Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations

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September 10, 2015
Summary

This report provides an overview of Jordanian politics and current issues in U.S.-Jordanian relations. It provides a brief discussion of Jordan’s government and economy and of its cooperation with U.S. policy objectives in the Middle East, including the promotion of Arab-Israeli peace.

Several issues are likely to figure in decisions by Congress and the Administration on future aid to and cooperation with Jordan. These include Jordan’s continued involvement in attempting to promote Israeli-Palestinian peace and the stability of the Jordanian regime, particularly in light of ongoing conflicts in neighboring Syria and Iraq. U.S. officials may also consider potential threats to Jordan from the Islamic State organization (also known as ISIS or ISIL).

Although the United States and Jordan have never been linked by a formal treaty, they have cooperated on a number of regional and international issues over the years. Jordan’s small size and lack of major economic resources have made it dependent on aid from Western and various Arab sources. U.S. support, in particular, has helped Jordan address serious vulnerabilities, both internal and external. Jordan’s geographic position, wedged between Israel, Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, has made it vulnerable to the strategic designs of more powerful neighbors, but has also given Jordan an important role as a buffer between these countries in their largely adversarial relations with one another.

The United States has provided Jordan with economic and military aid since 1951 and 1957, respectively. Total U.S. aid to Jordan through FY2015 amounted to approximately $15.83 billion. On February 3, 2015, the Obama Administration and the Jordanian government signed a nonbinding, three-year memorandum of understanding (MOU), in which the United States pledges to provide the kingdom with $1 billion annually in total U.S. foreign assistance, subject to the approval of Congress, from FY2015 through FY2017.

P.L. 113-235, the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act for FY2015, provides “not less than $1,000,000,000” in total U.S. foreign assistance for Jordan in FY2015. The act (in Section 7034) also reauthorizes loan guarantees to Jordan. It also permits the Secretary of Defense to provide Jordan with Defense Department Operation and Maintenance (O&M) OCO funds to “reimburse the government of Jordan in such amounts as the Secretary of Defense may determine to maintain the ability of the Jordanian armed forces to maintain security along the border between Jordan and Syria.”

H.R. 907 (passed by the House on July 7, 2015), The United States-Jordan Defense Cooperation Act of 2015, if enacted, would amend foreign assistance legislation to accelerate arms exports to Jordan and, among other things, authorize the Secretary of State to sign an assistance and cooperation MOU with Jordan (the MOU was signed in February 2015). S. 1789, the United States-Jordan Defense Cooperation Act of 2015, is the Senate companion bill to H.R. 907. It was introduced in the Senate in July 2015.
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Overview

Successive administrations have recognized Jordan as a key partner in pursuing various U.S. national security interests in the Middle East, such as countering terrorism and promoting Arab-Israeli peace. Over the past year, U.S.-Jordanian cooperation has increased due to the kingdom’s participation in the international coalition against the Islamic State organization (IS/ISIS/ISIL). The Islamic State’s presence in neighboring Syria and Iraq presents significant security concerns for Jordan. U.S. Ambassador to Jordan Alice G. Wells said in May 2015 that “For the first time in over 40 years Jordanian soldiers and pilots are prosecuting a war – side by side with the United States and 61 coalition partners – to defend Jordan.”

Many analysts believe that expanded U.S.-Jordanian cooperation against the Islamic State may to some extent increase Jordan’s vulnerability to the types of threats emanating from Syria and Iraq that such cooperation is intended to counter. Jordanian officials have voiced concerns regarding a possible terrorist backlash stemming from Jordan’s participation in coalition air strikes against the Islamic State. The government also is concerned over its ability to materially provide for the more than 630,000 United Nations-registered Syrian refugees currently residing in Jordan (there may be hundreds of thousands more who are unregistered, and more continue to arrive).

Regional Issues

Jordan’s Role in Combatting the Islamic State

Since U.S. and coalition airstrikes against the Islamic State began in August-September 2014 (officially named Operation Inherent Resolve in October 2014), the Jordanian Air Force has conducted airstrikes against Islamic State militants in Syria. However, its role increased significantly after the capture and murder of Jordanian pilot Lieutenant Moath al Kasasbeh by the Islamic State in Syria. In the aftermath of Kasasbeh’s immolation, King Abdullah II vowed to wage a “relentless” war against the Islamic State and “hit them in their own ground.” Jordan immediately increased the operational tempo of their airstrikes and expanded strikes into Iraq. As of May 2015, Jordanian planes had flown over 325 sorties against ISIS targets - more than all other regional coalition partners combined. Some other coalition partners, such as the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, have based their attack planes in Jordanian air bases.

Additionally, Jordanian officials, many of whom have ties to Sunni tribes in western Iraq, have offered to train and equip these tribes. However, Iraqi Shia political groups have rejected Jordan’s offer, calling it a violation of Iraqi national sovereignty. Some Iraqi and Syrian tribes have directly rejected Jordan’s train-and-equip offers out of apparent distrust.

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2 See CRS Insight IN10143, *The Islamic State in Syria and Iraq: A Possible Threat to Jordan?*, by Jeremy M. Sharp.
3 For additional background, see CRS Report R43612, *The ‘Islamic State’ Crisis and U.S. Policy*, by Christopher M. Blanchard et al.
4 On February 3, the Islamic State released a video depicting its killing of Jordanian F-16 pilot Kasasbeh, who was burned alive (reportedly on January 3) while standing inside a cage.
5 op.cit., U.S. Department of State, May 12, 2015.
6 “King of Jordan offers Military Support to Border Tribes,” *The Economist Intelligence Unit*, July 1, 2015.
Jordan has been beset by security incidents along its borders and has suffered economically from the loss of trade with Iraq and Syria.\(^7\) In April 2015, IS terrorists attacked Iraqi troops near the Trebil border crossing with Jordan, killing 5 Iraqi troops. The Islamic State’s presence in Iraq’s Anbar province bordering Jordan has dramatically reduced road trade between the two nations. According to one report, “the number of trucks crossing from Jordan into Iraq has fallen from about 400 a day in 2012, before ISIS seized territory, to 45 [in 2015].”\(^8\) Jordan also has experienced a steep drop in tourism as a result of international concern over possible future IS terrorist attacks against the kingdom. In the first few months of 2015, visits to Petra, Jordan’s main tourist attraction, are down 50% compared to the previous year.\(^9\)

Although many Jordanians support their country’s role in the coalition to defeat the Islamic State,\(^10\) the kingdom is home to several areas where manifestations of anti-government sentiment are high, economic prospects are poor, and sympathy for political Islam appears to be prevalent. Many Jordanians have tribal or kinship ties with Sunni communities in Iraq and Syria, whose sense of persecution, including at the hands of Iranian-supported governments and groups, has driven support for the Islamic State and other extremist groups. In order to crack down on IS recruitment in Jordan, the government has used existing anti-terrorism laws against Islamic State sympathizers. According to one report, “Some 300 people are currently in custody in Jordan for alleged IS sympathies, including 130 who have been sentenced....About half are in detention for expressing support for IS ideas on social media.”\(^11\) Some international non-governmental organizations, such as Human Rights Watch, have criticized the Jordanian authorities for suppressing freedom of the press, and

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8 Notifications are available online at: [http://www.dsca.mil/tags/jordan](http://www.dsca.mil/tags/jordan)

9 In order to improve Jordan’s border security, the kingdom has used U.S. military assistance to finance the Jordan Border Security Program (JBSP). The Department of State, the Department of Defense’s Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and various U.S. contractors such as DRS Technologies and Raytheon have worked together to integrate surveillance, WMD detection, and interdiction along specific stretches of Jordan’s borders with Syria and Iraq. According to one U.S. official, “the JBSP is already providing the Jordanians better visibility of their border, which has resulted in increased interdictions of drugs, weapons, and personnel smuggling.” See, Statement of Eric Rosenbach Assistant Secretary, Defense For Homeland Defense & Global Security Department of Defense, Committee on House Armed Services Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, March 25, 2015.

10 “Truck Drivers Steer a Perilous Path between Jordan and Iraq: Anbar Province: Transit Route,” [Financial Times](http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/86c73fca-5bc5-11e5-a00b-00144feabdc0.html), April 15, 2015.


particularly critical statements about the military’s involvement in the campaign against the Islamic State.

As coalition strikes against IS targets have extended into their second year, there has been some concern expressed in international circles that Jordan may not have the military capabilities to wage an expanded and long-term counter-insurgency operation against the Islamic State without significant Arab and Western assistance. Jordan has approximately 75 to 85 combat-capable aircraft, including at least 60 F-16s, but might lack significant stockpiles of precision-guided munitions for its jetfighters.

Jordan may be seeking to acquire unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for its operations in Iraq and Syria. In early February 2015, Congressman Duncan Hunter reportedly wrote a letter to President Obama suggesting that the Administration permit the export of the Predator XP to Jordan. On March 9, 23 lawmakers reportedly wrote the President asking that the Jordanian Air Force be permitted to utilize U.S. Air Force-owned MQ-1 Predator UAV assets without transferring actual UAV ownership to Jordan. Congressman Hunter reportedly wrote another letter to the President in May 2015 suggesting that the Chinese government was in talks with the Jordanian government over the possible acquisition of “weaponized unmanned systems.” In August 2015, some press accounts suggested that Israel may be providing Jordan with Israeli-built UAVs such as the Heron TP. Israel also may have provided Jordan with Bell/Cobra helicopters it had retired from service.

### U.S. Troops in Jordan

According to the President’s last War Powers Resolution Report to Congress, “at the request of the Government of Jordan, U.S. Armed Forces elements, including Patriot missile systems, fighter aircraft, and related support, command, control, and communications personnel and systems, are deployed to Jordan to support the security of Jordan and promote regional stability. The total number of U.S. forces in Jordan is approximately 2,200 U.S. military personnel. These forces will remain in Jordan, in full coordination with the Government of Jordan, until the security situation becomes such that they are no longer needed.” Although precise details of the U.S. military presence in Jordan may be classified, American soldiers support the deployment of a contingent of U.S. F-16s and operate a Patriot missile battery near Jordan’s northern border with Syria. With the increased presence of U.S. and foreign troops in Jordan, some policymakers may be concerned over the safety of U.S. personnel working/residing in the kingdom. In February 2015, the U.S. Embassy in Amman warned that “high-end malls” in Jordan’s capital could be attacked by unnamed militants, presumably tied or sympathetic to the Islamic State. The State Department lifted that advisory warning in April 2015.

### Jordan’s Support for Syrian Rebels

According to one report, Jordan provides a “staging ground for rebels and their foreign backers on Syria’s southern front.” One broad coalition of Syrian rebel groups, known as the “Southern

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17 Available at https://admin.govexec.com/media/obamahunter514.pdf Also, see “China May Be Selling Armed Drones to Jordan,” Defense One, May 15, 2015.
18 “Israel to supply Jordan with UAVs to combat the Islamic State,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, August 17, 2015.
The Southern Front, reportedly has direct ties to the Jordan-based Military Operations Center (MOC), which, according to press reports, coordinates some rebel operations in Syria and is staffed by foreign and Jordanian officials. Southern Front fighters may generally be ideologically moderate, but at times have fought alongside Islamist groups against Asad regime forces. The Jordanian government may back efforts to support rebel groups within the Southern Front in hopes of ensuring that a group friendly to the kingdom lies between it and the Asad regime and/or extremist Syrian groups. According to one report, Jordan may be considering the establishment of a “buffer zone” that would be manned by fighters from the Southern Front. The Southern Front has scored significant gains against Asad regime forces; nevertheless, as of September 2015 it has yet to seize key southern Syrian population centers such as Dera’a city (62 miles south of Damascus) and military installations such as Suwayda Air Base. The Southern Front also has to deal with competing groups more radical or Islamist in nature, such as the Syrian affiliate of Al Qaeda, Jabhat al Nusra, and fighters affiliated with the Jaysh al Fateh (Army of Victory) initiative to improve rebel coordination.

Overall, the long-term goals of Jordanian policy toward the Syrian civil war are unclear. If Jordan is directly aiding rebel groups in southern Syria, such intervention may have limited defensive goals. Jordan has concerns not just about the Asad regime, but about the growing strength of other radical groups inside Syria, which could threaten Jordan’s borders.

Jordan has to juggle the seemingly incompatible agendas of its partners and benefactors, such as the United States and Saudi Arabia. Some accounts of reported covert assistance suggest that decisions taken in Jordan, “balance the interests of the main players: Saudi Arabia provides funding and pushes for greater rebel support; Jordan manages the border and urges caution; and the United States supervises, maintaining a veto on weapon shipments.”

Syrian Refugees in Jordan

The continued inflow of Syrian refugees is placing tremendous strains on the Jordanian government. The United Nations (UN) High Commissioner for Refugees in August 2015 estimated that there were 630,224 registered Syrian refugees in Jordan, increasing the country's population by 10%. Jordanian border authorities at times have blocked some refugees from entering the kingdom and forcibly deported others due to security concerns and/or the strains the refugee population has placed on the country’s northern provinces. Rents have nearly tripled in border towns such as Mafraq and Ramtha, making housing unaffordable for many Jordanians. Jordan’s hospitals, schools, sanitation and water systems are under similar strain. Some Jordanian observers are writing articles openly questioning the wisdom of continuing to accept Syrian refugees and warning that resource, budget, and demographic pressures may disrupt life in the kingdom for a decade or more. A USAID report published in January 2014 on the fiscal impact of Syrian refugees on Jordanian government operations concluded that for 2014, providing public services for Syrian refugees would cost approximately 2.4% of Jordan’s Gross Domestic

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21 According to the Financial Times, this operation helps to “co-ordinate some operations and is manned by the US, European states and regional powers such as Jordan, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. The MOC sends weapons and distributes monthly salaries - about $50 per fighter - to several Southern Front groups.” See, “A Fight for Credibility” Financial Times, June 24, 2015.
22 The Southern Front claims it is the only legitimate representative of Free Syrian Army (FSA) in southern Syria.
According to the U.S. State Department, since large-scale U.S. aid to Syrian refugees began in FY2012, the United States has allocated more than $624 million in multilateral humanitarian assistance to help Jordan cope with the Syrian refugee crisis.27

Jordan, Israel, and the Palestinians

The Jordanian government has long described efforts to secure a lasting end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as one of its highest priorities. Although Jordan joined other neighboring Arab states in a series of military conflicts against Israel between 1948 and 1973, the late King Hussein (ruled 1952-1999) apparently concluded in the early 1990’s that peace with Israel was in Jordan’s strategic interests due to Israel’s conventional military superiority, the development of an independent Palestinian national movement that threatened both Jordanian and Israeli security, and the need for Jordan to regain Western support after it backed Saddam Hussein’s Iraq politically in the first Gulf War.28 Consequently, in 1994 Jordan and Israel signed a peace treaty,29 and King Abdullah II has used his country’s semi-cordial official relationship with Israel to improve Jordan’s standing with Western governments and international financial institutions, on which it relies heavily for external support and aid.

27 CRS correspondence with Department of State, Bureau of Legislative Affairs, August 2015.
29 Jordan and Israel signed the peace treaty on October 26, 1994. Later, the two countries exchanged ambassadors; Israel returned approximately 131 square miles of territory near the Rift Valley to Jordan; the parliament repealed laws banning contacts with Israel; and the two countries signed a number of bilateral agreements between 1994 and 1996 to normalize economic and cultural links. Water sharing, a recurring problem, was partially resolved in May 1997 when the two countries reached an interim arrangement under which Israel began pumping 72,000 cubic meters of water from Lake Tiberias (the Sea of Galilee) to Jordan per day (equivalent to 26.3 million cubic meters per year—a little over half the target amount envisioned in an annex to the peace treaty).
Nevertheless, the persistence of Israeli-Palestinian conflict continues to be a major challenge for Jordan. The issue of Palestinian rights resonates with much of the population, as more than half of all Jordanian citizens originate from either the West Bank or the area now comprising the state of Israel. There are an estimated 2 million United Nations-registered Palestinian refugees in Jordan, and, while many no longer regard their stay in Jordan as temporary, they have retained their refugee status both as a symbolic sign of support for Palestinians living under Israeli occupation and in hope of being included in any future settlement.

Furthermore, for King Abdullah II and the royal Hashemite family, who are of Arab Bedouin descent and whose legitimacy historically derives from the support of tribal families from the east bank of the Jordan River, finding a solution to the conflict is considered a matter of political survival. Although the Palestinians may be less rooted in Jordan than its East Bank citizens, addressing their grievances regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is of critical importance to the monarchy because they constitute a majority of Jordanian citizens and have other grievances about their status within Jordan relative to East Bankers. The royal family and their tribal constituents vehemently reject periodic Israeli calls for the reunification of the West Bank with Jordan proper (dubbed the “Jordanian Option”), a maneuver that could substantially alter the demographic and political status quo in Jordan. King Abdullah II has repeated the mantra that his father introduced after relinquishing Jordan’s claims to the West Bank: “Jordan is Jordan and Palestine is Palestine.”

### Holy Sites in Jerusalem

Per long-standing arrangements with Israel dating back to 1967 and then subsequently confirmed in their 1994 bilateral peace treaty, Israel acknowledges a continuing role for Jordan vis-à-vis Jerusalem’s historic Muslim shrines. A Jordanian waqf (or Islamic custodial trust) has long administered the Temple Mount (known by Muslims as the Haram al Sharif or Noble Sanctuary) and its holy sites, and this role is key to bolstering the religious legitimacy of the Jordanian royal family’s rule. Successive Jordanian monarchs trace their lineage to the Prophet Muhammad. Disputes over Jerusalem that appear to circumscribe King Abdullah II’s role as guardian of the Islamic holy sites create a domestic political problem for the King. In November 2014, Jordan recalled its ambassador to Israel in protest after Israel had closed the Mount/Haram to Muslim worshippers. Israel claimed it temporarily denied access to the Mount/Haram in order to reduce Israeli-Palestinian tensions after the shooting of an Israeli rabbi known for supporting Jewish worship (which is prohibited under a longstanding “status quo” arrangement) on the Mount/Haram. Jordan returned its ambassador to Israel three months later.

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30 For more information on Jerusalem and its holy sites, see CRS Report RL33476, *Israel: Background and U.S. Relations*, by Jim Zanotti.

31 Article 9, Clause 2 of the peace treaty says that “Israel respects the present special role of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in Muslim Holy shrines in Jerusalem. When negotiations on the permanent status will take place, Israel will give high priority to the Jordanian historic role in these shrines.” In 2013, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) reaffirmed in a bilateral agreement with Jordan that the King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan will continue to serve as the “Custodian of the Holy Sites in Jerusalem,” a title that successive Jordanian monarchs have used since 1924.

32 The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) maintains a large presence in Jordan, including part of its headquarters (the other part is in Gaza City). UNRWA has 7,000 staff in Jordan, comprising mostly teachers, doctors, and engineers. It operates 172 schools in Jordan (providing education through 10th grade, then the remainder is provided by the government). According to UNRWA officials, their budget is $104 million a year. At this point, 83% of all U.N.-registered refugees in Jordan live outside of UNRWA camps.

33 Jordan unilaterally annexed and administered the West Bank from 1948 to 1967, and relinquished its claims to the West Bank to the PLO in 1988.
Israeli-Jordanian Cooperation

Water Sharing

On December 9, 2013, Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority signed a regional water agreement that could pave the way for the Red-Dead Canal, which is a multi-billion dollar project to address declining water levels in the Dead Sea. The Red-Dead Canal is a decades-old plan to provide freshwater to water-scarce countries in the surrounding area while simultaneously restoring the Dead Sea. Under this December 2013 agreement, Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority have agreed to a water swap. Half of the water pumped from the Red Sea is to be desalinated in a plant to be constructed in Aqaba, Jordan. Some of this water is to then be used in southern Jordan. The rest is to be sold to Israel for use in the Negev Desert. In return, Israel is to sell freshwater from the Sea of Galilee to northern Jordan and sell the Palestinian Authority discounted freshwater produced by existing Israeli desalination plants on the Mediterranean. The other half of the water pumped from the Red Sea (or possibly the leftover brine from desalination) is to be channeled to the Dead Sea.

In February 2015, Israel and Jordan signed an agreement establishing a joint agency to administer the construction of the Red-Dead Canal and an associated desalination plant. The projected cost of the pipeline and desalination construction is preliminarily estimated at $900 million.

Israeli Natural Gas Exports to Jordan

Jordan depends on oil and gas imports and, since 2011, cut-offs in the supply of Egyptian natural gas due to unrest in the Sinai have cost the Jordanian government several billion dollars by compelling it to import more expensive alternatives. As Israel has developed its own natural gas infrastructure, it has sought export deals with Egypt and Jordan in order to deepen economic ties with them at a time when they have faced energy shortages due to regional unrest. In September 2014, a preliminary $12 billion agreement was reached for Israel to supply natural gas to Jordan’s National Electric Power Company (NEPCO) over a 15-year period. Earlier in 2014, Israel reached a separate 15-year, $500 million deal to supply natural gas to two Jordanian mineral companies, Arab Potash and Jordan Bromine. These deals are on hold due to ongoing uncertainty regarding the resolution of antitrust concerns in Israel involving the private consortiums seeking to export Israeli natural gas.

Israeli-Jordanian Military Cooperation

As previously mentioned, in the summer of 2015, various news stories indicated that Israel and Jordan had visibly increased bilateral military cooperation, perhaps in response to various regional threats, such as the Islamic State, Iran, and terrorist groups in the Sinai Peninsula. According to one report, Israeli tanker aircraft helped refuel Jordanian F-16s on their way to a U.S.-sponsored joint military exercise. Reports published in July 2015 indicate that in 2014, Israel provided Jordan with 16 AH-1F Cobra Gunship helicopters for border security.

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recently announced that it would construct a security fence along an 18.6-mile stretch of its border with Jordan.\footnote{Paul Goldman, “Israel Is Building an Anti-ISIS Fence Along Border With Jordan,” \textit{NBC News}, July 6, 2015.}

**Country Background**

Although the United States and Jordan have never been linked by a formal treaty, they have cooperated on a number of regional and international issues for decades. Jordan’s small size and lack of major economic resources have made it dependent on aid from Western and various Arab sources. U.S. support, in particular, has helped Jordan deal with serious vulnerabilities, both internal and external. Jordan’s geographic position, wedged between Israel, Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, has made it vulnerable to the strategic designs of its powerful neighbors, but has also given Jordan an important role as a buffer between these countries in their largely adversarial relations with one another.

Jordan, created by colonial powers after World War I, initially consisted of desert or semi-desert territory east of the Jordan River, inhabited largely by people of Bedouin tribal background. The establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 brought large numbers of Palestinian refugees to Jordan, which subsequently unilaterally annexed a small Palestinian enclave west of the Jordan River known as the West Bank.\footnote{Though there was very little international recognition of Jordan’s annexation of the West Bank, Jordan maintained control of it (including East Jerusalem) until Israel took military control of it during the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War, and maintained its claim to it until relinquishing the claim to the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1988.} The original “East Bank” Jordanians, though probably no longer a majority in Jordan, remain predominant in the country’s political and military establishments and form the bedrock of support for the Jordanian monarchy. Jordanians of Palestinian origin comprise an estimated 55% to 70% of the population and generally tend to gravitate toward the private sector due to their general exclusion from certain public sector and military positions.\footnote{Speculation over the ratio of East Bankers to Palestinians (those who arrived as refugees and immigrants since 1948) in Jordanian society tends to be a sensitive domestic issue. Jordan last conducted a national census in 2004, and it is unclear whether or not the government maintains such statistics. Over time, intermarriage has made it more difficult to discern distinct differences between the two communities, though divisions do persist.}
The Hashemite Royal Family

Jordan is a hereditary constitutional monarchy under the prestigious Hashemite family, which claims descent from the Prophet Muhammad. King Abdullah II (age 53) has ruled the country since 1999, when he succeeded to the throne upon the death of his father, the late King Hussein, after a 47-year reign. Educated largely in Britain and the United States, King Abdullah II had earlier pursued a military career, ultimately serving as commander of Jordan’s Special Operations Forces with the rank of Major General. The king’s son Prince Hussein bin Abdullah (b. 1994) is the designated crown prince.40

The king appoints a prime minister to head the government and the Council of Ministers (Cabinet).41 On average, Jordanian governments last no more than 15 months before they are dissolved by royal decree. This seems to be done in order to bolster the king’s reform credentials and to distribute patronage among a wide range of elites. The king also appoints all judges and is commander of the armed forces.

Political System and Key Institutions

The Jordanian constitution (promulgated in 1952) empowers the king with broad executive powers. According to Article 35, “The King appoints the Prime Minister and may dismiss him or accept his resignation. He appoints the Ministers; he also dismisses them or accepts their resignation, upon the recommendation of the Prime Minister.” The constitution enables the king to dissolve both houses of parliament and postpone lower house elections for two years.42 The king can circumvent parliament through a constitutional mechanism that allows provisional legislation to be issued by the Cabinet when parliament is not sitting or has been dissolved.43 The king also can issue royal decrees, which are not subject to parliamentary scrutiny. The king commands the armed forces, declares war, and ratifies treaties. Finally, Article 195 of the

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40 In July 2009, King Abdullah II named Prince Hussein (then 15 years old), as crown prince. The position had been vacant since 2004, when King Abdullah II removed the title from his half-brother, Prince Hamzah.

41 In March 2013, King Abdullah II consulted with members of the 17th parliament before choosing a prime minister. Although the King retains the constitutional authority to appoint and dismiss the prime minister, he has pledged to reach a consensus with lawmakers before choosing a premier. The Muslim Brotherhood, which boycotted the election leading to the formation of the current parliament, seeks a parliamentary system of government in which the prime minister would be chosen by the largest bloc in parliament.

42 The king also may declare martial law. According to Article 125, “In the event of an emergency of such a serious nature that action under the preceding Article of the present Constitution will be considered insufficient for the defense of the Kingdom, the King may by a Royal Decree, based on a decision of the Council of Ministers, declare martial law in the whole or any part of the Kingdom.”

43 New amendments to Article 94 in 2011 have put some restrictions on when the executive is allowed to issue temporary laws.
Jordanian Penal Code prohibits insulting the dignity of the king (lèse-majesté) with criminal penalties of one to three years in prison.

Political parties in Jordan are extremely weak, as the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Islamic Action Front (IAF) is the only well-organized movement. Most parties represent narrow parochial interests and are composed of prominent individuals representing a particular family or tribe.

Jordan’s constitution provides for an independent judiciary. According to Article 97, “Judges are independent, and in the exercise of their judicial functions they are subject to no authority other than that of the law.” Jordan has three main types of courts: Civil courts, special courts (some of which are military/state security courts), and religious courts. In Jordan, state security courts administered by military (and civilian) judges handle criminal cases involving espionage, bribery of public officials, trafficking in narcotics or weapons, black marketeering, and “security offenses.” Overall, the king may appoint and dismiss judges by decree, though in practice a palace-appointed Higher Judicial Council manages court appointments, promotions, transfers, and retirements.
Political Opposition and the Fracturing of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood

In Jordan, there is widespread dissatisfaction with the state of the economy and widespread apathy over the prospects for meaningful democratic reform. Nonetheless, public opinion seems more concerned with the deteriorating security situation in neighboring Syria and Iraq than in supporting the domestic political opposition. Moreover, although the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood is the strongest opposition group, it is divided between reformists and conservatives, and pro- and anti-monarchical factions. Youth protestors also have become active in opposition political circles, though these groups tend to be small and divided along secular-Islamist or even tribal lines.

In the spring of 2015, Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood fractured, leading to disputes over its legal status. A month after a state security court sentenced the deputy head of the organization to 18 months in prison for criticizing the United Arab Emirates in a Facebook post, another Brotherhood leader attempted to form a new organization that would be legally recognized by the state. In March 2015, Jordanian authorities licensed this new off-shoot of the Brotherhood, called the Muslim Brotherhood Association. Its parent organization, which is licensed as a charity and not an association, expelled the new group from its ranks, leaving Jordan with two competing Muslim Brotherhood political groups. According to one account, “The new, watered-down Brotherhood, licensed on March 4, is headed by former senator Abdul Majid Thneibat and comprised of liberal Brotherhood officials with ties to the government, providing Jordan what many officials have desired in private - a Brotherhood answerable to the regime that would not push for widespread reforms.” The old and new Brotherhood organizations are now locked in legal disputes over ownership of assets. Some analysts are concerned that Brotherhood members who are legally excluded from politics could join more radical organizations that espouse violence. According to one U.S.-based analyst, “while Amman has tamed its local Brotherhood chapter, it may have complicated its fight against domestic Islamist militancy in the process.”

Figure 2. IRI Poll on Jordanian Public Opinion

Source: International Republican Institute, “IRI Poll: Jordanians Optimistic about Direction of the Country even as Concerns over Terrorism Emerge,” May 27, 2015.

45 “Brotherhood Figure jailed in Jordan for Insulting Ally,” New York Times, February 17, 2015.
The Economy

With few natural resources and a small industrial base, Jordan has an economy which is heavily dependent on external aid from abroad, tourism, expatriate worker remittances, and the service sector. Among the longstanding problems Jordan faces are poverty (14.4%), corruption, slow economic growth, and high levels of unemployment (including female unemployment), nominally around 12.5% but thought by many analysts to be in the 25%-30% range. Youth unemployment is nearly 33%. Corruption is pronounced in Jordan. Use of intermediaries, referred to in Arabic as “Wasta” (connections), is widespread, and many young Jordanians have grown frustrated by the lack of social and economic mobility that corruption engenders. Each year, thousands of Jordanians go abroad in search of better jobs and opportunities. Like many poor countries, Jordan suffers from a “brain drain” of its most talented workers, and the government has struggled to develop incentives to keep its well-educated, highly skilled workers close to home. The government is by far the largest employer, with between one-third and two-thirds of all workers on the state’s payroll. According to a recent survey by Pew, 73% of Jordanians have a negative view of economic conditions in their country.

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Renewable and Nuclear Energy in Jordan

Due to the cost of importing oil and natural gas, the government has sought to diversify its energy portfolio by expanding the amount of power generated by renewable energy sources. According to USAID, in 2014, Jordan spent approximately 16% of GDP on oil imports, and losses by the National Electric Company accounted for nearly 5% of GDP. By 2020, Jordan hopes that 10% of all energy sources will come from solar or wind power. The U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) has lent $25 million in financing to help construct a solar power plant constructed by a subsidiary of U.S.-based SunEdison. Other international (IFC), European (EBRD, FMO, FinnFund), and Arab lenders (Bahrain) also are providing financing for solar and wind power projects in Jordan. In February 2015, the government issued its first renewable energy tender, awarding contracts to several international and Jordanian companies, including Qatar’s Nebras Power, Diamond Generating Europe (a subsidiary of Mitsubishi Corporation), and Jordan’s Kawar Group. Jordan also signed an agreement with the Russian company Rosatom to build a 2,000 megawatt nuclear power plant in Jordan by 2022. Jordan hopes that nuclear energy will ultimately provide 40% of the country’s energy.

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48 Jordan possesses substantial reserves of phosphates and potash. No significant oil and gas fields have been discovered. However, Jordan has one of world’s largest reserves of oil shale. Officials estimate that the country contains the world’s fourth-largest oil shale reserves.

49 It is estimated that up to 20% of GDP comes from remittances. Nearly 10% of Jordan’s population (600,000 est.) reside and work in Arab Gulf countries.

50 One factor that exacerbates the unemployment situation in Jordan is the social stigma attached to menial labor jobs. Referred to as the “culture of shame,” Jordanian tribal traditions look down on certain types of employment such as construction. In fact, the government estimates that there are approximately 300,000 to 400,000 foreign laborers in Jordan working as domestic laborers, bricklayers, and other tasks. According to the Jordanian Employment Ministry, Egyptians make up 68% of foreign workers in Jordan.

51 Jordan was ranked 55 out of 175 countries surveyed in Transparency International’s 2014 Corruption Perceptions Index.

52 In 2006, the Jordanian parliament passed a law establishing an Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) which has taken on several high level investigations in recent years, specifically looking into accusations of graft in a public housing project (Decent Home for Decent Living) and a water works project (Disi Water Conveyance).


55 USAID, Congressional Notification #74, Jordan, March 27, 2015.
According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Jordan’s economy is slowly recovering from the downturn that spread across the region in 2011. In 2014, GDP grew 3.1%. The Economist Intelligence Unit predicts that GDP growth will grow 2.5% this year. However, according to the International Monetary Fund, Jordan needs a growth rate of 6% to absorb new entrants into its labor force.

Due to perennially subpar economic growth, high energy/food subsidies, and a bloated public sector workforce, Jordan usually runs annual budget deficits (total public debt is $32 billion) which it partially offsets by appealing to the international community for direct budget support. In order to keep Jordan fiscally stable, the International Monetary Fund agreed to a three-year, $2 billion loan in August 2012. As part of the IMF deal, Jordan is increasing consumer electricity prices. It already has increased taxes on mobile phones and contracts. Nevertheless, economists are closely following Jordan’s overall debt burden, which has somewhat improved in 2015, falling to 80% (net public debt) of GDP.

Figure 3. GDP Growth and Male/Female Unemployment in Jordan
(4-quarter moving average, in percent)

Source: National authorities and IMF estimates.
Figure from IMF.

U.S. Foreign Assistance to Jordan

The United States has provided economic and military aid to Jordan since 1951 and 1957, respectively. Total U.S. aid to Jordan through FY2015 amounted to approximately $15.833 billion.

Three-Year MOU on U.S. Foreign Aid to Jordan

On February 3, 2015, the Obama Administration and the Jordanian government signed a nonbinding, three-year memorandum of understanding (MOU), in which the United States pledges to provide the kingdom with $1 billion annually in total U.S. foreign assistance, subject to the approval of Congress, from FY2015 through FY2017. The new MOU followed a previous five-year agreement in which the United States had pledged to provide a total of $660 million annually from FY2009 through FY2014. During those five years, Congress actually provided Jordan with $4.753 billion in total aid, or $1.453 billion ($290.6 million annually) above what was agreed to in the five-year MOU, including more than $1 billion in FY2014. According to the Department of State, “The United States and Jordan share a commitment to promoting regional security and stability, furthering Jordan’s economic development, and advancing social, political, and economic reform in Jordan. The United States recognizes Jordan’s increased immediate needs resulting from regional unrest, the efforts Jordan is undertaking at the forefront of the fight against ISIL and other extremist ideology and terrorism, the influx of refugees from Syria and Iraq, the disruption of foreign energy supplies, and other unprecedented strains.”

### Table 1. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Jordan, FY2012-FY2016 Request

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Account</th>
<th>FY2012</th>
<th>FY2013 (after sequestration)</th>
<th>FY2014</th>
<th>FY2015 Est.</th>
<th>FY2016 Request</th>
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<td>347.961</td>
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<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMET</td>
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<td>3.58</td>
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<tr>
<td>1206/2282 (DoD)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>28.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTPF (DoD)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>76.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>763.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>852.841</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,003.58</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,108.93</strong></td>
<td><strong>991.15</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** In FY2013, USAID notified Congress of a $200 million cash transfer to Jordan ($100 million in FY2012 Economic Support Funds (ESF) and $100 million in FY2013 ESF-OCO).

### Economic Assistance

The United States provides economic aid to Jordan both as a cash transfer and for USAID programs in Jordan. The Jordanian government uses cash transfers to service its foreign debt. Approximately 40% to 60% of Jordan’s ESF allotment may go toward the cash transfer. USAID programs in Jordan focus on a variety of sectors including democracy assistance, water preservation, and education (particularly building and renovating public schools). In the democracy sector, U.S. assistance has supported capacity-building programs for the parliament’s support offices, the Jordanian Judicial Council, the Judicial Institute, and the Ministry of Justice. The International Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute also have received U.S. grants to train, among other groups, some Jordanian political parties and members of parliament. In the water sector, the bulk of U.S. economic assistance is devoted to optimizing the management of scarce water resources, as Jordan is one of the most water-deprived countries in the world. USAID is currently subsidizing several waste treatment and water distribution projects in the Jordanian cities of Amman, Mafraq, Aqaba, and Irbid.

### Millennium Challenge Account (MCA)

In FY2006, Jordan was listed by the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) as a Threshold country in the lower middle-income bracket. On September 12, 2006, the MCC’s board of directors approved up to $25 million in Threshold Program assistance for Jordan. In September 2010, the Millennium Challenge Corporation approved a five-year, $275.1 million compact with Jordan to increase the supply of water available to households and businesses in the cities of Amman and Zarqa. The compact also is intended to help improve the efficiency of water delivery, wastewater collection, and wastewater treatment. If estimates hold true, the clean drinking water generated as a result of the MCC compact may be enough to supply almost 1 million Jordanian citizens with freshwater.
Loan Guarantees

Since 2013, the Obama Administration has provided three loan guarantees to Jordan, totaling $3.75 billion. These include:

- In September 2013, the United States announced that it was providing its first-ever loan guarantee to the Kingdom of Jordan. USAID notified Congress of its intent to obligate up to $120 million in FY2013 ESF-OCO to support a $1.25 billion, 7-year sovereign loan guarantee for Jordan.

- In February 2014, during a visit to the United States by King Abdullah II, the Obama Administration announced that it would offer Jordan an additional five-year, $1 billion loan guarantee. USAID notified Congress of its intent to obligate $72 million out of the $340 million of FY2014 ESF-OCO for Jordan to support the subsidy costs for the second loan guarantee.

- In June 2015, the Administration provided its third loan guarantee to Jordan of $1.5 billion. USAID notified Congress of its intent to obligate $221 million in FY2015 ESF to support the subsidy costs of the third loan guarantee to Jordan.

Military Assistance

Foreign Military Financing

U.S.-Jordanian military cooperation is a key component in bilateral relations. U.S. military assistance is primarily directed toward enabling the Jordanian military to procure and maintain conventional weapons systems. Foreign Military Financing (FMF) grants to Jordan enable its Air Force to maintain a modest fleet of F-16 fighters and purchase Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM). FMF grants also provide financing for Jordan’s purchase of U.S. Blackhawk helicopters in order to enhance Jordan’s border monitoring and counter-terror capability. In recent years, Jordan also has acquired Javelin missiles, Hellfire missiles, High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems, and night-vision devices.

Excess Defense Articles

In 1996, the United States granted Jordan Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status, a designation that, among other things, makes Jordan eligible to receive excess U.S. defense articles, training, and loans of equipment for cooperative research and development. Since 2009, Jordan has received excess U.S. defense equipment valued at approximately $81.69 million. In the last five years...

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57 Congress initially authorized additional economic assistance to Jordan in Section 7041 of P.L. 112-74, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012. P.L. 113-6, the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013 specified that such assistance should take the form of a loan guarantee. Section 1706 (j) of the same Act also appropriated $30 million (from FY2011) for the initial cost of sovereign loan guarantees. Congress reauthorized loan guarantees for Jordan in section 7034(r)(1) of P.L. 113-235 (Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015).

58 op.cit., Congressional Notification #74.


60 See, Designation Of Jordan As Major Non-Nato Ally, Determination of President of the United States, No. 97–4, November 12, 1996, 61 F.R. 59809.

years, Jordan has received excess U.S. defense articles, including two C-130 aircraft, HAWK MEI-23E missiles, and cargo trucks.

**Defense Department Assistance**

As a result of the Syrian civil war and Operation Inherent Resolve against ISIS, the United States has increased military aid to Jordan and channeled these increases through Defense Department-managed accounts. Although Jordan still receives the bulk of U.S. military aid from the FMF account, Congress has authorized defense appropriations to strengthen Jordan’s border security. Currently, Congress has authorized Jordan to receive funding from three primary accounts: (1) Section 1206/10 U.S.C. 2282 Authority to Build Partner Capacity, (2) the Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF), and (3) Department of Defense Operations & Maintenance Funds (O&M). Military aid provided by these accounts is generally coordinated through a joint Defense Department (DoD)-State Department (DoS) review and approved by the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State.

Recent obligations of DoD aid include:

- **$76.93 million** in FY2015 CTPF - $60.120 million for border security and $16.810 million for a Quick Response Force
- **$16.6 million** in redirected Section 1206/10 U.S.C. 2282 funds (originally provided to Yemen between FY2012-FY2014) for AT-802 fixed-wing aircraft with associated spares, ancillary items, and spare parts for the CASA CN-235 aircraft.
- **$11.6 million** in FY2015 Section 1206/10 U.S.C. 2282 funds for border guard forces.

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62 Section 1205 of P.L. 113-291, the FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act, permits the transfer of other appropriated funds (such as CTPF monies) to conduct programs under 10 U.S.C. 2282 authority.

63 Section 9013 of H.R. 2685, the Department of Defense Appropriations bill for FY2016, states that “The Secretary of Defense is authorized, in coordination with the Secretary of State, to provide assistance, to the Government of Jordan for purposes of supporting and enhancing efforts of the armed forces of Jordan and to sustain security along the border of Jordan with Syria and Iraq: Provided, That up to $600 million of funds appropriated by this Act for the Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund may be used for activities authorized by this section.” CTPF funds for Jordan also are authorized in Section 1202 of H.R. 1735, the National Defense Authorization bill for Fiscal Year 2016.

64 Section 1207 of P.L. 113-66, the FY2014 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), originally authorized the Secretary of Defense to provide up to $150 million in “assistance on a reimbursement basis to the Government of Jordan for purposes of supporting and maintaining efforts of the armed forces of Jordan to increase security and sustain increased security along the border between Jordan and Syria.” The FY2015 Omnibus, P.L. 113-235, permits the Secretary of Defense to provide Jordan with Defense Department Operation and Maintenance (O&M) OCO funds to “reimburse the government of Jordan in such amounts as the Secretary of Defense may determine to maintain the ability of the Jordanian armed forces to maintain security along the border between Jordan and Syria.” H.R. 2685, the Department of Defense Appropriations bill for FY2016, would continue to authorize O&M funds for Jordan, as would Section 1202 of H.R. 1735, the National Defense Authorization bill for Fiscal Year 2016.
Table 2. Annual U.S. Aid to Jordan Since the 1991 Gulf Crisis
($ in millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year (FY)</th>
<th>Economic Assistance</th>
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<th></th>
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### Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations

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<th>Military Assistance</th>
<th>Totals</th>
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<tr>
<td>2015 est.</td>
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**Notes:** These figures do not include debt relief subsidy appropriations, food aid between 1999-2006, or amounts for de-mining assistance and counter-terrorism assistance.

- e. Three components: $30 million (Administration’s original request); $70 million in additional FMF under FY1996 appropriation (P.L. 104-134) to cover balance of F-16 aircraft package; and $100 million in special drawdown authority (P.L. 104-107).
- f. These figures include $100 million in economic assistance under the President’s Middle East Peace and Stability Fund ($100 million in FY1997, $116 million in FY1998).
- g. For each of these two years, FMF figure includes $25 million in drawdown authority.
- h. Some of these funds were obligated in later years (FY2001 or FY2002).
- i. Total FY2007 supplemental aid to Jordan was $85.3 million. The above chart does not include $25 million in NADR funds.
- j. The total $700 million FY2014 ESF appropriation to Jordan was split between enduring ($360 million) and OCO ($340 million) funds.

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