a written rebuke from Secretary of State **Henry Kissinger**, who advised him to stop the "political science lectures." The Chilean government responded to the "lectures," not by easing repression, but by initiating a propaganda campaign.

POPULAR UNITY. *See* UNIDAD POPULAR (UP).

PORTO, SÉRGIO (1923–1968). **Brazilian** humorist, journalist, and writer. Born in the Copacabana neighborhood in Rio de Janeiro, where he lived all his life, Porto is regarded as one of the finest Brazilian humorists of the 20th century. In the late 1950s, under the nom de plume Stanislaw Ponte Preta, he initiated a newspaper column that would bring him lasting fame. Published in the pages of the daily *Última Hora*, his column of social and political commentary became known for its sardonic humor at the expense of the government following the **military** coup of 1964. Under the occasional title "O Festival de Besteira que Assola o País" (Festival of Nonsense That Desolates the Country), or "Febeapá," he commented on the situation in Brazil. According to one critic, the "Febeapá" is best remembered for mocking "the pretensions of the 'revolution,'" which he terms *la redentora* ("the redeemer"), by composing a list of officials who have become prime players in the "festival de besteira" and recounting their "episodes."

His Stanislaw Ponte Preta persona, ostensibly a carefree bon vivant with great success among women, made him a favorite of readers who reportedly went on to adopt some of his best-known phrases as their own, such as "aderia mais que político brasileiro ao poder" (stuck more than a Brazilian politician to power) or the ostensibly innocent "no Brasil as coisas acontecem e depois, com um simples

desmentido, deixaram de acontecer” (In Brazil, things happen, and later, with a simple denial, they stop happening). Three compilations of “Febeapá” went on to become best sellers in print.

An elegant stylist, under his own name he published several short novels and two volumes of memoirs, most notably *A Casa Demolidada* (The Demolished House), a chronicle of the idyllic Copacabana of his childhood and its transformation into the hip, noisy tourist destination of the 1960s. His satiric short story, “O Elefante” (The Elephant) was included in the collection of short stories *64 d.c.* (64 AD), which took its title from the year of the military coup. In it, Porto allegorizes the situation of Brazil in a story about an elephant, named Brasil, and its plight, in a tale marked by patriotic references, exaggerated for comical effect.

Among scholars of Brazilian popular culture, he is also remembered for the care he took — a care that belied his carefree public persona — with the scripts of the television and radio shows in which he participated, among them the long-running *Times Square* on TV Rio. He was also a keen music critic, credited with authoring hundreds of liner notes and collaborating on important music journals of the time, often in conjunction with his uncle, Lúcio Rangel, one of Brazil’s most important music critics of the 20th century. (Rangel is credited with bringing together the then-unknown musician Antonio Carlos Jobim and the playwright and lyricist Vinicius de Moraes, a collaboration that resulted in the magnificent play *Orfeu da Conceição*, the basis for the 1959 movie by French director, Marcel Camus, titled *Orfeu Negro* [Black Orpheus], a magical retelling of the Orpheus and Eurydice myth, set during Carnival in Rio.)

In his later years, Porto, a lifelong smoker who had suffered his first heart attack at age 36, intensified his work schedule, which had included for many years a day job as a banker. He assembled a theater show titled *Show do Crioulo Doido* (Show of the Crazy Creole) with which he toured the country and which earned him, according to a newspaper remembrance, innumerable problems with the military censors. Sérgio Porto was found dead, the victim of a heart attack, on 30 September 1968, following an evening’s show in which he, once again, skewered the foibles of the Brazilian government.

PRATS GONZÁLEZ, CARLOS (1915–1974). Chilean general, commander in chief of the army under President **Salvador Allende Gossens** (1970–1973), and a constitutionalist who opposed the coup of 11 September 1973. In June 1973 Prats González had demonstrated his commitment to constitutional government by putting down a tank rebellion (*tancazo*) led by Colonel Roberto Souper, thereby earning the enmity of anti–Allende Gossens forces within the **military**. The victim of a right-wing propaganda campaign, he was forced to resign as commander in chief in August 1973, replaced by General **Augusto Pinochet Ugarte**, a longtime friend and colleague. After the coup, Prats González went into **exile** in **Argentina**, where he worked on his memoirs. On 29 September 1974 he and his wife, Sofía, were murdered by a car bomb planted by agents of the **Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional** (DINA, Directorate of National Intelligence), **Chile**’s secret police. The operation, which reached across the border, prefigured the high-level political assassinations carried out by **Operation Condor**, a Latin American military network formed in 1975. Pinochet Ugarte, the head of the Chilean junta, denied involvement in the murder, despite the threat that Prats González posed to the military regime. In 1998, however, it became known that Pinochet Ugarte ordered the assassination of Prats González and two other rivals, Bernardo Leighton and **Orlando Letelier del Solar**.

PRESTES, LUÍS CARLOS. *See* PARTIDO COMUNISTA BRASILEIRO (PCB) / BRAZILIAN COMMUNIST PARTY.

“PRESUMPTION OF DEATH” LAW. *See* MADRES DE PLAZA DE MAYO.

PROCESO DE REORGANIZACIÓN NACIONAL / PROCESS OF NATIONAL REORGANIZATION. The term, often shortened to “Proceso,” refers to the **military** regime that ruled **Argentina** from 1976 to 1983. The Proceso was a program designed to transform the country politically, economically, and culturally. The regime repressed any resistance to its rule and anything not in keeping with free-market capitalism and “Western Christian” civilization.

PROCESS OF NATIONAL REORGANIZATION. *See* PROCESO DE REORGANIZACIÓN NACIONAL.

PUIG, MANUEL (1932–1990). Argentine novelist, playwright, scriptwriter, and assistant director. Born in the town of General Villegas, in the province of Buenos Aires, a town often described as a remote backwater in the arid pampas. His lifelong fascination with movies began early, when the young Puig and his mother attended the cinema to escape the boredom of provincial life under the early regime of **Juan Perón**, a period he would later satirize in his first novel, *La traición de Rita Hayworth* (1965, translated as *Betrayed by Rita Hayworth* in 1971). In 1946 Puig moved to Buenos Aires to attend an American boarding school. He enrolled at the University of Buenos Aires in 1951, first as a student of architecture and later as a philosophy major. In 1955 he was awarded a scholarship to study movie directing with Vittorio De Sica and Cesare Zavattini at the Centro Sperimentale di Cinematografia in Rome. Puig would later describe himself as disenchanted with the filmmaking process at Cinecittà and would abandon his studies. Between 1957 and 1961 he worked as an assistant film director and translator of subtitles in Rome, Paris, and Buenos Aires, with a brief stay in Stockholm. He later moved to New York City, where he worked for Air France.

In 1967 Puig returned to his native **Argentina**. His novel *La traición de Rita Hayworth* had been panned by Argentine critics and had problems with local censors but was later acclaimed by literary critics in the **United States** and France. Upon his return, the openly gay Puig soon came under attack by a hostile press as an enemy of “family, religion and class structure,” according to his biographer and translator, Suzanne Jill Levine. The hostility against the author continued with the publication of his second novel, *Boquitas pintadas* (1969, translated as *Heartbreak Tango: A Serial* in 1973), which became an instant best seller in Argentina and culminated with the publication in 1973 of *The Buenos Aires Affair*. Repeated telephone threats and the return of Juan Perón to power in 1973—**Isabel Perón**, Perón’s third wife and successor, was, according to some accounts, an implacable foe of the writer—sent Puig into **exile**, where

he finished *El beso de la mujer araña* in 1976 (translated as *Kiss of the Spider Woman* in 1979).

This novel, Puig's best-known work, tells the story of two cell-mates, the gay window dresser Molina and the young Marxist revolutionary Valentín in an unnamed Latin American country, clearly identifiable as Argentina. In the story, cast as a series of dialogues overheard by an unseen and anonymous listener, Molina attempts to distract the young Valentín, suffering from the effects of **torture**, by retelling and sometimes inventing improbable Hollywood plots, all featuring enigmatic heroines, including the Spider Woman of the title. A story of love, loss, and redemption through the artificiality of the movies, the novel was filmed in 1985 under the direction of Hector Babenco, with a screenplay by Leonard Schrader and the participation of William Hurt, Raul Julia, and Sonia Braga. The movie won a Best Actor Oscar for William Hurt. The novel was later adapted for the stage with a libretto by Terrence McNally, score by John Kander and Fred Ebb. After an initial debut off Broadway, where it was met by lukewarm reviews, the play opened in London, where it was awarded the London Evening Standard Drama Award. Finally, in 1993 it made its Broadway debut, where it ran for over 900 performances and garnered seven Tony Awards, including Best Musical, Best Actor, and Best Actress.

Manuel Puig spent his remaining years in exile in New York City, Rio de Janeiro, and Cuernavaca, Mexico. His novel *La traición de Rita Hayworth* was named the best novel of 1968–1969 by the French newspaper *Le Monde*; earlier, it had been a finalist in the Seix Barral Editorial Biblioteca Breve award. He received the Curzio Malaparte Film Prize in 1966 and the San Sebastian Festival Jury Prize in 1978. Puig died in Cuernavaca in 1990.

PUNTO FINAL / FULL STOP. Legislation passed in **Argentina** on 24 December 1986, intended to impose a limit on the number of **military** officers prosecuted for **human-rights** violations. *Punto Final* specified that only those indicted by 22 February 1987 could be put on trial. Despite the deadline, about 400 officers were indicted. On 14 June 2005 the Supreme Court ruled 7–1 that the law was unconstitutional, once again opening the door for officers to face prosecution.

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RADICAL CIVIC UNION. *See* UNIÃO CÍVICA RADICAL (UCR).

RAMOS, GRACILIANO (1892–1953). **Brazilian** author, journalist, and political activist. Born in Quebrangulo, in the northern state of Alagoas, where his father was in business. Ramos spent his early years in the *nordestino* of Brazil, a region of the country known for its periodic droughts and for the poverty of many of its inhabitants. He worked as a journalist in Rio de Janeiro for the daily *Correio da Manhã* until returning once again to the north. In Palmeira dos Índios, he was elected *prefeito*, mayor, in 1927. After a few years in government, he resigned his post. Later, he was named Secretary of Education for Alagoas.

Following the abortive uprising by the **Partido Comunista Brasileiro** (PCB, Brazilian Communist Party), led by Luís Carlos Prestes, Ramos was arrested in March 1936, along with thousands of others. The charges were never clarified, but he was held until January 1937. He would go on to become a respected novelist, known for his sober style and his focus on regionalist themes. He was elected president of the Associação Brasileira de Escritores (Brazilian Association of Writers) toward the end of his life. Throughout it, he maintained ties with leftist sectors, although he would not formally join the PCB until 1945. Earlier, in 1944, he was appointed Federal Inspector of Secondary Education.

Ramos is chiefly remembered for his reconstruction of the rule of Getúlio Vargas (1930–1945) and for his book *Memórias do Cárcere* (Memoirs of Prison). A measured, thoughtful work, it was begun in 1947. In it, the author reflects on his experiences under Vargas's Estado Novo dictatorship of 1937–1945. He also examines self-censorship, which leads the artist to abandon any artistic pursuits, thus eliminating the necessity of the state to censor his or her work. The phenomenon represents a form of inner **exile**, termed *insilio* in the Spanish-speaking countries of Latin America, and has often been remarked upon by those living under dictatorships, particularly artists. *Memórias do Cárcere* was published in a posthumous edition in 1953.

Among his works of fiction, he is remembered for his novel *Angústia* (1936, Anguish) and particularly for *Vidas secas* (1938, Thirsty

Lives), which remains a classic of Brazilian literature, exploring the lives and struggles of the inhabitants of the *nordestino*.

REAGAN, RONALD (1911–2004). President of the **United States** (1981–1989). In the presidential election of November 1980, Reagan, a conservative Republican, defeated **Jimmy Carter**, the incumbent Democratic president. Reagan attacked Carter’s **human-rights** policy, blaming it for weakening the United States in relation to international **communism**. The Carter policy, Reagan charged, was not sufficiently aimed at human-rights violations committed by communist nations. Instead, the policy focused on and helped undermine regimes in Iran and Nicaragua, for example, regimes that, however authoritarian and repressive, had been friendly to the United States. Reagan placed the concept of human rights within the context of the Cold War. To the Reagan administration, protecting human rights was equated with fighting communism. To personify this shift in policy, Reagan appointed **Jeane Kirkpatrick** to be U.S. ambassador to the **United Nations** (UN) and nominated Ernest Lefever to be assistant secretary of state for Human Rights and Humanitarian affairs, a post occupied by **Patricia Derian** during the Carter administration. Lefever’s nomination failed to win confirmation in Congress: his views on human rights were too conservative—and his personality too abrasive—for both Republicans and Democrats alike. **Elliott Abrams** was confirmed to the post instead. Like Lefever, Abrams saw communist regimes to be the main target of U.S. human-rights policy. Unlike Lefever, he advanced an argument that was much more nuanced, speaking of the need to criticize violations committed by U.S. allies.

At the UN Kirkpatrick attacked the human-rights records of communist nations while defending the records of its authoritarian allies, including the **military** regimes of the Southern Cone. Yet by 1980 the generals in **Uruguay** had already begun lengthy negotiations with civilian leaders, the result of which were national elections in 1984 and a return to democracy a year later. **Argentina** returned to democratic rule in 1983, the collapse of the military due in large part to its defeat in the **Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas** war, in which Reagan sided with Britain. **Chile** would remain under military rule until the end of the decade, but by 1985, the beginning of Reagan’s second

term in office, U.S. policy toward authoritarian allies began to shift. Kirkpatrick was no longer at the UN, and Richard Schifter, a moderate, had replaced Abrams. Although its policy was still centered on anticommunism, the Reagan administration began to realize that government oppression was not so much eliminating opposition forces as sustaining them. Hence it began to apply pressure for change on authoritarian regimes such as Chile and **Paraguay**.

RELATIVES OF THE DETAINED AND DISAPPEARED FOR POLITICAL REASONS. *See* FAMILIARES DE DESAPARECIDOS Y DETENIDOS POR RAZONES POLÍTICAS.

RELEGACIÓN. *See* EXILE.

RETTIG REPORT. *See* COMISIÓN NACIONAL DE VERDAD Y RECONCILIACIÓN.

REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES. *See* FUERZAS ARMADAS REVOLUCIONARIAS (FAR).

RICO, ALDO. *See* CARAPINTADAS.

ROA BASTOS, AUGUSTO (1917–2005). **Paraguayan** author, one of Latin America's most important writers of the 20th century. Born in Asunción into a family of Spanish, French, and Portuguese ancestry, Roa Bastos moved early in the author's life to Iturbe, near the provincial capital of Villarrica in the Guairá region, where his father was employed in the administration of a sugar plantation. The lush countryside, inhabited by the Guaraní people of Paraguay, was one of the first sites of the famous Jesuit missionary communities of Paraguay, **Brazil**, and **Argentina**, which were first founded in 1604. It also afforded the future writer the opportunity to absorb the culture and social structure of the region and to become fluent in Guaraní, a linguistic trait that will mark his writing throughout his life.

His early education was conducted at home. In 1925 he was sent to Asunción under the care of his paternal uncle, Bishop Hermenegildo Roa, who undertook the financial care and lodging of his young country relative. Asunción at that time was a small city still

reeling from the devastating effects of the War of the Triple Alliance (1865–1870), possibly one of the most destructive conflicts in modern world history. The country reportedly lost more than 50 percent of its population to war and disease; the survivors were mainly women, children, and the elderly. During this time, the young Roa Bastos continued his education, reading extensively of the Spanish classic authors in his uncle's library, thus completing the process begun by his mother, who would read to him from the small library in her possession. Among her favorite books were a Bible in Guaraní and Charles Lamb's prose retelling of Shakespeare's plays.

In 1933 Roa Bastos, by then working in a bank, volunteered for the second Chaco War (1932–1935) and served as a noncombatant, an experience that would weigh heavily on the future author's attitude toward war and death. After the conflict, he worked in various occupations. As a journalist, he soon became known for his keen criticism of literature, particularly European. He published his first book of verse, *El ruiseñor de la aurora y otros poemas* (The Nightingale of Dawn and Other Poems) of marked *Modernista* influence, a work the author would later disown. While he was editor for the daily *El País*, the British Council awarded him a scholarship that took him to wartime London, where his activities included developing programming for the BBC and reporting for Paraguayan dailies. Of his time in Europe, he is remembered for his interview of the French leader Charles De Gaulle—a coup for any journalist at the time—and his impressions of England, later published in book form.

Back in Asunción, Roa Bastos continued his work as a journalist until 1947, when he was singled out for detention by the **Colorado** government then in power. After narrowly escaping capture by a group of *py nandí* (Guaraní for “barefoot ones”) soldiers sent after him, Roa Bastos obtained political asylum in the Brazilian embassy until he was allowed to leave for Buenos Aires, Argentina. Thus began a life of **exile** that would create in Roa Bastos a deep consciousness of his lost country and an equally deep need to recreate its history. The experience would provide one of the most complex explorations of the psychology of power in modern narrative—his 1974 novel, *Yo, el supremo* (translated into English as *I, The Supreme*). At the time of his exile, “me estaba convirtiendo en un ‘axiliado’ cuya definición perfecta, la de Ambrose Bierce, dice que es el ‘ciudadano

que sirve a su país viviendo en el extranjero, sin ser un embajador.’ Me estaba yendo a cumplir estas funciones honorarias de las que no se puede dimitir y en las que no hay retiro ni jubilación” (“I was becoming an ‘exile,’ the perfect definition of which, that of Ambrose Bierce, is ‘the citizen who serves his country by living abroad, without being an ambassador.’ I was leaving to carry out those honorary functions from which one can not resign and from which there is no pension or retirement,” an adaptation, as quoted, of one of Bierce’s entries in his popular *Devil’s Dictionary*.)

Ironically, Buenos Aires proved to be the exiled author’s most fertile intellectual territory. While he maintained close ties to other Paraguayan exiles and made a precarious living at several occupations, his literary activities bloomed. He established close friendships with Argentine writers such as **Ernesto Sábato** and **Jorge Luis Borges** and soon began working as a journalist, as he had in Paraguay. His first book of narrative, *El trueno entre las hojas* (Thunder among the Leaves), was published in 1953. In 17 short stories, set mostly in the Paraguayan countryside, the author explores the tragedy of rural societies racked by war, social violence, and cultural disintegration. A few years later, some of these short stories were adapted for the screen by Roa Bastos, who will go on to participate actively in the then-burgeoning Argentine cinema.

Roa Bastos initially attracted critical attention in Argentina with the publication of his first novel, *El hijo del hombre* (Son of Man), in 1960. Throughout several revised editions, the novel tells the story of the lives and exploitation of indigenous workers in the yerba mate fields. In poetic language suggestive of the Bible and heavily marked by Guaraní, Roa Bastos tells of mythical foundations, indigenous societies, the Chaco War, and the story of the son of man, Cristóbal Jara, born to die for his fellow humans. *El hijo del hombre* is the first in what is widely regarded as Roa Bastos’s monumental achievement, a trilogy that will eventually include *Yo, el supremo* and *El fiscal* (1993, *The Prosecutor*). While working on *Yo, el supremo*, he was briefly allowed to return to Paraguay, only to be expelled soon after his arrival by the regime of General **Alfredo Stroessner**, accused of subversive activities. Back in Buenos Aires, he then published *Yo, el supremo* to huge international acclaim. Although Roa Bastos would reject the label magical realism on more than one occasion, *Yo, el supremo* would immediately be included

among the novels then attracting international acclaim to Latin American authors. In the **United States**, which until the 1970s had largely ignored the literary output of its neighbors to the South, the publication of an English edition in 1986 would anoint Roa Bastos as one of the voices of the so-called Latin American Boom.

A dizzying literary tour de force, *Yo, el supremo* explores the limits and madness of power through the life of an unnamed Latin American dictator. The novel was based on the life of the supremely eccentric Dr. José Gaspar Rodríguez de Francia, dictator of Paraguay between 1811 and 1840. From its initial scene, where a *pasquín* (a political poster) is found pasted on a wall of the capital demanding the death of the dictator—and apparently written by the Supremo himself—the narrative flows between the past, present, and future, with the dictator at times speaking from his grave. Dictations to a private secretary, fragments of historical accounts, snatches from the dictator’s own journals, commentary by unnamed critics, a never-ending circular that narrates the history of the country, the presence of the Guaraní oral tradition—all constitute the fragments that readers are meant to organize as they read. The effect is maddening at times, and reflects, as one critic has noted, the destructiveness of absolute power, which, in its quest to control everything, is left to destroy itself.

If the novel attracted international attention, it also won its creator attention from another, unwelcomed source. Roa Bastos had to go into exile once again, as *Yo, el supremo* was placed on the list of banned “subversive” books by the **military** junta of Argentina. Of his memory of the city that had become a second home, he would later say “Buenos Aires siempre fue para mí y lo seguirá siendo hasta el fin de mis días la ciudad más hermosa del mundo, intemporal, cosmopolita y mágica” (Buenos Aires was always for me and will remain to the end of my days the most beautiful, timeless, cosmopolitan and magic city in the world). In 1976 he was invited to teach Spanish and Guaraní at the Université Toulouse II-Le Mirail in France; previously, he had taught literature and film at several universities in Argentina.

In his French exile, Roa Bastos concentrated on literary criticism, but he also published another novel based on Paraguay’s history, *El sonámbulo* (The Sleep Walker), based on the life and times of Francisco Solano López, who ruled as president-for-life from 1862 until

the end of War of the Triple Alliance in 1870. This novel was later expanded into *El fiscal*, the third novel in the Roa Bastos trilogy. During this period, he traveled to Paraguay and was again expelled; this time, the government stripped him of his Paraguayan passport. Soon after, Spain and France would make grant him Spanish and French citizenships, in 1982 and 1985, respectively. He would, however, recover his Paraguayan nationality with the downfall of the Stroessner regime in 1989, which saw the definite return of the author to the country from which he had been exiled for 42 years. That year, Roa Bastos was awarded the Cervantes Prize, arguably the most important literary award in the Spanish-speaking world. In his acceptance speech, Roa Bastos—who had coincidentally received a Honoris Causa degree from Toulouse II-Le Mirail that same day—spoke of the location of human endeavor as “entre lo utópico y lo posible, éste es el reto de la historia” (the challenge of history lies between that which is utopian and that which is possible).

The following years would see the publication of several other works. In 1992, to coincide with the 5th centennial of Columbus’ voyage, he published *Vigilia del Almirante* (The Admiral’s Vigil), another historical meditation, narrated in the first person, of an event with profound and cataclysmic results for Latin America. In his 1995 novel, *Contravida* (Counterlife) he examined the life of an exiled writer as he recreates his life through memory. In *Madame Sui* (1996), his last completed novel, he returned to Paraguay in the fictionalized account of the life of one of Stroessner’s lovers. In poor health in his last years, he was reportedly surrounded by assistants of dubious credentials and integrity. At times, the frail author was left alone at night, under key, reportedly with no food, by his daily attendant. After his death, this woman was charged with theft of the author’s money and incarcerated.

Roa Bastos was the author of over 29 works, translated into at least 25 languages, including an extensive list of children’s works, poetry, and drama, as well as novels and short stories. He was often cited as a candidate for the Nobel Prize of Literature. Less known is his authorship, alone or with others, of the scripts of 12 movies of the early Argentine cinema; among them were film versions of his books *Yo, el supreme* (directed by Tito Chamorro) and *El trueno entre las hojas* (1958, directed by Armando Bo). He also wrote scripts for the

films *Alias Gardelito* (1961, directed by Lautaro Murúa), *El último piso* (1962, directed by Daniel Cherniavsky), *Choferes del Chaco* (1963, directed by Lucas Demare and based on a chapter of *Hijo del hombre*), *Shunko* (1963, directed by Lautaro Murúa), and *Castigo al traidor* (1966, directed by Manuel Antín), as well as screen adaptations for the novels *Don Segundo Sombra*, by Ricardo Güiraldes, and *El señor presidente*, by Miguel Angel Asturias.

Augusto Roa Bastos died in 2005 after surgery, following complications after a fall at his home in Asunción.

ROCHA, GLAUBER (1939–1981). Brazilian filmmaker, writer, and film theorist. Born in Vitória da Conquista, in the state of Bahia, Rocha is credited with being one of the founders of Brazil's visionary *Cinema Novo* movement, which in the 1960s captured the attention of moviegoers at home and abroad. Along with Miguel Littín of Chile, Jorge Sanjinés of Bolivia, and Tomás Gutiérrez Alea of Cuba—practitioners of the *Nuevo Cine Latinoamericano* (New Latin American cinema)—this new cinema aesthetic favored political themes and small independent productions in opposition to the Hollywood style of filmmaking then prevalent in Latin America. In Brazil Rocha was associated with the directors Ruy Guerra, Carlos Diegues, Arnaldo Jabor, and Joaquim Pedro de Andrade, though he remained for many years the most visible Brazilian director abroad.

An early fan of film, Rocha reportedly organized film clubs during his youth. He studied law at the Universidade da Bahia but abandoned it in his third year. His first film dates from those years, as well as an incipient career as a film reviewer for the daily *Jornal da Bahia*, for which he would go on to edit the literary supplement. His first film exhibited abroad was *Barravento* (1962, *Turning Wind*), which he completed after taking over from director Roberto Pires. In 1963 another of his films, *Deus e o diabo na terra do sol* (literally, *God and the Devil in the Land of the Sun*, released as *Black God, White Devil*), brought him international renown as a finalist for the Palme d'Or in Cannes. Both films featured mixed-race segments of Brazilian society, without resorting to the picturesque treatment so common in the country. By this time he had settled in Rio, where he joined a young circle of influential filmmakers.

With the advent of the **military** coup of 1964, Rocha soon found himself the subject of political persecution. In October 1965 he was arrested following a demonstration in front of the Hotel Glória in Rio de Janeiro, along with other Brazilian artists, including the novelist and journalist **Carlos Heitor Cony**. He also shared a cell for a time with the novelist and journalist **Antonio Callado**. Despite the increasing military censorship, Rocha continued to work with great success. Earlier, he had collaborated on the film *Vent d'Est* (Wind from the East), by the French filmmaker Jean-Luc Godard, playing a very close approximation of his public persona: the intellectual as revolutionary. In his own work, Rocha went on to direct *Terra em Transe* (1967, The Anguished Land) and *O Dragão da Maldade Contra o Santo Guerreiro* (1969, released in the United States as *Antonio das mortes*), which won him the Best Director award at Cannes, a prize he shared that year with the Czech filmmaker Vojtěch Jasný. Along with *Deus e o diabo na terra do sol*, the films remain Rocha's most enduring filmic legacy. *Terra em transe*, according to one scholar, examines the failure of both the populist left and the fascist right in a Brazil faced with the rise of authoritarian regime. *O dragão da maldade contra o santo guerreiro*, shot in color, draws upon Brazilian popular culture, including the "culture of resistance" that the filmmaker saw in the indigenous people of Brazil. Set in the sertão region of the northwest, it has been described by one scholar as an "allegorical political Western."

A polemical artist, Rocha defended the use of violence as a transformative element of society. In his often-quoted 1965 manifesto, "The Aesthetic of Hunger" (first published in Portuguese as "A Estética da Fome"), he stated that "the moment of violence is the moment when the colonizer becomes aware of the existence of the colonized." In 1971 he left Brazil for **exile**, spending time in Cuba, Italy, Spain, and France. He directed several films on the theme of colonization, including *Der Leone Have Sept Cabeças* (1970, released as *The Lion Has Seven Heads*), whose multilanguage title is meant to echo the experience of colonial exploitation in Africa, and *Cabezas cortadas* (1971, released internationally as *Cutting Heads*). During his five years of exile, the original negatives for *Terra em transe* and *O Dragão da Maldade Contra o Santo Guerreiro* were destroyed in a mysterious fire at a film laboratory in France.

Upon his return in 1976, Rocha went on to film two documentaries of note. One, filmed amid a Carnavalesque atmosphere, is about the funeral of the painter Di Cavalcanti (né Emiliano Augusto Cavalcanti de Albuquerque Melo, 1897–1976). The film is reportedly still banned in Brazil because of an injunction brought by the painter's family, who objected to the treatment of the occasion; nonetheless, it was awarded a special prize at the Cannes Film Festival. He also filmed *Jorge Amado no cinema* (1979, *Jorge Amado on Film*), on the novelist **Jorge Amado**. However, his last, most ambitious work remains *La Idade da Terra* (1980, released as *The Age of the Earth*), an allegory that explored the themes of colonialism, liberation, and violence in Brazilian history. Blending myth and history, in what some scholars have termed an almost Baroque style, the film presented four Christlike figures—in segments conceived to be seen in any order—preaching on the possibilities of national redemption. Although critics savaged the film at home and in that year's Film Festival in Venice, it has been reevaluated in recent years. Other scholars suggest that film tastes had changed since his last critical success in Cannes.

In 1980, deeply affected by the accidental death of his sister, the actress Anecy Rocha, and the negative reception of *La Idade da Terra*, Rocha went into voluntary exile. However, sick with a pulmonary disease, in August 1981 he returned to Brazil from Lisbon, where he had been receiving treatment. Rocha died three days later, on 22 August, in a clinic in Rio de Janeiro, at age 43.

ROCK MUSIC. *See* CULTURAL RESISTANCE.

ROLÓN, ISMAEL. *See* CATHOLIC CHURCH.

ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH. *See* CATHOLIC CHURCH.

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SÁBATO, ERNESTO (1911–). Argentine physicist, novelist, and essayist. Born in Rojas (Buenos Aires) into a large Italian-Albanian family. An early militancy in the Juventud Comunista during the years

of the dictatorship of General José Félix Uriburu was disowned in the 1930s following accounts of Stalinist atrocities in the Soviet Union. Later he earned a doctorate in physics from the Universidad de La Plata (1938), where he also studied philosophy and literature under the noted educator and humanist Pedro Henriquez Ureña (Dominican Republic, 1884–1946). Upon graduation, Sábato was awarded a fellowship at the Joliot Curie Laboratory in Paris to pursue studies in nuclear physics. In 1940 he returned to **Argentina** as professor at the Universidad Nacional de Buenos Aires. During this period, he also wrote for the literary journal *Sur* and the daily *La Nación*. A series of articles published in *La Nación* attacking the regime of **Juan Perón** forced him to abandon his post at the university in 1945.

That year also marked the publication of his first collection of essays, *Uno y el universo* (1945), a critique of moral relativism and logical positivism inherited from another century. He would revisit this theme in *Hombres y engranajes* (1951), one of the most influential collections of essays in Latin America in the 1950s. A writer of great literary influence in his native Argentina and abroad, Sábato has published three novels: *El tunnel* (1948); *Sobre héroes y tumbas* (1961), considered one of the most important novels in Latin America in the 20th century; and *Abaddón, el exterminador* (1974), which presents a universe dominated by forces of evil, where resistance seems futile. A recipient of several important awards, Sábato received in 1984 the Premio Cervantes, the most prestigious literary award in Spain.

In 1983 Sábato was named to the presidency of the **Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas** (CONADEP, National Commission on the Disappeared), and directed the compilation of the report *Nunca más*, which detailed the atrocities perpetrated by the Argentine **military** against the civilian population.

SÁBATO COMMISSION. *See* COMISIÓN NACIONAL SOBRE LA DESAPARICIÓN DE PERSONAS (CONADEP).

SAER, JUAN JOSÉ (1937–). Argentine narrator, journalist, scriptwriter, literary critic, and professor of film and Latin American literature. Born in the small town of Serondino, into a working-class family of Syrian immigrants from Damascus. His family moved to Santa Fé, in the littoral of the Paraná River, when Saer was 11. Some

of his poems were published in a local newspaper, where he began working as a journalist at age 19. In 1960 he published his first collection of short stories and soon began teaching courses in film and literary criticism at the Instituto de Cinematografía of the Universidad Nacional del Litoral at Santa Fé. In 1968 Saer was awarded a fellowship by the French government to study film. He settled in Paris, where he has lived ever since. He has made annual visits to his native **Argentina** except during the period of the **military** regime. He received the Premio Nadal, awarded by Editorial Nadal in Spain, for his novel *La ocasión* (1968, translated as *The Event* in 1995) and the Prix de Nantes for *El entenado* (1983), judged the best novel in French translation in 1988. He is a professor of Latin American literature at the University of Rennes in France. In 1993 he was a teaching fellow at Princeton University. He is a frequent lecturer on literary topics in the **United States** and Argentina.

Saer is the author of several novels and volumes of short stories centered on the fictional town of Colastine and peopled by a cast of regular characters. He is also the author of several works of literary criticism that examine the literary tradition of the Southern Cone. Saer's works associated with the period of the "**dirty war**" are *Nadie nada nunca* (1980, translated as *Nobody Nothing Never* in 1993) and *Glosa* (1986). *Nadie nada nunca* is a haunting story that portrays a string of several killings and mutilations of horses—a crime, unexplained and never solved, that mimics the climate of fear during the political repression. *Glosa* presents two conflicting choices—suicide or **exile**—as the only options open to two young friends in the Argentina of 1978.

His narrative, described by a critic as "rooted . . . in a nonmagical brand of realism almost Balzacian in scope," has also dealt with the power of memory and remembering. In an interview published in English in 1999, Saer is quoted as saying, "There can be no doubt that when we forget, it is not so much a memory we lose as our desire to remember it."

SAINT JEAN, IBÉRICO. Argentine general, governor of Buenos Aires during the first junta, and minister of the interior under the third. In her book *Children of Cain: Violence and the Violent in Latin America*, Tina Rosenberg quotes General Saint Jean as saying, "First,

we must kill all subversives, then their sympathizers; then those who are indifferent; and finally, we must kill all those who are timid.”

SANGUINETTI, JULIO MARÍA. President of **Uruguay** (1985–1990), the first civilian president following the end of the **military** dictatorship (1973–1985). Representing the **Colorado** political party, Sanguinetti took office on 1 March 1985 and managed the country’s return to democracy, restoring civil and **human rights**. Within a month of taking office, he freed all political prisoners. His presidency was weakened, however, by sponsoring an amnesty for military and police officials accused of human-rights violations. About 160 officers were affected by the amnesty, which, despite much popular support for bringing officers to trial, was upheld in a referendum in 1989. Sanguinetti was voted out of office in November of that year, when the Blancos political party, led by Luis Alberto Lacalle, returned to power for the first time in 23 years.

SANJINÉS, JORGE (1936–). **Bolivian** filmmaker, screenwriter, and theorist. A noted practitioner of the *nuevo cine latinoamericano* (New Latin American cinema) along with **Glauber Rocha** of **Brazil**, **Miguel Littín** of **Chile**, and Tomás Gutiérrez Alea of Cuba, among others. Jorge Sanjinés is perhaps Bolivia’s best-known film director.

As a teenager, he accompanied his father into political **exile** in Peru, where he developed a passion for film. In an interview, the filmmaker remembered with “infinite nostalgia my days as a cinema buff and impertinent spectator in the beautiful city of Lima” in the 1950s. A few years later, between 1957 and 1960, he would study film at the Universidad Católica in neighboring Chile. His first steps as a filmmaker back in La Paz brought him into contact with Óscar Soria, Antonio Eguino, and other young Bolivians with whom he would found Grupo Ukamau, a radical film collective. Soria and Eguino would collaborate in Sanjinés’s first film, *Ukamau / ¡Así es!* (1966). The first movie filmed in Bolivia with a bilingual Aymara and Spanish soundtrack, it tells the story of the murder and rape of an indigenous woman and of her husband’s revenge. The movie, made under the auspices of the Instituto Cinematográfico Boliviano, of which Sanjinés was then director, was controversial and reportedly led to Sanjinés’s firing. *Ukamau* is hailed as a visionary example of

the politically committed cinema for which its director would soon be known throughout Latin America.

Sanjinés's collaboration with his colleagues of Grupo Ukamau—named after the film—would result in other memorable films in which Óscar Soria would also collaborate in the script and Antonio Eguino would be director of photography. Among these are *Yawar Malku / La sangre del condor* (1969, *Yawar Malku / The Blood of the Condor*) and *El coraje del pueblo* (1971, *The Courage of the People*, distributed in the **United States** as *The Night of San Juan*). The former, filmed in Quechua and Spanish, detailed the exploitation of the indigenous people of Bolivia, symbolized by a campaign to sterilize indigenous women without their consent, a campaign conducted under the guise of maternity clinics operated by the Peace Corps. The film was the first in a series of “dramatic reenactments” the director would deploy to critical acclaim, as was his next film, *El coraje del pueblo*, the first Bolivian exposé of an incident that first attracted the director's attention as a small blurb in a La Paz newspaper and that would be known as the Massacre of San Juan. Using nonactors—survivors of the attack by army troops on striking miners in the mining camp Siglo XX in 1967—Sanjinés charged the Bolivian government with a campaign of intimidation and murder that culminated in the incident of 24 June 1967. The political activist **Domitila Barrios de Chungara** would also describe the incident in her testimonial narrative. Following the coup of General **Hugo Banzer Suárez** in 1971, Sanjinés went into exile in Peru and would not return to Bolivia until 1979. *El coraje del pueblo* would not be shown in Bolivia until 1978. A few years after his return from exile, Sanjinés filmed the documentary *Las banderas del amanecer* (codirected with Beatriz Palacios). It details the tumultuous years that saw the end of the Banzer Suárez regime.

A lifelong Marxist, Sanjinés has been hailed for his use of film as a way to counter historical amnesia in his country. Influenced by the Italian neorealist films, as exemplified by his casting of nonactors, and the Soviet tradition of filmmaking, most notably in his work with the Grupo Ukamau, Sanjinés is also a respected film theorist. His book, *Teoría y práctica de un cine junto al pueblo* (1978, translated rather awkwardly in 1989 as *Theory and Practice of a Cinema with People*) details the collective's approach to filmmaking. At a time

and place where filmmakers were beset with production difficulties and economic pitfalls, Sanjinés is distinguished by the uniquely Latin American perspective he brought to his films, particularly in his exploration of Bolivia's indigenous identity and his transcending the obstacles that beset many of his colleagues.

He has been the recipient of many international awards and the Premio Nacional de Cultura (National Prize of Culture) of Bolivia. In January 2009 Jorge Sanjinés was designated a trustee of the Fundación Cultural del Banco Central (Cultural Foundation of the Central Bank), the leading body responsible for all museums and archives in Bolivia.

SANTUCHO, MARIO ROBERTO (“ROBI”) (1936–1976). Leader of the **Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo (ERP, People's Revolutionary Army)**, a **guerrilla** movement in **Argentina**. Santucho was born into a large, prosperous family in the city of Santiago del Estero. He became interested in political ideas as an adolescent, having grown up in a household accustomed to debate. In the late 1950s he studied accounting at the University of Tucumán and became active in student politics. In 1961 he spent several months in Cuba, for whose socialist revolution he had already declared his support. While there, he received guerrilla training. In July 1961, during his absence, his brothers Francisco René and Oscar Asdrubal founded the Frente Revolucionario Indoamericano Popular (FRIP, Indo-American Popular Revolutionary Front). On his return, Santucho envisioned FRIP as the beginning of a revolutionary party. He began to recruit members in Tucumán province, where he was working as an accountant for the sugar workers' union. The workers were receptive to his message—the local economy was dependent on sugar subsidies, which the federal government continually threatened to cut off. Santucho was active in the union's many protests. In 1965 FRIP merged with Palabra Obrera (PO, Workers' Word), a Trotskyist party, to form the Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores (PRT, Workers' Revolutionary Party). The PO had been embroiled in an internal dispute over whether to engage in armed conflict. The dispute continued after the merger. Nahuel Moreno, the PO leader, opposed guerrilla warfare; Santucho—urged on by his friends Luis Pujals and Enrique Gorriarán Merlo—promoted it. In January 1968 Moreno was forced out, and Santucho, now head of the PRT, set

the organization on a revolutionary course. The ERP, the armed branch of the PRT, was established in 1970.

Over the next four years, Santucho led an urban guerrilla campaign of bank robberies, kidnappings, and assassinations. In 1974, frustrated by the ERP's inability to win the support of urban workers, Santucho set up a rural front in Tucumán province. By then, the sugar industry had collapsed, and the many unemployed were eager to support a revolutionary cause. The rural front was defeated a year later, when President **Isabel Perón** sent in the army. By mid-1976 (four months after the coup that ushered in the “**dirty war**”), the ERP was in ruins, and Santucho was prepared to go to Cuba. In July, however, the army mounted a surprise attack on a house where he was to meet with other guerrilla leaders, including the **Montonero** chief Mario Firmenich. Santucho died in the resulting gunfight.

SCHOOL OF THE AMERICAS. *See* UNITED STATES.

SCILINGO, ADOLFO FRANCISCO. Argentine navy captain and member of the notorious **Escuela Mecánica de la Armada** (ESMA, Navy Mechanics School) during the “**dirty war.**” Ending almost 20 years of silence, Scilingo confessed to participating in “death flights.” He said that from 1976 to 1983, thousands of prisoners were thrown alive into the Atlantic Ocean from navy aircraft after being stripped, drugged, and weighted down. His story is told in a book, *El vuelo*, by the writer and **human-rights** activist **Horacio Verbitsky**. Published in 1995, *El vuelo* was translated in 1996 as *The Flight: Confessions of an Argentine Dirty Warrior*. In April 2005 a Spanish court sentenced Scilingo to 640 years in prison for his participation in the flights—the first time a country ever convicted someone in person (as opposed to in absentia) for human-rights crimes committed outside its borders. Scilingo, 58 at the time of his sentencing, is serving a 30-year term—the maximum under Spanish law. The indictment had been made by Judge **Baltasar Garzón**.

SEBASTIÁN ACEVEDO MOVEMENT AGAINST TORTURE.
See MOVIMIENTO CONTRA LA TORTURA SEBASTIÁN ACEVEDO.

SEINELDÍN, MOHAMMED ALÍ. *See* CARAPINTADAS.

SEMANA SANTA. *See* CARAPINTADAS.

SENDIC ANTONACCIO, RAÚL (c. 1925–1989). Founder of the **Tupamaros**, a leftist **guerrilla** movement in **Uruguay**. Sendic Antonaccio dropped out of law school in the late 1950s to become an activist among sugar workers in the northern province of Artigas. In 1963 he founded the Tupamaros, who made their public appearance in 1967 and began a campaign of bombings, robberies, and kidnappings against the **military** and police. First captured in 1970, he led a prison breakout a year later, freeing himself and 105 other guerrillas. He was captured again in September 1972. After his release in 1985 under an amnesty announced by the civilian government of President **Julio María Sanguinetti**, Sendic Antonaccio remade the Tupamaros into a legal political party. His health declined rapidly, however, from the **torture** and other harsh treatment he suffered during his 14 years as a political prisoner. He died on 27 April 1989.

SERVICIO ECUMÉNICO DE REINTEGRACIÓN (SER) / ECUMENICAL SERVICE FOR REINTEGRATION. A **human-rights** nongovernmental organization in **Uruguay**. Founded by church groups in 1984, SER provided material, psychological, and social assistance to those released from prison and returning from **exile**. In 1990 SER became the Servicio Ecuménico por la Dignidad Humana (SEDHU, Ecumenical Service for Human Dignity), an organization involved in rural development and in assistance to poor immigrants.

SERVICIO ECUMÉNICO POR LA DIGNIDAD HUMANA. *See* SERVICIO ECUMÉNICO DE REINTEGRACIÓN (SER).

SERVICIO ESPECIAL DE SEGURIDAD (SES) / SPECIAL SECURITY SERVICE.

SERVICIO PAZ Y JUSTICIA (SERPAJ) / PEACE AND JUSTICE SERVICE. A pan-Latin American **human-rights** organization founded in 1971. Since 1974, it has been led by **Adolfo Pérez**

Esquivel, an Argentine and winner of the Nobel Peace Prize. Although committed to social justice and **liberation theology**, SERPAJ is ecumenical and not affiliated with any church. It has branches in **Argentina, Chile, Uruguay**, and other countries of Latin America.

During the years of **military** rule, SERPAJ-Argentina provided material and legal support to the victims of state violence, especially the poor. SERPAJ-Chile, founded in 1977, concentrated on organizing at the grassroots level, promoting nonviolent action through workshops and seminars, neighborhood groups, and networks. Its efforts helped form the **Movimiento contra la Tortura Sebastián Acevedo** (Sebastián Acevedo Movement against Torture). SERPAJ-Uruguay, founded in 1981, gained international attention for promoting human rights throughout the region. Although closed by the military in 1983, SERPAJ-Uruguay continued its work, helping to form other human-rights groups and participating in the **Concertación Nacional Programática** (CONAPRO), a 1984 joint party agreement calling for truth and justice upon the country's return to democratic rule. The promise of CONAPRO was never fulfilled—President **Julio María Sanguinetti** did not sign it. Nevertheless, SERPAJ-Uruguay joined with the **Instituto de Estudios Legales y Sociales** (IELSUR), another Uruguayan human-rights group, to produce the report *Uruguay nunca más* (1989), an account of human-rights violations committed from 1972 to 1985.

SERVIÇO NACIONAL DE INFORMAÇÕES (SNI) / NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. Known as the “System,” the SNI was **Brazil's** secret police during the 1964–1985 **military** dictatorship. It was established on 13 June 1964 by the **Escola Superior de Guerra** (ESG, Higher War College) and designed by General Golbery do Couto e Silva, who became its first chief. It was located in the executive branch, where its chief held the rank of minister and sat in the president's cabinet. Its main office was in the capital, Brasília, but it had eight regional offices as well. In addition, after February 1967 its officials were embedded in every government ministry, ensuring compliance with national policy and providing clearances for jobs and promotions. During the dictatorship, the SNI's budget was increased more than 3,000 times, and more than 50,000 people were on the payroll. Among them were **Emílio Garrastazú Médici**

and **João Baptista de Oliveira Figueiredo**, SNI chiefs who would become military presidents.

The SNI, which Golbery do Couto e Silva called the “ministry of silence,” adopted the ESG’s theory of internal war, which saw the main threat to Brazil as coming not from an external enemy but from “subversives”—**trade unionists**, peasants, students, professors, religious group, and, by 1968, armed **guerrillas**. Against them the SNI waged a “**dirty war**” through intelligence agencies that acted almost independently and sometimes competed with one another. Some of the agencies were created by the military: the Centro de Informações do Exército (CIEX, Army Intelligence Center), the Centro de Informações da Marinha (CENIMAR, Naval Intelligence Center), and the Centro de Informações da Aeronáutica (CISA, Air Force Intelligence Center). Other agencies were created by the political police: the Departamento de Ordem Político e Social (DOPS, Department of Political and Social Order), at the national level, and the Departamento Estadual de Ordem Política e Social (DEOPS, State Department for Political and Social Order), at the state level. Each of the agencies employed **death squads** and **torture** centers. From 1964 to 1969, the primary torture centers were those of CENIMAR and DOPS.

In mid-1969, to coordinate the repression of urban guerrillas and other “subversives,” the army established Operação Bandeirantes (OBAN, Operation Pioneer), which was funded by local and international firms, including Ford and General Motors. Based in São Paulo, OBAN integrated the efforts of the army, navy, air force, and police. It was so successful that, in January 1970, it provided the model for the Destacamento de Operações Internas—Comando Operacional de Defesa Interna (DOI—CODI, Information Operations Detachment—Operational Command for Internal Defense). DOI—CODI units—the DOI was an executive branch, the CODI a death squad—were staffed by all three military branches but were under the control of CIEX. They were established in São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Brasília, Minas Gerais, Rio Grande do Sul, Bahia, Pernambuco, and Ceará. The DOI—CODIs were the principal torture centers during the dirty war’s most repressive phase, which would last until 1974. Sergio Fleury’s São Paulo DEOPS, however, competed aggressively with the DOI—CODIs.

After March 1974, the SNI and the DOI—CODIs resisted President **Ernesto Geisel**’s policy of political liberalization known as *distensão*

(relaxation). They continued to arrest and torture suspects. But the death under torture of two well-known figures—Vladimir Herzog in October 1975 and Manoel Fiel Filho in January 1976—prompted Geisel to bring the security forces under control. Nevertheless, the SNI continued to operate and receive funding, even after 1985, when the dictatorship ended. In 1990, the newly elected President Collor de Mello abolished the SNI, replacing it with a civilian security organization.

SILVA HENRÍQUEZ, RAÚL. *See* CATHOLIC CHURCH; COMITÉ DE LA PAZ (COPACHI); VICARÍA DE LA SOLIDARIDAD.

SILVEIRA, ÊNIO (1925–1996). **Brazilian** editor. One of Latin America's most important editors of the 20th century and a staunch defender of freedom of the press. He was born in São Paulo into an upper-middle-class family of intellectuals. Several close relatives were authors, including his father, an attorney. In his childhood milieu, books were accorded an almost religious reverence.

In 1944 he began working for the Companhia Editora Nacional, then one of Brazil's most important editorial houses. After two years of rapid rise in the company and studies at the Escola Livre de Sociologia e Política of São Paulo, he left Brazil and enrolled at Columbia University in New York. In the **United States**, Silveira established many links with important editorial houses and publishers, particularly Alfred A. Knopf (1892–1984), the legendary New York editor. At Knopf's, Silveira served an internship and became familiar with all aspects of the book trade. He also established contacts with the **Communist** Party. He credited the leftist authors Richard Wright (1908–1960, the author of *Black Boy*) and Howard Fast (1914–2003, the author of *Spartacus*) for his political tutelage.

Back in Brazil at the request of his father-in-law, Octalles Marcondes Ferreira, who was one of the partners of Companhia Editorial Nacional, Silveira took over the editorship of a Nacional subsidiary, Editora Civilização Brasileira, then in financial difficulties. The new assignment entailed a move to Rio de Janeiro, where he settled in 1952. By all accounts, the young editor revolutionized the Brazilian book trade. Early on, he discontinued the practice that required a

book's pages to be cut at the edges, a practice in vogue at the time in Brazil. Most important, he employed an artist, the Austrian-born Eugenio Hirsh (1923–2001), to design visually daring covers that gave the publisher's books a distinct look. Editora Civilização Brasileira became known for publishing the most significant books of the time, bringing to Brazil a virtual "who's who" of the world's authors. (By contrast, in the United States, even today only about 3 percent of all published books are translations.) By the end of the decade, Editora Civilização Brasileira was one of the most important publishing houses in the country—perhaps in all of Latin America—and Silveira had bought a significant portion of the company's shares.

In the early 1960s, Silveira and his father-in-law dissolved their partnership over ideological differences—Silveira aligned himself with leftist causes—though the two remained close friends. In 1964 he edited two collections, *Cadernos do Povo* (The People's Journals) and *Violão de Rua* (Street Guitar), which sought to explain leftist ideological concepts to the average reader. Silveira, who would join the **Partido Comunista Brasileiro** (PCB, Brazilian Communist Party) in 1965, had earlier joined other intellectuals in creating Comando dos Trabalhadores Intelectuais (Comando of Intellectual Workers) to advance the cause of Brazilian culture. These actions culminated, in the first days of the **military** coup of 1964, with the inauguration of the journal *Revista Civilização Brasileira*, which was published from 1965 to the end of 1968 and became one of the best-known journals of the opposition. In its first volume, a 60-page unsigned article titled "O terrorismo cultural" (Cultural Terrorism), cataloged in a dispassionate tone the arrest, harassment, and campaign of intimidation against leading figures in education as well as the arts and sciences, among them the journalist and author **Carlos Heitor Cony**.

Although censorship was unevenly applied, many felt the effects, among them writers employed in government. In 1964, for example, Antonio Houaiss was dismissed from his post in the Brazilian diplomatic service. Silveira employed him—as he would many others—at his editorial house. The result was one of the best translations ever published of James Joyce's *Ulysses*. Houaiss went on to become one of the most noted philologists in Brazil during the second half of the 20th century.

Ênio Silveira, however, is best remembered for publishing books critical of the military regime. During the early years, Editora Civilização Brasileira published some of the best-remembered novels of that period, including *Quarup*, by **Antonio Callado**, and *Pessach: A travessia*, by Cony, along with other titles that aimed to capture the historical moment: *Depois do sol*, the first work of the novelist Ignácio de Loyola Brandão (b. 1936); *Veranico de janeiro*, by Bernardo Ellis (1915–1977); *Noite contra a noite*, by José Conde; and *A noite sem homem*, by Orígenes Lessa (1903–1986). In May 1966 Editora Civilização Brasileira filed a suit against the Federal Department of Public Safety, challenging the legality of the confiscation of several books carried out without judicial orders. Among the books seized by the military were *Primeiro de abril* (April 1st), by Mário Lago; *O Golpe de Abril* (The April Coup), by Edmundo Moniz; *O golpe começou em Washington* (The Coup began in Washington), by Edmar Morel (1912–1989); and *História Militar do Brasil* (Military History of Brazil), by Nelson Werneck Sodré. The journalist Mário Lago (1911–1962) is best remembered for the song “Aurora”; he was imprisoned by the regime six times between 1964 and 1986 and retold some of his jail experiences in his book. Moniz and Morel were journalists, and Sodré a distinguished historian.

Despite the government’s actions, Editora Civilização Brasileira remained one of the most vital forces in Brazilian cultural life, continuing a trajectory that had begun in the early 1960s when the company published more than 20 titles a month. His actions would earn Silveira seven processes of investigation and four arrests. In addition, after 1968 the company’s bookstore and offices were the objects of several arson and bomb attempts.

In 1982 Ênio Silveira entered into a business agreement with the Difusão Européia do Livro and sold almost all of his shares to the Pinto de Magalhães Bank of Portugal. He remained the head of the company until his death in 1995.

SOMIGLIANA, CARLOS (1932–1987). Argentine playwright and screenwriter. Born in Buenos Aires, Somigliana attended the Colegio Nacional de Buenos Aires. In 1958 he relocated to the city of Ushuaia, where he began a long career as a functionary of the Argentine

federal Judiciary. While in Ushuaia, he wrote his first play, *Amarillo* (Yellow), and participated in local theater groups.

After Somigliana returned to the capital, *Amarillo* premiered in 1965, attracting the attention of theater circles. His second play, *Amor de gran ciudad* (Love in the Big City), debuted a few months later. In 1970 Somigliana collaborated with **Roberto Cossa**, Germán Rozenmacher, and Ricardo Talesnik in *El aeroplano negro* (The Black Airplane), a carnivalesque exploration of the impact of the figure of **Juan Perón** on the national psyche.

The collaboration with Cossa, a close friend, would also result in other ventures, such as a dramatic version of *Martín Fierro*, Argentina's national poem, a play that debuted in Rosario in 1967; the volume *Cuentos populares* (Popular Stories), also in collaboration with Raúl Rubén Peñarol Méndez; and the script for the thriller *El arreglo* (The Deal, 1983), directed by Fernando Ayala. In 1984 Somigliana would also write the script for the historical crime drama *Asesinato en el Senado de la Nación* (Murder in the National Senate, 1984), directed by Juan José Jusid. He is also remembered for two adaptations of William Shakespeare for the Argentine stage: *Macbeth* (1980) and *Richard III sigue cabalgando* (Richard III Rides On).

In addition to his work for the cinema, between 1970 and 1980 he produced several scripts for television, such as *Esta noche . . . miedo* (Tonight . . . Fear, 1970); *Alguien como vos* and *Alguien como usted* (Someone Like You, 1973); *Historias de medio pelo* (Half-Price Stories, 1974); *Mañana puedo morir* (I Can Die Tomorrow, 1979); and *Hombres en pugna* (Men in Conflict, 1980).

A member of the Generation of the '60s, along with **Roberto Cossa**, **Griselda Gambaro**, **Carlos Gorostiza**, **Ricardo Halac**, and **Rodolfo Walsh**, among others, Somigliana is associated with the social-realist-theater movement of that decade. Among his plays are the one-act *La bolsa de agua caliente* (The Hot-Water Bottle, 1967), *De la navegación* (Concerning Sailing, 1969), *El ex-alumno* (The Alumnus, 1970), *Historia de una estatua* (Story of a Statue, 1983), *La democracia en el tocador* (Democracy in the Boudoir, 1988), and *Homenaje al pueblo de Buenos Aires* (Homage to the People of Buenos Aires, 1988), though he is best remembered for two works from the 1980s: *El Nuevo mundo* (The New World, 1981) and *Oficial primero* (First Officer, 1982).

El Nuevo mundo depicts an imaginary, farcical trip by the Marquis de Sade to an unnamed Latin American capital, where those in power freely confess themselves his disciples and fault the French libertine only for his lack of hypocrisy. One of de Sade's disciples says, "¡Extermine a los pobres pero hágalo en nombre del bienestar futuro!" (Exterminate the poor but do it on behalf of future progress!) This work premiered in Buenos Aires in 1981 as part of the first cycle of **Teatro Abierto Argentino** (Open Theater of Argentina), the best-known example of **cultural resistance** to emerge in Argentina during the years of the **military** junta.

His play *Oficial primero* (First Officer) introduced the topic of the *desaparecidos* (missing) to Argentine theater audiences. Presented in 1982 as part of the second cycle of Teatro Abierto Argentino, it depicts a courtroom where the first officer of the title shifts habeas corpus writs from one side of his desk to the other, while scores of young actors signifying corpses tumble onto the stage with each new denial of the writs—the macabre, silent scene underscored by the strains of Viennese waltzes. According to one spectator: "Luego de la caída del telón y la oscuridad de la sala, tras helados segundos de consternación, el público descargaba en aplausos la angustia y el llanto contenidos." (After the curtain fell and in the darkness of the theater, after a few seconds of frozen consternation, the audience discharged in applause the anguish and the tears that had been held back.)

One of the less-remembered chapters of Somigliana's life is his direct involvement in the trials of the military juntas following the restoration of democracy in 1983. A longtime functionary with the federal judiciary, Somigliana was approached by Julio César Strassera, the lead prosecutor, during the months leading to the first trials, to help with the investigation into the abuses perpetrated by the military and to aid in preparing legal briefs. In addition, Somigliana also collaborated directly in elaborating a 12-hour television series, never seen in its entirety, based on courtroom video footage.

The story of the series, and its eventual fate, illuminate the precarious hold of democracy in Argentina during the presidency of **Raúl Alfonsín**. The trials were set to occur between 22 April 1985 and 14 August 1985. Two stationary cameras were placed in the courtroom, although it was determined that they would not focus

directly on any of the defendants. The Argentine media were set to receive three minutes of video, no audio, for daily broadcasts to the nation. Audio of the trials, however, was heard twice by radio audiences during those months: once, during Admiral **Emilio Massera's** historic defense (“En primer lugar, me siento responsable pero no me siento culpable, sencillamente porque no soy culpable” / First, I feel responsible but not guilty, simply because I’m not guilty), and on 9 December 1985, when Carlos Arslanian, the presiding judge, handed down final verdicts.

Not long after, in April 1986, a group assembled in an apartment in the historic district of San Telmo to collaborate, in secret, on the projected miniseries. According to Claudia Selser, a member of the group, the idea for a series had received the blessing of President Alfonsín. Other members of the team included the journalist Mariana Taboada, the lawyer and **human-rights** specialist Juan Antonio Travieso, and Somigliana, who was chosen to write the script. The team labored until 24 December 1986 choosing a musical score, selecting, writing, and editing for the series, which lacked a voice-over narrative. In the end, despite dissension, the team decided to let the material speak for itself.

The series creators thus planned to reveal to Argentine television audiences practices such as the illegal adoption of children born in captivity to **tortured** prisoners, a fact then unknown to many Argentines; the detention and execution of high school students in the La Perla secret detention center; the torture of prisoners to the ebb and flow of music from televised World Cup games; and the grotesque situations engendered by the social reality—like the one related by the journalist **Jacobo Timerman**, who, while masked and handcuffed in a cell, was asked by one of his captors for the correct spelling of the word “lobby.” In all, 530 hours of courtroom footage were distilled into a 12-hour miniseries, set to conclude with the historic sentencing by the court.

At the conclusion of the project, Somigliana decided to use a pseudonym for the credits, fearing his links to Teatro Abierto Argentino and the federal judiciary would compromise the series in the public’s mind. The name he chose, Carlos Mentana—foreshadowing perhaps the fate of the series—paid homage to a 19th-century ancestor who died in battle in Garibaldi’s Italy.

In April 1987 Lieutenant Colonel Aldo Rico led the first of the so-called **Carapintadas** uprisings against Alfonsín, and the projected broadcast was shelved, thought too incendiary given the social and political climate. Copies of the series were then made and entrusted for safekeeping to the Somigliana family, to some judiciary members who had presided over the trials of the junta, and to a representative of the **Asamblea Permanente por los Derechos Humanos** (APDH, Permanent Assembly for Human Rights). Copies were also smuggled out of the country and into the fireproof vaults of the Swedish Parliament in Oslo. It is unclear, however, whether copies of the miniseries still exist outside their presumed resting place in Sweden.

Although the series itself remains unseen, some of the original courtroom footage was eventually incorporated into documentaries. One of them, by the journalist Magdalena Ruiz Guiñazú, is titled *ESMA: El día del juicio* (ESMA: Day of Judgment, 1998). It revisits the notorious detention center the **Escuela Mecánica de la Armada** (ESMA, Navy Mechanics School), updating the story of one of the children born within its walls. Also in 1998, the APDH gave a copy of the series to the Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional (Library of the National Congress).

In 2000 the Archivo General de la Nación (General National Archive) began making copies of the original 530 hours of video footage. Four years later, the city of Buenos Aires ruled that the material would be transmitted on cable television in 23 installments and that the final installment, to be shown on a giant screen in the **Plaza de Mayo**, would coincide with a commemorative march on 9 December 2005 by the **Madres de Plaza de Mayo**. Finally, also on 9 March 2005, the television newsmagazine *A dos voces* presented a 90-minute program titled *Lo que nunca se vio del juicio de las Juntas Militares* (What Was Never Seen of the Trials of the Military Juntas). The program incorporated some of the original footage.

Among Somigliana's many admirers, it is generally felt that his dedication to the miniseries, along with a lifelong tobacco habit, led to his early death, by heart attack, on January 1987, scarcely a month after its completion. A few months earlier, he had founded a new theater group, Teatro de la Campana, along with Cossa, Pepe Bove, Rubens Correa, **Oswaldo Dragún**, and Raúl Serrano—some of whom were former colleagues in the Teatro Abierto Argentino—in

the basement of the historic Teatro del Pueblo, in Buenos Aires. In 1990 the directive of the Teatro del Pueblo founded the Fundación Carlos Somigliana (SOMI, Carlos Somigliana Foundation) to support Argentine playwrights. Cossa, who still speaks movingly of the author, is the president of SOMI.

In November 2007 the Teatro del Pueblo and SOMI staged a six-day cycle of plays in honor of the 20th anniversary of his death. The plays were a major success, and all tickets were distributed free to an appreciative public.

SPECIAL SECURITY SERVICE. See SERVICIO ESPECIAL DE SEGURIDAD (SES).

STARK, SERGIO ARELLANO. See CARAVAN OF DEATH.

STROESSNER, ALFREDO (1912–2006). Nicknamed “Lecaya,” (“Old Man” in Guaraní, the language of **Paraguay’s** indigenous people). An army general and the president of Paraguay from 1954 to 1989, Stroessner was one of the most durable dictators in Latin America. He always chafed, however, at being labeled a dictator, and first appearances suggest that his rule (the *Stronato*) was benevolent. He built roads, schools, bridges, highways, and hospitals, and in the 1970s he presided over an economic boom during which the annual growth rate reached 8 percent. Also in the 1970s he built the Itaipú Dam, developing the country’s hydroelectric power. Yet his critics pointed out that the boom failed to benefit the vast majority of the population, that corruption was rampant, and that his regime imposed an almost continual state of siege. Invoking the threat of **communist** subversion, Stroessner waged a “**dirty war**” against enemies real or perceived, using fear, **torture**, disappearances, and **exile**. Among his victims were rural **guerrillas** during the 1950s and 1960s, as well as priests and members of the Paraguayan **Catholic Church**, which by the late 1960s had become a voice for social justice. In the 1970s he repressed Christian Agrarian Leagues, whose members were rounded up and held in concentration camps. He sheltered Nazis such as Josef Mengele, the “Angel of Death.” And in 1975 he joined the newly created **Operation Condor**, a secret security organization that included the **military** dictatorships of **Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,**

and **Uruguay**. Condor hunted down, tortured, and disappeared one another's political enemies.

Alfredo Stroessner was born on 3 November 1912 in the city of Encarnación, Paraguay, where his father, a German immigrant, had founded a successful brewery. In 1929, at age 17, he entered the Military College in Asunción, and when the second Chaco War (1932–1935) broke out with Bolivia, he, like his fellow cadets, was sent into battle. He emerged from the war with two medals for bravery and a promotion to first lieutenant. Although Paraguay was victorious, both countries had lost thousands of lives and now faced ruined economies and political upheaval. In Paraguay, one coup followed another. At first, Stroessner stayed clear of politics and pursued his studies. In 1936 he was promoted to captain, and in 1940 he was promoted to major and was sent to Brazil for special artillery training. In 1943, back in Paraguay and working as an artillery instructor, he was forced to take sides in an attempted coup against General Higinio Morínigo. He sided with Morínigo, and after the coup failed, he was rewarded with a nomination to the Superior War College. After graduating, he was promoted to lieutenant colonel and put in charge of an artillery regiment.

In March 1947 another coup against Morínigo ignited a civil war. Although a majority of the military officers backed the rebels, Stroessner remained loyal, and his artillery regiment fought alongside the **Partido Colorado** (Red Party) and its peasant troops, the *py nandí* (Guaraní for “barefoot ones”). His forces played a decisive role in the final battle, and after the rebels were defeated on 20 August, he was hailed as a hero and decorated. Now politically ambitious, he began to plot, developing a knack of choosing the right side. In June 1948 he joined a group of officers to oust Morínigo, and then, in October 1948, joined a second coup, this one aimed at ousting the new president, Juan Natalicio González. But the second coup failed—the one time Stroessner picked a losing cause. He escaped to the Brazilian embassy hidden in the trunk of a car and went into exile.

Stroessner returned in February 1949 to help stage a coup that installed Felipe Molas López as president. Molas López rewarded him with a promotion to brigadier general. In September 1949 Stroessner betrayed Molas López in favor of Federico Chávez, who rewarded Stroessner with rapid promotions—to commander of the country's

artillery (1950), commander of the First Military Region (1951), and commander in chief of the army (1951). On 5 May 1954 Stroessner overthrew Chávez in a bloody coup and an interim president was put in place. But Stroessner, the new political force, engineered his own election to the presidency. He ran unopposed on the Colorado ticket on 11 July 1954 and was inaugurated on 15 August.

Stroessner ruled singlehanded, supported by the Partido Colorado—purged of all rivals—and the military, their loyalty rewarded with patronage and a share in Paraguay's second most important industry after agriculture: smuggling. The country was at the center of Latin America's trade in contraband goods such as cigarettes, cocaine, coffee, and whisky. Despite this pattern of rule, the country maintained the trappings of democracy, and Stroessner was reelected—by large margins—every five years beginning in 1958. But the elections served merely to anoint him—he ran unopposed or against token opposition.

By the mid-1980s opposition groups began to mobilize. Even the Partido Colorado and the military were looking ahead to the post-Stroessner period. Stroessner was over 70 years old, and the average age of his cabinet, whose composition seldom changed, was 68. Nevertheless, he sought reelection in February 1988 and claimed 89 percent of the vote, though opposition members denounced the election as a fraud. On 3 February 1989 he was ousted in a coup led by General Andrés Rodríguez, his second in command, whose daughter Martha was married to Stroessner's son Freddy.

Stroessner and his family were granted asylum in Brazil, which he never left for fear of being arrested. Shunned by his friends and separated from his wife, the former Eligia Mora, he lived in virtual isolation. His son Freddy, a cocaine addict, committed suicide. In 1994 his eldest son, Gustavo, was divorced on the grounds of physical abuse. His daughter, Graciela Concepción de Dominguez, became a widow, but then remarried, and both of his daughters-in-law fought over his property in court.

On 15 August 2006 Alfredo Stroessner died of pneumonia after a hernia operation in a Brasília hospital.

SUÁREZ MASÓN, CARLOS (1924–2005). Also known as *Pajarito* (Birdie) and *El Cacique* (Chief). **Argentine** general and commander

of the First Army Corps in Buenos Aires. He was a hard-liner during the repression and wanted the **military** to retain power indefinitely. As commander, he was responsible for dozens of secret detention centers in Buenos Aires and surrounding areas, where some 5,000 people were detained, **tortured**, and murdered. After the return to civilian rule, he fled to California to escape prosecution but was discovered in 1987 and extradited to Argentina, where he was put on trial for murder and kidnapping. In 1990, however, before his trial ended, he was pardoned, along with other generals, by President **Carlos Saúl Menem**. He faced trial again, in the late 1990s, for trafficking in babies born to political prisoners, a crime not covered by the earlier pardon. While awaiting trial, Suárez Masón, like other Argentine prisoners over 70, was held under house arrest. But after he violated this privilege by leaving his house in January 2005 to attend a party for his 80th birthday, he was rearrested and sent to prison. On 21 June 2005, shortly after the Supreme Court ruled the generals' pardons unconstitutional, he died in a military hospital. By then he was awaiting trial not only for baby trafficking but also for kidnapping and murder. Although he escaped conviction in Argentina, Italian courts sentenced him in 2004 to life in prison in absentia for the murder of Italian-Argentines.

SUPREME MILITARY COURT. The highest court in the **military**-justice system during **Brazil's** 1964–1985 military dictatorship. It was composed of 15 judges, all appointed for life: four generals, three admirals, three air force commanders, and five civilians. Formerly based in Rio de Janeiro, the court moved to the capital, Brasília, during the presidency of **Emílio Garrastazú Médici** (1969–1974), when the military's "**dirty war**" against its perceived political enemies reached its peak.

The Court was the final court of appeals in a process that began, at the bottom, with **torture** centers—for example, Operação Bandeirantes (OBAN, Operation Pioneer) or the Destacamento de Operações Internas—Comando Operacional de Defesa Interna (DOI—CODI, Information Operations Detachment—Operational Command for Internal Defense)—which would extract written confessions from political prisoners. Once the confessions were obtained, the prisoners were allowed civilian lawyers, who represented them at trials before

regional military tribunals, composed of four military officers and one civilian judge. During the trials, some defendants—an estimated 25 percent—denounced their confessions as having been obtained through torture. Usually, such denunciations would have no effect on the verdict—the defendant would be dismissed as a liar and found guilty. Still, the denunciations would be added to the trial’s transcript.

All verdicts from the military tribunals were appealed to the Supreme Military Court, and on the rare occasion that a tribunal ruled in favor of the defendant, the Court almost always reversed the decision. All the documents related to the proceedings of the tribunals and the Court were stored in the Court’s archive. It was these documents that were secretly photocopied by the **Brasil: Nunca Mais** (BNM, Brazil: Never Again) project, documents that contained clear evidence that the government employed torture.

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TABOADA TERÁN, NESTOR (1929–). **Bolivian** novelist, historian, and journalist. Born in La Paz, Taboada Terán belongs to the so-called Chaco generation, those Bolivians who grew up in the shadow of Bolivia’s defeat by **Paraguay** in the two Chaco Wars (1928–1930, 1932–1935). In the author’s case, the war cast a long shadow: his father died in the second of these conflicts, when the author was only three years old. His writing career began with the publication of the short story “Claroscuro,” which in 1948 won him an award and the attention of critics. He completed studies in graphic arts in **Brazil** and journalism in Ecuador.

Intensely patriotic since his earliest years, Taboada Terán has spoken of an anecdote of his youth in a 2008 interview: at age 14, he saw headlines about Bolivia’s foundering economy on the front page of a journal in La Paz. He immediately presented himself at the offices of the newspaper, demanded an explanation, and offered himself as his country’s savior. The editors, good-naturedly, took his picture and published it in the paper, accompanied with a note in which he was described as *un pichón de tigre* (a tiger’s cub). Years later, Taboada Terán would join the Partido de Izquierda Revolucionaria

(Leftist Revolutionary Party), which he abandoned in 1950 to found, with other intellectuals, the Partido Comunista de Bolivia (Bolivian Communist Party). The Partido Comunista threw its support behind the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR, Movement for National Revolution) during the elections of May 1951.

Like many other young radicals during the 1960s and 1970s, Taboada Terán traveled to Africa, **Chile**, China, Cuba, and the Soviet Union. A linotypist by trade until the publication of his first novel, in 1964 he was named Director of Culture for the Universidad Técnica de Oruro and later the Universidad Mayor de San Simón de Cochabamba. His first novel, *El precio del estaño* (1960, The Price of Tin) is based on the December 1942 massacre of miners in the Catavi mining sector, the locale of the 1967 massacre denounced in the testimonial memoir by **Domitila Barrios de Chungara**. As with his next book, the collection of short stories *Indios en rebelión* (1968, Indians in Rebellion), Taboada Terán's early works ground the roots of many of his country's social and economic ills in the discrimination suffered by indigenous and *mestizo* (mixed-race) sectors of Bolivian society. His early works and political militancy earned him the censure of the government. In 1972 under the regime of General **Hugo Banzer Suárez**, his personal library was publicly burned in one of Cochabamba's *plazas*, and the author was forced to go into **exile** in Buenos Aires, **Argentina**.

In his Buenos Aires exile, which would last eight years, Taboada Terán returned to the second war of the Chaco, where his father lost his life, with the publication of *El signo escalonado* (1975, The Stepped Symbol). The novel examines the origins of the Chaco conflict and its effect on Bolivia's largely *mestizo* troops, one of whom argues that it is a "transnational" war that has little to do with the reality facing the Bolivian peasants and miners and their Paraguayan counterparts. In 1977 he published what is perhaps his best-known novel, *Manchay Puytu: El amor que quiso olvidar Dios* (Manchay Puytu: The Love God Wanted to Forget), the first in a trilogy of novels that examine the pre-Hispanic and colonial histories of his Andean nation. In 1994 the Bolivian composer Alberto Villalpando would premiere an opera based on this work. Other works in the trilogy are *Angelina Yupanki: Marquesa de la Conquista* (1992, Angelina Yupanki, Marchioness of the Conquest) and *Ollantay: La*

guerra de los dioses (1994, Ollantay: The War of the Gods). *Angelina Yupanki*, published to coincide with the fifth centennial of the arrival of Columbus to the Americas, posits an Andean counterpart to Malinche, the Nahuatl interpreter for the Spanish invaders, traditionally derided in Mexico as the symbolic mother of the first *mestizo* and Cortez's collaborator. Moving away from the social realism of his first novels, the trilogy has been hailed for its mix of oral tradition and history; the matter-of-fact retelling of legends; the presence of magic, all of it leavened by humor, while still retaining the author's preoccupation with the examination of the roots of social injustice. Stylistically, Taboada Terán is distinguished by the linguistic hybridity of the works, less a matter of incorporating indigenous Aymara words into the content than a recreation of the Aymara language syntax; a trait that approximates him to the *indigenista* novel of Latin American writers such as the Peruvian José María Arguedas.

The author of over 70 works, Taboada Terán remains a widely admired figure in his native country. In 2008, he received the Premio Nacional de Cultura (National Prize for Culture) for his work at home and abroad to publicize the cultural patrimony of his country. He is the recipient of the highest civilian decoration bestowed by the Bolivian Congress, "La Bandera de Oro" (the Golden Flag) and was made a trustee of the Fundación Cultural del Banco Central (Cultural Foundation of the Central Bank), the leading body responsible for all museums and archives in Bolivia. He is also a member of the Academia Boliviana de la Lengua (Bolivian Language Academy).

Abroad, he was made Chevalier des Arts et des Lettres by the French government and received several awards in Argentina. In 2001 the Università degli Studi della Tuscia in Viterbo, Italy, established the Nestór Taboada Terán scholarship for a graduate thesis on Bolivian literature. Details of the scholarship and biographical data about the author are available at <http://tinyurl.com/c597gq>.

One of his short stories, "The Indian Paulino," was included in the 2000 anthology *The Fat Man from La Paz: Contemporary Fiction from Bolivia*, and some of his works, such as *Ollantay: Guerra de los dioses*, have been translated into European languages. Apart from that, his work remains largely unknown among the English-speaking reading public. Nestór Taboada Terán lives in Cochabamba, Bolivia.

TEATRO ABIERTO ARGENTINO / OPEN THEATER OF ARGENTINA. An arts initiative conceived by a group of **Argentine** playwrights, actors, and theater folk, Teatro Abierto Argentino resulted in a cycle of 20 one-act plays inaugurated on 28 July 1981 at the Teatro del Picadero in Buenos Aires with the slogan “Vamos a demostrar que existimos” (Let’s show we exist) in response to the abuses perpetrated by the **military** regime.

From its inception, Teatro Abierto Argentino was led by **Oswaldo Dragún** and counted on the collaboration of well-known literary figures such as **Aida Bortnik**, **Roberto Cossa**, **Griselda Gambaro**, **Carlos Gorostiza**, **Ricardo Halac**, **Ricardo Monti**, **Eduardo Pavlovsky**, and **Carlos Somigliana**; in all, 21 playwrights collaborated in that first endeavor. Other noted playwrights, such as **Eugenio Griffiero** and **Jorge Goldenberg**, would later join the collective. In its first season, many public figures provided support, among them the 1980 Nobel Peace Prize laureate **Adolfo Pérez Esquivel** and the writer **Ernesto Sábato**, later president of the **Comisión Nacional de Investigación de Desaparición de Personas** (CONADEP, National Commission on the Disappeared), as did countless theater folk who collaborated in the project without charge and at great personal risk. Among them were 21 directors, including Rubens Correa, Carlos Gandolfo, Jorge Hacker, and Francisco Javier; over 150 actors, including Luis Brandoni, Mirta Busnelli, Carlos Carella, Ulises Dumont, Cipe Lincovsky, Pepe Novoa, Jorge Rivera López, and Pepe Soriano; scores of musicians and composers, including Rodolfo Mederos and Lito Vitale; and costume, stage, and lighting designers, such as Gastón Breyer and Emilio Basaldúa, who since 2006, has been artistic director of the legendary Teatro Colón in Buenos Aires. In addition, the owners of the 340-seat Teatro del Picadero, located at Rauch Passage, offered the use of the newly remodeled theater without charge.

Plays were scheduled to run from 28 July to 21 September 1981 in cycles of seven days per play; three plays were staged every afternoon. Opening time was set for 6:30 p.m., early for Buenos Aires theatergoers, so that artists and theater workers could be at their regular theater jobs at more conventional times. While largely ignored at first by authorities, the initial run was a great success. Tickets for all scheduled performances were sold out before opening day.

Soon mainstream media such as the daily *Clarín* reported on the success of the initiative. Major Buenos Aires publications published reviews and interviews with the participants throughout the months preceding and following the inauguration of the cycle. On 6 August 1981 Teatro del Picadero—named after the old *criollo* term for the earthen ring of early Argentine circuses—was destroyed by arson. Incendiary bombs placed under the stage were determined to have caused the conflagration, although no group assumed responsibility.

A press conference held the next day at Teatro Lasalle, packed for the occasion, brought offers of public support from Esquivel and Sá-bato as well as several artists' unions, in addition to a telegram, read at the occasion, voicing support from **Jorge Luis Borges**. Offers of new space came from 17 theater owners in the city, and the collective voted to move the spectacle to the nearby Teatro Tabarís on Corrientes—Buenos Aires's main commercial theater strip—where Teatro Abierto Argentino completed its run. The new site, with 600 seats, offered nearly three times as much space as the destroyed Teatro del Picadero.

Over its two months of existence, over 25,000 people stood in long lines to buy tickets—a show of cultural solidarity that represented a dangerous act of defiance against the military regime. The success of Teatro Abierto Argentino 1981 encouraged other acts of **cultural resistance** throughout Buenos Aires and the provinces, such as Danza Abierta (Open Dance), Folclore Abierto (Open Folklore), Libro Abierto (Open Book), Música Siempre (Music Forever), Poesía Abierta (Open Poetry), and Tango Abierto (Open Tango). The theatrical cycles were repeated in the following years.

The first cycle of Teatro Abierto Argentino featured the plays *El nuevo mundo*, by Somigliana (translated in 1997 as *New World*); *Lejana tierra prometida* (Distant Promised Land), by Halac; *Coronación* (Coronation), by Roberto Perinelli; *La cortina de abalorios* (The Glass-bead Curtain), by Monti; *Decir que sí* (Saying Yes), by Gambaro; *El que me toca es un chancho* (Timeout), by Alberto Drago; *Criatura* (Creature), by Griffero; *Tercero incluido*, by Pavlovsky (translated in 1997 as *Third Person Included*); *Gris de ausencia*, by Cossa (translated in 1997 as *Grey Song of Absence*); *El 16 de octubre* (October 16), by Ellio Galipolli; *Desconcierto* (Disconcert), by Diana Raznovich; *Chau, rubia* (Bye, Blondie), by Víctor Pronzato;

La oca (Chutes and Ladders), by Carlos Pais; *El acompañamiento* (The Accompaniment), by Gorostiza; *Lobo, ¿estás?* (Wolf, Are You There?), by Pacho O'Donnell; *Papá querido* (Dear Dad), by Bortnik; *For Export*, by Patricio Esteve; *Mi obelisco y yo* (My Obelisk and I), by Dragún; *Cositas mías* (Little Things of Mine), by Jorge García Alonso; and *Trabajo pesado* (Heavy Work), by Máximo Soto. Still another play, *Antes de entrar dejen salir* (Let Us Out Before You Come In), by Oscar Viale, was written for Teatro Abierto 1981 but not staged at that time.

The process of selection of that first cycle of Teatro Abierto Argentino reportedly grew out of informal conversations held by playwrights and theater folk in the cafes frequented by the Buenos Aires artistic community. No specific thematic directives were handed to that first group of authors; instead, authors were asked to write dramas that confronted the social reality of Argentina in 1981. Given the political climate, the resulting works often employed indirection and metaphor to comment on society's responses to the abuses perpetrated by the military junta.

In 1982, with the military junta under increasing pressure because of the faltering economy and the disastrous invasion of the **Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas**, Teatro Abierto Argentino inaugurated a more ambitious cycle at the Teatro Margarita Xirgu, in San Telmo, and the 19th-century Teatro Odeón, demolished in 1991 to create a parking lot. Critical opinions differ about the success of the second cycle because many of the 50 plays, presented in October and November, were experimental. The second cycle was financed by the sale of the book *Teatro abierto 1981*, which had a printing of 8,000 volumes and was distributed throughout Latin America.

In 1983, on the eve of open elections, a street-carnival atmosphere of *murgas* (bands of street musicians) and parades ushered the return of Teatro Abierto Argentino to the Teatro Margarita Xirgu behind a banner that proclaimed "Por un teatro popular y sin censura" (Toward a popular theater without censorship). Under the slogan "A ganar la calle" (Let's win the streets), offerings were expanded to include programs dedicated to Nicaragua and **Chile**, as well as open discussion of the issue of the *desaparecidos* (missing). This third cycle ran from October to December. Despite positive reviews and

lower ticket prices, however, it failed to attract as wide an audience as the previous two.

In 1985, after a one-year hiatus, Teatro Abierto Argentino returned. This fourth cycle provided an opportunity for new areas of dramatic exploration by nontraditional theater participants such as anthropologists, psychologists, and sociologists, as well as theater folk. As a result, the experiences of groups such as marginalized, indigenous urban people, working-class **women**, and veterans of the Malvinas/Falklands War were examined. The fourth cycle was inaugurated with a 48-hour celebration called *El teatrazo* (Big Theater). *El teatrazo* featured theater offerings in conventional places as well as in buses, parks, subways, train stations, and warehouses. In addition, concerts for children and adults were performed, as well as open rehearsals, readings, panels, and classes. The date 21 September 1985 was declared Latin American Theater Day, and the cycle included the participation of invited artists from Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela.

Despite the magnitude of the fourth cycle, 1985 marked the end of Teatro Abierto Argentino. The movement would soon be disbanded because of internal conflicts, diminished attendance, and a lack of funding worsened by the country's growing inflation.

On 6 August 2001, on the 20th anniversary of the fire that destroyed the original home of Teatro Abierto Argentino, Teatro del Picadero reopened in Buenos Aires as *El Picadero*. A commemorative plaque was placed in the theater by the Argentine legislature, although it was later removed and remains missing. Among the first offerings on that occasion was the documentary *Teatro abierto, país cerrado* (Open Theater, Closed Country), by the filmmaker Arturo Balassa. In this documentary, nearly all of the original participants voiced memories of the event. The economic upheavals of the new century dealt a serious blow to the newly reopened theater, which was eventually closed and scheduled for demolition.

In December 2007 a group of artists linked to Teatro Abierto Argentino held a demonstration in front of the shuttered theater, demanding that the government save this memorable symbol of Argentine cultural resistance. In January 2008 the Argentine legislature voted to save it. A new theater is scheduled for construction on the site.

TERUGGI, FRANK, JR. *See* CHARLES HORMAN.

THEBERGE, JAMES (d. 1988). A career diplomat with experience in Latin America, Theberge was appointed by President **Ronald Reagan** in 1982 to serve as U.S. ambassador to **Chile**. While there, Theberge was so strongly associated with the **military** government of General **Augusto Pinochet Ugarte** that he was widely referred to as the junta's "fifth man." In 1986 Ambassador Theberge was replaced by **Harry Barnes**, who reflected the view, held by the second Reagan administration, that Chile and other South American dictatorships should return to democracy. Barnes, in turn, would become a hated figure of the military dictatorship.

TIMERMAN, JACOBO (1923–1999). Argentine journalist. Born in Ukraine, he fled with his family to **Argentina** in 1928 to escape persecution against Jews. In his twenties Timerman began work as a journalist in Buenos Aires for publications such as *El Mundo* and *La Nación*. Censured during the regime of **Juan Perón**, he worked then for the Agence France Press. He first achieved professional success in 1962 with the publication of *Primera Plana*, a weekly news magazine inspired by U.S. models. In 1971 he founded *La Opinión*, a newspaper in the style of the French *Le Monde*. During the period of the "**dirty war**," *La Opinión* became one of the strongest critics of the **military** dictatorship. It campaigned against arrests and disappearances, publishing in its pages the habeas corpus brought to the courts by the families of the missing (*desaparecidos*). After numerous anonymous death threats to Timerman and the bombing of his house and the editorial offices of the newspaper, he was arrested in 1977 by military intelligence agents under the command of General **Ramón Juan Alberto Camps**. While in military custody, Timerman was repeatedly **tortured** and held incommunicado. Upon his release, he was held under house arrest for two years. Soon after, he was stripped of his citizenship and property and put aboard a plane to Israel.

Timerman returned to Argentina in 1984 and became editor of the newspaper *La Razón*. In 1988, then presidential candidate **Carlos Saúl Menem** sued Timerman for libel and defamation. He was acquitted following two separate trials, but the charges were not finally dropped until 1996, following Timerman's flight to **Uruguay** and an

international outcry. An outspoken and at times controversial figure in Latin American journalism, Timerman was a founding member of the press freedom group Asociación para la Defensa del Periodismo Independiente. In 1981 he received the Maria Moors Cabot journalism award by Columbia University in New York.

His best-known work is *Prisoner without a Name, Cell without a Number* (1980), an account of his imprisonment and the abuses of the military dictatorship. A controversial screen version of this work—the screenwriter asked that his name be removed from the credits—was filmed in 1983 by the director Linda Yellen as *Jacobo Timerman: Prisoner without a Name, Cell without a Number*. Timerman is also the author of *Chile: Death in the South* (1987), where he provides testimony from prisoners of the regime of **Augusto Pinochet Ugarte** in **Chile**. See also ANTI-SEMITISM.

TODOS POR LA PATRIA (TPP). See MOVIMIENTO TODOS POR LA PATRIA (MTP).

TORRES GONZÁLEZ, JUAN JOSÉ (c. 1921–1976). Leftist general and president of **Bolivia** (October 1970–August 1971). Coming to power in a coup, he led a revolution supported by miners, peasants, students, and fellow leftist **military** officers. Some of these officers had become revolutionaries after taking part in the 1967 capture of Che Guevara in Bolivia, having been converted through discussions with captured **guerrillas**. Ousted in a right-wing coup by General **Hugo Banzer Suárez**, Torres González fled to **Argentina**, which had not yet fallen to military dictatorship. There he plotted a left-wing countercoup. In June 1976, a little over two months after the Argentine military had seized power, Torres González was kidnapped by a **death squad** and murdered. His corpse was found in Buenos Aires; he had been blindfolded and shot three times. In November 1999 the Argentine government ruled the killing an act of **Operation Condor**, accepted partial responsibility, and awarded his widow \$325,000 in compensation.

TORTURA NUNCA MAIS (RIO DE JANEIRO) / TORTURE—NEVER AGAIN. A **human-rights** nongovernmental organization in **Brazil**. It was founded in 1985 by former political prisoners and by

relatives of the dead and missing (*desaparecidos*). Its objectives are to fight human-rights violations of all kinds; to support people who fight for human rights in the world; to collaborate with national and international human-rights organizations; to offer assistance—both physical and psychological—to victims of organized violence; and to ensure that the human-rights violations of Brazil’s **military** dictatorship are not forgotten, especially the imprisonments, **tortures**, deaths, and disappearances. Because of its efforts, torturers have been removed from public office, health professionals who collaborated with torturers—by issuing false reports, for example—have lost their licenses, and victims have been honored by having roads and schools named after them. Each year it awards the Chico Mendes medal to people or organizations that struggle for human rights in Brazil or elsewhere. It also denounces cases of torture, both old and new, and urges that the violators be brought to justice.

TORTURE. Those abducted by the **military** and security forces during the “**dirty wars**” were routinely subjected to torture, both physical and psychological. Common methods of physical torture were beatings, electric shocks to sensitive areas of the body, repeated submersion, sexual violation, and prolonged suspension. Methods of psychological torture included threats, insults, humiliation, and mock executions.

Torturers were generally members of the military and police. Often each of the service branches and police organizations had its own intelligence operation, and courses on torture were often included in counterinsurgency training. Chile’s secret police, for example, the **Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional** (DINA, Directorate of National Intelligence), drew not only from the military and police but also from civilian extremist groups.

Among the most infamous torture sites was the **Escuela Mecánica de la Armada** (ESMA, Navy Mechanics School), in Buenos Aires. In Chile, DINA operated out of a number of places around Santiago, including **Villa Grimaldi** and Londres 38. In Uruguay, a torture site often recalled is 300 Karl (named for 300 Karl Marx, a military operation directed at members of the Communist Party). Housed in an army base, 300 Karl was referred to by both prisoners and jailers alike as *el infierno* (hell).

Although torture was often used to extract information from prisoners—new suspects were kidnapped because their names were spoken during interrogation sessions—gathering information seems not to have been the primary aim. Indeed, health professionals who specialize in treating torture victims say that information extracted by torture is often unreliable—that victims report having blurted out anything they thought might satisfy their tormentors. Instead, specialists say, the primary aim of torture is to dominate victims by breaking down their personalities and destroying their identities and self-esteem. Many torture victims suffer from depression, guilt, and powerlessness. Many fear authority figures, mistrust strangers, and have difficulty holding on to jobs. They often experience sleeplessness, flashbacks, and nightmares. Some turn to drugs and alcohol or commit suicide.

Some victims receive help from nonprofit organizations that rehabilitate torture survivors. Working often on shoestring budgets, volunteer doctors and therapists interview patients gently, listening to their stories and attempting to treat their physical and psychological wounds. Patients receive emotional support by interacting with others who have had similar experiences. Health professionals agree that societies as well as individuals are affected by torture and need to recover.

TRADE UNIONS. The history of trade unionism in South America is entwined with the history of **communism** in the region. In **Argentina**, the **Confederación General del Trabajo** (CGT, General Labor Confederation) was under leftist control before becoming the backbone of the **Peronist** movement during the 1940s. In the late 1950s, the CGT split into two factions—some unions remained loyal to Perón, others came under independent or leftist control. The CGT's counterparts in **Bolivia**, **Brazil**, **Chile**, and **Uruguay** were under leftist control. In Chile, for example, the Central Única de Trabajadores (CUT, Unified Workers' Central) was dominated by the **Partido Comunista** (PC, Communist Party) and the **Partido Socialista** (PS, Socialist Party). In **Paraguay**, the Confederación Paraguaya de Trabajadores (CPT, Paraguayan Workers' Confederation) was created by the **Partido Revolucionario Febrerista** (PRF, February Revolutionary Party), which was a heterogeneous group

from across the political spectrum, including socialists. Trade unionism, however, had little role in Paraguayan politics—the economy was largely dependent on agriculture and contraband.

Socialist aspirations in these countries contributed to the social unrest that provoked **military** coups. In the repression that followed, trade unionists were often targeted—especially leaders and radical members. Having silenced labor, the military governments proceeded to institute free-market economic policies. Perhaps the best-known example was that of the “shock treatment” administered to the economy by the **Chicago Boys** in Chile. By the late 1970s and early 1980s, however, unions began to recover, working with international organizations, **human-rights** groups, and political parties to create pressure for a return to democracy. In Bolivia, it was a general strike that ousted the military ahead of schedule. Yet labor was by no means homogeneous, and some unionists chose to negotiate with the military regimes.

TRIPLE A. *See* ALIANZA ANTICOMUNISTA ARGENTINA (AAA).

TUPAMAROS. The popular name for the Movimiento de Liberación Nacional (MLN, Movement for National Liberation), an urban **guerilla** organization active in **Uruguay** in the 1960s and 1970s. The name is a contraction of Tupac Amaro (the organization’s spelling of Tupac Amaro [José Gabriel Condorcanqui]), the Inca who in 1780–1781 led a revolt against the Spanish in Peru. The Tupamaros were a colorful group, earning a reputation for carrying out operations with precision and panache. Although often described as a middle-class movement (reflecting Uruguay itself), they recruited men and **women** from all classes and sectors of society. Recruiting took place within networks of family and friends, each recruit known to someone already in the movement. As a further precaution against betrayal and leaks of information, the movement (below the executive level) was divided into columns, which, in turn, were divided into cells. Each column was a replica of the movement as a whole.

The movement’s origins can be traced to 31 July 1963, when a group of leftists raided the Swiss Rifle Club in Colonia, a town 80 miles from Montevideo. At the center of the group was a band of

Socialists led by **Raúl Sendic Antonaccio**, a former law student who had organized sugar workers in northern Uruguay. But the group also attracted leftists of other persuasions (Anarchists, Maoists, Trotskyists)—all committed to bringing about change through armed insurrection. The guerrillas spent several years in preparation—recruiting and training, gathering weapons, and establishing safe houses. In 1965 they adopted the name *Movimiento de Liberación Nacional* (Tupamaros) and in 1967—following some premature encounters with the police—published their first communiqué, declaring themselves outside the law.

Their first two years of public activity are often described as their “Robin Hood” period, in which they attracted attention to themselves and discredited the government rather than attacking the government head-on. In 1969 they made a leap to another level of guerrilla warfare, seizing the town of Pando on 8 October. When it was learned that captured guerrillas were being tortured by the police, the Tupamaros responded by assassinating the torturers. On 31 July 1970 the Tupamaros made an international statement by abducting Daniel Mitrione, a USAID police advisor whom they accused of being a **Central Intelligence Agency** (CIA) member and **torture** instructor. They demanded as ransom the release of 150 political prisoners. As the government was about to give in, the police captured several Tupamaro leaders in the process of planning their next move. The government broke off negotiations, thinking it had gained the upper hand. On 8 August 1970 Mitrione was found dead.

After the Mitrione killing, the Tupamaros—who until then had enjoyed much public support—lost some of their mystique. They also lost many of their members to capture. They were far from defeated, however, conducting an enormous bank heist in November 1970 and kidnapping British ambassador Sir Geoffrey Jackson in January 1971. On 9 September Sendic Antonaccio (captured the year before) led 105 other Tupamaros in a daring escape from Punta Carretas Prison, tunneling to a nearby house. They conducted the operation with Tupamaro flair: a sign left in the tunnel read, “Movement for National Liberation Transit Authority—Please keep to your left.” The organization, triumphant, released Sir Geoffrey unharmed. The government, embarrassed, put antiguerrilla operations in control of the **military**. The Tupamaros, however, had called a truce, having

decided to support a leftist coalition—the Frente Amplio (Broad Front)—in the election scheduled for November 1971. After **Juan María Bordaberry**, a staunch conservative, won the presidency in a controversial election, they ended their truce, assaulting and abducting police officers suspected of participating in **death squads** during the election period. On 14 April 1972 they assassinated four government officials in Montevideo, provoking the government to declare a “state of internal war” (martial law). The military seized the opportunity to escalate its counterinsurgency campaign, and by the end of the year the Tupamaros were crushed. Guerrilla hideouts were discovered, scores of prisoners rounded up, weapons captured, and “people’s prisons” liberated. In September 1972 Sendic Antonaccio was shot in the face during a gun battle and recaptured.

In 1973 the military took control of the weakened government and held power for 12 years. When civilian rule returned in March 1985, the Tupamaros and other political prisoners were released under an amnesty. Sendic Antonaccio remade the Tupamaros into a legal political party, which joined the Frente Amplio. In February 1987 they began a campaign—joined by **trade unions**, **human-rights** organizations, and other leftist political parties—to force a referendum on whether to overturn an amnesty that had been granted to the police and military in December 1996. The issue was put to a vote in 1989, and the amnesty law was upheld.

The actions of the Tupamaro guerrillas—especially the Mitrione killing—were the subject of the film *State of Siege*, directed by **Costa-Gavras**, and the novel *El color que el infierno me escondiera* (published in English as *El infierno*), by Carlos Martínez Moreno.

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UNIDAD POPULAR (UP) / POPULAR UNITY. A coalition of five leftist political parties in **Chile**, including the **Partido Comunista** (PC, **Communist** Party) and the **Partido Socialista** (PS, Socialist Party). Formed in 1969, the UP helped elect **Salvador Allende Gossens** to the presidency in 1970. The UP enjoyed the broad support of the Chilean working class, many of whom were urban workers who had been traditionally excluded from the democratic process. UP

leader Salvador Allende Gossens presented a party platform advocating reform, not revolution—a “peaceful road” toward a democratically based socialist government.

Once in office, the UP tried to fulfill its main objective of redistributing wealth and power. Its program was vigorously opposed by the right and center party representatives in the legislature, particularly the Christian Democrats, and by the upper and middle classes. Attempts to circumvent the opposition resulted in economic and social chaos. In the end, the UP fell victim to elements from both inside and outside the country. Protests were organized by conservative **women’s** groups, professional guilds (*gremios*), and business and landowners associations. Meanwhile, through economic blockades and political conspiracies, the **United States**, under the administration of President Richard Nixon, sought to destabilize the economy and discredit the government. The UP was overthrown in a coup led by General **Augusto Pinochet Ugarte** on 11 September 1973.

UNIÓN CÍVICA RADICAL (UCR) / RADICAL CIVIC UNION.

A centrist, primarily middle-class political party in **Argentina**. By no means radical in the sense that the word is usually understood in Anglo-American politics, the UCR is committed to the rule of law. President **Raúl Alfonsín** (1983–1989), representing the UCR, oversaw the country’s transition to democratic rule. *See also* PERONISM.

UNITED NATIONS. The UN Charter, drawn up in 1945 in the wake of the Holocaust, committed the organization and its members to the protection of **human rights**. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, prepared by the Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) and adopted by the UN General Assembly on 10 December 1948, recognized two categories: economic, social, and cultural rights, which include the right to an adequate standard of living for individuals and their families (Article 25); and civil and political rights, which include freedom from arbitrary arrest (Article 9) and freedom from **torture** (Article 5). When the Declaration was first adopted, there was not enough agreement among members to make it legally binding. Later the two categories of rights were separated into two documents. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

came into effect on 3 January 1976; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights came into effect on 23 March 1976. The two covenants and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights make up the International Bill of Human Rights.

The UN established agencies and procedures to address human-rights concerns. Primary responsibility fell to the UNHRC and its Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities (renamed in 1999 the Sub-Commission on Discrimination and Protection of Human Rights). One difficulty lay in deciding how to protect human rights without interfering in the domestic affairs of a nation—the charter prohibited interference. For many years, there was no procedure in place for acting on complaints. In 1967 the UN introduced resolution 1235, which allowed the UNHRC to review complaints for consistent patterns of “gross violations.” In 1970 a new resolution, 1503, took the procedure a step further, allowing for the preparation of a confidential blacklist of offending governments. Under 1503, complaints received by the UN would first undergo a general review. Those revealing a consistent pattern would be passed on to a group of five subcommissioners, who would compile a preliminary blacklist. After being voted on in August by the full subcommission, the list would go to the UNHRC, where a similar process would take place six months later. Blacklisted governments would first be reprimanded in private. If they did not improve, the procedure called for them to be reprimanded in public.

Offending governments, however, were themselves members of the UNHRC and went to considerable efforts to avoid censure; hence the importance within the UNHRC of Special Procedures, or Special Rapporteurs, consisting of working groups and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) concerned with human rights. Some rapporteurs focused on themes (for example, disappearances, summary execution, and torture); others focused on individual countries. Free of government constraints, the rapporteurs documented human-rights abuses and issued reports suggesting the actual scope of the problem. NGOs, such as **Amnesty International** and the **International Commission of Jurists** (ICJ), had to abide by strict rules. To participate in the UN—to speak at meetings and distribute documents—they had to become accredited, proving their financial independence and promising to refrain from “politically motivated” attacks on governments.

This was the context in the 1970s when the UN examined the human-rights situation in South America.

ARGENTINA: After the **military** coup of March 1976, Gabriel Martínez, **Argentina's** ambassador to the UN, turned his attention from trade (his specialty) to the defense of the junta's human-rights record. As early as August 1976, the UN subcommission, meeting in Geneva, drafted a resolution on behalf of two thousand political refugees—mostly leftists—who had escaped military regimes in their own countries and were now at risk in Argentina. The resolution had been prompted by the deaths of Héctor Gutiérrez Ruiz and Zelmar Michelini, **Uruguayan** legislators who disappeared in Buenos Aires in May. The resolution passed despite Martínez's objections, and Argentina was well on its way to making the blacklist.

The case against the junta began to build. In November a team from Amnesty International went on a fact-finding mission to Argentina. The team's report, published on 23 March 1977 (on the eve of the first anniversary of the coup), contained a clear record of political abductions and won Amnesty International the Nobel Peace Prize for 1977. The junta, however, took the offensive. It accused four NGOs of making politically motivated attacks, citing a long-neglected UN rule requiring NGOs to renew their accreditation, or consultative status, every four years. The UN called a special meeting early in 1978 to consider the charge. Nothing definitive came out of the meeting, but Martínez claimed victory, noting that from then on the NGOs would have to act with more caution. Meanwhile, in 1977, Argentina had avoided the preliminary blacklist by the narrowest of margins. Given a year's reprieve, Martínez set out to pack the subcommission—his own role on the commission was limited to that of observer. In 1978 he engineered the election of Mario Amadeo, a fellow Argentine, and the defeat of several of Argentina's most vocal critics. Martínez's efforts paid off for the junta. When Argentina made the preliminary list in 1978 and the case advanced to the full subcommission, Amadeo asked for one more year, arguing that the abductions had ceased and that the government needed more time to examine individual complaints. The subcommission voted to spare the junta once again.

The junta's reprieve was short-lived. On 20 December 1978 the UN General Assembly passed a resolution condemning disappearances,

citing excesses committed by police and security forces. The resolution did not mention any country but was clearly aimed at Argentina. An even stronger statement—this time naming Argentina—came in February 1979 at the session of the UNHRC in Geneva. Delegates from Western Europe and North America proposed that complaints about disappearances be collected and analyzed by the secretary general. The proposal carried a strong threat of establishing a working group like the one that had been sent to **Chile**. Martínez answered the threat using a variety of methods. He drafted an alternative proposal, lobbied Socialist and non-Western delegates for support, filibustered, and at a crucial moment in the negotiations walked out of a UNHRC meeting. The issue was tabled until the 1980 session.

For three years Martínez had managed to keep Argentina off the blacklist. In 1979 he conceived a plan to buy even more time. He decided to stop fighting the inevitable and to allow the blacklisting, knowing that the case would be kept confidential for a year. Both the five subcommissioners and the full subcommission voted to forward the name of Argentina on to the UNHRC, which would meet the following February. On 28 January 1980 Martínez appeared before a group of five UNHRC delegates and presented a 92-page response to concerns raised at the 1979 session of the UNHRC. The delegates found the response lacking and put tough questions to Martínez. The implication was that a failure to answer the questions would open the case to the public the following year. The next month, at the UNHRC meeting, Jerome Shestack, the delegate from the **United States** and a **Jimmy Carter** appointee, maintained the tough line of questioning despite the Carter administration's softened stance toward Argentina. His efforts earned him a rebuff from the State Department but moved the case of Argentina forward at the UN. The French renewed the call for a working group on disappearances in response to the 1977 abduction and murder of two French nuns who had been working with the **Madres de Plaza de Mayo** (Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo).

Martínez was in retreat—so much so that in August 1980 an Argentine foreign ministry official advised the junta to put an end to the disappearances and return the country to civilian rule. Meanwhile, the UN formed the Working Group on Disappearances and, over the objections of Martínez, authorized it to intervene on behalf of individuals and to collect information from nonaccredited NGOs,

a category that would include most of the NGOs in Argentina. The junta received a public reprimand in December 1980 when the UN working group released its report on disappearances (the group had visited Argentina in October). By then, however, **Ronald Reagan** had been elected president, and the junta gained renewed life. Michael Novak, Shestack's successor, voted with Argentina and Chile against extending the working group's mandate.

BOLIVIA: In 1981 the UNHRC passed a resolution condemning human-rights abuse in **Bolivia**. The country would also be mentioned in reports of the UN's Working Group on Disappearance, created in 1980.

BRAZIL: Because of the efforts of Amnesty International, the UN had become aware of the practice of torture in countries such as **Brazil**, Chile, Greece, South Vietnam, and Uruguay. In 1975 the UN General Assembly passed a declaration against torture, but it neither named nor confronted the offending governments. The failure prompted a call for a convention specific to torture. The UN's Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment went into effect on 26 June 1987.

CHILE: In 1975 the UN established a working group to visit Chile. It was not until July 1978, however, that the regime of **Augusto Pinochet Ugarte** allowed a visit to take place. The group, led by Theo van Boven, the director of the Human Rights Division of the UN, met with Pinochet Ugarte, with former democratically elected Chilean presidents, and with relatives of people who disappeared. It visited prisons as well, including **Villa Grimaldi**, a detention center where the **Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional** (DINA, Directorate of National Intelligence), the secret police, once tortured its prisoners. Although Chilean officials denied that the villa had been put to that use—it was now an officers' club—prisoners previously held there convinced team members of its former purpose. Many believe that Pinochet Ugarte permitted the visit in the hope of being rewarded for his cooperation. After all, Chile was the first country to allow a human-rights investigation by the UN. The group's report, however, provided a comprehensive look at the human-rights situation in Chile, covering not only torture and disappearance but also issues such as health care, unemployment, child welfare, and labor laws. The visit helped direct the attention of van Boven—and the UN—to

Latin America in general, and in 1981 the UNHRC passed a public resolution condemning rights abuse in Chile.

PARAGUAY: Paraguay was placed on the UNHRC confidential blacklist in 1975. Like other countries labeled “gross violators by the UNHRC,” it benefited from the confidentiality requirement of the 1503 resolution. In speaking before the UNHRC, one NGO representative resorted to referring to Paraguay as “a small landlocked country somewhere in Latin America.” In 1986 the UN reported that 94 percent of Paraguay’s political prisoners were unsentenced.

URUGUAY: Uruguay was placed on the UNHRC confidential blacklist in 1976. Like Paraguay, it benefited from the confidentiality provided by the 1503 resolution. For three years, the case was kept under review without any improvement in the country’s human-rights record. The commission’s failure to make the case public during that period is attributed to the personality of its Uruguayan delegate, Carlos Giumbruno, whose emotional displays in defense of his country were effective and mistaken for cooperation. In 1979 the commission, faced with a decision, opted to send an envoy to Uruguay. UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim appointed the Peruvian-born Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, an experienced diplomat, the current undersecretary general for political affairs, and the future secretary general.

Pérez de Cuéllar traveled to Montevideo in December 1979, accompanied by Carlos Giumbruno. His 1980 report, sympathetic with the military regime, was leaked and proved embarrassing to the UN. Its conclusions—that prison conditions were reasonable and that no one was imprisoned because of his or her ideas—were flatly contradicted by those of another report, also leaked, issued about the same time by the Red Cross. The commission, which could neither reject the report of its own envoy nor embrace its findings, decided to keep the case of Uruguay under review and to ask Secretary General Waldheim to make additional efforts the following year.

Despite its efforts, the UNHRC came under criticism. **Jeane Kirkpatrick** and others accused it of double standards—for singling out Argentina and Chile, for example, instead of Cuba. Other critics pointed out that it failed to respond to issues or responded slowly—in 1981 it passed a resolution condemning Cambodia, after Pol Pot’s murderous regime (1975–1979) had been ousted. These criticisms

persisted. In 2006 the failure to act against Sudan and Zimbabwe prompted UN Secretary General Kofi Annan to scrap the UNHRC and replace it with the Human Rights Council, a smaller, standing body whose members, it was hoped, would include human-rights proponents from every region. *See also* ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES.

UNITED STATES. U.S. involvement in the “**dirty wars**” can be traced to the advent of the Cold War. From the 1950s onward, the United States trained thousands of Latin American **military** students at its School of the Americas (at locations such as the Panama Canal Zone and Fort Benning in Columbus, Georgia) and other army facilities such as the Inter-American Defense College (IADC), at Fort Lesley J. McNair in Washington, D.C. (The School of the Americas is now called the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation.) In the absence of any external threat, the primary concern of this military cooperation was to combat **communist** subversion, the fear of which became more pronounced after Fidel Castro came to power in Cuba in 1959. Students at the U.S. facilities were trained in counterinsurgency and anticommunism and immersed in North American culture and values. Some were groomed for leadership: the IADC curriculum included courses in financial management, communications, and international finance. The result was the creation in each country of a military that equated its interests with those of the United States and could be expected to maintain stability. Among the graduates of the IADC, for example, were Admiral **Emilio Massera** of **Argentina** and General **Gustavo Leigh Guzmán** of **Chile**, both of whom were members of ruling juntas, and General José Cardozo of **Uruguay**, who headed his country’s antisubversives board. This military cross-fertilization—Argentina also drew on the advice of French officers who had fought in Algeria—led to a rethinking of the primary role of the military in Latin America. The military identified the primary threat as coming not from external forces but from internal “subversives” who blended in with everyday society. An unconventional enemy called for unconventional warfare and had to be rooted out, even in disregard of internationally recognized **human rights**.

Although the United States supported the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for much of the Cold War the country’s

foreign policy ignored or paid little attention to human rights. During the administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower (1953–1961), Secretary of State John Foster Dulles equated the support of human rights with the containment of Soviet-led communism. The short-lived administration of John F. Kennedy (1961–1963) continued the anticommunist approach to policy. To that end, it unveiled the Alliance for Progress, a program aimed at promoting economic development and rescuing people from poverty and repression. The assumption was that flourishing economies were the best defense against communist aggression. A bureaucracy was needed to administer U.S. assistance, and the Agency for International Development (AID) was created. The problem was how to keep communism away until prosperity took hold. The answer was to use military aid to bolster countries' national security. Out of this concern arose the **guerrilla-fighting** U.S. Army Special Forces (Green Berets) and a wide range of military support to Latin American and other countries—advisors, engineers, and increased training.

When Kennedy was assassinated in 1963, optimism died with him. During the administration of President Lyndon Johnson (1963–1969), an increasing number of AID personnel received military training, and a large share of the economic aid for Latin America went for counterinsurgency training. During the administration of President Richard Nixon (1969–1974), human rights—secondary considerations under Kennedy and Johnson—were devalued further. Nixon's secretary of state, **Henry Kissinger**, made no secret of his belief that human rights often interfered with other foreign-policy objectives.

In the early 1970s, political fallout from the Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal led to a questioning of a foreign policy preoccupied with anticommunism. The impetus came from Congress, especially Representative Donald M. Fraser, whose Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the Foreign Affairs Committee conducted a series of human-rights hearings, beginning in 1973. As the hearings continued over the next three years, the countries of Latin America fell under scrutiny. Congress was outraged by what it heard to the point of legislating against continued assistance. Congress had been especially shocked by growing evidence of U.S. involvement in the overthrow of President **Salvador Allende Gossens** in Chile. The administration of President **Jimmy Carter** (1977–

1981) built on congressional efforts and gave the issue of human rights an independent status, separating it from what Carter called the U.S.'s "inordinate fear of communism." He named **Patricia Derian**, an outspoken human-rights advocate, to head the State Department's Bureau of Human Rights. The enforcement of Carter's human-rights policy, however, was inconsistent. Even in Latin America, where the administration's pressure was credited with saving many lives, the policy succumbed to pragmatism over time.

With the administration of President **Ronald Reagan** (1981–1989), Cold War policy returned. The protection of human rights was once again reduced to the fight against communism. Leading the attack on Carter's human-rights record was **Jeane Kirkpatrick**, the U.S. ambassador to the UN. By the beginning of Reagan's second term, however, Kirkpatrick's ideas had fallen out of favor. Overlooking human-rights abuses committed by anticommunist allies was seen as counterproductive, since repression often provokes unrest. Reagan's policy shifted from fighting communism to promoting democracy, at least in South America and the Caribbean, where Chile, Haiti, and **Paraguay** were beneficiaries. On the other hand, anticommunism still drove policy in Central America, where the administration aimed at overthrowing the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and defeating the guerrillas in El Salvador. Nevertheless, it was the South American and Caribbean successes that influenced the administrations of George H. W. Bush (1989–1993) and Bill Clinton (1993–2001), who tended to equate democracy promotion with human rights. That view was reflected in the name change of the Bureau of Human Rights, which is now the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor.

The United States was the venue for the landmark human-rights case *Filártiga v. Peña-Irala* (1980), which the Center for Constitutional Rights has called "probably the most important domestic international human rights case of the modern era." It has been the basis for nearly 20 successful human-rights cases brought on behalf of citizens from Argentina, Chile, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Mexico, Nicaragua, and the Philippines. Ironically, the case came under scrutiny during the administration of George W. Bush (2001–2009), which argued that the precedent could dissuade foreign allies from assisting the United States in its so-called war on terror.

URUGUAY (1973–1985). Uruguay, like **Chile**, fell under **military** control in 1973. Until then, both countries had been admired for their strong democratic institutions—Uruguay having earned such nicknames as “the Switzerland of America” and “the Sweden of the South.” Unlike Chile and **Argentina**, however, whose transitions to military rule occurred suddenly on dates etched in collective memory, Uruguay’s descent into dictatorship was long and drawn out. Another important difference is that whereas fewer people died in Uruguay than in either Chile or Argentina, Uruguay had a larger percentage of political prisoners—more per capita than in any other country in the world. Under military rule, the one-time “Switzerland of America” was transformed into what **Eduardo Galeano** would call “a vast **torture** chamber.”

BACKGROUND TO THE “DIRTY WAR”: Traditionally, Uruguay has been ruled by two political parties: the **Colorados** (Reds) and the **Blancos** (Whites). In 1903 the progressive José Batlle y Ordóñez, a Colorado, was elected president, and during his two terms in office (1903–1907 and 1911–1915), he transformed the country into a welfare state—the first in Latin America. He enacted labor reforms such as the eight-hour workday, the right to strike, and workmen’s compensation. He passed social legislation, legalizing divorce and advancing the rights of **women**. And he nationalized important industries such as utilities, banking, insurance, and transportation. His actions and policies increased the standard of living.

In 1929 the death of Batlle y Ordóñez and the start of the Great Depression brought dissension in both parties as well as economic crisis. The situation resulted in a coup, the first in Uruguay in the 20th century—the second would come in 1973. On 31 March 1933 President Gabriel Terra dissolved parliament and altered the constitution. By 1938, however, elections were allowed, and by 1942, the changes to the constitution were reversed. Although the period from 1933 to 1942 could be described as a dictatorship, it was a dictatorship of politicians, not of the military. The dictatorial interlude (known as the *dictablanda*, or “soft” dictatorship) was free of torture, execution, and political prisoners, and there was little censorship. Constitutional rule returned as quietly as it left, bringing with it the civil liberties, distributive policies, and stability that characterized the Batlle y Ordóñez years.

This stability was financed by the robust export economy the country enjoyed during World War II and the Korean War. By the early 1950s Uruguay—then a prosperous, middle-class welfare state—had reached the height of what many consider its golden age. Eager to share in the spoils, the Blancos joined forces with the Colorados in realizing a dream of Batlle y Ordóñez’s—a completely collegial executive, which guaranteed the Blancos a share of executive power. A new constitution, promulgated in 1952, eliminated the office of president and packed all executive functions into a nine-member *Colegiado*—six seats for the winning party, three for the runner-up. The new constitution also legitimized a patronage system begun in 1931 by what was jocularly known as the *Pacto de Chinchulín* (Pork Barrel Pact), which ensured each party a share in public employment.

By the mid-1950s declining exports and a poor domestic economy contributed to economic stagnation, which would play an important role in the coming social unrest and military intervention. In 1958 the economic crisis, combined with strong antiurban sentiment among ranchers and farmers, helped the Blancos accomplish what had eluded them for 93 years—victory in a national election. It was widely hoped that a change in the majority party would return the country to happier days. What the change actually meant was that the Blancos would be entitled to a larger share of a dwindling amount of patronage. The economy continued to stagnate under new leadership, and although the Blancos won the next presidential election in 1962, they did so by a much smaller margin than in 1958. The *Colegiado* was widely blamed for the crisis, and people began to clamor for a president—for a strong leader who could take decisive action.

The election of 1966 included a plebiscite that returned the country to a presidential system, abolishing the *Colegiado*. It created an Office of Planning and Budget and gave the president control over the economy. The election also returned the Colorados to power in the form of a right-wing faction led by Oscar Gestido, a retired general. President Gestido died within a year, and Jorge Pacheco Areco, his vice president, succeeded him. President Pacheco Areco faced a worsening economy, labor unrest, and the exploits of an urban **guerrilla** group called the **Tupamaros**. He used his executive powers to repress opposition, arguing that constitutional liberties had to be sacrificed in the name of internal order. Labor leaders and other activists

were arrested, and there were reports of beatings and torture. Many legislators objected to the strong measures, but the threat of military intervention on Pacheco's behalf forced them to back down.

The Tupamaros, officially known as the *Movimiento de Liberación Nacional* (MLN, Movement for National Liberation), increased their activities in response to the harsh campaign waged against them by Pacheco. Formed in 1963, the Tupamaros spent the first few years carrying out operations of the Robin Hood variety. In 1969, however, they turned to the main task—to undermine the government. Despite taking their guerrilla warfare to the next level, they managed to retain public support until 1970, when they executed Daniel Mitrione. Mitrione, a retired police chief from Muncie, Indiana, was a police advisor provided through the United States Agency for International Development (AID). According to the Tupamaros and others, he was also an agent of the **Central Intelligence Agency** (CIA) and a torture instructor. Abducted on 31 July, he was found dead on 8 August after the government refused to fulfill the terms of his ransom—the release of all guerrilla prisoners.

The Mitrione killing not only tarnished the Tupamaros' image but also escalated the government's campaign against them, an escalation that led to the capture of many guerrillas within the following year. The imprisoned guerrillas responded by staging a dramatic escape on 9 September 1971, freeing 106 of their comrades. The Tupamaros released a prisoner of their own, Sir Geoffrey Jackson, the British ambassador to Uruguay, whom they had abducted eight months earlier. For the government, the prison breakout was embarrassing and came at the worst possible time. Not only was the national election only two months away, it was an election in which the dominant parties faced their first serious challenger, a left-wing coalition endorsed by the Tupamaros.

The Frente Amplio (Broad Front) coalition comprised the Communists, the Christian Democrats, the Socialists, and two leftist factions from the Colorados and Blancos. Although the Frente's presidential candidate, Liber Seregni, a retired general, was not a Marxist, the coalition's leftist platform appealed to the Tupamaros, who participated in the election through a front organization. A Gallup poll in August had predicted a close race among the three major contestants. On election day, the Colorados narrowly defeated the

Blancos, and both parties gained more than twice as many votes as the Frente. The new Colorado president, a wealthy rancher named **Juan María Bordaberry**, took office on 1 March 1972 for a five-year term. A former member of Pacheco's cabinet, Bordaberry was determined to continue the previous president's campaign against the Tupamaros. But first he had to get past Congress, which objected to the intensity of the campaign. Meanwhile, the Tupamaros ended the informal truce they had called a month before the election. On 14 April 1972 they assassinated several government officials throughout Montevideo. Congress granted Bordaberry's request for a declaration of a "state of internal war"—but only for 30 days. Suspending all constitutional liberties, "internal war" essentially amounted to martial law. Thirty days later, Congress extended the decree for 45 days following much spirited debate. By June the internal war had become so intense that Congress—over the objections of the Frente representatives—extended the decree indefinitely.

The state of internal war meant that the military was in full control of antiguerrilla operations, essentially allowed to combat subversion as it saw fit. By the middle of 1972 the guerrilla movement was in disarray, most of its members either in jail or in exile. The international press reported very few guerrilla casualties (about 30) but many guerrilla prisoners (about 1,600 in August). Charges had begun to surface that prisoners were regularly tortured, reports that led the Uruguayan Roman **Catholic Church** in June to issue a 16-point declaration urging a return to peace. Not only did the government ignore the plea to reverse its course toward militarization but also the military, now politicized, began the long process of taking full control of the government.

THE "DIRTY WAR" AND URUGUAY UNDER DICTATORSHIP: The coup stretched out over a four-month period. The first step began on 12 February 1973 when officers from the army and air force rebelled against President Bordaberry, insisting that the military be given a voice in setting national policy. Bordaberry was allowed to remain president but was instructed to create a Consejo de Seguridad Nacional (COSENA, National Security Council), which would be dominated by the military and would oversee policy. Next, the military took aim at Congress. It viewed the body as obstructionist and was especially angered by the refusal of Congress to lift the immunity of

Senator Enrique Erro, whom it charged with aiding and abetting the Tupamaros. Erro had also voted for an investigation into the alleged use of torture by the military. On 27 June 1973 Bordaberry, with the support of the military, dissolved Congress and replaced it with the Council of State, which was composed of 25 appointed civilians. He also dissolved the communist-controlled Convención Nacional de Trabajadores (CNT, National Convention of Workers), which had called a general strike to protest the closing of Congress. The CNT, ignoring the order to dissolve, continued to strike. Students joined workers in an angry demonstration that racked Montevideo for two weeks. The police and military finally quashed the uprising, making mass arrests of demonstrators as well as labor and political leaders, among them General Liber Seregni.

With the Tupamaros defeated, Congress closed, and the labor movement destroyed, the military consolidated its rule. It banned leftist political parties, took control of the university and secondary schools, and silenced the press. It then turned its attention to the economy, adopting a free-market approach like that taken by the military government in **Brazil**. Although the military was now firmly established, Uruguay was still, technically, a *civilian* dictatorship, since a constitutionally elected president remained in office. In June 1976 the military removed this pretense, deposing Bordaberry and suspending national elections. The newly created Council of the Nation (composed of the Council of State and the 21-member Junta of Generals) was charged with appointing the president and formulating general policy. Executive power resided in COSENA (composed of the president, his ministers, and the commanders of the three armed services). Meanwhile, thousands of Uruguayans lost their political rights, forbidden from taking part in political activity or from holding office. This group included those who had been put on trial for political crimes or had participated in the elections of 1966 and 1971 as either office holders or candidates.

In July 1976 the Council of the Nation elected Dr. Aparicio Méndez Manfredini to the presidency for a five-year term. By this time, plans were under way for a gradual return of the country to civilian government—but on the military's terms. Repression, however, continued. **Human-rights** groups estimated the number of political prisoners to have reached 6,000. Meanwhile, tens of thousands

of Uruguayans had fled the country, many of them academics and artists. In August 1977 the government announced its *cronograma* (timetable), which called for a plebiscite in November 1980 on a constitution drafted by the military. The draft constitution permitted the military to intervene in civilian governments—to suspend constitutional liberties in the name of national security. The draft also severely limited the authority of a legislative body to lift a state of emergency and allowed for the trying of civilians in military courts. If approved, the new constitution would write into law the extralegal acts committed by the dictatorship. On 30 November 1980 the constitution was rejected by 57 percent of the voters.

The military, repudiated, settled in for a lengthy negotiation toward civilian rule. In September 1981 General Gregorio Alvarez Armellino became president, and the government announced a new *cronograma*. The plan called for the reorganization of political parties, the drafting of a new constitution by party leaders and the military, a vote on the constitution in a combined plebiscite election in November 1984, and finally the transition to a civilian government on 1 March 1985. The party reorganization, however, was subject to guidelines set down in a law passed by the Council of State on 3 June 1982. The law banned Marxist parties as well as parties that had made up the Frente Amplio in 1971. The only parties allowed were the Colorados, the Blancos, and a Christian-democratic party called Unión Cívica (Civic Union). The election held in November 1982 to determine party leadership delivered another serious blow to the military. Not only did antimilitary candidates win by a landslide; the top vote getter was Wilson Ferreira Aldunate (“Wilson”), a charismatic Blanco leader.

Rebuffed again, the military employed a delaying tactic, not entering into negotiations until well into 1983. But talks with the opposition parties broke down in July over the issue of national security. The military continued to insist on a national security council, which would allow the generals to intervene in a civilian government and to try civilians in military courts. In September the generals banned all political activity and in late October announced that they would bring a constitution to a vote in November 1984 as scheduled—with or without negotiations. The three legal parties, forming a coalition called the Interpartidaria, responded to this pressure by applying

pressure of their own, organizing demonstrations that continued into the following year. The demonstrations were met in turn by continued government force, which added new political prisoners to the hundreds remaining in detention. Popular unrest was increased by a rapidly declining economy—the country in the midst of a deep recession. The labor movement, reorganized, joined the fray. A new (but illegal) confederation, the *Plenario Intersindical de Trabajadores* (PIT, Interunion Plenary of Workers), supported the demonstrators and applied additional pressure in the form of work stoppages and demands for higher pay. It was also in late 1983 that the opposition gained an important international ally. **Raúl Alfonsín**, the newly elected president of Argentina, made it clear to Uruguay that it should join his country in a return to civilian rule.

By 1984 the military, politically isolated, was eager for a negotiated exit. In anticipation of the elections scheduled for later that year, it passed a law that restored legal status to all leftist parties except the communists. With this move, the generals were determined to avoid a repeat of the 1983 party election, when leftists, unable to slate their own candidates, cast their votes for Wilson. Political tensions increased on 16 June 1984 when Wilson himself returned to Uruguay after 11 years in exile. He was immediately arrested. When talks resumed in July, the Blancos boycotted negotiations in protest of their jailed leader. The remaining opposition parties, negotiating from a position of strength, won important concessions. Most notably, the military dropped its demand for a national security council in return for representation on an advisory body. Despite these gains, Wilson remained in jail (though he was released five days after the election), and neither he nor Seregni would be allowed to run for office.

The Colorados won a narrow victory in the November 1984 elections, receiving 41 percent of the vote. The Blancos received 35 percent; the Frente Amplio, 22 percent; and Unión Cívica, 2 percent. Each party was awarded a proportional number of seats in a newly installed legislature. The leading Colorado candidate, **Julio María Sanguinetti**, became president. According to schedule, he was inaugurated on 1 March 1985.

AFTERMATH OF THE “DIRTY WAR”: By the end of March 1985, Congress passed an amnesty law that released all political prisoners. About 200 prisoners received a general amnesty;

the sentences of about 60 others—those who had participated in assassination and kidnapping—were commuted following reviews by civilian courts. One of those receiving a commuted sentence was **Raúl Sendic Antonaccio**, the founder of the Tupamaros. President Sanguinetti approved of the distinction, arguing that those convicted of violent acts were being released, not out of forgiveness, but in the interest of peace and national reconciliation. In 1985 Congress established the Comisión Investigadora Parlamentaria sobre Situación de Personas Desaparecidas y Hechos que la Motivaron (Commission on the Situation of “Disappeared” People and Its Causes), which documented 164 disappearances, many of whom (about 130) disappeared in Argentina, Chile, or **Paraguay**, presumably victims of **Operation Condor**. (Project Disappeared now puts the Uruguayan figure at about 300.) The commission’s charge did not allow it to investigate illegal detention or torture.

Sanguinetti adopted the “theory of the two demons,” which held the guerrillas and the military equally responsible for the violence. He argued that, for the sake of national reconciliation, the military should be granted an amnesty as well, pointing out that the number of missing (*desaparecidos*) was much smaller in Uruguay than in Argentina—about 170 as opposed to 9,000 to 30,000, though allegations of torture numbered in the thousands. In August 1986 the government proposed legislation that would grant an amnesty to all military and police personnel accused of human-rights abuses. The opposition parties rejected the draft legislation but on 22 December approved a revised version (*Punto Final*) that blocked human-rights trials and placed the responsibility for further investigations on the president. The law provoked widespread opposition from human-rights groups, torture victims, civil-rights lawyers, center-left political parties, **trade unions**, and students. In February 1987 they began a campaign to collect signatures from 25 percent of the registered voters, the number that the constitution required to force a referendum on legislation. Needing at least 555,701 signatures, by December they had collected 634,702, despite opposition to the process from the military and elites. It was not until the end of 1988, however, that the electoral court completed its charge of verifying signatures.

The referendum was scheduled for 16 April 1989. Sanguinetti campaigned in favor of the amnesty, arguing that dredging up the

past would provoke a coup. Opponents of the legislation argued that the only basis for democracy is justice. In the end, the amnesty law, called *Ley de Caducidad* (Impunity Law) was upheld by 53 percent of the voters, though people in Montevideo and young people throughout the country voted strongly against it.

Although the amnesty remained in effect, one of its clauses supplied an opening for human-rights activism. Article 4 directed the government to determine the fate of the disappeared, including the 12 children kidnapped with their parents or born in prison and illegally adopted by military families. Over the next 15 years, however, despite protests and petitions, three democratic administrations ignored the mandate. Not until March 2000, with the inauguration of President Jorge Batlle Ibáñez, did investigations begin. Almost as soon as he took office, Batlle Ibáñez led the search for the granddaughter of the Argentine poet **Juan Gelman**. She had been born 24 years before in a Uruguayan prison. Within a month, Gelman and his granddaughter were reunited. In August Batlle Ibáñez created the Comisión para la Paz (Peace Commission), whose charge was to uncover the fate of the missing and to share this information with victims' relatives. Led by Archbishop Nicolás Cotugno, the commission issued a preliminary report in October 2002. It found evidence that the military dictatorship had been responsible for the disappearance of 26 Uruguayans. All the victims were alleged to have died under torture and been cremated, their ashes thrown into the Atlantic Ocean.

In March 2005 President Tabaré Vázquez, a 65-year-old physician, took office. Leading a left-wing coalition that included former Tupamaros, he acted on a campaign promise to reopen human-rights cases. By July, former President Bordaberry and his foreign minister, Juan Blanco, were charged in connection with the murders of the Uruguayan legislators Zelmar Michelini and Héctor Gutiérrez, who had fled to Argentina when Congress was closed and political parties were banned. Murdered along with them were two suspected guerrillas, William Whitelaw and Rosario Barredo. The murders have since been attributed to Operation Condor. The charge against Bordaberry and Blanco was aggravated homicide—a charge meant to circumvent the amnesty still in effect. They were arrested in November 2006, and the case is being litigated.

UTURUNCOS. The word means “Tigermen” in Quechua. It was the popular name for the Movimiento Peronista de Liberación (MPL, Peronist Liberation Movement), a **guerrilla** organization that appeared in **Argentina** in 1959. Inspired by the success of the Cuban revolution, the MPL took up arms in rural Tucumán Province. The 20 guerrillas, mostly urbanites and students, were unprepared for armed insurrection. A few weeks into their campaign, they were surrounded and captured.

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VALECH COMMISSION. See COMISIÓN NACIONAL SOBRE PRISIÓN POLÍTICA Y TORTURA.

VALENZUELA, LUISA (1938–). Argentine journalist and novelist. Born in Buenos Aires, Valenzuela is the daughter of the Argentine novelist Luisa Mercedes Levinson. Early collaborations in her career included the literary supplement of *La Nación* and *El Mundo*, both in Buenos Aires, as well as a stint at Radio Télévision Française in Paris, where she lived for three years. Her first novel, *Hay que sonreír*, was published in 1966. Between 1969 and 1978 Valenzuela spent many periods abroad, staying in Mexico, Spain, and the **United States**. During the “**dirty war**” in **Argentina**, she resided in the United States, where she taught at Columbia University and New York University. She has been the recipient of many honors, among them a Guggenheim Fellowship in 1982.

Valenzuela’s fiction often seeks to liberate language from the constraints imposed on individuals, particularly **women**, by patriarchy and political power. Sexual relationships are often examined and configured as relationships of power. Translated into several languages, the works most associated with the “dirty war” are the short-story collections *Strange Things Happen Here: Twenty-Six Short Stories and a Novel* (1975) and *Other Weapons* (1982), as well as the novel *The Lizard’s Tail* (1983). An account of the life of José López Rega (*El brujo*, “the sorcerer”), private secretary to **Juan Perón**, *The Lizard’s Tail* is often read as a thinly disguised rendering of the dislocation and horror of Argentine society during the repression. A later

novel, *Black Novel with Argentines* (1990), explores the conditions that gave rise to the “dirty war” in an apparently “civilized” society.

In 1989, after the restoration of democracy, Valenzuela returned to Argentina.

VANGUARDA POPULAR REVOLUCIONÁRIA (VPR) / PEOPLE’S REVOLUTIONARY VANGUARD. *See* CARLOS LA-MARCA.

VANGUARDIA FEBRERISTA / FEBRUARY VANGUARD. A **Paraguayan** armed **guerrilla** group, formed in 1958 by young militants from the **Partido Revolucionario Febrerista** (PRF, February Revolutionary Party), a party **exiled in Argentina**. Led by Arnaldo Valdovinos, the Vanguardia harassed the Paraguayan government of General **Alfredo Stroessner** by launching attacks over the border. Although the Febrerista leaders repudiated the Vanguardia’s militancy, calling it a threat to party discipline, Valdovinos ignored them. He may have felt further committed because of the death of his brother, Raúl Ferrari Valdovinos, murdered in February 1959 by Stroessner’s agents in response to a Vanguardia guerrilla operation. In April 1959 the Febreristas suspended Valdovinos and other Vanguardia leaders from the party, forbidding regional and local party committees to give the Vanguardia any support. Later that year, the Vanguardia merged with another guerrilla group, the **Movimiento 14 de Mayo para la Libertad Paraguaya** (M-14, 14th of May Movement for Paraguayan Liberty), led by Benjamín Vargas Peña, and Valdovinos managed to obtain funding from the leftist democratic government of Rómulo Betancourt in Venezuela. But after being denied the top leadership position, Valdovinos left the movement. By the end of 1960, Valdovinos had been expelled from the party for insubordination, and the Vanguardia broke up. *See also* FRENTE UNIDO POR LA LIBERACIÓN NACIONAL.

VARGAS, MANUEL (1952–). **Bolivian** author and editor. Born in Vallegrande, in the province of Santa Cruz, the author has lived in La Paz since the early 1960s. He is the author of several novels and collections of short stories, among them *Nocturno paceño* (La Paz

Nocturnes), a novel set during the dictatorship of General **Hugo Banzer Suárez**.

In this work, which remains to be translated into English, the presence of Banzer Suárez is the connecting thread for a series of seemingly loosely connected episodes detailing the experiences of young leftist students living in an atmosphere of terror and fear. Chief among them are Adrian and Erwin, recent arrivals from the provinces, who most experience the psychological effects of living under the regime. The novel, however, evades the pitfalls of easy nostalgia. According to the author, while it details the abuses of the regime—disappearances, **torture**, detentions—it also points out the disillusionment of the Bolivian left with the revolutionary ideals of previous decades and the tendency of present Bolivian activists to ignore history. While the author rejects the transcendental character usually ascribed to the historical novel, he has mentioned that the failure of the text to name the dictator is an act of an almost mythical power to eradicate evil. Speaking specifically of the absence of named dictators in the novel, Vargas has said that “naming them made me uneasy. In revenge—oh, the power of literature—I made them ‘disappear.’”

As with earlier Bolivian writers, Vargas seeks to portray the world of Bolivian peasants and their language. Since 1996, he has been an editor of the editorial house *Correveidile* and of a magazine of the same title. He resides in La Paz.

VERBITSKY, HORACIO (1942–). Argentine journalist. Possibly the best-known newspaper columnist in **Argentina**. Since 1987 Verbitsky has published a weekly political commentary in the alternative daily *Página/12* of Buenos Aires. He was awarded the Latin American Studies Association (LASA) Media Award in 1996 and the International Press Freedom Award in 2001. A member of the executive board of the **Human Rights** Watch/Americas, he is also one of the founding members of the Latin American press freedom organization Periodistas.

Born into a family of journalists—his father and several uncles and cousins were all members of the Argentine press—Verbitsky began his career while still in high school as a movie reviewer for

several Buenos Aires publications. In his early years he wrote for the dailies *El Siglo* and *El Mundo* as well as for radio and television programs. During the last two years of the government of **Juan Perón** (1973–1974), Verbitsky joined the **Montoneros** and wrote for the leftist press, including the weekly *CGT*, published by the Argentine General Confederation of Labor, in collaboration with the journalists Rogelio García Lupo and **Rodolfo Walsh**. He combined his clandestine activities with work in mainstream publications such as *Confirmado*, *Primera Plana*, *La Opinión*, and *Clarín*. Between 1974 and 1975 he lived in **exile** in Peru. During the last years of the **military** regime—and after the closing of several publications and the disappearance of fellow journalists—he made a living as a translator for a small agency.

He is the author of several books on Argentine political and economic affairs. His best-known work is *El vuelo* (1995), published in 1996 as *The Flight: Confessions of an Argentine Dirty Warrior*. In it Verbitsky transcribed a series of interviews with **Adolfo Francisco Scilingo**, a former navy captain and member of the notorious **Escuela Mecánica de la Armada** (ESMA, Navy Mechanics School). In the first public admission of guilt by a member of the military, Scilingo detailed how, between 1976 and 1983, thousands of political detainees were drugged, stripped naked, and thrown from navy aircraft into the waters of the Atlantic Ocean.

Nicknamed *el perro* (“the dog”) for his relentless reporting style, Verbitsky is a frequent contributor to *El País*, the *New York Times*, and the *Wall Street Journal*.

VERDUGO, PATRICIA (1947–2008). **Chilean** journalist. One of the best-known journalists in Latin America, Verdugo was widely published in Latin America and Europe. She was the recipient of the Maria Moors Cabot Award from Columbia University in 1993, the National Journalism Award of Chile in 1997, and the Latin American Studies Association (LASA) Media Award in 2000.

Verdugo was the author of 11 books, among them *Chile, Pinochet, and the Caravan of Death*, a translation of *Caso Arellano: Los zarpazos del puma* (1989). The book, which holds the best-seller record in Chile, is a detailed account of the **caravan of death** ordered by General **Augusto Pinochet Ugarte** and carried out by General Sergio

Arellano Stark in Chile in 1973. The evidence collected in this book is considered one of the key elements that led to Pinochet Ugarte's arrest in London in 1998 and to eventual hearings in Chile, hearings in which the former dictator was stripped of prosecutorial immunity and ordered to be held under house arrest.

In July 1976 her father, Sergio Verdugo Herrera, a member of the Christian Democratic Party and a union leader, was abducted from his home. His **tortured** body was later discovered drowned in the Mapocho River in Santiago. Verdugo wrote extensively of his disappearance and death, most notably in her 1999 book *Bucharest 187*—titled after her father's house in the Providencia neighborhood of Santiago—in which she detailed her family's unsuccessful attempts to determine his whereabouts and to bring his murderers to justice. Previously Verdugo published *Interferencia secreta* (1998), which offered transcripts of the radio communiqués between Pinochet Ugarte and **military** officers involved in the coup. The transcripts had been recorded by an unnamed Chilean radio aficionado. The book, with its accompanying compact disc of the actual radio transmissions, was widely distributed in Latin America and Europe.

In *Bucharest 187* Verdugo described her work as one of remembrance, an act both “sacred” and “subversive,” in opposition to a prevailing social discourse that would demand collective amnesia.

Patricia Verdugo died of cancer on 13 January 2008.

VICARÍA DE LA SOLIDARIDAD / VICARIATE OF SOLIDARITY. A **human-rights** nongovernmental organization in **Chile**. Established in 1976 by Cardinal Raúl Silva Henríquez, the Vicaría documented human-rights violations and distributed humanitarian aid during the **military** government of General **Augusto Pinochet Ugarte**. It replaced the **Comité de la Paz** (COPACHI, Committee for Peace), which had been formed in 1973. Like COPACHI, the Vicaría was affiliated with the **Catholic Church**. Unlike COPACHI, however, the Vicaría enjoyed the full protection of the church, having been created under the auspices of the Archdiocese of Santiago.

Since repression affected all aspects of Chilean life, the Vicaría addressed a wide range of problems—legal, medical, and social. Its legal program centered on collecting evidence of detention, **torture**, political execution, and disappearance. Its medical program provided

health care to the poor as well as treatment for torture victims and those injured during demonstrations against the government. Indeed, torture victims were often left outside the Vicaría's door. Its social programs gave material support both to human-rights victims and to workers displaced by the shock-treatment economics of Pinochet Ugarte's **Chicago Boys**. Daily means were provided by *ollas comunes* (literally, "common pots," or soup kitchens).

The Vicaría's activities, especially its efforts at documentation, antagonized the military. Unlike other human-rights organizations, which lost records to security raids, the Vicaría had the advantage of church protection. The military did, however, wage a campaign of harassment and terror against the legal staff. Lawyers were especially vulnerable because of their filings of *amparos*, or writs of habeas corpus, and were subject to arrest, **exile**, and *relegación* (internal exile).

Throughout the dictatorship, the Vicaría was a source of inspiration to many Chileans. After the return to democracy in 1990, its legacy continued in the **Comisión Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliación** (National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation), which was charged with investigating human-rights abuses.

VICARIATE OF SOLIDARITY. *See* VICARÍA DE LA SOLIDARIDAD.

VIDELA, JORGE RAFAEL (1925–). Nicknamed "the Bone," because of his lean and hard-muscled physique. General, commander of the army, and leader of the first junta (1976–1981) during the "**dirty war**" period in **Argentina**. (The other members of the first junta were **Emilio Massera** and **Orlando Ramón Agosti**.) Videla was born on 2 August 1925 in Mercedes, a city in Buenos Aires Province. His father, Rafael Videla, was an army colonel who commanded the Sixth Infantry Regiment. His mother, María Redondo, came from a Mercedes family of long standing. He graduated from the Colegio Militar (Military Academy) in 1944 as an infantry lieutenant and from the Senior War College in 1954. He devoted a large portion of his career to the Colegio Militar, training future officers in his roles as instructor, professor, and (from 1971 to 1973) commandant. In

1973 he was promoted to chief of the General Staff (second in the army chain of command) and, in August 1975, commander in chief.

The promotion of Lieutenant General Videla to the top position came when the army rejected an effort by President **Isabel Perón** to bring the service under the control of **Peronists**. He had a reputation for being a political moderate—neither a Peronist nor an avowed anti-Peronist. He also knew and had the respect of officers in the field, having taught many of them. And like most other officers, he was a strong anticommunist, his distaste for Marxism reinforced by a traditional Roman Catholicism. Under his leadership, the army waged “war”—its first war of the century—against left-wing **guerrillas**, who had been conducting a campaign of kidnappings, assassinations, and bombings. Following the **military** coup of 24 March 1976, he emerged as the leader of a three-man junta and was named president. He presided over a “dirty war” against subversives. His definition of “subversive” included anyone promoting ideas alien to “Western, Christian values.” He retired in 1981, replaced as president by General **Roberto Viola**, the new army commander in chief and leader of the second junta.

On 22 April 1985, after the return to civility, Videla was put on trial with the eight other service commanders who had made up the three juntas of the “dirty war” period. The defendants were charged with murder, kidnapping, illegal detention, **torture**, and robbery. The six-member Federal Court of Appeals delivered its verdict on 9 December 1985. Videla, as the leader of the army during the worst years of government repression, was convicted and sentenced to life in prison. In late December 1990 he was pardoned and released, along with Massera and Viola, under a controversial amnesty. In June 1998 Videla was placed under house arrest for ordering the traffic of babies born to detained mothers. (The abduction and illegal adoption of children are crimes not covered in the earlier amnesty.) He remains under house arrest.

VILAS, ACDEL EDGARDO. *See* EJÉRCITO REVOLUCIONARIO DEL PUEBLO (ERP) / PEOPLE’S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY.

VILLAFLORES DE VICENTI, AZUCENA. *See* MADRES DE PLAZA DE MAYO.

VILLA GRIMALDI. A palatial estate at the foot of the Andes mountains that served as the main **torture** and detention center for the **Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional** (DINA, Directorate of National Intelligence), the Chilean secret police. More than 200 political prisoners were detained there from 1974 until 1977, when DINA was officially dissolved. After the return to civilian rule, Villa Grimaldi was razed, and **human-rights** groups converted the space into a “Park of Memory” in honor of the thousands who disappeared during the **military** regime of **Augusto Pinochet Ugarte**.

VILLA MARTELLI. *See* **CARAPINTADAS**.

VIOLA, ROBERTO (1924–1994). General and president of the second junta (March to December 1981) during the “**dirty war**” in **Argentina**. (The other members of the junta were **Armando Lambruschini** and **Omar Graffigna**). Promoted to general in 1971, he commanded the Second Army Corps during the 1976 coup that ousted President **Isabel** (“**Isabelita**”) **Perón**. With General **Jorge Rafael Videla**, he had been one of the main plotters—Viola and Videla were known within the **military** as “the two Vs.”

Viola became president when the “dirty war” was beginning to wind down—the regime’s opponents had been killed, **exiled**, or terrorized into submission—and he began taking slow steps toward a political liberalization. But his junta was replaced eight months later by a third junta, led by **Leopoldo Fortunato Galtieri**.

In the 1985 trial of the nine former junta commanders, Viola said that Argentina’s return to democracy was made possible only by the military’s war against subversives and that he was “responsible, but not guilty.” Nevertheless, he was convicted and sentenced to 17 years in prison, though a Supreme Court ruling a year later shortened his sentence by six months. He was pardoned in December 1990 by President **Carlos Saúl Menem**.

VON VACANO, ARTURO (1938–). **Bolivian** journalist and novelist. Born in La Paz, Von Vacano worked for media outlets in Latin America and in his native Bolivia, where he also published several novels. In 1980, following the so-called cocaine coup of General

Luís García Meza, he went into **exile**. Between 1980 and 1987, he worked as a writer and an editor for United Press International in New York and Washington, D.C. He currently writes a column for Redbolivia.com and continues to publish fiction as well as volumes dealing with Bolivian politics, most recently two laudatory volumes on the presidency of Evo Morales.

His novel *Morder el silencio* (1980) was first translated into English in 1987 as *Biting Silence*. In it, the author presents a novelized version of the detention—by a dictatorial regime—of an unnamed narrator, a writer by trade, who is subjected to psychological **torture**. The regime, identified only as *La Bestia* (The Beast), appears to be self-perpetuating—a stand-in for any number of dictatorships in Latin America throughout the 20th century. Indeed, the U.S. translator Gregory Rabassa, in a critical commentary on the novel, has noted “la novela es realmente ‘boliviana’ pero se expande hasta incluir a todo Latinoamérica y, sin duda, cualquier otro país que encaja en la denuncia de la injusticia y la tortura dictatoriales” (the novel is truly ‘Bolivian’ but it expands to include all of Latin America and, undoubtedly, any other country that fits into the denunciation of injustice and torture by dictatorships).

VON WERNICH, CHRISTIAN FEDERICO (1938–). Catholic priest and former chaplain of the Buenos Aires police. Born in the province of Entre Ríos, **Argentina**, Father Von Wernich was the first clergy member tried for complicity in the kidnapping, **torture**, and execution of political prisoners during Argentina’s “**dirty war.**”

As police chaplain, Von Wernich worked under the direction of Chief Inspector **Miguel Etchecolatz**, who in turn reported to General **Ramón Camps**. In 1996 his superiors relocated Von Wernich to **Chile** at his own request. In Chile the journalist Hernán Brienza discovered Von Wernich serving in a parish in the seaside town of El Quisco under the alias Christian González. Brienza detailed the search for Von Wernich in his book *Maldito tú eres: El caso Von Wernich: Iglesia y represión ilegal*. Soon after, on 25 September 2003, Federal Judge Arnaldo Corazza, of La Plata, ordered Von Wernich’s arrest. Judge Corazza’s investigation resulted in the testimony of over 30 witnesses who placed Von Wernich at three illegal detention centers: Puesto

Vasco, COTI Martínez, and Pozo de Quilmes. The trial began on 5 July 2007, under extreme security measures, in the city of La Plata, the capital of the province of Buenos Aires.

As the trial began, over 120 witnesses were expected to testify. Von Wernich was charged with collaborating with state security agents in cases of illegal detention, torture, and murder. Héctor Mariano Balent, a torture survivor, testified that Von Wernich would urge prisoners to collaborate by saying, “Come on, son. Confess everything so they stop torturing you.” Héctor Timerman, the Argentine consul in New York, linked Von Wernich to one of the best-known cases during Argentina’s “dirty war,” the detention and torture of his father, **Jacobo Timerman**, the former editor of *La Opinión*. His father once confided to him that while he was being tortured with electric prods, his blindfold fell off, and he saw Von Wernich standing by the side of Camps.

Von Wernich was also charged with extorting money from the families of *desaparecidos* (missing), particularly in the case known as “El grupo de los siete,” a group of seven militants detained by police under Etchecolatz’s direction. According to testimony, Von Wernich told the families that the militants, while under “rehabilitation,” had agreed to collaborate with the police and would, in return, be **exiled** to neighboring countries. At least two families testified they had handed over between \$1,500 and \$3,000 to Von Wernich for the “upkeep” and travel plans of the young militants, who never reached their destinations. According to the report *Nunca más (Never Again)*, published in 1985 by the **Comisión Nacional de Investigación de Desaparición de Personas** (CONADEP, National Commission on the Disappeared), Julio Alberto Emmed, one of the officers involved in the case, said that Von Wernich was present the night three members of the group were executed. The priest’s shirt was profusely stained with blood as Emmed struggled with one of the victims in an automobile. When Emmed expressed qualms to Von Wernich about the violent deaths, Von Wernich assured him that the execution “was necessary, it was a patriotic act and God knew it was for the good of the country.” Emmed later recanted, claiming that CONADEP had offered him money and immunity. In 1987 he was murdered under “mysterious circumstances.” Emmed’s original testimony remains

the only direct link to the likely fate of the seven militants, who remain among the missing.

On 9 October 2007 the judges Carlos Rozanski, Norberto Lorenzo, and Horacio Isaurralde—the panel that had presided over the trial of Etchecoltaz—found Von Wernich guilty of complicity in seven homicides, 42 kidnappings, and 32 instances of torture. During the trial, Von Wernich refused to testify. He is currently serving a life sentence.

– W –

WALSH, RODOLFO (1927–1977?). Argentine journalist and writer. Born in Choele-Choel, in Río Negro province, into a family of Irish immigrants, Walsh abandoned his studies at 16 and soon became a translator and proofreader for the editorial house Hachette. In 1951 he began working as a journalist, collaborating with the magazines *Leoplan* and *Vea y Lea*. In 1959 he traveled to Cuba, where he was one of the founders of the news agency Prensa Latina. Back in his native Argentina, Walsh worked for the daily *Noticias* as well as for several weeklies: *Panorama*, *Primera Plana*, *Villero*, and the *CGT* (a publication of the Argentine General Confederation of Labor). Many of these publications were later closed by the **military** regime during the “**dirty war**.” In 1976 Walsh founded the Agencia de Noticias Clandestinas (ANCLA), a clandestine network aimed at disseminating news about Argentina to national and international media. According to the journalist **Horacio Verbitsky**, a participant in another clandestine news service called Information Chain, one-page newsletters were secretly circulated and handed to people who were asked to make copies and distribute them in turn.

Between 1969 and 1973, Walsh published several books that won him a reputation as a daring investigative reporter: *¿Quién mató a Rosendo?* (1969), *Un oscuro día de justicia* (1973), and *El caso Satanovsky* (1973). He was also an award-winning author of works for the stage—his 1965 play *La granada*, for example—and short stories. His short story “Esa mujer” has often been singled out as one of the most innovative short narratives of Argentine literature in the 20th century. His best-known work, however, remains the “Carta abierta

de Rodolfo Walsh a la Junta Militar” of 24 March 1977, marking the first anniversary of the coup. In this open letter to the military junta, Walsh denounced the political repression, murders, **torture**, and disappearances that had taken place in Argentina during the junta’s first year in power, a period that saw his daughter, María Victoria Walsh, assassinated by members of the military and his house in Tigre Delta raided and ransacked.

On 25 March 1977, the day after “Carta abierta” was circulated, security forces near the Constitución station in Buenos Aires abducted Walsh. The previous evening, his house in San Vicente, in Buenos Aires province, had been under attack for more than two hours by about 40 heavily armed men who later ransacked the place, according to eyewitness reports. Walsh remains among the *desaparecidos*.

WAR TRIBUNALS. Courts established by the junta in **Chile** to try to convict its political opponents. The trial and sentencing procedures violated the basic **human rights** of the accused. Meanwhile, the lower courts and the Supreme Court claimed to have no jurisdiction during a state of siege or state of war. Although the law clearly established the independence of the courts under such conditions, the lower and high courts remained loyal to the **military** government. Jurists who challenged the courts’ progovernment stance were censured or removed.

WOMEN. Both as individuals and in groups, women played important parts in the events described in this volume. To be sure, conservative women often collaborated with the **military**. In **Brazil** and **Chile**, for example, women’s groups led demonstrations that raised support for coups, and in **Argentina**, President **Isabel** (“**Isabelita**”) **Perón**, a right-wing **Peronist**, declared a state of siege and gave the military a free rein in its war against the **guerrillas**. At the same time, women were among the military’s victims. Chilean soldiers would slit women’s pants while shouting “In Chile, women wear skirts!” Female prisoners were often sexually abused. And in Argentina, pregnant prisoners would often be kept alive only until they gave birth, their children adopted by military families.

Many women challenged the regimes. Some joined armed movements, making up a large percentage of urban guerrillas. Others

adopted nonviolent protest. In Argentina, for example, women's groups such as the **Madres de Plaza de Mayo** (Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo) and their offshoot, the **Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo** (Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo), were among the first to demonstrate against the military regime. Their status as mothers and grandmothers did not always protect them—Azucena Villaflor de Vicenti, the founder of the Madres, was kidnapped by a **death squad** from the **Escuela Mecánica de la Armada** (ESMA, Navy Mechanics School) and disappeared, and the Abuelas adopted undercover tactics. In **Bolivia**, **Domitila Barrios de Chungara** led other female activists in a monthlong hunger strike that won an amnesty for 340 political and labor leaders. And in Chile, Sola Sierra Henríquez created the **Agrupación de Familiares de Detenidos-Desaparecidos** (AFDD, Association of Relatives of the Detained-Disappeared), which organized marches and other acts of nonviolent protest, including the making of *arpilleras*.

Among the women writers whose works have “dirty war” themes are **Isabel Allende**, **Aida Bortnik**, **Diamela Eltit**, **Griselda Gambaro**, and **Luisa Valenzuela**. *See also* MICHELLE BACHELET.

WRIGHT, JAIME. *See* BRASIL: NUNCA MAIS (BNM).

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INTRODUCTION

Listed are a variety of sources: official government reports; the reports of nongovernmental organizations at the international, regional, and national levels; and works by individuals. The works by individuals include academic studies, testimonials by those affected by the “dirty wars,” and creative works—novels, short stories, poetry, plays, and films. Most of the sources are listed under the individual countries, though sources covering two or more of the countries are listed in the “General Works” section. When a general work contains chapters on individual countries, each chapter is listed separately under the appropriate country. Many of the sources are in Spanish or Portuguese; others were originally published in English. When an English translation is available, it is listed first, followed by the publishing information for the original work.

Important primary sources documenting human-rights violations committed during the “dirty wars” are the reports issued by government truth commissions, such as *Nunca Más* [*Never Again*] (“Argentina—Aftermath,” under the corporate author Argentina. Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas), and the *Report of the Chilean National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation*, two volumes (“Chile—Aftermath,” under the corporate author Chile. Comisión Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliación). The report of Uruguay’s truth commission—Comisión Investigadora Parlamentaria sobre Situación de Personas Desaparecidas y Hechos que la Motivaron (Commission on the Situation of “Disappeared” People and Its Causes)—is available within the five volumes published under the title *Investigación Histórica sobre Detenidos Desaparecidos en Uruguay* (“Uruguay—Aftermath,” under the corporate author Uruguay. Presidencia de la República. It is also at www.desaparecidos.org/uru). The reports on Chile and Uruguay documented deaths and disappearances but not torture. In 2004 Chile issued a 1,200-page torture report titled *Informe de la the Comisión Nacional sobre Prisión Política y Tortura* (“Chile—Aftermath,” under the corporate title Chile. Comisión Nacional sobre Prisión Política y Tortura). In Uruguay, the nongovernmental human-rights organization Servicio Paz y Justicia-Uruguay produced its own truth report, *Uruguay Nunca Más: Human Rights Violations, 1972–1985* (“Aftermath”).

Bolivia’s truth commission never published a final report, though Federico Aguiló attempted to fill the void by compiling “*Nunca más*” *para Bolivia*, published by the nongovernmental organization Asamblea Permanente de Derechos Humanos de Bolivia (“Aftermath”). In Brazil, the report *Nunca Mais* (Never Again, published in English as *Torture in Brazil*) was published not by the government but by the Archdiocese of São Paulo. Yet it is perhaps the most authoritative of the reports, based not on victims’ testimonies but on the military dictatorship’s own documents, which an archdiocesan team secretly photocopied. (It is listed in “Aftermath,” under the corporate author Catholic Church. Archdiocese of São Paulo.) In 2007 the Brazilian government issued the 500-page report *Direito à memória e à verdade* (The Right to Memory and the Truth), acknowledging the dictatorship’s role in torture, rape, and murder. It is available on the Web. Paraguay never established a truth commission, but the Centro de Estudios Paraguayos “Antonio Guasch,”

a nongovernmental organization, published *El precio de la paz* (The Cost of Peace), a collection of victims' testimonies ("Paraguay—Aftermath," under the name of its editor, José María Blanch).

Reports issued by regional and international human-rights organizations—especially following site visits—are important sources as well, having directed international attention to the region and the offending countries. Among the organizations whose policy it was to publish reports were the Organization of American States Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), and Amnesty International. During the 1970s and 1980s, the IACHR published reports on Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay. All IACHR reports, past and present, are available—in English, Spanish, Portuguese, and French—on the organization's Web site at www.cidh.oas.org. An ICJ report is available for Chile ("Dirty War—Nonfiction"), and Amnesty International reports are listed in the "General Works" section as well as in the "Dirty War—Nonfiction" sections for the countries involved. Although it is not the policy of the Red Cross to publish reports, its report on Uruguay was leaked; it appeared in the *New York Review of Books* under the title "In Libertad Prison" ("Dirty War—Nonfiction," under the author J. F. LaBarthe).

Victims' testimonials, or *testimonios*, are listed in the "'Dirty War'—Nonfiction" sections under the countries involved. Perhaps the best known is *Prisoner without a Name, Cell without a Number* (*Preso sin nombre, celda sin número*), in which the late Argentine journalist Jacobo Timerman relates his detention and torture under General Ramón Camps. Many *testimonios*, however—like the three-volume *Las manos en el fuego*, by the Uruguayan Ernesto González Bermejo—remain untranslated.

Another category of works representing the past is literature, or what has become known as the literature of the dictatorship. Some of the works included are symbolic and allegorical, such as Cristina Peri Rossi's novel *Ship of Fools* (*La nave de los locos*), which examines the dictatorship in Uruguay. Many readers may already be familiar with authors who have been translated into English—for example, Antônio Callado, Manuel Puig, and Luisa Valenzuela. There are, however, many works, in Spanish and Portuguese, that remain untranslated. It is hoped that their inclusion will stimulate the interest of readers and scholars in bringing these texts to the attention of the English-speaking public.

Movies are another way to represent the past, and like works of literature, items in this category may be allegorical, set in a different time period, or even set in a different country. *Sweet Country* (*Dulce país*), directed by Michael Cacoyannis and based on the novel by Caroline Richards, is ostensibly about Chile, though it may apply equally to Greece, which went through its own period of dictatorship. *Camila*, directed by María Luisa Bemberg, is set in Argentina during an earlier repressive period, but could be taken as a statement about the most recent one. *Il postino* (*The Postman*), based on the novel *Ardiente paciencia*, by Chile's Antonio Skármeta, is set in Italy. Among the feature films are *La historia oficial* (*The Official Story*) (on Argentina), the *Kiss of the Spider Woman* (also on Argentina), *Missing* (on Chile), *State of Siege* (on Uruguay), and *The Year My Parents Went on Vacation* (on Brazil). Documentaries include *One Man's War* (about the Filártiga case in Paraguay) and the series of films directed by Patricio Guzmán: *La batalla de Chile* (parts one, two, and three) and *Le cas Pinochet* (*El caso Pinochet*, *The Pinochet Case*).

Among the secondary sources are two books on Operation Condor: *Predatory States: Operation Condor and Covert War in Latin America* (2005), by J. Patrice McSherry, and the more popularly titled *The Condor Years: How Pinochet and His Allies Brought Terrorism to Three Continents* (2004), by John Dinges ("General Works"). Books on the individual countries include *Guerrillas and Generals: The "Dirty War" in Argentina* (2002), by Paul H. Lewis; *A Concise History of Bolivia* (2003), by Herbert S. Klein; *The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil, 1964–85* (1988), by Thomas E. Skidmore; *A Concise History of Brazil* (1999), by Boris Fausto; *Chile under Pinochet: Uncovering the Truth* (2000), by Mark Ensalaco; *Soldiers in a Narrow Land: The Pinochet Regime in Chile* (1994), by Mary Helen Spooner; and *The Stroessner Era: Authoritarian Rule in Paraguay* (1990), by Carlos R. Miranda. All are listed in the "Dirty War—Nonfiction" sections. *Uruguay: Democracy at the Crossroads* (1988), by Martin Weinstein, is listed in the "Aftermath" section.

The bibliography does not attempt to list critical and interpretive works on the literature of dictatorship. The following titles, however, can be mentioned as examples of secondary sources available on literary criticism: Jorgelina Corbatta's *Narrativas de la guerra sucia en Argentina: Piglia, Saer, Valenzuela, Puig* ("Argentina—Aftermath")

and Jorge Ruffinelli's "Uruguay: Dictadura y re-democratización: Un informe sobre la literatura, 1973–1989" ("Uruguay—Aftermath"). The body of critical material on the topic is vast, and the Modern Language Association database remains an excellent tool for identifying additional titles.

The OpenWeb is useful in various ways. First, in addition to accessing some of the documents listed above, it can be used to access the declassified documents collected and published by the National Security Archive (www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv), an independent nongovernmental organization located at George Washington University. Second, it can be used to find information on human-rights organizations. Third, it can be used to find biographical information, supplementing information found in traditional library sources such as *Current Biography* (H. W. Wilson Company, various years), biographical dictionaries, and secondary sources.

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