Iran, Gulf Security, and U.S. Policy

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Summary

Since the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, a priority of U.S. policy has been to reduce the perceived threat posed by Iran to a broad range of U.S. interests, including the security of the Persian Gulf region. In 2014, a common adversary emerged in the form of the Islamic State organization, reducing gaps in U.S. and Iranian regional interests, although the two countries have somewhat differing approaches over how to try to defeat the group.

During the 1980s and 1990s, U.S. officials identified Iran’s support for militant Middle East groups as a significant threat to U.S. interests and allies. A perceived potential threat from Iran’s nuclear program emerged in 2002, and the United States has orchestrated broad international economic pressure on Iran to try to ensure that the program is verifiably confined to purely peaceful purposes. The international pressure might have contributed to the June 2013 election as president of Iran of the relatively moderate Hassan Rouhani, who campaigned as an advocate of ending Iran’s international isolation. Subsequent multilateral talks with Iran produced an interim agreement (“Joint Plan of Action,” JPA) that halted the expansion of Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for modest sanctions relief. After more than a year of further talks, on April 2, 2015, the United States and its partners announced a political outline of a comprehensive nuclear agreement, with intent to finalize details by June 30, 2015. The framework stipulates technical steps that would give the international community confidence that it would take Iran at least one year to produce a nuclear weapon, were Iran to try to do so. In exchange, Iran is to receive relief from most of the U.S., multinational, and U.N. sanctions imposed on Iran since 2010.

A final nuclear agreement could significantly improve U.S.-Iran relations, but the framework agreement comes in the context of U.S. and allied concerns about Iranian actions in the region. The Persian Gulf states express concern that Iran has made substantial gains in recent years, for example in supporting the rebel Houthi movement in Yemen and in organizing Shiite forces to defend the embattled government of Bashar Al Assad of Syria. The war against the Islamic State organization has also given Iran additional influence over the government of Iraq as well as common interests with the United States in Iraq. On Syria, Iran supports Assad, whereas the United States asserts his departure is key to a political solution. The January 2015 fall of the government of Yemen under pressure from the Houthis has aggravated Saudi-Iranian tensions as Saudi Arabia has undertaken military action against the Houthis there. U.S. allies, particularly Israel and the Gulf states, express concern that a lifting of sanctions will furnish Iran with additional resources with which to expand its influence further. The Gulf states express fears that a nuclear deal could cause the United States to tilt toward Iran or forfeit its role as the final guarantor of Gulf security.

Domestically, Rouhani’s unexpected election win and latitude from Iran’s Supreme Leader to negotiate a nuclear deal demonstrates that Iran’s population supports reducing Iran’s isolation. Rouhani has sought to satisfy this sentiment not only through the nuclear negotiations but also by orchestrating the release of some political prisoners and easing some media restrictions. But, Iran’s judiciary remains in the hands of hardliners who continue to restrict social freedoms and prosecute regime critics and dissenters. For further information, see CRS Report R43333, Iran: Efforts to Achieve a Nuclear Accord, by Kenneth Katzman, Paul K. Kerr, and Michael John Garcia; CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman; and CRS Report R44017, Iran’s Foreign Policy, by Kenneth Katzman.
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Political History

Iran is a country of about 75 million people, located in the heart of the Persian Gulf region. The United States was an ally of the late Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi ("the Shah"), who ruled from 1941 until his ouster in February 1979. The Shah assumed the throne when Britain and Russia forced his father, Reza Shah Pahlavi (Reza Shah), from power because of his perceived alignment with Germany in World War II. Reza Shah had assumed power in 1921 when, as an officer in Iran’s only military force, the Cossack Brigade (reflecting Russian influence in Iran in the early 20th century), he launched a coup against the government of the Qajar Dynasty. Reza Shah was proclaimed Shah in 1925, founding the Pahlavi dynasty. The Qajars had been in decline for many years before Reza Shah’s takeover. That dynasty’s perceived manipulation by Britain and Russia had been one of the causes of the 1906 constitutionalist movement, which forced the Qajars to form Iran’s first Majles (parliament) in August 1906 and promulgate a constitution in December 1906. Prior to the Qajars, what is now Iran was the center of several Persian empires and dynasties whose reach shrunk steadily over time. Since the 16th century, Iranian empires lost control of Bahrain (1521), Baghdad (1638), the Caucasus (1828), western Afghanistan (1857), Baluchistan (1872), and what is now Turkmenistan (1894). Iran adopted Shiite Islam under the Safavid Dynasty (1500-1722), which ended a series of Turkic and Mongol conquests.

The Shah was anti-Communist, and the United States viewed his government as a bulwark against the expansion of Soviet influence in the Persian Gulf and a counterweight to pro-Soviet Arab regimes and movements. Israel maintained a representative office in Iran during the Shah’s time and the Shah supported a peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli dispute. In 1951, under pressure from nationalists in the Majles (parliament) who gained strength in the 1949 Majles elections, he appointed a popular nationalist parliamentarian, Dr. Mohammad Mossadeg, as prime minister. Mossadeg was widely considered left-leaning, and the United States was wary of his drive for nationalization of the oil industry, which had since 1913 been controlled by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. His followers began an uprising in August 1953 when the Shah tried to dismiss him, and the Shah fled. The Shah was restored in a CIA-supported uprising that toppled Mossadeg ("Operation Ajax") on August 19, 1953.

The Shah tried to modernize Iran and orient it toward the West, but in so doing he alienated religious Iranians and the Shiite clergy and he allegedly tolerated severe repression and torture of dissidents by his SAVAK intelligence service. The Shah exiled Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in 1964 because of Khomeini’s active opposition to what he asserted were the Shah’s anti-clerical policies and forfeiture of Iran’s sovereignty to the United States. Khomeini fled to and taught in Najaf, Iraq, a major Shiite theological center. In 1978, three years after the March 6, 1975, Algiers Accords between the Shah and Iraq’s Baathist leaders that temporarily ended mutual hostile actions, Iraq expelled Khomeini to France, where he continued to agitate for revolution that would establish Islamic government in Iran. Mass demonstrations and guerrilla activity by pro-Khomeini forces caused the Shah’s government to collapse. Khomeini returned from France on February 1, 1979 and, on February 11, 1979, he declared an Islamic Republic of Iran. Khomeini’s concept of velayat-e-faqih (rule by a supreme Islamic jurisprudent, or “Supreme Leader”) was enshrined in the constitution that was adopted in a public referendum in December 1979 (and amended in 1989). The constitution provided for the post of Supreme Leader of the Revolution. The regime based itself on strong opposition to Western influence, and relations between the United States and the Islamic Republic turned openly hostile after the November 4, 1979, seizure of the U.S. Embassy by pro-Khomeini radicals. Ayatollah Khomeini died on June 3, 1989, and was succeeded as Supreme Leader by Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i.
The regime faced serious unrest in its first few years, including a June 1981 bombing at the headquarters of the Islamic Republican Party (IRP) and the prime minister’s office that killed several senior leaders. The regime used these events, along with the hostage crisis with the United States, to justify purging many of the secular, liberal, and left-wing personalities that were prominent in the years just after the revolution. Examples included the regime’s first Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan; the pro-Moscow Tudeh Party (Communist), the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI, see below), and the first elected President Abolhassan Bani Sadr. The regime was under economic and military threat during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War, which resulted at times in nearly halting Iran’s oil exports.

Regime Structure, Stability, and Opposition

Iran’s Islamic regime is widely considered authoritarian, although it provides for elected institutions, checks and balances, and diversity of opinion among leaders. The Supreme Leader is not directly elected by the population, but he is selected by an all-elected body. The President and the Majles (unicameral parliament) are directly elected. There are also elections for municipal councils, which select mayors. Even within the unelected institutions, factional disputes between those who insist on ideological purity and those considered more pragmatic have been frequent and highly consequential. Iranian leaders assert that Iran is perhaps the most politically stable major country in the region. Aside from the 2009-2010 uprising, the regime has faced only episodic unrest from minorities, intellectuals, students, labor groups, and women.

Unelected or Indirectly Elected Institutions: The Supreme Leader, Council of Guardians, and Expediency Council

At the apex of the Islamic Republic’s power structure is a “Supreme Leader” who has vast formal powers and no term limits. He is chosen by an elected body—the Assembly of Experts—which also has the constitutional power to remove him. Upon Ayatollah Khomeini’s death, the Assembly selected one of his disciples, Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i, as Supreme Leader. Although he has never had Khomeini’s undisputed political or religious authority, the powers of the office ensure that Khamene’i is Iran’s paramount leader. Under the constitution, the Supreme Leader is Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, giving him the power to appoint commanders. He is directly represented on the highest national security body, the Supreme National Security Council, composed of top military and civilian security officials. The constitution gives the Supreme Leader the power to approve the removal of an elected president if either the judiciary or the Majles (parliament) decide there is cause for that removal. The Supreme Leader appoints half of the 12-member Council of Guardians; all members of the Expediency Council, and the head of Iran’s judiciary (currently Ayatollah Sadeq Larijani).

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1 At the time of his selection as Supreme Leader, Khamene’i was generally referred to at the rank of Hojjat ol-Islam, one rank below Ayatollah, suggesting his religious elevation was political rather than through traditional mechanisms.
Table 1. Supreme Leader: Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i

Born in July 1939 to an Azeri (Turkic) family from Mashhad. Was jailed by the Shah of Iran for supporting Ayatollah Khomeini’s revolution. After the regime took power in 1979, helped organize Revolutionary Guard and other security organs. Lost some use of right arm in purported assassination attempt in June 1981. Was elected president during 1981-1989 and was selected Khomeini’s successor in June 1989 upon his death. Upon that selection, Khamene’i religious ranking was advanced in official organs to “Grand Ayatollah” from the lower ranking “Hojjat ol-Islam.” But, still lacks the undisputed authority to end factional disputes or the public adoration Khomeini had. Has taken more of a day-to-day role since 2009 uprising, including in the nuclear negotiations issue. Sided decisively with hardline opponents of then president Ahmadinejad after mid-2011, but acquiesced to the election of the relatively moderate Rouhani. Khamene’i publicly supported the JPA but has expressed skepticism that a permanent nuclear settlement can be reached. Reputedly issued religious proclamation (2003) against Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon, and has publicly (2012) called doing so a “sin,” and is widely believed to fear direct military confrontation with United States on Iranian soil. Generally does not meet with Western officials and is suspicious of relations with the West as potentially making Iran vulnerable to Western cultural influence, spying, and possible regime destabilization efforts.

Throughout career, has consistently taken hardline stances on regional issues, particularly toward Israel, often calling it a cancerous tumor that needs to be excised from the region. In March 2014, publicly questioned whether the Holocaust occurred—an issue highlighted by former president Ahmadinejad.

Fully backs efforts by Revolutionary Guard and other Iranian organs to support pro-Iranian movements and governments, including that of Syria. On economic issues, he has tended to support the business community (bazaaris), and opposed state control of the economy, but believes Iran’s economy is self-sufficient enough to withstand the effects of international sanctions.

His office is run by Mohammad Mohammadi Golpayegani, with significant input from Khamene’i’s second and increasingly influential son, Mojtaba. Also advised by Keyhan editor Hossein Shariatmadari and former Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati.

Khamene’i’s health is widely considered good, although the government acknowledged that he underwent prostate surgery in September 2014. Potential successors include former judiciary chief Ayatollah Mahmoud Shahrudi; Expediency Council Chairman and longtime regime stalwart Ayatollah Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani; hardline senior cleric Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi Mesbah Yazdi; current Judiciary head Ayatollah Sadeq Larijani; and hardline Tehran Friday prayer leader Ayatollah Ahmad Khatemi. None is considered a clear consensus choice if Khamene’i leaves the scene unexpectedly, and experts assess that the Assembly of Experts might use a constitutional provision to set up a three-person leadership council to replace Khamene’i rather than select one person. Of the potential successors, only Rafsanjani can legitimately claim to have been a constant presence at Ayatollah Khomeini’s side in the revolution that established the Islamic Republic.

Source: CRS.

Council of Guardians and Expediency Council

The 12-member Council of Guardians (COG) consists of six Islamic jurists appointed by the Supreme Leader, and six secular lawyers selected by the judiciary and confirmed by the Majles. Currently headed by Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, the conservative-controlled body reviews legislation to ensure it conforms to Islamic law. It also vets election candidates by evaluating their backgrounds according to constitutional requirements that a candidate demonstrate knowledge of Islam, loyalty to the Islamic system of government, and other criteria that are largely subjective. The COG also certifies election results.

The 42-member “Expediency Council” was established in 1988 to resolve legislative disagreements between the Majles and the COG. It has since evolved into a policy advisory body for the Supreme Leader and an overseer of the performance of the president and his cabinet. Its members serve five-year terms; its chairman, Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, was reappointed in February 2007 and again in March 2012. The Expediency Council’s executive officer is former Revolutionary Guard commander-in-chief Mohsen Reza’i.
### Table 2. Major Factions, Personalities, and Interest Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conservatives</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Supreme Leader Ali Khamene'i</td>
<td>See box above.</td>
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<tr>
<td>President Hassan Rouhani</td>
<td>See box below.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Expediency Council Chair</td>
<td>Born in 1934, a longtime key regime strategist, Khomeini disciple, and advocate of</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ayatollah Ali Akbar</td>
<td>“grand bargain” to resolve all outstanding issues with United States. Was Majles</td>
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<td>Iran’s total pistachio production. Ouster as Assembly of Experts chairman in 2011 widely</td>
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<td></td>
<td>attributed to his tacit support of popular opposition to Ahmadinejad 2009 reelection.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>That perception undoubtedly contributed to COG denying his candidacy in 2013 presidential</td>
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<td>elections, even though Khamene’i had reappointed him Expediency Council chair in March 2012.</td>
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<td>Victory of ally Rouhani in the 2013 election has revived Rafsanjani’s influence.</td>
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<td>The political activities of Rafsanjani’s children have contributed to his uneven relations</td>
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<td></td>
<td>with Khamene’i. Daughter Faizah was jailed in September 2012 for participating in the 2009</td>
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<td>protests. Five Rafsanjani other family members were arrested in 2009 and 2010 on similar</td>
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<td></td>
<td>charges.</td>
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<td>Senior Shiite Clerics</td>
<td>The most senior clerics, most of whom are in Qom, including several Grand Ayatollahs, are</td>
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<td></td>
<td>generally “quietist”—they believe that the senior clergy should refrain from direct</td>
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<td>involvement in politics. These include Grand Ayatollah Nasser Makarem Shirazi, Grand</td>
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<td>Ayatollah Abdol Karim Musavi-Ardabili, and Grand Ayatollah Yusuf Sanei, all of whom</td>
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<td>criticized the regime’s crackdown against oppositionists during the 2009 uprising. Others</td>
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<td>believe in political involvement, including Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi Mesbah Yazdi, the</td>
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<td>founder of the hardline Haqani school and spiritual mentor to Ahmadinejad until breaking</td>
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<td>with him in 2011. Yazdi is an assertive defender of the powers of the Supreme Leader and a</td>
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<td>proponent of an “Islamic state” rather than the current “Islamic republic.”</td>
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<tr>
<td>Society of Militant Clerics</td>
<td>Longtime organization of moderate-to-hardline clerics. Did not back Ahmadinejad</td>
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<td>for reelection in 2009 and led a bloc opposing Ahmadinejad in the March 2, 2012, Majles</td>
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<td></td>
<td>elections. President Rouhani is a member of this group.</td>
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<td>Organized Opposition/Regime Critics</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reformist and Green</td>
<td>The titular leader of the Green movement, Mir Hossein Musavi, a non-cleric, is about 70.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Movement Leaders: Mir</td>
<td>An architect by training, and a disciple of Ayatollah Khomeini, he served</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hossein Musavi/</td>
<td>as foreign minister (1980), then prime minister (1981-1989), at which time he</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mohammad Khatemi/Mehdi</td>
<td>successfully managed the state rationing program during the privations of the Iran-Iraq</td>
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<td>Karrubi</td>
<td>War but often feuded with Khamene’i, who was then president. At that time, he was an</td>
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<td></td>
<td>advocate of state control of the economy. His post was abolished in the 1989 revision of</td>
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<td>the constitution.</td>
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<td>Musavi supports political and social freedoms and reducing Iran’s international isolation,</td>
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<td>but also state intervention in the economy to benefit workers and lower classes. Appeared</td>
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<td>at some of the 2009 protests, sometimes harassed by security agents, but harder line</td>
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<td>opposition leaders resented his statements supporting reconciliation with the regime. He</td>
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<td>and his wife (prominent activist Zahra Rahnevard), along with fellow Green Movement</td>
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<td>leader and defeated 2009 presidential candidate Mehdi Karrubi, were placed in detention in</td>
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<td>mid-2011. In early 2014, Karrubi was allowed to return to his home, although still under</td>
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<td>the control of regime guards. Musavi remains in detention. Karrubi was Speaker of the</td>
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<td>Mohammad Khatami was elected president on a reformist platform in May 1997, with 69% of</td>
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<td>the vote; reelected June 2001 with 77%. Rode wave of sentiment for easing social and</td>
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<td>political restrictions, but these groups became disillusioned with Khatami’s failure as</td>
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<td>president to buck hardliners on reform issues. He endorsed</td>
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</table>
Musavi in the 2009 election.

Student Groups

Groups composed of well-educated, Westernized urban youth have been the backbone of the Green Movement. The Office of Consolidation of Unity is the student group that led the 1999 riots but which later became controlled by regime loyalists. An offshoot, the Confederation of Iranian Students (CIS), believes in regime replacement and in 2013 formed a “National Iran Congress” to advocate that outcome. CIS founder Amir Abbas Fakhravar is based in the United States. Co-founder Arzhang Davoodi has been in prison for 11 years and in July 2014 was sentenced to death.

Islamic Iran Participation Front (IIPF)

The most prominent and best organized pro-reform grouping, but in 2009 lost political ground to Green Movement groups. IIPF leaders include Khatemi’s brother, Mohammad Reza Khatemi (deputy speaker in the 2000-2004 Majles) and Mohtasen Mirdamadi. Backed Musavi in June 2009 election; several IIPF leaders detained and prosecuted in postelection dispute. The party was outlawed by the regime in September 2010.

Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution Organization (MIR)

Composed mainly of left-leaning Iranian figures who support state control of the economy, but want greater political pluralism and relaxation of rules on social behavior. A major constituency of the reformist camp. Its leader is former Heavy Industries Minister Behzad Nabavi, who supported Musavi in 2009 election and has been incarcerated for most of the time since June 2009. The organization was outlawed by the regime simultaneously with the outlawing of the IIPF, above.

Combatant Clerics Association

Very similar name to organization above, but politically very different. Formed in 1988, it is run by reformist critics. Leading figures include Mohammad Khatemi, former Interior Minister Ali Akbar Mohtashemi-Pur, and former Prosecutor General Ali Asgar Musavi-Koiniha.

Other Prominent Dissidents

Other leading dissidents, some in Iran, others in exile (including in the United States), have been challenging the regime since well before the Green Movement formed. Journalist Akbar Ganji served six years in prison for alleging high-level involvement in 1999 murders of Iranian dissident intellectuals. Religion scholar Abdol Karim Soroush left Iran in 2001 after challenging the doctrine of clerical rule. Former Revolutionary Guard organizer Mohsen Sazegara broadcasts on-line to Iran from his base in the United States. Nobel Peace Prize laureate (2003) and Iran human rights activist lawyer Shirin Abadi, who for many years represented clients persecuted or prosecuted by the regime, left Iran after the 2009 uprising. Some well-known dissidents incarcerated since 2010 include filmmaker Jafar Panahi; journalist Abdolreza Tajik; famed blogger Hossein Derakhshan. 80-year-old Iran Freedom Movement leader Ibrahim Yazdi was released from prison in April 2011 after resigning as the Freedom Movement’s leader. Human rights lawyer Nasrin Sotoudeh was released from prison in September 2013. In May 2015, the regime arrested Ms. Narges Mohammad, a well-known activist against regime executions. Other significant dissidents in exile include former Culture Minister Ataollah Mohajerani, Mohsen Kadivar, and U.S.-based Fatemah Haghighatgoo. Other leading dissidents, some in Iran, others in exile (including in the United States), have been challenging the regime since well before the Green Movement formed. Journalist Akbar Ganji served six years in prison for alleging high-level involvement in 1999 murders of Iranian dissident intellectuals. Religion scholar Abdol Karim Soroush left Iran in 2001 after challenging the doctrine of clerical rule. Former Revolutionary Guard organizer Mohsen Sazegara broadcasts on-line to Iran from his base in the United States. Nobel Peace Prize laureate (2003) and Iran human rights activist lawyer Shirin Abadi, who for many years represented clients persecuted or prosecuted by the regime, left Iran after the 2009 uprising. Some well-known dissidents incarcerated since 2010 include filmmaker Jafar Panahi; journalist Abdolreza Tajik; famed blogger Hossein Derakhshan. 80-year-old Iran Freedom Movement leader Ibrahim Yazdi was released from prison in April 2011 after resigning as the Freedom Movement’s leader. Human rights lawyer Nasrin Sotoudeh was released from prison in September 2013. In May 2015, the regime arrested Ms. Narges Mohammad, a well-known activist against regime executions. Other significant dissidents in exile include former Culture Minister Ataollah Mohajerani, Mohsen Kadivar, and U.S.-based Fatemah Haghighatgoo.

Monarchists/Shah’s Son

Some Iranians outside Iran, including in the United States, want to replace the regime with a constitutional monarchy led by Reza Pahlavi, the U.S.-trained son of the late former Shah and a U.S.-trained combat pilot. The Shah’s son, who is about 60 years old, has delivered statements condemning the regime for the post-2009 election crackdown and he has called for international governments to withdraw their representation from Tehran. He appears periodically in broadcasts into Iran by Iranian exile-run stations in California, as well as in other Iran-oriented media.

Pahlavi has always had some support particularly in the older generation in Iran, 2

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but he reportedly is trying to broaden his following by asserting that he supports democracy and not restoration of a monarchy. Since March 2011, he has been increasingly cooperating with—and possibly attempting to co-opt—younger leaders in a “National Council of Iran” (NCI), which was formally established along with over 30 other groups in April 2013. The Council drafted a set of democratic principles for a post-Islamic republic Iran but has since floundered as a result of defections and relative lack of activity.

Leftist Groups

Some oppositionists who support left-wing ideologies support the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI). See text box at the end of this report.

Sunni Armed Opposition:

Jundullah

Jundullah is composed of Sunni Muslims primarily from the Baluchistan region bordering Pakistan. The region is inhabited by members of the Baluch minority and is far less developed than other parts of Iran. On the grounds that Jundullah has attacked civilians in the course of violent attacks in Iran, the State Department formally named it an FTO on November 4, 2010. Some saw the designation as an overture toward the Iranian government, while others saw it as a sign that the United States supports only opposition groups that are committed to peaceful methods. Jundullah has conducted several attacks on Iranian security and civilian officials, including a May 2009 bombing of a mosque in Zahedan and the October 2009 killing of five IRGC commanders in Sistan va Baluchistan Province. The regime claimed a major victory against the group in February 2010 with the capture of the group’s top leader, Abdolmalek Rigi. The regime executed him in June 2010, but the group retaliated in July 2010 with a Zahedan bombing that killed 28 persons, including some IRGC personnel. The group is believed responsible for a December 15, 2010, bombing at a mosque in Chahbahar, also inBaluchistan, that killed 38.

Kurdish Armed Groups: Free Life Party (PJAK)

An armed Kurdish group operating out of Iraq is the Free Life Party, known by its acronym PJAK. Its leader is believed to be Abdul Rahman Hajji Ahmadi, born in 1941, who is a citizen of Germany and lives in that country. Many PJAK members are women, supporting the organization’s dedication to women’s rights. PJAK was designated by the Treasury Department in early February 2009 as a terrorism supporting entity under Executive Order 13224, although the designation statement indicated the decision was based mainly on PJAK’s association with the Turkish Kurdish opposition group Kongra Gel, also known as the PKK. Five Kurds executed by Iran’s regime in May 2010 were alleged members of PJAK.

In June 2010 and July 2011, Iran conducted some shelling of reputed PJAK bases inside Iraq, reportedly killing some Kurdish civilians.

Arab Oppositionists/Arabs

Another militant group, the Ahwazi Arabs, operates in the largely Arab-inhabited areas of southwest Iran. Relatively inactive over the past few years, and the regime continues to execute captured members of the organization.

U.S.-Based Opposition and Advocacy-Groups

Of the more than 1 million Iranian Americans of differing ideologies, a vast majority want to see a change of regime in Tehran, although many Iranian Americans are not active on Iran policy issues. Many still have families living in Iran and appear concerned that anti-regime activity in the United States will put them in jeopardy. Up to half of all Iranian Americans are based in the Los Angeles area, and activists there run small broadcasting operations into Iran.

National Iranian-American Council (NIAC)

NIAC is an advocacy group that does not seek regime change in Iran. The stated mission of NIAC is to promote discussion of U.S. policy. The group advocates engagement with Iran, supports easing some U.S. sanctions against Iran and has asserted that the Administration is actively planning to take military action against Iran. These positions have led some experts and commentators to allege, although without providing evidence, that it is a front for the Iranian regime. NIAC has criticized the regime’s human rights abuses.

Public Affairs Alliance of Iranian-Americans (PAAIA)

PAAIA’s mission is to discuss issues affecting Iranian Americans, such as discrimination caused by public perceptions of association with terrorism or radical Islam. Some observers believe it has become less active since 2011.
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because of desertions by some members who want PAAIA to be more active in trying to shape U.S. Iran policy and to take a stronger stand against Tehran.

Sources: Various press accounts and author conversations with Iran experts in and outside Washington, DC.

Elected Institutions and Recent Elections

Several major institutions are directly elected by the population, but international organizations and governments question the credibility of Iran’s elections because of the COG’s role in limiting the number and ideological diversity of candidates, often for reasons that appear arbitrary or designed to deny the candidacies of figures critical of regime policies. Women can vote and run for most offices, but the COG interprets the Iranian constitution as prohibiting women from running for the office of president. Presidential candidates must receive more than 50% of the vote to avoid a runoff, which is generally held several weeks later.

Another criticism of the political process in Iran is the relative absence of political parties; establishing a party requires the permission of the Interior Ministry under Article 10 of Iran’s constitution. The standards to obtain approval are high: to date, numerous parties have filed for permission since the regime was founded, but only those considered loyal to the regime have been granted (or allowed to retain) license to operate. Some have been licensed and then banned, such as the two reformist parties Islamic Iran Participation Front and Organization of Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution, which were formally outlawed in September 2010.

The Presidency

The main directly elected institution is the presidency, which is clearly subordinate to the Supreme Leader. Each president has tried and generally failed to expand his authority relative to the Supreme Leader. Presidential authority, particularly on matters of national security, is also disputed by key clerics and allies of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and other powerful institutions. But, the presidency provides vast opportunities for the holder of the post to reward supporters.

The president appoints and supervises the cabinet, develops the budgets of cabinet departments, and imposes and collects taxes on corporations and other bodies. The presidency also runs oversight bodies such as the Anticorruption Headquarters and the General Inspection Organization, to which all government officials are formally required to submit annual financial statements. Religious foundations, called “bonyads,” for example, are loosely regulated and largely exempt from taxation. Likewise, the IRGC is able to generate profits from its business affiliates, which enjoy vast tax and regulatory benefits, and can spend significant amounts of unbudgeted funds on arms, technology, support to pro-Iranian movements, and other functions.

Prior to 1989, Iran had both an elected president as well as a prime minister selected by the elected Majles (parliament). However, the holders of the two positions were constantly in institutional conflict and a 1989 constitutional revision eliminated the prime ministership. Because Iran’s presidents have sometimes assert the powers of their institution against the office of the Supreme Leader itself, in October 2011, Khamene’i raised the possibility of eliminating the post of president and restoring the post of prime minister, which would be selected by the elected Majles. The prime minister would not be directly elected by the population and would presumably not be as independent of the Supreme Leader.
The Majles

Iran’s Majles, or parliament, is unicameral, consisting of 290 seats, all elected. Majles elections occur one year prior to the presidential elections; the elections for the ninth Majles were held on March 2, 2012 and the next will be held in on March 26, 2016. The Majles confirms cabinet selections and drafts and acts on legislation. Among its main duties is to consider and enact a proposed national budget, actions that typically take place in advance of the Persian New Year (Nowruz) each March 21. It actively legislates on domestic economic and social issues, but it tends to defer to the presidency and security institutions on defense and foreign policy issues. It is constitutionally required to ratify major international agreements, including any comprehensive nuclear agreement, but the Supreme Leader’s broad powers would enable him to avoid this requirement.

The Majles has always been highly factionalized. However, all factions tend to defer immediately to the authority of the Supreme Leader. There is no “quota” for the number of women to be elected, but women regularly run and win election. Still, their representation has been small relative to the female population. There is one “reserved seat” for each of Iran’s recognized religious minorities, including Jews and Christians.

The Assembly of Experts

A major although little publicized elected institution is the Assembly of Experts. Akin to a standing electoral college, it is empowered to choose a new Supreme Leader upon the death of the incumbent, and it formally “oversees” the work of the Supreme Leader. The Assembly can replace him if necessary, although invoking that impeachment power would, in practice, most likely occur in the event of a severe health crisis. It is also empowered to amend the constitution.

The Assembly has 86 seats, elected to an eight-year term, with elections conducted on a provincial basis. It generally meets two times a year, for a few days each. The fourth election for the Assembly was held on December 15, 2006; after that election, Rafsanjani, still a major figure having served two terms as president (1989-1997), was named deputy leader of the Assembly. After the death of the leader of the Assembly (Ayatollah Meshkini), Rafsanjani was selected its head in September 2007. Rafsanjani’s opposition to the crackdown on the 2009 uprising ran him afoul of the Supreme Leader and he was not reelected as chair of the body in March 2011. He was replaced by aging and infirm compromise candidate Ayatollah Mohammad Reza Mahdavi-Kani. Poor health has precluded Mahdavi-Kani from performing his duties since June 2014, and he died in late October. He was replaced on an acting basis by deputy Chairman Mahmoud Shahrudi, a former chief of the judiciary. However, the Assembly selected 83-year old Mohammad Yazdi as the new chairman in March 2015; Shahrudi withdrew and Yazdi outpolled Rafsanjani for the slot. Yazdi will serve until the next Assembly of Experts election on March 26, 2016 (concurrent with the Majles elections).

Recent Elections and Their Implications

Rafsanjani served as president during 1989-1997, winning election in a vote held soon after Ayatollah Khomeini’s death in June of 1989. He was succeeded by avowed reformist Mohammad Khatemi who won landslide victories in the elections of 1997 and 2001. After marginalizing Khatemi by accusing him of opening up the political system too much, hardliners began to regain the sway they held when Ayatollah Khomeini was alive. Conservatives won 155 out of the 290
Majles seats in the February 20, 2004, Majles elections, in large part because the COG disallowed 3,600 reformist candidates.

2005 Presidential Election. The COG narrowed the field for the June 2005 presidential elections to 8 out of the 1,014 persons who filed. The major candidates were Rafsanjani,3 Ali Larijani, Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, and Tehran mayor Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. With 21% and 19.5%, respectively, Rafsanjani and Ahmadinejad, who apparently had the tacit backing of Khamene‘i, moved to a runoff on June 24. Reformist candidates fared relatively poorly. Ahmadinejad won with 61.8% to Rafsanjani’s 35.7%. During Ahmadinejad’s first term, which began in August 2005, splits widened between Ahmadinejad and other conservatives. In the March 2008 Majles elections, some conservatives banded together in an anti-Ahmadinejad bloc.

2009 Presidential Election. Reformists saw this conservative split as an opportunity to unseat Ahmadinejad in the June 12, 2009 presidential election and rallied behind Mir Hossein Musavi, who had been prime minister during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War. The COG also allowed the candidacies of reformist Mehdi Karrubi and former IRGC Commander Mohsen Reza‘i (see above). Musavi’s young, urban supporters used social media such as Facebook and Twitter to organize large rallies in Tehran, but pro-Ahmadinejad rallies were large as well. Turnout was about 85%. The Interior Ministry announced two hours after the polls closed that Ahmadinejad had won, although in the past results have been announced the day after. The vote totals, released June 13, showed Ahmadinejad receiving about 25 million votes (63%), Musavi with about 13 million, and under 1 million each for Reza‘i and Karrubi. Musavi supporters immediately began protesting, citing the infeasibility of counting votes so quickly. Some outside analysts said the results tracked pre-election polls, which showed strong support for Ahmadinejad in rural and poor urban areas.4 Large public demonstrations occurred June 13-19, 2009, largely in Tehran but also in other cities. Security forces used some force and killed over 100 protesters (opposition figure—Iran government figure was 27), including a 19-year-old woman, Neda Soltani, who subsequently became an emblem of the uprising.

The opposition congealed into the “Green Movement of Hope and Change,” which mounted a challenge to the regime. Some protests in December 2009 overwhelmed regime security forces in some parts of Tehran, but the movement’s outward activity declined after its demonstration planned for the February 11, 2010, anniversary of the founding of the Islamic Republic was suppressed. Minor protests were held on several subsequent occasions in 2010. The uprising apparently failed to win support from older Iranians and Iranians who live in rural areas.

As the unrest ebbed, Ahmadinejad sought to promote the interests of his loyalists and a nationalist version of Islam that limits clerical authority. Infighting escalated in April 2011 when Khamene‘i overrode Ahmadinejad’s dismissal of MOIS head (intelligence minister) Heydar Moslehi and Ahmadinejad protested by refusing to attend cabinet meetings from April 24 to May 4, 2011.

Amid the widening rifts, the March 2, 2012, Majles elections attracted only 5,400 candidacies—33% fewer than the previous Majles elections. Only 10% of them were women. The COG issued

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3 Rafsanjani was constitutionally permitted to run because a third term would not have been consecutive with his previous two terms. In the 2001 presidential election, the Council permitted 10 out of the 814 registered candidates.

4 A paper published by Chatham House and the University of St. Andrews strongly questions how Ahmadinejad’s vote could have been as large as reported by official results, in light of past voting patterns throughout Iran. “Preliminary Analysis of the Voting Figures in Iran’s 2009 Presidential Election.” http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk.
a final candidate list of 3,400 for the 290 seats up for election. Two blocs of candidates supported strongly by Khamene’i won about 75% of the seats—weakening Ahmadinejad politically.

**June 14, 2013, Presidential Election**

In early 2013, the presidential election was set for June 14, with municipal elections to be held concurrently, perhaps in part to improve turnout among voters mobilized by local issues. Candidate registration took place during May 7-11, 2013, and the COG finalized the presidential candidate field on May 22. A runoff was to be held on June 21 if no candidate received more than 50% of the votes. The major candidates who filed included:

- Four figures close to the Supreme Leader—Tehran mayor Qalibaf, former Majles Speaker Haddad Adel, former foreign minister and top Khamene’i foreign policy advisor Ali Akbar Velayati, and Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator, Seyed Jalilli. The COG approved them to run; Haddad Adel dropped out before the vote.
- Former chief nuclear negotiator Hassan Rouhani, a moderate and Rafsanjani ally.
- Former IRGC Commander-in-Chief Mohsen Reza’i was approved to run, but his constituency had not broadened since the 2009 contest. The COG disapproved Rafsanjani’s candidacy—a disqualification that shocked Iranians because of Rafsanjani’s prominent place in the history of the regime. Ahmadinejad ally, Mashai, was also turned down to run by the COG.

Green Movement supporters, at first expected to boycott the vote, mobilized behind Rouhani late in the campaign as the perception took hold that the regime was committed to avoiding another election-related rift in society. This vote propelled a 70% turnout and a first-round victory for Hassan Rouhani, garnering about 50.7% of the 36 million votes cast—enough to avoid a runoff. Khamene’i and the rest of the political establishment congratulated Rouhani. Many asserted that the Rouhani victory represented the continued strength of the ideals of the Green Movement, even if supporters of those ideals participated in regime-conducted elections and institutions. Others assert that his supporters had unrealistic expectations for him to ease social restrictions.

Rouhani was sworn in on August 4, 2013, and nominated a cabinet that same day. His nominees appeared to reflect an intent to implement his platform and to appoint competent officials rather than political loyalists. The Majles approved all but three of his choices. The most significant confirmed appointees, as well as other personnel moves made by Rouhani, include:

- Foreign Minister: Mohammad Javad Zarif, the former Ambassador to the United Nations in New York. Rouhani assigned Zarif to serve concurrently as chief nuclear negotiator, a post traditionally held by the chairman of the Supreme National Security Council. In September 2013, Rouhani appointed senior IRGC leader and former Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani as head of that body; Shamkhani has held more moderate positions than his IRGC peers.
- Oil Minister: Bijan Zanganeh, who served in the same post during the Khatemi presidency and attracted significant foreign investment to the sector. He replaced Rostam Qasemi, who was associated with the corporate arm of the IRGC. Zanganeh has reappointed and recruited many oil industry technocrats.
- Defense Minister: Hosein Dehgan. An IRGC stalwart, he was an early organizer of the IRGC unit in Lebanon that helped form Hezbollah’s militia wing; that unit
later became the Qods Force. He later was IRGC Air Force commander and deputy Defense Minister.

- Justice Minister: Mostafa Pour-Mohammadi, a controversial minister because of Pour-Mohammadi’s alleged abuses of political dissidents in previous positions, including as Interior Minister (2005-2008).

- The relatively moderate ex-Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi serves as the head of Iran’s atomic energy agency; and Reza Najafi is envoy to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Salehi was intimately involved in the last stages of nuclear negotiations that led to the April 2, 2015, framework accord.

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Hojjat ol-Islam Dr. Hassan Rouhani

Hassan Rouhani is a Hojjat ol-Islam, one rank below Ayatollah. He was born in 1948. He holds a Ph.D. in law from Glasgow Caledonian University in Scotland. Rouhani is a long-time regime stalwart who was part of Ayatollah Khomeini’s circle prior to the triumph of the Islamic revolution. He is also an associate and protégé of Rafsanjani, and Rouhani’s pragmatic policy approach on issues such as the nuclear issue and relations with the United States approximates Rafsanjani’s views. Rouhani’s closeness to Rafsanjani potentially complicates Rouhani’s relations with Khamenei, but there is no evidence of direct Rouhani-Khamenei tension to date.

Often nicknamed the “diplomat sheikh,” Rouhani was chief nuclear negotiator during 2003-2005, when Iran did agree to suspend uranium enrichment. He is believed amenable to a nuclear deal with the international community that would reduce international sanctions but not necessarily preclude any options for Iran’s nuclear program over the longer term. He also campaigned on a platform of easing the Islamic Republic’s social restrictions as well as the suppression of free expression that has been particularly focused since the 2009 uprising. On the other hand, some accounts suggest that he supported the crackdown against the July 1999 student uprising.

Even though Rouhani drew support from the Green movement and reform movement to win his election, he is a longtime member of the political establishment. Rafsanjani appointed him a member of the Supreme National Security Council in 1989, and he remains on that body. He has been a member of the Assembly of Experts since 1999, and was a member of the Majles during 1980-2000, serving twice as deputy speaker. He has also been a member of the Expediency Council since 1991. He headed the Center for Strategic Studies, a foreign policy think tank that advises both Rafsanjani and the Supreme Leader, since 1992.

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Rouhani Presidency

The focus of Rouhani’s presidency, to date, has been on international diplomacy, nuclear negotiations, regional issues, and the economy, but reformist supporters say they are holding Rouhani to his campaign promises to ease restrictions on freedom of expression. A test of his intentions and capabilities has been whether the titular Green Movement leaders Mousavi and Karrubi, who were detained in early 2011, would be set free. In early 2014, the regime moved Karrubi back to his home from a detention facility, but regime guards reportedly are posted in his home. Musavi has not been released. In June 2014, Supreme Leader Khamenei told a reformist parliamentarian that they would have faced worse consequences if the regime had put them on trial. Nor has Rouhani succeeded in easing travel restrictions on the reformist former president Mohammad Khatami who ran afoul of Khamenei in the latter stages of his term. Still, in late 2013, the government released nearly 80 political prisoners incarcerated for involvement in the uprising, including prominent human rights lawyer Nasrin Sotoudeh.

5 “Iran’s Khamenei Warns Off Bid to Free Opposition Chiefs” Agence France Presse, July 1, 2014.
In a direct rebuke to Rouhani, in August 2014, when the Majles voted to oust Minister for Science, Research, and Technology Reza Faraji Dana. Majles hardliners say the minister was appointing to senior ministry positions persons who supported the 2009 uprising. Several Rouhani nominees to replace him were voted down before the Majles confirmed Mohammad Farhadi as the new minister in late November 2014. Foreign Minister Zarif has been questioned by the Majles on several occasions for reported concessions in the nuclear talks (see below).

**Human Rights Practices**

Iran’s human rights record is scrutinized—and widely criticized—by the United Nations, the United States, and multilateral groupings. After a four-year review of Iran’s human rights record that took place in February 2010, on March 24, 2011, the U.N. Human Rights Council voted, 22 to 7, to reestablish the post of “Special Rapporteur” on Iranian human rights abuses, and former Maldives Foreign Minister Ahmad Shaheed was appointed to this role in June 2011. The last Special Rapporteur mission on Iran existed during 1988-2002. On March 28, 2014, the U.N. Human Rights Council voted 21 to 9 with 16 abstentions to renew the mandate of the Special Rapporteur for another year.6

Iran has been censured for refusing permission for the Special Rapporteur to conduct fact-finding visits to Iran. On November 21, 2011, the U.N. General Assembly’s Third Committee, by a vote of 86-32, with 59 abstentions, approved a resolution asserting that Iran must cooperate with the efforts of the Special Rapporteur. The full Assembly approved the resolution on December 19, 2011, by a vote of 89-30 with 64 abstentions. In April 2014, the European Parliament passed a resolution calling on European Union (EU) diplomats to raise Iran’s human rights record at official engagements. Earlier, on March 25, 2014, an EU human rights delegation visited Iran and held a meeting there with the released opposition figure Nasrin Sotoudeh, mentioned above.

International criticism of Iran’s human rights practices predates the crackdown against the 2009 uprising. Table 3, which discusses the regime’s record on a number of human rights issues, is based on the latest State Department human rights report (for 2013: February 27, 2014)7 and on reports from U.N. Special Rapporteur Shaheed, the latest of which is dated August 27, 2014 (U.N. document A/69/356). These reports cite Iran for a wide range of serious abuses—aside from its suppression of political opponents—including unjust executions, politically motivated abductions by security forces, torture, and arbitrary arrest and detention.

The Special Rapporteur reports have been particularly critical of a high rate of executions—about 735 in 2014 according to human rights observer groups—and worsening conditions for women. In May 2014, six Iranian youths who made a dance video to the tune of Pharell Williams’s song “Happy.” The youths were released on bail but on September 19, 2014, received suspended sentences of six months jail time and 91 lashes each. In November 2014, security forces blocked large gatherings of Iranian youths converging on the burial of a popular young singer, Morteza Pashai.

In an effort to explain why Iran’s human rights record has not improved significantly since he took office, Rouhani has asserted that he does not control Iran’s judiciary and security

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6 No votes were: India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Russia, Venezuela, Vietnam, China, and Cuba.
institutions, which remain controlled by hardliners. The most prominent of the security institutions are the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), the IRGC, the Basij organization of the IRGC, and the Law Enforcement Forces (riot police, regular police, and gendarmerie). The Ministry of Islamic Guidance monitors journalists reporting from Iran as well as media and communications operations. Iran has an official body, the High Council for Human Rights, headed by former Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Larijani (brother of the Majles speaker and the judiciary head). However, it generally defends the government’s actions to outside bodies rather encourages improvement of the government’s human rights practices.

Suggesting that hardliner opposition can sometimes be overcome, the Special Rapporteur has noted that the 2012 revisions to the Penal Code and Criminal Procedure Code made some reforms, including eliminating death sentences for children convicted of drug-related offenses. The Rapporteur credits Rouhani with a September 2013 proposal for a new “charter for citizen’s rights.” In 2014, Iran ratified an additional International Labour Organization convention. In August 2014, Rouhani’s government obtained approval by service providers to operate higher-speed Internet networks that allow for easier transmission of photos and videos.

Despite the criticism of its human rights record, on April 29, 2010, Iran acceded to the U.N. Commission on the Status of Women, after dropping an attempt to sit on the higher-profile U.N. General Assembly Human Rights Council. It also has a seat on the boards of the U.N. Development Program (UNDP) and UNICEF. Iran’s U.N. dues are about $9 million per year.

Administration and Congressional Action. As part of its efforts to isolate the regime on human rights grounds, on September 29, 2010, President Obama, acting in accordance with Section 105 of P.L. 111-195 (CISADA), issued Executive Order 13553, imposing sanctions on Iranian officials determined to have committed human rights abuses since Iran’s 2009 election. Sanctions include a ban on visas to the United States and freeze on U.S.-based assets or trade with them. In an annex, eight Iranian officials were named as violators and were subjected to the sanctions.

In the 112th Congress, several bills were introduced to increase sanctions on Iranian human rights abusers, including S. 879 and H.R. 1714. Elements of them were incorporated into a broad Iran sanctions bill, the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act (H.R. 1905), passed by both chambers on August 1, 2012, and signed on August 10 (P.L. 112-158).

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<th>Group/Issue</th>
<th>Regime Practice/Recent Developments</th>
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<tr>
<td>Ethnic and Religious</td>
<td>Persians are about 51% of the population, and Azeris (a Turkic people) are about 24%. Kurds are about 7%-15% of the population, and about 3% are Arab. Shiite Muslims are about 90% of the Muslim population and Sunnis are about 10%. About 2% of the population is non-Muslim, including Christians, Zoroastrians (an ancient religion in what is now Iran), Jewish, and Baha’i.</td>
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<td>Religious Breakdown</td>
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<td>Media Freedoms</td>
<td>Iran’s Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance actively blocks pro-reform websites and blogs and closing newspapers critical of the government, but some editors say that the government has become more tolerant of critical media since Rouhani took office. The Majles investigated the November 2012 death in custody of blogger, Sattar Beheshti; seven security officers were arrested and the Tehran “Cyber Police” commander was removed for the incident. Iran is setting up a national network that would have a monopoly on Internet service for Iranians.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Labor Restrictions</td>
<td>Independent unions are legal but not allowed in practice. The sole authorized national labor organization is a state-controlled “Workers’ House” umbrella. A bus drivers’ union leader, Mansur Osanloo, was jail from 2007 until 2011.</td>
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Group/Issue | Regime Practice/Recent Developments
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**Women** | Women can vote in all elections and run in parliamentary and municipal elections. Nine women are in the Majles, but women cannot serve as judges. There was one woman in a previous cabinet (Minister of Health) but she was fired in December 2012 for criticizing lack of funding for medicines. Women are permitted to drive and work outside the home without restriction, including owning their own businesses, although less than 20% of the workforce is female. Women are required to be covered in public, generally with a garment called a chador, but enforcement has relaxed since Rouhani took office. Women do not have inheritance or divorce rights equal to that of men, and their court testimony carries half the weight of a male’s. Laws against rape are not enforced effectively; in October 2014, Reyhaneh Jabbari was convicted of killing a man she said was raping her. In September 2014, an Iranian-British woman was jailed briefly for trying to attend a men’s volleyball match.

**Religious Freedom Overview** | Each year since 1999, the State Department religious freedom report has named Iran as a “Country of Particular Concern” under the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA). No sanctions have been added under IRFA, on the grounds that Iran is already subject to extensive U.S. sanctions. Continued deterioration in religious freedom have been noted in the past few International Religious Freedom reports, stating that government rhetoric and actions creates a threatening atmosphere for nearly all non-Shia religious groups.

**Christians** | In September 2011, a Protestant pastor who was born a Muslim, Youcef Nadarkhani, was sentenced to death for refusing to recant his Christian faith. The United States government and many human rights groups called for an overturning of the sentence. He was released on September 8, 2012, but was rearrested on Christmas Day 2012. On February 29, 2012, the House debated but postponed action on H.Res. 556 demanding he be released. The issue of pastor Saeed Abedini, a dual national, is discussed below under “arrest of dual nationals.”

**Baha’is** | Iran is repeatedly cited for virtually unrelenting repression of the Baha’i community, which Iran’s Shiite Muslim clergy views as a heretical sect, which numbers about 300,000-350,000. At least 30 Baha’is remain imprisoned and 60 were arrested in 2012, according to the State Department IRFA report for 2012. U.N. Rapporteur said in February 2013 that 110 Baha’is are in jail, with 133 more to start serving jail time. Seven Baha’i leaders were sentenced to 20 years in August 2010; their sentences were reduced in September 2010 to 10 years but the full sentence was restored on appeal. In the 1990s, several Baha’is were executed for apostasy. Virtually yearly congressional resolutions condemn Iran’s treatment of the Baha’is.

**Jews** | Along with Christians, a “recognized minority,” with one seat in the Majles, the 8,800-member (2012 census) Jewish community enjoys somewhat more freedoms than Jewish communities in several other Muslim states. However, in June 1999, Iran arrested 13 Jews that it said were part of an “espionage ring” for Israel, and 10 were convicted. An appeals panel reduced the sentences and all were released by April 2003. On November 17, 2008, Iran hanged Muslim businessman Ali Ashati for providing Iranian nuclear information to Israel. On September 4, 2013, Rouhani’s “Twitter” account issued greetings to Jews on the occasion of Jewish New Year (“Rosh Hashanah”). The Jewish Majles member accompanied Rouhani on his visit to the U.N. General Assembly meetings in September 2013.

**Azeris** | Azeris are one-quarter of the population and are mostly well integrated into government and society (Khamenei’s himself is of Azeri heritage), but many Azeris complain of ethnic and linguistic discrimination. Each year, there are arrests of Azeri students and cultural activists who press for their right to celebrate their culture and history. The government accuses them of promoting revolution or separatism.

**Kurds** | There are about 5 million-11 million Kurds in Iran. The Kurdish language is not banned, but schools do not teach it and Kurdish political organizations, activists, and media outlets are routinely scrutinized, harassed, and closed down for supporting greater Kurdish autonomy. Several Kurdish oppositionists have been executed since 2010. Violent unrest broke out in the Kurdish city of Mahabad after a local woman was killed in unclear circumstances in a hotel room there, reportedly while with a member of Iran’s intelligence services.

**Arabs** | Ethnic Arabs are prominent in southwestern Iran, particularly Khuzestan Province. The 2 million to 4 million Arabs in Iran encounter systematic oppression and discrimination, including torture and a prohibition on speaking or studying Arabic.
Since 2005, State Department “Trafficking in Persons” reports have placed Iran in Tier 3 (worst level) for failing to take significant action to prevent trafficking in persons. Iranian women, boys, and girls are trafficked for sexual exploitation in Iran as well to Pakistan, the Persian Gulf, and Europe.

The United Nations asserts that there were 500 executions in 2013 and that pace, according to some human rights groups, doubled in 2014. Iran is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and is obligated to cease the executions of minors.

In 2002, the head of Iran’s judiciary issued a ban on stoning. However, Iranian officials later called that directive “advisory” and could be ignored by individual judges.

Iran does not recognize dual nationality. Iranian-American scholar Haleh Esfandiari, of the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, DC, was imprisoned for several months in 2007 on the grounds that the Center was involved in democracy promotion efforts in Iran. An Iranian-American journalist, Roxanna Saberi, was imprisoned for five months in 2009 for expired press credentials. Three American hikers (Sara Shourd, Shane Bauer, and Josh Fattal) were arrested in August 2009 after crossing into Iran from a hike in northern Iraq. They were released in 2010 and 2011 on $500,000 bail each—brokered by Oman.

Former FBI agent Robert Levinson remains missing after a visit in 2005 to Kish Island to meet an Iranian source (Dawud Salahuddin, allegedly responsible for the 1980 killing in the United States of an Iranian diplomat who had served the Shah’s government). Iran denies knowing his status or location. In December 2011, Levinson’s family released a one-year old taped statement by him. In January 2013, his family released recent photos of him, and they acknowledged in late 2013 that his visit to Kish Island was related to CIA contract work.

A former U.S. Marine, Amir Hekmati, was arrested in 2011 and remains in jail in Iran allegedly for spying for the United States. His family has been permitted to visit him there. On December 20, 2012, a U.S. Christian convert of Iranian origin, Rev. Saeed Abedini, was imprisoned for “undermining national security” for setting up orphanages in Iran in partnership with Iranian Christians. His closed trial was held January 22, 2013, and he was convicted and sentenced to eight years in prison. He has conducted several hunger strikes and in March 2015 proposed giving up his Iranian dual nationality in order to qualify for deportation.

In mid-July 2014, Washington Post Tehran correspondent Jason Rezaian (a dual national) was detained along with two American journalists and his journalist wife, an Iranian national. His wife was released in October. In December 2014, Rezaian was formally charged, although the charges were not made public. He remains incarcerated despite comments by some Iranian officials that the allegations against him appear to be minor enough to allow his release. Iran’s judiciary has prevented efforts by his family to hire a lawyer for him.

Several bills in the 114th Congress (S.Con.Res. 14 and S.Con.Res. 16) address the issue. S.Con.Res. 14 expresses the sense of Congress that no sanctions be lifted as part of a nuclear deal unless the dual nationals are released.


The Strategic Challenge Posed by Iran

Successive Administrations have identified Iran as a key national security challenge, in large part because of Iran’s nuclear and missile programs as well as its long-standing attempts to counter many U.S. objectives in the region. Reflecting the many different ways Iran could harm U.S. interests, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, in his February 2015 annual threat
assessment testimony before Congress, described Iran as “...an ongoing threat to U.S. national interests because of its support to the Asad regime in Syria, promulgation of anti-Israel policies, development of advanced military capabilities, and pursuit of its nuclear program.”

Some interpret Iran’s defense strategy as intended primarily to protect itself from any potential U.S.-led effort to change Iran’s regime. The unclassified executive summary of a congressionally mandated Defense Department report on Iran’s military power states that “Iran’s military doctrine is defensive. It is designed to deter an attack, survive an initial strike, retaliate against an aggressor, and force a diplomatic solution to hostilities while avoiding any concessions that challenge its core interests.”

The sections below analyze Iran’s nuclear, missile, and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs.

**Nuclear Program and International Response**

No Iranian program is as paramount a concern to U.S. officials as its nuclear program. A nuclear armed Iran, in the view of U.S. and regional officials, would be more assertive than it now is in trying to influence the policies of regional states and in supporting leaders and groups in the Middle East and elsewhere that oppose U.S. interests and allies. Iran could conclude that the United States would hesitate to use military pressure against it if it possessed nuclear weapons. U.S. policymakers express concern that Iran’s developing a nuclear weapon would produce a nuclear arms race in one of the world’s most volatile regions, and Israel views an Iranian nuclear weapon as a threat to its existence. There are also concerns that Iran might transfer nuclear technology to extremist groups or countries.

Iran’s nuclear program became a significant U.S. national security issue in 2002, when Iran confirmed that it was building a uranium enrichment facility at Natanz and a heavy water production plant at Arak. In 2010, Iran began enriching to 20% U-235, which is relatively easy technically to enrich further to weapons-grade uranium (90%+). Another requirement for a nuclear weapon is a triggering mechanism that Iran might have researched, but not necessarily developed, prior to 2003. The United States and its partners also insist that Iran must not possess a nuclear-capable missile.

**Iran’s Nuclear Intentions and Activities**

The U.S. intelligence community has stated in its “worldwide threat assessment” testimony in recent years that Iran has not made a decision to eventually build nuclear weapons. Iranian leaders profess that WMD are inconsistent with its ideology, citing Supreme Leader Khamene’i’s 2003 formal pronouncement (fatwas) that nuclear weapons are un-Islamic. On February 22, 2012, he stated that the production of and use of a nuclear weapon is prohibited as a “great sin,” and that stockpiling such weapons is “futile, expensive, and harmful.”

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9 In November 2006, the IAEA, at U.S. urging, declined to provide technical assistance to the Arak facility on the grounds that it was likely for proliferation purposes.
Some Iranian leaders appear to perceive a nuclear weapons capability as a means of ending Iran’s historic vulnerability to great power invasion or domination. Other Iranian leaders apparently argue that a nuclear weapon would make Iran less secure by stimulating a regional arms race and imposition of further international sanctions, and possibly causing military action by Israel or the United States. Such actions could, some Iranians argue, threaten the survival of the regime.

Iranian leaders deny they are trying to achieve a nuclear weapons capability and assert that Iran’s nuclear program is for medical uses and electricity generation in light of finite oil and gas resources. Iran argues that uranium enrichment is its “right” as a party to the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and that it wants to make its own nuclear fuel to avoid potential nuclear fuel supply disruptions by international suppliers. U.S. officials have said that Iran’s gas resources make nuclear energy unnecessary, but that the United States and its partners accept Iran’s right to use nuclear energy as long as Iran verifiably demonstrates that its nuclear program is for only peaceful purposes.

**IAEA Investigation of Past Nuclear Explosive Device Research (“Possible Military Dimensions,” PMD)**

Allegations that Iran might have researched a nuclear explosive device have caused experts and governments to question Iran’s assertions of purely peaceful intent for its nuclear program. This issue is a component of the emerging comprehensive nuclear agreement discussed below. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been investigating information detailed in its report of November 8, 2011 on Iran’s alleged research efforts on designs for a nuclear explosive device (“possible military dimensions” of Iran’s nuclear program, or “PMD”). No IAEA report or U.S. intelligence comments have asserted that Iran has diverted any nuclear material for a nuclear weapons program.

Iran and the IAEA have agreed on a series of “practical measures” to resolve the outstanding questions: (1) six measures agreed on November 11, 2013, relating mainly to access to uranium mines and clarification of sites for additional nuclear plants; (2) seven measures agreed on February 9, 2014, relating to access to additional mines and facilities such as those for laser enrichment, as well safeguards for the Arak reactor and information on “Exploding Bridge Wire Detonators” that could be used for a nuclear explosion; and (3) five more measures agreed on May 20, 2014, including additional access to facilities as well as information on alleged research into initiation of a nuclear explosion, and alleged Iranian modeling and calculations of nuclear explosive yields. The February 19, 2015, IAEA report states that Iran has not provided the requested information on the explosion and explosion yield calculations issues. As noted in the earlier IAEA report of May 23, 2014, Iran has provided some information on the alleged development of “Explosive Bridge Wire Detonators.” The IAEA has not to date been allowed requested access to the military facility at Parchin, where Iran allegedly conducted testing on elements of a nuclear explosive device. Parts of Parchin were inspected twice in 2005.

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Nuclear Weapons Time Frame Estimates

Estimates vary as to how long it would take Iran to develop a nuclear weapon, were there a decision to do so. Vice President Biden told the Washington Institute for Near East Policy on April 30, 2015, that Iran could likely have enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon within 2-3 months of a decision to manufacture that material. The U.S. objective of a comprehensive nuclear settlement is to ensure that the “breakout time”—an all-out effort by Iran to develop a nuclear weapon using declared facilities or undeclared covert facilities—is at least 12 months.

Status of Uranium Enrichment and Ability to Produce Plutonium15

A key to extending the “breakout time” for an Iranian nuclear weapon is to limit Iran’s ability to produce fissile material by enriching uranium with devices called centrifuges. Iran has about 19,000 total installed centrifuges, of which about 10,000 are in operation. Prior to the JPA, Iran was enriching some of its uranium to the 20% level—which requires nearly as much effort as that required to produce weapons grade uranium (90% U-235). When the JPA went into effect, Iran had a stockpile of about 22,000 lbs (10,000 kilograms) of low-enriched (3.5%-5%) uranium (enough to produce about eight nuclear weapons if it were to enrich that stockpile to weapons grade) and a about 400 lbs of 20% U-235 (short of the 550 lbs. that would be needed to produce one nuclear weapon from that stockpile). Some of the 20% enrichment took place at the heavily fortified Fordow site that Iran acknowledged constructing in September 2009. Iran is assessed by the IAEA as complying with the provisions of the JPA, which required Iran to cease enriching to 20% and to not add to its stockpile of 3.5%-5% enriched uranium.

Another issue is centrifuge capability. IAEA reports prior to the start of the JPA said that Iran had installed about 1,000 of the more advanced IR-2 centrifuges at its Natanz enrichment site, although they were not put into operation.

Plutonium Route? Another means of acquiring fissile material for a nuclear weapon is to produce plutonium. Iran’s heavy water plant at Arak, which had been slated for completion in 2014, could, if completed, produce plutonium that can be reprocessed into fissile material for a nuclear weapon. However, there are no indications from the IAEA or other sources that Iran has a facility to conduct such reprocessing. The JPA required Iran to halt construction of the reactor, although not necessarily all construction of the site, and provisions on Arak in the April 2, 2015, framework comprehensive accord are discussed below.

Bushehr Reactor/Russia to Build Additional Reactors

U.S. officials have generally been less concerned the Russian-built (under a January 1995 contract) nuclear power plant at Bushehr. Under a bilateral agreement, Russia supplies nuclear fuel for the plant and takes back spent nuclear material for reprocessing. Russia delayed opening the plant apparently to pressure Iran on the nuclear issue, but it was fueled by October 25, 2010, was linked to Iran’s power grid in September 2011, and was reported operational as of September 3, 2012. Iran has assumed full control over plant operations since then. As part of this work, Russia trained 1,500 Iranian nuclear engineers.

In November 2014, Russia and Iran reached agreement for Russia to build two more reactors at Bushehr—and possibly as many as six more beyond that—at Bushehr and other sites. Under the reported terms, Russia would supply and reprocess all fuel for these reactors—potentially depriving Iran of a rationale for arguing that it needs to eventually have its own industrial-scale ability (involving hundreds of thousands of centrifuges) to manufacture nuclear reactor fuel. In January 2015, Iran announced it had begun actual construction on two nuclear power plants near the existing one at Bushehr. Because of Russia’s supplying and reprocessing nuclear fuel for all these plants, the reactors are not part of the negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear accord.

Early International Diplomatic Efforts to Address Iran’s Nuclear Program

International concerns about Iran’s nuclear program produced a global consensus to apply economic pressure on Iran, coupled with diplomacy, to persuade Iran to limit its nuclear program. In 2003, France, Britain, and Germany (the “EU-3”) opened a separate diplomatic track to curb Iran’s program. On October 21, 2003, Iran pledged, in return for peaceful nuclear technology, to (1) fully disclose its past nuclear activities, (2) sign and ratify the “Additional Protocol” to the NPT (allowing for enhanced inspections), and (3) suspend uranium enrichment activities. Iran signed the Additional Protocol on December 18, 2003, although the Majles has not ratified it.

Iran ended the suspension after several months, but the EU-3 and Iran reached a more specific November 14, 2004, “Paris Agreement”—suspending uranium enrichment as of November 22, 2004, in exchange for renewed trade talks and other aid. The Bush Administration supported Paris Agreement on March 11, 2005 by announcing it would drop U.S. objections to Iran applying to join the World Trade Organization. The Paris Agreement broke down after the election of Ahmadinejad, who rejected as insufficient an EU-3 proposal for a permanent nuclear agreement that would provide Iran with peaceful uses of nuclear energy and limited security guarantees. On August 8, 2005, Iran broke the IAEA seals and began uranium “conversion” (one step before enrichment) at its Esfahan facility. On September 24, 2005, the IAEA Board declared Iran in non-compliance with the NPT and, on February 4, 2006, the IAEA board voted 27-3 to refer the case to the Security Council. On March 29, 2006, the Council presidency set a 30-day time limit for ceasing enrichment.

“P5+1” Formed. After the EU-3 agreements with Iran broke down, the Bush Administration offered on May 31, 2006, to join the nuclear talks. The expanded negotiating group was called the “Permanent Five Plus 1” (P5+1: United States, Russia, China, France, Britain, and Germany). The P5+1’s intent was to persuade Iran to again suspend uranium enrichment through a combination of incentives and possible economic sanctions. Then EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana presented the P5+1’s first offer to Iran on June 6, 2006, focused on guaranteeing Iran nuclear fuel (Annex I to Resolution 1747) but threatening a ban on technology and arms sales to Iran (sanctions that were imposed in subsequent years).

16 For text of the agreement, see http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/iaeaIran/annex14112004.shtml. EU-3-Iran negotiations on a permanent nuclear pact began on December 13, 2004, and related talks on a trade and cooperation accord (TCA) began in January 2005.

17 Voting no: Cuba, Syria, Venezuela. Abstaining: Algeria, Belarus, Indonesia, Libya, South Africa.


19 One source purports to have obtained the contents of the package from ABC News: http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Notes/BN060609.htm.
First Four U.N. Security Council Resolutions Adopted

The U.N. Security Council subsequently imposed sanctions on Iran in an effort to shift Iran’s calculations toward compromise.

- *Resolution 1696*. On July 31, 2006, the Security Council voted 14-1 (Qatar voting no) for U.N. Security Council Resolution 1696, giving Iran until August 31, 2006 to fulfill the IAEA demand to suspend enrichment suspension, suspend construction of the Arak heavy-water reactor, and ratify the Additional Protocol to Iran’s IAEA Safeguards Agreement. It was passed under Article 40 of the U.N. Charter, which makes compliance mandatory, but not under Article 41, which refers to economic sanctions, or Article 42, which authorizes military action.

- *Resolution 1737*. After Iran refused a proposal to temporarily suspend enrichment, the Security Council adopted U.N. Security Council Resolution 1737 unanimously on December 23, 2006, under Chapter 7, Article 41 of the U.N. Charter. It demanded enrichment suspension by February 21, 2007, and prohibited sale (or financing of a sale) to Iran of technology that could contribute to Iran’s nuclear program. It required U.N. member states to freeze the financial assets of named Iranian nuclear and missile firms and related persons.

- *Resolution 1747*. On March 24, 2007, Resolution 1747 was adopted unanimously demanding Iran suspend enrichment by May 24, 2007. The Resolution added entities to those sanctioned by Resolution 1737 and banned arms transfers by Iran (a provision targeting Iran’s arms supplies to Lebanese Hezbollah and to Shiite militias in Iraq). It called for, but did not require, countries to cease selling arms or dual use items to Iran and for countries and international financial institutions to avoid giving Iran any new loans or grants (except loans for humanitarian purposes).

- *Resolution 1803 and Additional Incentives for Iran*. On March 3, 2008, Resolution 1803 was adopted by a vote of 14-0 (Indonesia abstaining). It added persons and entities to those sanctioned; banned travel outright by certain sanctions persons; banned virtually all sales of dual use items to Iran (citing equipment listed as dual use in various proliferation conventions); authorized, but did not require, inspections of shipments by Iran Air Cargo and Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Line, if such shipments are suspected of containing banned WMD-related goods. In May 2008, the P5+1 added political and enhanced energy cooperation with Iran to previous incentives, and the text of that enhanced offer to Iran was later revealed as an Annex to Resolution 1929 (see below).

- *Resolution 1835*. The August 2008 crisis between Russia and Georgia contributed to Russia’s opposing new U.N. sanctions on Iran. In an effort to demonstrate to Iran continued P5+1 resolve, on September 27, 2008, the Council adopted Resolution 1835 (September 27, 2008), demanding compliance with existing resolutions but not adding sanctions.

In July 2008, just prior to the passage of Resolution 1835, Iran it indicated it might be ready to accept a temporary “freeze for freeze”: the P5+1 would impose no new sanctions and Iran would stop expanding uranium enrichment. No agreement on that concept was reached, even though the Bush Administration sent then-Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs William Burns to a P5+1-Iran negotiation in Geneva on July 19, 2008.
Developments During the Obama Administration

After President Obama was inaugurated, the P5+1 met in February 2009 to adjust its negotiating strategy in light of the new U.S. Administration’s stated commitment to direct U.S. engagement with Iran. On April 8, 2009, then-Under Secretary William Burns announced that a U.S. diplomat would henceforth attend all P5+1 – Iran meetings. In July 2009, the United States and its allies announced that Iran needed to offer constructive proposals by late September 2009 or face “crippling sanctions.” On September 9, 2009, Iran issued new proposals that the P5+1 said it considered a sufficient basis to resume the talks with Iran.

Tentative Agreement Falls Apart. The October 1, 2009, P5+1-Iran meeting in Geneva produced a tentative agreement for Iran to allow Russia and France to reprocess 2,600 pounds (which at that time was 75% of Iran’s low-enriched uranium stockpile) for medical use. Technical talks on the tentative agreement were held October 19-21, 2009, in Vienna and a draft agreement was approved by the P5+1 countries and the IAEA. However, the agreement was not finalized reportedly because the Supreme Leader opposed the concessions Iran was making in it.

Tehran Declaration Brokered by Brazil and Turkey. In April 2010, Brazil and Turkey negotiated with Iran to revive the October arrangement. On May 17, 2010, with the president of Brazil and prime minister of Turkey in Tehran, the three signed an arrangement (“Tehran Declaration”) for Iran to send 2,600 pounds of uranium to Turkey, which would be exchanged for medically useful reprocessed uranium. Iran forwarded to the IAEA a formal letter of acceptance. Some experts assert that the Obama Administration quietly supported the Brazil-Turkey initiative, but the Administration publicly rejected it on the grounds that it did not address Iran’s enrichment to the 20% level. The Administration decided to finalize agreement on another Security Council resolution that would pressure Iran economically.

U.N. Security Council Resolution 1929

Immediately after announcement of the Tehran Declaration, Secretary of State Clinton announced that the P5+1 had reached agreement on a new sanctions resolution that would give U.S. allies authority to take substantial new measures against Iran. Adopted on June 9, 2010, the key provisions of Resolution 1929 are contained in the summary table below, and an annex presented a modified offer of incentives to Iran. By authorizing U.N. member states to sanction key Iranian economic sectors such as energy and banking, Resolution 1929 placed significant additional economic pressure on Iran. However, the Resolution produced no immediate breakthrough in the talks: rounds of negotiations on December 6-7, 2010 in Geneva and January 21-22, 2011 in Istanbul floundered over Iran’s demand for immediate lifting of international sanctions. In August 2011, Iran praised Russian proposals for a stepwise exchange of the lifting of international sanctions for Iran’s giving up some nuclear activities. State Department official Victoria Nuland confirmed that U.S. diplomats had worked with Russian counterparts to develop the proposal. Additional rounds of P5+1-Iran talks in 2012 and 2013 (2012: April in Istanbul; May in Baghdad; and June in Moscow. 2013: Almaty Kazakhstan in February and in April) focused on a P5+1

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21 Text of the pact is at http://www.cfr.org/publication/22140/.
22 It was adopted by a vote of 12-2 (Turkey and Brazil voting no) with one abstention (Lebanon).
proposal that Iran halt enrichment to the 20% level (“stop”); allow removal from Iran of the existing stockpile of 20% enriched uranium (“ship”); and eventually close the Fordow facility (“shut”). The P5+1 proposals offered to allow Iran to enrich uranium to the 3.5%-5% level and guaranteed Iran a supply of medical isotopes.

Rouhani Election and Joint Plan of Action (JPA)

P5+1 leaders asserted that the election of Rouhani improved the prospects for a nuclear settlement. In advance of his visit to the U.N. General Assembly meetings in New York during September 23-27, 2013, Rouhani stated that the Supreme Leader had given him and his team authority to negotiate a nuclear deal. The Supreme Leader largely affirmed that authority in a speech to the IRGC on September 17, 2013, in which he said he believes in the concept of “heroic flexibility”—adopting “proper and logical diplomatic moves, whether in the realm of diplomacy or in the sphere of domestic policies.”24 On the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly meetings in September 2013, talks between Secretary of State John Kerry, Foreign Minister Zarif and other P5+1 officials resulted in a decision to hold another round of P5+1-Iran talks in Geneva on October 15-16, 2013. Talks continued during November 7-9, 2013, on an interim “standstill” agreement that would allow time to negotiate a comprehensive accord.

The P5+1-Iran meetings that began in Geneva on November 20 ended with an agreement (“Joint Plan of Action,” JPA) early in the morning of November 24, 2013. The JPA:

- was to be in place for six months, renewable for up to six additional months by mutual agreement, during which time a “comprehensive solution” to Iran’s nuclear program is negotiated. The JPA did not explicitly recognize Iran’s “right” to enrich uranium but indicated that a final agreement would likely “involve a mutually defined enrichment program.” Pursuant to technical discussions, implementation of the JPA began on January 20, 2014.

- requires Iran to cease enriching uranium to 20% U-235 and to dilute or convert the 20% enriched stockpile to other forms that are difficult to enrich further. Iran is permitted to continue enriching to the 3.5% level but not to expand its stockpile of about 22,000 pounds of 3.5% enriched uranium.

- requires Iran not to substitute its existing centrifuges with newer models, to limit production of centrifuges to replacing those that break, and to halt development of (although not all construction at) the heavy-water nuclear reactor at Arak.

- requires that a comprehensive nuclear accord address the requirements of U.N. Security Council resolutions, including: the ban on Iran from developing a ballistic missile capable of delivering a nuclear weapon and the requirement to clear up outstanding questions related to PMD (see above).

- provides for temporary sanctions consisting primarily of $700 million per month in hard currency payments for oil and revenues from the suspension of sanctions on the sales of petrochemicals, trading in previous metals, and transactions related to Iran’s auto industry. The JPA stipulates that Iran’s oil exports of about 1.1 million barrels per day remain constant, and that the P5+1 countries and EU

24 Open Source Center, “Iran: Leader Outlines Guard Corps Role, Talks of ‘Heroic Flexibility,’” published September 18, 2013.
will impose “no new nuclear sanctions.” Iran also is to receive help buying humanitarian supplies, including spare parts for civilian aircraft. (For detail on the sanctions relief, see CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions.)

The Administration argues that the JPA has frozen Iran’s nuclear advancement and the IAEA has stated in its reports that Iran has complied with its terms. However, in actions that appear to violate at least the spirit of the JPA if not necessarily its letter, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Non-Proliferation Vann Van Diepen said on March 16, 2014, that Iran is still “very actively” creating front companies and attempting to procure items for their nuclear program and missile program and other programs.25 The U.N. “Panel of Experts” mandated by Resolution 1929 has reported that Iran has continued to try to import items that could be used in programs that would violate Security Council Resolutions.26

April 2, 2015, Framework for a Comprehensive Accord27

The JPA contained provisions that set the stage for a comprehensive nuclear agreement—a “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action” (JCPA or JCPoA)—that would include a “mutually defined [Iranian] enrichment programme with practical limits and transparency measures to ensure the peaceful nature of the programme.” P5+1-Iran negotiations on a comprehensive settlement began in February 2014 but did not make insufficient progress to meet the July 20, 2014, and November 24, 2014, deadlines for a JCPA. On November 24, 2014, Iran and the P5+1 extended the talks, and all provisions of the JPA, with the intent to finalize a comprehensive accord by June 30, 2015. The parties stated they would first attempt to reach an overarching framework and roadmap for the agreement “within four months” (at first widely interpreted as being by March 24, 2015, but subsequently interpreted by the Administration as being the end of March) and would conclude the technical details of a comprehensive agreement by June 30, 2015.

Several rounds of U.S.-Iran and P5+1-Iran talks were held in early 2015, primarily in various cities in Switzerland. At the end of February 2015, the United States and Iran agreed to have their top nuclear officials join the talks—the head of Iran’s Atomic Energy organization and U.S. Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz. After slightly missing the March 31 deadline, the parties announced on April 2, 2015, that they had reached a framework agreement for a JCPA. The framework is to form the foundation upon which the final text of the JCPA will be written by June 30, and several rounds of negotiations have been held since to try to finalize an accord. According to the Administration, the framework agreement, if translated into a final accord, will extend the amount of time that Iran would need to produce enough weapons-grade HEU for one nuclear weapon to “at least one year, for a duration of at least ten years.” The following sections analyze the framework agreement, including some areas where agreement has been deferred to the negotiations on a completed, finalized accord.

- Iran has agreed to enrich uranium only at the Natanz commercial-scale facility for 15 years and to reduce its installed centrifuges at the facility to 6,104 centrifuges, all of which will be IR-1 centrifuges. Of those centrifuges, no more

27 For detail on the framework accord, reaction, and congressional review and oversight issues, see: CRS Report R43333, Iran: Efforts to Achieve a Nuclear Accord, by Kenneth Katzman, Paul K. Kerr, and Michael John Garcia
than 5,060 will enrich uranium for 10 years. All centrifuges and enrichment infrastructure that are removed are to be placed in IAEA-monitored storage.

- Iran has agreed to refrain from producing enriched uranium containing more than 3.67% uranium-235 for at least 15 years, and to reduce its stockpile of 3.67% U-235 to 300 kilograms for 15 years.

- All excess centrifuges and enrichment infrastructure will be used only as replacements for operating centrifuges and equipment, and Iran will refrain from producing enriched uranium for “at least” 10 years with its advanced centrifuge models [IR-2, IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, or IR-8 models]. Iran is to remove its IR-2M centrifuges currently installed at the Natanz commercial facility. However, Tehran will “engage in limited research and development with its advanced centrifuges according to a schedule and parameters which have been agreed to by the P5+1.”

- Iran has agreed to convert its Fordow enrichment facility into a nuclear physics and technology research center. Tehran will also refrain from enriching uranium and conducting “research and development associated with uranium enrichment” at the facility for 15 years. Iran will remove about two-thirds of the centrifuges and related infrastructure from the facility.

- Iran is to “redesign and rebuild” the Arak reactor [based on a design that is agreed to by the P5+1] so that it will not produce weapon-grade plutonium. Moreover, Iran is to ship the reactor’s spent fuel “out of the country for the reactor’s lifetime.” The reactor’s original core is to “be destroyed or removed from the country.” Iran is also to refrain indefinitely from reprocessing spent fuel or conducting related R&D on spent fuel. Tehran has also committed to refrain from accumulating heavy water “in excess of the needs of the modified Arak reactor.” For 15 years, Iran will “sell any remaining heavy water on the international market” and refrain from building additional heavy water reactors.

- Tehran “has agreed to implement” the Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement. Iran is also to implement the modified code 3.1 of the subsidiary arrangements to its IAEA safeguards agreement. According to the framework:

- Iran is also to provide the IAEA with additional access to nuclear-related facilities; and access to the country’s uranium mines, as well a continuous surveillance of Iran’s uranium mills.

- Inspectors are to have “continuous surveillance” for 20 years of the production and storage facilities for certain centrifuge components, and Iran’s centrifuge manufacturing base will be frozen and under continuous surveillance.

- IAEA inspectors will have access to a future “dedicated procurement channel for Iran’s nuclear program” that is to be established “to monitor and approve, on a case by case basis, the supply, sale, or transfer to Iran of certain nuclear-related and dual use materials and technology.”

- Iran is also to address the outstanding issues in the IAEA’s investigation of Tehran’s nuclear program by implementing “an agreed set of measures to address the IAEA’s concerns regarding” the possible military dimensions (PMD) of Iran’s nuclear program. This refers to suspected weapons-relevant work Iran may have conducted in the past, such as research about nuclear payload for missiles. The
framework accord did not address a deadline or specific provisions for how to judge Iran’s compliance on this issue.

- The U.S. and EU nuclear-related sanctions are to be suspended after the IAEA has verified that has taken all of its key nuclear related steps,” and “All past U.N. Security Council resolutions on the Iran nuclear issue will be lifted simultaneous with the completion, by Iran, of nuclear-related actions addressing all key concerns....” As far as what constitutes “nuclear-related sanctions,” U.S. and P5+1 officials have not challenged Iran’s assertions (stated in the Iran fact sheet) that sanctions will be lifted on Iran’s financial, banking, and insurance sectors, including on its Central Bank and its ban from using the SWIFT electronic payments system; on oil, gas, and petrochemicals; on Iran’s automotive sector; and on its shipping, aviation, and oil tanker entities and industries.

- If an issue of significant [Iranian] nonperformance cannot be resolved through [an agreed dispute resolution process], then all previous UN sanctions could be reimposed.” The fact sheet adds that U.S. sanctions on Iran for terrorism, human rights abuses, and ballistic missiles will remain in place...”

- A dispute resolution process will be specified, which enables any JCPA participant, to seek to resolve disagreements about the performance of JCPA commitments. If an issue of significant non-performance cannot be resolved through that process, then all previous UN sanctions could be re-imposed.

- Provisions of U.N. Security Council resolutions that deal with transfers of sensitive technologies and activities will be reestablished by a new UN Security Council resolution that will endorse the JCPA and urge its full implementation. Important restrictions on conventional arms and ballistic missiles, as well as provisions that allow for related cargo inspections and asset freezes, will also be incorporated by this new resolution.

The Administration argues that all U.S. options to prevent an Iranian nuclear weapon would still be available even after a comprehensive accord expires. International reaction to the framework accord has tended to agree with the Administration assessment, but Israel, the GCC states, and some in Congress have criticized the potential deal as leaving Iran with a substantial nuclear infrastructure and lifting those sanctions that reduces the amount of Iranian revenue available to support an expansionist foreign policy.

Congress will apparently have an opportunity to formally review a comprehensive accord, if one is reached. The Senate and House both overwhelmingly passed The Iran Nuclear Review Act of 2015 (H.R. 1191), which provides for Congress to pass legislation (subject to veto procedures) to approve or disapprove of a finalized nuclear deal. For more information, see CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman.

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Table 4. Summary of Provisions of U.N. Resolutions on Iran Nuclear Program (1737, 1747, 1803, and 1929)

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<tr>
<th>Provisions</th>
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<tr>
<td>Requires Iran to suspend uranium enrichment, cease construction of the heavy water reactor at Arak, and sign the Additional Protocol. (1737 and subsequent resolutions)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prohibits transfer to Iran of nuclear, missile, and dual use items, except for use in light-water reactors. (All combined)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prohibits Iran from exporting arms or WMD-useful technology. (1747)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prohibits Iran from investing abroad in uranium mining, related nuclear technologies, or nuclear capable ballistic missile technology. Prohibits Iran from launching ballistic missiles even on its own territory. (1929)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Freezes the assets of over 80 named Iranian persons and entities, including Bank Sepah, and several corporate affiliates of the Revolutionary Guard. (1737 and subsequent resolutions)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Requires that countries ban the travel of over 40 named Iranians.</td>
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<td>Mandates that countries not export major combat systems to Iran. It did not bar sales of missiles not on the “U.N. Registry of Conventional Arms” (meaning that the delivery of the S-300 system, discussed above, would not be legally banned). (1929)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calls for “vigilance” (a nonbinding call to cut off business) with respect to all Iranian banks, particularly Bank Melli and Bank Saderat. (1929)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calls for vigilance (voluntary restraint) with respect to providing international lending to Iran and providing trade credits and other financing and financial interactions. (1929)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calls on countries to inspect cargoes carried by Iran Air Cargo and Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines—or by any ships in national or international waters—if there are indications they carry cargo banned for carriage to Iran. Searches in international waters would require concurrence of the country where the ship is registered. (1929)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Sanctions Committee, composed of the 15 members of the Security Council, monitors implementation of all Iran sanctions and collects and disseminates information on Iranian violations and other entities involved in banned activities. A seven-member “panel of experts” is empowered (renewable each year) to report on sanctions violations and make recommendations for improved enforcement. The panel’s reports are not officially published by the Sanctions Committee but are usually carried by various websites. Resolution 2105, adopted June 5, 2013, extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts until July 9, 2014. (1929)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reported Covert Action Against Iran’s Program

In conjunction with diplomacy and sanctions, the United States U.S. reportedly has also employed covert action to slow Iran’s program. During 2006-2008, it was reported that the United States and Israel conducted operations that resulted in the sale to Iran of nuclear and other technology rigged to have a destructive effect on Iran’s programs. Another example includes the Stuxnet computer virus that caused many Iranian centrifuges to be destroyed. The killings of some Iranian scientists over the past few years remain unexplained. Mostafa Ahmadi Roshan, a chemical engineer at the Natanz enrichment facility, died when a bomb placed under his car exploded on January 10, 2012.

Some believe that Iran is retaliating for the reported covert action through cyberattacks on U.S. or foreign financial institutions, which have been occurring since 2012. U.S. officials have said Iran might also have perpetrated a cyberattack against Persian Gulf state oil and gas firms in mid-2012. U.S. officials say they are working with affected institutions to try to stop the attacks.29

Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missile Programs

Iran has developed some weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, and it has a relatively advanced ballistic and cruise missile program. Although Iran is widely believed unlikely to use chemical or biological weapons or to transfer them to its regional proxies or allies, Iran’s missiles are considered to pose a realistic and significant threat to U.S. ships, forces, and allies in the Gulf region and beyond. The April 2, 2015, framework nuclear accord makes no reference to limiting Iran’s ability to develop ballistic missiles, although the tentative accord indicates that U.S. sanctions on such Iranian efforts would remain in place.

Chemical and Biological Weapons

Official U.S. reports and testimony state that Iran maintains the capability to produce chemical warfare (CW) agents and “probably” has the capability to produce some biological warfare agents for offensive purposes, if it made the decision to do so. This raises questions about Iran’s compliance with its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which Iran signed on January 13, 1993, and ratified on June 8, 1997.

Missiles and Warheads

The Administration asserts that Iran’s ballistic missiles and its acquisition of indigenous production of anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) provide capabilities for Iran to project power. DNI Clapper testified in March 2013, that the intelligence community assesses that “Iran’s ballistic missiles are capable of delivering WMD.”

Tehran views its conventionally armed missiles as an integral part of its strategy to deter—and if necessary retaliate against—forces in the region, including U.S. forces. A particular worry of U.S. commanders remains Iran’s inventory of cruise missiles, which can reach U.S. ships in the Gulf quickly after launch. U.S. officials and reports have estimated that Iran is steadily expanding its missile and rocket inventories and has “boosted the lethality and effectiveness of existing systems with accuracy improvements and new sub-munition payloads.”

It is unclear the extent to which Iran continues to receive outside assistance for its missile program. Some reports suggest Iranian technicians may have witnessed North Korea’s satellite launch in December 2012, which, if true, could support the view that Iran-North Korea missile cooperation is extensive. Table 5 contains some details on Iran’s missile programs. Iran’s programs do not appear to have been significantly set back by the November 12, 2011, explosion at a ballistic missile base outside Tehran that destroyed it and killed the base commander.

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31 For more information on Iran’s missile arsenal, see CRS Report R42849, Iran’s Ballistic Missile and Space Launch Programs, by Steven A. Hildreth.
32 Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence, February 2, 2010.
Table 5. Iran’s Missile Arsenal

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Missile Type</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shahab-3 (“Meteor”)</td>
<td>The 800-mile range missile is operational, and Defense Department reports indicate Tehran has improved its lethality and effectiveness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shahab-3 “Variant” /Sijil/Ashoura</td>
<td>The Sijil, or Ashoura, is a solid fuel Shahab-3 variant with 1,200-1,500-mile range. The April 2012 DoD report indicates the missile is increasing in range, lethality, and accuracy, potentially putting large portions of the Near East and Southeastern Europe in range, including U.S. bases in Turkey. In concert with the beginning of 10-day “Great Prophet Six” military exercises, on June 28, 2011, Iran unveiled underground missile silos.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BM-25</td>
<td>1,500-mile range. In April 2006, Israel’s military intelligence chief said that Iran had received a shipment of North Korean-supplied BM-25 missiles, capable of carrying nuclear warheads. The Washington Times appeared to corroborate this reporting in a July 6, 2006, story, which asserted that the North Korean-supplied missile is based on a Soviet-era “SS-N-6” missile. Press accounts in December 2010 indicated that Iran may have received components but not the entire BM-25 missile from North Korea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICBM</td>
<td>U.S. officials have asserted that Iran might be capable of developing an intercontinental ballistic missile (3,000 mile range) by 2015. Iran has not announced any tests of a missile of intercontinental range.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short Range Ballistic Missiles</td>
<td>Iran is fielding increasingly capable, short range ballistic missiles, according to DOD 2012 and 2014 reports, such as ability to home in on and target ships while the missile is in flight. One version could be a short range ballistic missile named the Qiam, tested in August 2010. Iran has long worked on a 200 mile range “Fateh 110” missile (solid propellant), which it again tested in August 2012. A version of it is the Khaliji Fars (Persian Gulf) anti-ship ballistic missile that could threaten maritime activity throughout the Persian Gulf. Iran also is able to arm its patrol boats with Chinese-made C-802 anti-ship cruise missiles. Iran also has C-802’s and other missiles emplaced along Iran’s coast, including the Chinese-made CSSC-2 (Silkworm) and the CSSC-3 (Seersucker). Iran also possesses a few hundred short-range ballistic missiles, including the Shahab-1 (Scud-b), the Shahab-2 (Scud-C), and the Tondar-69 (CSS-8).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Space Vehicle</td>
<td>In February 2009, Iran successfully launched a small, low-earth satellite on a Safir-2 rocket (range about 155 miles). The Pentagon said the launch was “clearly a concern of ours” because “there are dual-use capabilities here which could be applied toward the development of long-range missiles.” A larger space vehicle, Simorgh, was displayed in February 2010, and Iran has claimed additional satellite launches since.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warheads</td>
<td>Wall Street Journal report of September 14, 2005, said that U.S. intelligence believes Iran is working to adapt the Shahab-3 to deliver a nuclear warhead. Subsequent press reports say that U.S. intelligence captured an Iranian computer in mid-2004 showing plans to construct a nuclear warhead for the Shahab.33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conventional and “Asymmetric Warfare” Capability

Iran’s armed forces are likely able to deter or fend off any aggression from Iran’s neighbors, and Iran’s Supreme Leader and other Iranian political and military figures have repeatedly warned that Iran could and would take military action if it perceives it is threatened. Iran can also project power through its recruiting, advising, and arming of various factions in the region. However, Iran generally lacks the ability to deploy concentrated armed force across long distances or

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waterways such as the Persian Gulf. Iran’s conventional military arsenal and training are almost certainly insufficient for Iran to defeat the United States in a direct military confrontation. The FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 113-291) requires another such DOD report on Iran in 2015.

Organizationally, Iran’s armed forces are divided to perform functions appropriate to their roles in Iran. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC, known in Persian as the Sepah-e-Pasdaran Enghelab Islami)\(^\text{34}\) controls the Basij (Mobilization of the Oppressed) volunteer militia that has been the main instrument to repress domestic dissent. The IRGC and the regular military (Artesh)—the national army that existed under the former Shah of Iran—report to a joint headquarters, headed by Dr. Hassan Firuzabadi. The Artesh is deployed mainly at bases outside major cities and its leaders have publicly asserted that the regular military does not have a mandate to suppress public demonstrations and will not do so.

The IRGC Navy and regular Navy (Islamic Republic of Iran Navy, IRIN) are distinct forces; the IRIN has responsibility for the Gulf of Oman, whereas the IRGC Navy has responsibility for the closer-in Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz. The regular Air Force controls most of Iran’s combat aircraft, whereas the IRGC Air Force runs Iran’s ballistic missile programs. Iran has a small number of warships on its Caspian Sea coast. In January 2014, Iran sent some warships into the Atlantic Ocean for the first time ever, presumably to try to demonstrate growing naval strength.

Iran’s armed forces have few formal relationships with foreign militaries outside the region. Iran’s military-to-military relationships with Russia, China, Ukraine, Belarus, and North Korea generally have focused on Iranian arms purchases or upgrades. Such sales to Iran are banned by U.N. Resolution 1929 of June 2010 and many of these relationships have lapsed. Iranian technicians reportedly attended North Korea’s December 2012 launch of a rocket that achieved orbit. Iran and India have a “strategic dialogue” and some Iranian naval officers reportedly underwent some training in India in the 1990s, but this military-to-military relationship has diminished in recent years. Iran’s military also conducted joint exercises with the Pakistani armed forces in the early 1990s, a relationship that has also declined. In September 2014, two Chinese warships docked at Iran’s port of Bandar Abbas, for the first time in history, to conduct four days of naval exercises,\(^\text{35}\) and in October the leader of Iran’s regular (not IRGC) Navy made the first visit ever to China by an Iranian Navy commander.

**Asymmetric Warfare Capacity/Threat to the Gulf**

Iran apparently is attempting to compensate for its conventional military weaknesses by developing a significant capacity for “asymmetric warfare” that would maximize Iran’s advantages and minimize those of a large, advanced force like that of the United States. The unclassified executive summary of the 2014 Defense Department report on Iran’s military capability says that Iran continues to develop “anti-access and area denial” capabilities to control the Strait of Hormuz and its approaches. It is developing increasingly lethal systems such as more

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advanced naval mines, submarines, coastal defense and anti-ship cruise and ballistic missiles, and attack craft.\textsuperscript{36}

The purpose of Iran threatening to or trying to block the Strait could be to threaten the world economy, perhaps in order to extract concessions from the international community. It is a long-asserted core U.S. interest to preserve the free flow of oil and freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf, which is only about 20 miles wide at its narrowest point. The Strait is identified by the Energy Information Administration as a key potential “chokepoint” for the world economy. About 17 million barrels of oil flow through the Strait, which is 35% of all seaborne traded oil and 20% of all worldwide traded oil.\textsuperscript{37} Iran possibly sought to assert its potential ability to control the Strait by stopping or firing on several commercial ships in transiting the Strait in May 2015 – publicly asserting it was doing so to force a resolution of commercial disputes with the shipping companies involved.

Were Iran to take action against the United States and the GCC states, Iranian forces would probably rely most heavily on ships, submarines, and short range missiles. Iran could potentially use its large fleet of small boats to “swarm” U.S. ships, and its ability to lay numerous mines in the narrow Strait of Hormuz. Iran has added naval bases along its Gulf coast in recent years, enhancing its ability to threaten shipping in the Strait. In February 2013, Iran began planning an additional naval base near Iran’s border with Pakistan, on the Sea of Oman.

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{37} http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=18991
Table 6. Iran’s Conventional Military Arsenal

| Military Personnel: | 460,000+. Regular ground force is about 220,000. Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) ground force is about 130,000. Remainders are regular and IRGC navy (18,000 and 20,000 personnel respectively) and Air Forces (52,000 regular Air Force personnel and 5,000 Guard Air Force personnel.) About 12,000 air defense. |
| Security Forces: | About 40,000-60,000 law enforcement forces on duty, with another 600,000 Basij security/paramilitary forces available for combat or internal security missions. |
| Tanks: | 1,800+ Includes 480 Russian-made T-72 |
| Ships: | 100+ (IRGC and regular Navy) Includes 4 Corvette; 18 IRGC-controlled Chinese-made patrol boats, several hundred small boats.) Also has 3 Kilo subs (reg. Navy controlled). 2012 DOD report says Iran may have acquired additional ships and submarines over the past two years, but does not stipulate a supplier, if any. |
| Midget Subs: | Iran has been long said to possess several small subs, possibly purchased assembled or in kit form from North Korea. Iran claimed on November 29, 2007, to have produced a new small sub equipped with sonar-evading technology, and it claimed to deploy four Iranian-made “Ghadir class” subs to the Red Sea in June 2011. |
| Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAMs): | 150+ I-Hawk plus possibly some Stinger |
| Anti-aircraft Missile Systems: | Russia delivered to Iran (January 2007) 30 anti-aircraft missile systems (Tor M1), worth over $1 billion. In December 2007, Russia agreed to sell the highly capable S-300 air defense system, which would greatly enhance Iran’s air defense capability, at an estimated cost of $800 million. The system would not, according to most experts, technically violate the provisions of U.N. Resolution 1929, because the system is not covered in the U.N. Registry on Conventional Arms. However, on September 22, 2010, then Russian President Medvedev signed a decree banning the supply of the system to Iran, asserting that its provision to Iran is banned by Resolution 1929. In August 2011, Iran and Russia took their dispute over the non-delivery of the S-300 to the International Court of Justice. Press reports in April 2015, after the April 2, 2015, framework nuclear accord, indicate that President Putin might sign a decree to proceed with the S-300 delivery. In November 2011, Iran claimed to have deployed its own version (Mersad) of the system. |
| Defense Budget: | About 3% of GDP |

Table 7. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)

The IRGC is generally loyal to Iran’s hardliners politically and is clearly more politically influential than is Iran’s regular military, which is numerically larger, but was held over from the Shah’s era. The IRGC’s political influence has grown sharply as the regime has relied on it to suppress dissent. A 2009 Rand Corporation study stated: “Founded by a decree from Ayatollah Khomeini shortly after the victory of the 1978-1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) has evolved well beyond its original foundations as an ideological guard for the nascent revolutionary regime ... The IRGC’s presence is particularly powerful in Iran’s highly factionalized political system, in which [many senior figures] hail from the ranks of the IRGC...”

Through its Qods (Jerusalem) Force (QF), the IRGC has a foreign policy role in exerting influence throughout the region by supporting pro-Iranian movements and leaders. The IRGC-QF numbers approximately 10,000-15,000 personnel who provide advice, support, and arrange weapons deliveries to pro-Iranian factions or leaders in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, Persian Gulf states, Gaza/West Bank, Afghanistan, and Central Asia. IRGC leaders have confirmed the QF is in Syria to assist the regime of Bashar al-Assad against an armed uprising, and it reportedly provided advisers to help the Israeli government counter an offensive by Sunni Islamist extremists in June 2014. The QF commander, Brigadier General Qassem Soleimani reportedly has a direct and independent channel to Khamenei. The QF commander during 1988-1995 was Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi, who served as Defense minister during 2009-2013. He led the QF when it allegedly assisted two bombings of Israeli and Jewish targets in Buenos Aires and is wanted by Interpol for a role in the 1994 bombing there. He allegedly recruited Saudi Hezbollah activists later accused of the June 1996 Khobar Towers bombing; and assassinated Iranian dissident leaders in Europe in the early 1990s.

IRGC leadership developments are significant because of the political influence of the IRGC. On September 2, 2007, Khamenei named Mohammad Ali Jafari as commander in chief of the Guard. Jafari is considered a hardliner against political dissent and a close ally of the Supreme Leader. He criticized Rouhani for accepting a phone call from President Obama on September 27, 2013, and has continued to oppose major concessions as part of a permanent nuclear settlement. The Basij reports to the IRGC commander in chief; its leader is Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Naqdi. It operates from thousands of positions in Iran’s institutions. Command reshuffles in July 2008 integrated the Basij more closely with provincially based IRGC units and increased the Basij role in internal security. In November 2009, the regime gave the IRGC’s intelligence units greater authority, perhaps surpassing those of the Ministry of Intelligence, in monitoring dissent. The IRGC Navy has responsibility to patrol the Strait of Hormuz and the regular Navy has responsibility for the broader Arabian Sea and Gulf of Oman (deeper waters further off the coast).

As noted, the IRGC is also increasingly involved in Iran’s economy, acting through a network of contracting businesses it has set up, most notably Ghorb (also called Khatem ol-Anbiya, Persian for “Seal of the Prophet”). Active duty IRGC senior commanders reportedly serve on Ghorb’s board of directors and its chief executive, Rostam Ghasemi, served as Oil Minister during 2011-2013. In September 2009, the Guard bought a 50% stake in Iran Telecommunication Company at a cost of $7.8 billion. The Wall Street Journal reported on May 27, 2014, that Khatam ol-Anbia has $50 billion in contracts with the Iranian government, including in the energy sector but also in port and highway construction. It has as many as 40,000 employees.

On October 21, 2007, the Treasury Department designated several IRGC companies as proliferation entities under Executive Order 13382. Also that day, the IRGC as a whole, the Ministry of Defense, several IRGC commanders, and several Iranian banks were sanctioned under that same executive order. Simultaneously, the Qods Force was named as a terrorism supporting entity under Executive Order 13224. These orders freeze the U.S.-based assets and prevent U.S. transactions with the named entities, but these entities are believed to have virtually no U.S.-based assets. On June 9, 2011, the IRGC and Basij were named as human rights abusers under Executive Order 13553, with the same penalties as the above Executive Orders.

Power Projection Through Allies and Proxies: the Qods Force

An instrument of Iran’s national security policy is not only to deploy conventional force but to supports armed factions in the region, some of which are named as terrorist organizations by the United States. Many experts refer to this Iran policy as the practice of “asymmetric warfare,” based on the fact that the policy uses Tehran’s advantages and minimizes its disadvantages relative to large military powers such as the United States. Some U.S. observers interpret Iran’s objectives in supporting armed factions as attempting to overturn a power structure in the Middle East that Iran asserts favors the United States, Israel, and Sunni Muslim Arab regimes. Iran couches its support for Shiite and other Islamist movements as support for an “oppressed” underclass and explains its policies as attempting to thwart any chance for the United States to overturn its Islamic revolution. The strategy helps Iran expand its influence with little direct risk, gives Tehran a measure of deniability, and serves as a “force multiplier” that compensates for a relatively weak conventional force. Some U.S. officials believe that, in the event of a U.S.-Iran confrontation, Iran would try to retaliate through terrorist attacks inside the United States or against U.S. embassies and facilities in Europe or the Persian Gulf. Iran could also try to direct anti-U.S. militias in Afghanistan to attack U.S. personnel there. Iran’s support for armed factions that use international terrorism, particularly Lebanese Hezbollah, formed the basis of Iran’s addition to the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism (“terrorism list”) in January 1984. For a detailed assessment of Iran’s overall foreign policy, see: CRS Report R44017, Iran’s Foreign Policy, by Kenneth Katzman.

Some assert that Rouhani seeks to curb Iran’s support for militant movements in the region because their activities could injure his goals of broader international engagement. However, many doubt that Rouhani is able to do so because he is perceived as having no authority over the Qods Force commander, Qasem Soleimani, who is said to report directly to Khamenei. Some observers assert that Sunni rebellions against pro-Iranian governments in Iraq and Syria have cast doubt among some in Iranian leadership circles about Soleimani’s preferred policies of providing unqualified support for pro-Iranian Shiite leaders in the region.

In prior decades, Iran’s conduct of international terrorism took the form of assassinating dissidents abroad. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Iran allegedly was responsible for the assassination of several Iranian dissidents based in Europe, including Iranian Kurdish dissident leader Abdol Rahman Qasemlu, several other Kurdish leaders (including those killed at the Mykonos café in Berlin in September 1992), the brother of PMOI leader Masud Rajavi, and several figures close to the late Shah of Iran. In May 2010, France allowed the return to Iran of Vakili Rad, who had been convicted in the 1991 stabbing of the Shah’s last prime minister, Shahpour Bakhtiar. Iran has not been accused of dissident assassinations abroad in well over a decade.

Iran is supporting a number of armed factions on several fronts in the region, as well as some regional leaders that the United States asserts need to leave office.

- Lebanese Hezbollah. Lebanese Hezbollah, which is named by the United States as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), is Iran’s chief protégé movement in the region by virtue of a long relationship that began when Lebanese Shiite clerics of the pro-Iranian Lebanese Da’wa Party began to organize in 1982, after

Israel’s invasion that year. Iran’s political, financial, and military aid to Hezbollah has helped it become a major force in Lebanon’s politics and Iran reportedly has been instrumental in persuading Hezbollah leaders to become directly involved in the Syria conflict on behalf of Syrian President Bashar Al Assad. State Department terrorism reports assert that Iran “has provided hundreds of millions of dollars in support of Hezbollah and has trained thousands of Hezbollah fighters at camps in Iran.” Israeli sources report that Iran has given Hezbollah about 100,000 rockets of varying types since the Israel-Hezbollah war in 2006, some of which can reach virtually all parts of Israel. In part as a consequence of its military strength, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) rarely acts against Hezbollah’s forces or interests.

- **Hamas.** The State Department annual report on terrorism has consistently stated that Iran supplies funding, weapons, and training to Hamas, a Sunni Islamist Palestinian organization which is named as an FTO. Hamas exercises control in the Gaza Strip after seizing that territory in a civil conflict with the non-Islamist Palestine Liberation Organization, which dominates the Palestinian Authority based in the West Bank. Largely because of sympathy with the mostly Sunni rebels in Syria, Hamas opposed the efforts by Assad to defeat the rebellion militarily and a rift opened with Assad and with Iran. Iran has since sought to rebuild the Hamas relationship by reportedly providing missile technology and other equipment.

- **Iraq.** The June 2014 offensive led by the Islamic State organization threatened Iraq’s government and Iran responded quickly by supplying IRGC-QF advisers, intelligence drone surveillance, weapons shipments, and other assistance. The IRGC-QF advisers have helped reactivate the Shiite militias as a core of armed support to the faltering Iraq Security Forces. The United States also supports the Iraqi government but cautions that the government reliance on Shiite militias will hinder efforts at political reconciliation that are needed to defeat the Islamic State in Iraq. The Shiite militias include As’aib Ahl Al Haq (League of the Righteous), Kata’ib Hezbollah (Hezbollah Brigades), and the Mahdi Army of Moqtada Al Sadr (renamed the Peace Brigades in 2014). Kata’ib Hezbollah has been named a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) by the United States.

- **Syria.** In Syria, President Bashar Al Assad has been Iran’s closest Arab ally, whereas the United States has called for Assad’s overthrow. Syria has been the main transit point for Iranian weapons shipments to Hezbollah, and both Iran and Syria have used Hezbollah as leverage against Israel to try to achieve regional and territorial aims. In an effort to prevent Assad’s downfall—and the likely accession of a regime run by Sunni Islamists - Iran is providing substantial amounts of material support to the Syrian regime, including funds, weapons, and fighters. 39 Many accounts indicate that Iran has IRGC-QF personnel to Syria to advise the regime and fight alongside the Syrian military. U.S. officials say that they are working to persuade Iran to abandon Assad, presumably in favor of a figure that Iran would perceive as not inimical to its interests—such as the securing of a weapons supply corridor to Hezbollah.

• **Houthi Rebels in Yemen.** In Yemen, Iran has been supporting a Zaydi Shiite revivalist movement known as the “Houthis” with unknown quantities of arms and other aid, reportedly including AK-47s, rocket-propelled grenades, and other arms. A senior Iranian official reportedly told journalists in December 2014 that the Qods Force has a “few hundred” personnel in Yemen training Houthi fighters. In September 2014, the Houthis seized major locations in the capital, Sanaa, and took control of major government locations in January 2015, forcing Saleh’s successor, Abd Rabu Mansur Al Hadi, to flee to Aden. The Houthis successes—including advancing into Aden by April 2015 despite bombing by a U.S.-supported and Saudi-led coalition of Arab states—might demonstrate Iran’s continuing ability to project influence in the Arabian Peninsula and broader Middle East. However, many argue that Iran’s support for the Houthis does not appear to be nearly as significant as its aid to closer allies such Lebanese Hezbollah.

### U.S. Policy Responses and Further Options

The potential threat to U.S. interests posed by Iran are complex and have engendered a variety of U.S. responses and consideration of numerous different options. The policies employed and further available options are discussed in the sections below.

### U.S. – Iran Relations and Diplomacy

The February 11, 1979, fall of the Shah of Iran, who was a key U.S. ally, opened a deep and ongoing rift in U.S.-Iranian relations. The Carter Administration sought to engage the Islamic regime, which initially had numerous moderates in senior posts, was but the Administration’s allowing the ex-Shah into the United States for medical treatment was the ostensible trigger for the November 4, 1979 takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran by radical pro-Khomeini “students in the line of the Imam (Khomeini).” The radicals held 66 U.S. diplomats hostage for 444 days, releasing them minutes after President Reagan’s inauguration on January 20, 1981. The United States broke relations with Iran on April 7, 1980, two weeks prior to the failed U.S. military attempt to rescue the hostages during April 24-25, 1980.

Iran has an interest section in Washington, DC, under the auspices of the Embassy of Pakistan; it is staffed by Iranian Americans. The former Iranian Embassy closed in April 1980 when the two countries broke diplomatic relations, and remains under the control of the State Department. The U.S. interest section in Tehran—under the auspices of the Embassy of Switzerland there—has no American personnel. Iran’s Mission to the United Nations in New York runs most of Iran’s diplomacy inside the United States. The former U.S. embassy in Tehran is now used as a museum commemorating the revolution and as a Basij headquarters.

*Reagan Administration.* The Reagan Administration designated Iran as a “state sponsor of terrorism” (placed on the “terrorism list”) in January 1984, primarily because of Iran’s support for Lebanese Hezbollah. The designation reinforced a U.S “tilt” toward Iraq in the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War, other components of which were U.S. diplomatic efforts to block conventional arms transfers.

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sales to Iran and the provision of battlefield intelligence to Iraq. During 1987-1988, U.S. naval forces engaged in several skirmishes with Iranian naval elements in the course of U.S. efforts to protect international oil shipments in the Gulf from Iranian mines and other attacks. On April 18, 1988 ("Operation Praying Mantis"), Iran lost one-quarter of its larger naval ships in an engagement with the U.S. Navy, including a frigate sunk. On July 3, 1988, U.S. forces in the Gulf mistakenly shot down Iran Air Flight 655 by the USS Vincennes over the Gulf. However, the Administration to some extent undermined its efforts to contain Iran by providing some arms to Iran ("TOW" anti-tank weapons and I-Hawk air defense equipment) as part of an effort to enlist Iran’s help in compelling Hezbollah to release U.S. hostages in held in Lebanon.

George H. W. Bush Administration. After the Iran-Iraq War ended in August 1988, President Bush laid the groundwork for a rapprochement with Iran in his January 1989 inaugural speech, in which he said that "goodwill begets goodwill" with respect to Iran. His comments were widely interpreted as offering to improve relations with Iran if it helped obtain the release of the U.S. hostages in Lebanon. Iran apparently did assist in obtaining their release, and all remaining U.S. hostages there were freed by the end of December 1991. However, no U.S.-Iran thaw followed, possibly because Iran continued to back groups opposed to Israel and Middle East peace.

Clinton Administration. Upon taking office in 1993, the Clinton Administration announced a strategy of “dual containment” of Iran and Iraq—attempting to keep both weak rather than alternately tilting to one or the other. In 1995 and 1996, the Clinton Administration and Congress banned U.S. trade and investment with Iran and imposed penalties on investment in Iran’s energy sector (Iran Sanctions Act) in response to growing concerns about Iran’s weapons of mass destruction and its efforts to subvert the Arab-Israeli peace process. The Clinton Administration expressed skepticism of the EU’s policy of “critical dialogue” with Iran, in which the EU states met with Iran but criticized its human rights policies and its support for militant movements.

The election of relative moderate Mohammad Khatemi in May 1997 precipitated a U.S. offer of direct dialogue without preconditions. In January 1998, Khatemi publicly agreed to “people-to-people” U.S.-Iran exchanges, but ruled out U.S.-Iran direct talks. In a June 1998 speech, then-Secretary of State Albright called for mutual confidence building measures that could lead to a “road map” for normalization. In a March 17, 2000, speech, she acknowledged past U.S. meddling in Iran, announcing an easing of the U.S. trade ban, and promised to try to resolve outstanding claims disputes. At the September 2000 U.N. “Millennium Summit” in New York, Albright and President Clinton attended Khatemi’s speeches.

George W. Bush Administration. Despite limited tacit cooperation with Iran on post-Taliban Afghanistan, President George W. Bush identified Iran as a U.S. adversary by including it as part of an “axis of evil” (along with Iraq and North Korea) in his January 2002 State of the Union message. Later that year, Iran’s nuclear program emerged as a major issue for U.S. policy toward Iran. President Bush’s January 20, 2005, second inaugural address and his January 31, 2006, State of the Union message stated that the United States would be a close ally of a free and democratic Iran—reflecting apparent sentiment for changing Iran’s regime. On the other hand, reflecting the views of those in the Administration who favored diplomacy, the Administration continued a

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dialogue with Iran on Afghanistan and expanded the dialogue to include issues facing post-Saddam Iraq.\textsuperscript{43} The Administration did not offer unconditional, direct dialogue on \textit{all} issues of mutual concern. The United States aided victims of the December 2003 earthquake in Bam, Iran.

Some assert that the Bush Administration missed an opportunity for a “grand bargain” with Iran on its nuclear program and regional issues by rebuffing a reported May 2003 Iranian overture for such a sweeping agreement. The \textit{Washington Post} reported on February 14, 2007 (“2003 Memo Says Iranian Leaders Backed Talks”), that the Swiss ambassador to Iran in 2003, Tim Guldimann, had informed U.S. officials of a comprehensive Iranian proposal for talks with the United States.\textsuperscript{44} However, State Department and some European diplomats dispute that the proposal was fully vetted within Iran’s leadership.

\textbf{Obama Administration Policy: Pressure Coupled with Engagement}

Upon taking office, President Obama asserted that there was an opportunity to diplomatically persuade Iran to limit its nuclear program and to build a relationship after decades of estrangement and enmity. Some Obama Administration officials expressed skepticism that engagement would yield changes in Iran’s policies, while other officials believed that the United States needed to present Iran with clear choices if it continues to expand its nuclear program. Obama Administration Iran policy unfolded in President Obama’s first message to the Iranian people on the occasion of Nowruz (Persian New Year) on March 21, 2009. He stated that the United States “is now committed to diplomacy that addresses the full range of issues before us, and to pursuing constructive ties among the United States, Iran, and the international community.” He also referred to Iran as “The Islamic Republic of Iran,” a formulation suggesting aversion to regime change. Other early steps included the following.

\begin{itemize}
  \item President Obama’s reported two letters in 2009 to Iran’s Supreme Leader expressing the Administration’s philosophy in favor of engagement with Iran.
  \item A major speech to the “Muslim World” in Cairo on June 4, 2009, in which President Obama acknowledged that the United States had played a role in the overthrow of Mossadeq, and said that Iran had a right to peaceful nuclear power if it complies with its responsibilities under the NPT.
  \item An announcement on April 8, 2009, that U.S. officials would attend all P5+1 meetings with Iran, and a loosening of restrictions on U.S. diplomats to meet their Iranian counterparts at international meetings.
\end{itemize}

\textbf{2009-2013: Emphasis on Pressure}

At the end of 2009, Iran’s crackdown on the 2009 election-related unrest and its refusal to finalize the October 1, 2009, interim nuclear agreement discussed above caused the Administration to shift to a “two track strategy:” economic pressure coupled with nuclear negotiations and offers of sanctions relief in return for nuclear compromise. The sanctions imposed during the period, and the degree of international cooperation with sanctions enforcement, were substantial, as discussed in CRS Report RS20871, \textit{Iran Sanctions}. The Administration also criticized Iran’s human rights


\textsuperscript{44} http://www.armscontrol.org/pdf/2003_Spring_Iran_Proposal.pdf.
abuses, altered some trade regulations to help Iranians circumvent government restrictions on the Internet, and continued to fund exchanges with civil society activists in Iran. The Administration repeatedly stated that a military option is “on the table” and it continued to work with the Persian Gulf states and other regional allies, as discussed in detail below.

2013-Present: Rouhani Presidency

The election of Hassan Rouhani in June 2013 provided the Administration an opportunity for a shift to emphasis on diplomacy. The Administration immediately thereafter reiterated an offer, stated by Vice President Biden in February 2013, to engage in direct talks with Iran on the nuclear issue. The potential for rapprochement improved during the 2013 U.N. General Assembly meetings in New York. On September 20, 2013, the Washington Post published an op-ed by Rouhani stating a commitment to engage in constructive interaction with the world. President Obama, in his September 24, 2013, speech, confirmed that he had exchanged letters with Rouhani stating the U.S. willingness to resolve the nuclear issue peacefully and that the United States “[is] not seeking regime change.” An Obama-Rouhani meeting did not occur, reportedly because of Rouhani’s perceived need to avoid angering hardline regime elements in Iran, but President Obama called Rouhani by phone on September 27, 2013 – the first direct contact between presidents of the two countries since the 1979 revolution. Since then, the United States and Iran have held bilateral meetings at the margins of all nuclear talks, including discussions of regional issues such as the Islamic State organization, as well as the detention of several dual citizens discussed above.

Before the April 2, 2015, framework nuclear accord was announced, both Iranian and U.S. officials have said the nuclear deal is separate from broader issues. However, days after the framework accord, President Obama stated that he hopes that a finalized deal “ushers in a new era in U.S.-Iranian relations.” An improvement in U.S.-Iran relations could lead to resolution to some of the conflicts roiling the region and possibly produce a restoration of official U.S.-Iran diplomatic relations. There has been occasional past U.S. consideration of requesting that Tehran allow U.S. personnel to staff the U.S. interests section in Tehran, but Iran has not supported the idea to date. The Obama Administration has said embassy exchanges are not under discussion in connection with the Iran nuclear talks, but in May 2015 the two governments confirmed that they had granted each other permission to move their respective interests sections in Washington, D.C. and in Tehran to more spacious locations.

As an example of the way in which past injuries continue to affect the relationship, in early 2014, Iran appointed one of those involved in the 1979 seizure of the U.S. embassy in Tehran—Hamid Aboutalebi—as ambassador to the United Nations. That appointment was the subject of April 2014 congressional passage of S. 2195, which would give the Administration authority to deny him a visa to take up his duties. The United States subsequently announced he would not be admitted to the United States and Iran subsequently replaced him with Gholam Ali Khoshroo, who studied in the United States and served in the reformist government of president Khatami.

45 Remarks by President Obama in Address to the United Nations General Assembly, September 24, 2013.
U.S. Defense Posture in the Persian Gulf and Military Options

Successive U.S. Administrations have sought to back up diplomacy with the capability to exercise significant military options against Iran. The possible stated uses of U.S. military action against Iran include preventing Iran from becoming a nuclear state, reassuring and being positioned to defend the Persian Gulf states or other U.S. allies, protecting the free flow of oil or shipping in the Gulf, and containing Iranian power generally. In past years, the U.S. presence in the Gulf has also been intended to contain Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.

Military Options to Prevent a Nuclear Iran

President Obama has repeatedly stated that “all options are on the table” to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. In a March 2, 2012, interview in The Atlantic, President Obama clarified that the “military option” as meaning that there is a military component to preventing a nuclear-armed Iran. In the context of the April 2, 2015, framework accord, President Obama has reiterated that military action remains an option if no deal is finalized as well as after the primary restrictions of the deal expire. S.J.Res. 41, which passed the Senate on September 22, 2012, in the 112th Congress, rejects any U.S. policy that relies on “containment” of a potential nuclear Iran, but acknowledges that President Obama has ruled out a containment policy.

In arguing for the possible nuclear deal, the Administration asserts that even military action would only set back Iran’s nuclear advancement temporarily—and with far less certainty or duration than the deal under discussion. Others argue that U.S. military action could set back Iran’s nuclear program substantially because there are a limited number of key targets and all targets, even the hardened Fordow site, are vulnerable to U.S. air power. A U.S. ground invasion to remove Iran’s regime has not, at any time, appeared to be under serious consideration, in part because of the likely resistance an invasion would meet in Iran.

Senior U.S. officials have repeatedly stressed the potential adverse consequences of military action, such as Iranian retaliation that might expand throughout the region, a reduction of Iran’s regional isolation, a strengthening of Iran’s regime domestically, and an escalation of world oil prices. Most U.S. allies in Europe oppose military action against Iran’s nuclear facilities or for other purposes, unless Iran undertakes clearly provocative action. European and Asian countries tend to emphasize the potential consequences of military action against Iran, such as Iran’s possible implementation of threats to close the Strait of Hormuz. Iran’s actions against some commercial shipping in the Gulf in the spring of 2015 might represent an Iranian effort to demonstrate it can implement such threats.

Some argue that there are U.S. military options that would not require hostilities. These options include a naval embargo or a “no-fly zone” over Iran to pressure the regime. These options appear to be under current consideration.

A U.S. decision to take military action against Iran’s nuclear facilities might raise the question of presidential authorities. No legislation has been passed by both chambers and signed into law limiting the President’s authority to use military force against Iran. In the 109th Congress, H.Con.Res. 391 (introduced on April 26, 2006) called on the President to not initiate military action against Iran without first obtaining authorization from Congress. A similar bill, H.Con.Res. 33, was introduced in the 110th Congress. An amendment to H.R. 1585, the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2008, requiring authorization for force against Iran, was defeated 136 to 288. A provision that sought to bar the Administration from taking military action against Iran without congressional authorization was taken out of an early draft of an FY2007 supplemental appropriation (H.R. 1591). Other provisions, including requiring briefings to Congress about military contingency planning related to Iran’s nuclear program, were in the House version (H.R. 5658) of a FY2009 defense authorization bill, but not the final law. The FY2011 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 111-383, signed January 7, 2011) contained a provision (§1243) requiring the Administration to develop a “National Military Strategy to Counter Iran.”

**Gulf State Cooperation with U.S. Policy Toward Iran**

U.S. military options against Iran depend, in large measure, on cooperation from the Persian Gulf countries that share the waterway with Iran. The six Persian Gulf monarchy states, all led by Sunni royal families, in 1981 formed an alliance called the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates). The United States and the GCC states have a long history of security cooperation, dating to the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war and expanding significantly after the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. With Iraq militarily weak since the fall of Saddam Hussein, most of the GCC leaders currently express concerns about the influence and intentions of Iran in the Gulf and broader region. Some of the GCC leaders accuse Iran of fomenting unrest among Shiite communities in the GCC states themselves, particularly those in the Eastern Provinces of Saudi Arabia and in Bahrain, which has a majority Shiite population.

The GCC leaders express concerns that a comprehensive nuclear deal could lead to a broader U.S.-Iran rapprochement and possibly weaken the U.S. commitment to Gulf security. The GCC states publicly backed the April 2, 2015, framework nuclear accord while asserting concerns about Iran’s “destabilizing activities in the region.” In light of these stated concerns, President Obama announced in his statement on the framework accord that he would invite the GCC leaders to Camp David later in 2015 to discuss Gulf security. The meetings were held May 13-14, 2015, between President Obama and two Gulf leaders (Amir of Kuwait and of Qatar) and four other Gulf leadership delegations (Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Zayid Al Nuhayyan representing the UAE and its ailing President Khalifa bin Zayid Al Nuhayyan; Deputy Prime Minister Fahd bin Mahmoud Al Said, representing the ailing Sultan Qaboos bin Said Al Said; Crown Prince Mohammad bin Nayef and deputy Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman representing Saudi King Salman; and Crown Prince Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa, representing his father, King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa of Bahrain. The joint statement issued after the summit announced a new U.S.-GCC strategic partnership and reiterated that it is U.S. policy to use all elements of U.S. national power to secure core U.S. interests in the Gulf and to deter and confront external aggression “against our allies and partners...” An annex to the joint statement says that the United States will increase security cooperation with the GCC states in the following ways: (1) facilitating U.S. arms transfers to the GCC states; (2) increased U.S.-GCC cooperation on maritime security, cybersecurity, and counter-terrorism; (3) organizing additional large-scale joint military exercises and U.S. training; and (4) stating a renewed commitment to a concept of a Gulf-wide ballistic missile defense capability, which the United States has sought to promote in
recent years. The joint statement highlighted joint efforts to counter Iran’s “malign influence” in the region as well as a commitment to defeating the Islamic State and to countering violent extremism more broadly.

The “strategic partnership” builds on the “U.S.-GCC Strategic Dialogue” inaugurated by then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in March 2012. In February 2010, then-Secretary Clinton also raised the issue of a possible U.S. extension of a “security umbrella” or guarantee to regional states against Iran. The GCC states reportedly had sought such a commitment at the Camp David summit, but the joint statement instead stated that

In the event of [ ] aggression or the threat of [ ] aggression [against the GCC states], the United States stands ready to work with our GCC partners to determine urgently what action may be appropriate, using the means at our collective disposal, including the potential use of military force, for the defense of our GCC partners.\(^5\)

**GCC Military Capacity and U.S. Deployments in the Gulf**

A key component of the military component of U.S. strategy in the Gulf is the maintenance of a large U.S. military presence in the Gulf. U.S. officials assert that, as of 2015, there are about 35,000 forces in the Gulf region. Most of them are stationed at various Gulf state facilities that the United States has access to, in accordance with Defense Cooperation Agreements (DCAs) between the United States and these countries. Some of the forces are aboard the at least one U.S. aircraft carrier task force that is in the Gulf region virtually continuously. The DCA's and other agreements not only stipulate modalities of joint cooperation, but also reportedly provide for the United States to preposition substantial military equipment in some of the Gulf states and to have access to Gulf state military facilities in operations.\(^5\)

The U.S.-GCC defense posture in the Gulf is as follows:\(^5\)

- **Saudi Arabia.** The United States does not have a DCA with Saudi Arabia. Nonetheless, a few hundred U.S. military personnel are in Saudi Arabia training its military, Saudi Arabia National Guard (SANG), and Ministry of Interior forces. The Saudi force has about 225,000 active duty personnel, with about 600 tanks, of which 200 are U.S.-made M1A2 “Abrams” tanks. The Saudi Air Force relies heavily on the U.S.-made F-15 “Eagle.”

- **Kuwait.** The United States has had a DCA with Kuwait since 1991, and about 13,000 U.S. Army personnel are stationed there, providing ground combat

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50 https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/05/14/annex-us-gulf-cooperation-council-camp-david-joint-statement


52 https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/05/14/us-gulf-cooperation-council-camp-david-joint-statement

53 The texts of the DCAs and related agreements are classified, but general information on the provisions of the agreements has been provided in some open sources, including: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/files/pub185.pdf

54 The U.S. deployments in the Gulf are discussed in greater detail in CRS reports on the individual GCC states. Information in this section is derived from author visits to the GCC states since 1993 and conversations with U.S. and Gulf state diplomats. See also: International Institute for Strategic Studies, “The Military Balance, 2015”
capability in the wake of the full U.S withdrawal from Iraq. The forces operate out of such facilities as Camp Arifjan, south of Kuwait City, where the United States prepositions ground armor including tanks. U.S. forces train at Camp Buehring, about 50 miles west of the capital, and operate in other facilities such as Shaykh Jabir Air Base. Kuwait has a small force of about 15,000 active military personnel. It relies almost exclusively on U.S. equipment, including the M1A2 Abrams tank the F/A-18 "Hornet" combat aircraft.

- **Qatar.** The United States has had a DCA with Qatar since 1992 and signed an updated version in December 2013. About 5,000 U.S. forces, mostly Air Force, are in Qatar, manning the forward headquarters of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), which has responsibility for the Middle East and Central Asia; a Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) that oversees U.S. combat aircraft missions in the region; the large Al Udeid Air Base, and the As Saliyah army prepositioning site where U.S. tanks are prepositioned. Qatar’s armed force is small with about 12,000 active military personnel. Qatar has historically relied on French military equipment, fielding AMX-30 tanks and Mirage combat aircraft. In May 2015, during a visit to the Gulf by French President Francois Hollande, Qatar agreed to buy 24 French-made Rafale fighter jets worth about $7 billion.\(^5\)

- **UAE.** The United States has had a DCA with UAE since 1994. About 5,000 U.S. forces, mostly Air Force and Navy, are stationed in UAE, operating surveillance and refueling aircraft from Al Dhafra Air Base, and servicing U.S. Navy and contract ships which dock at the large commercial port of Jebel Ali. The UAE armed forces include about 63,000 active duty personnel. Its ground forces use primarily French tanks such as the Leclerc purchased in the 1990s and the AMX-30, but its air forces are equipped with F-16s the country has bought from the United States in recent years. The UAE has stated that it wants to buy the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, but U.S. officials have stated that the system will not be approved for sale to the GCC for at least several years after the aircraft is delivered to Israel, based on U.S. policy to maintain Israel’s "Qualitative Military Edge" (QME).

- **Bahrain.** The United States has had a DCA with Bahrain since 1991. About 6,000 U.S. personnel, mostly Navy, operate out of the large Naval Support Activity facility that houses the U.S. command structure for all U.S. naval operations in the Gulf. U.S. Air Force personnel also access Shaykh Isa Air Base. Bahrain has the smallest military in the Gulf, with only about 6,000 active personnel, but it has internal security forces under the Ministry of Interior with about 11,000 personnel. The United States has given Bahrain older model U.S. M60A3 tanks and a frigate ship as “excess defense articles,” and the country has bought U.S.-made F-16s with national funds.

- **Oman.** The United States has had a “facilities access agreement” (not a DCA) with Oman since April 1980. Under the agreement, U.S. forces, mostly Air Force, have access to Omani air bases such as those at Seeb, Masirah Island, Thumrait, and Musnanah. A few hundred U.S. forces serve at these facilities. Oman has a 25,000 person force that has historically relied on British-made military

\(^{5}\) France and Qatar Seal $7 Billion Rafale Fighter Jet Deal. Reuters, April 30, 2015.
equipment. The United States has provided some M60A3 tanks as excess defense articles, and Oman has bought F-16s using national funds.

The United States has consistently sought to promote cooperation among the GCC states, each of which has its own military forces. In the past few years, the GCC leaders have formally supported suggestions by Saudi Arabia to form a unified GCC military command structure, but similar proposals have been discussed within the GCC for at least two decades with minimal implementation to date. The United States has sought to promote that concept by attempting to deal with the GCC countries as a bloc, rather than individually, but suspicions and grievances among the GCC states has precluded progress on that concept to date.

In addition, even though the GCC states are large buyers of U.S. and other military equipment, commentators often question the level of training and expertise of the Gulf military forces. Some of the GCC states rely heavily on foreign troops in their ranks, such as Pakistani troops serving under contract. The UAE has reportedly contracted with private security firms to develop certain elements of a force that can be used for internal security and other purposes. On the other hand, some police units in Bahrain and some UAE forces have acquired sufficient expertise to help U.S. forces that have sought to stabilize Afghanistan.

**Integrated Missile Defense**

A cornerstone of the initiative, similar to that of forerunner efforts, is to coordinate Gulf state missile defense capabilities. Secretary of Defense Hagel emphasized the joint missile defense vision during his December 2013 and May 2014 visits to the Gulf, including stating that the United States prefers to sell related equipment to the GCC as a bloc, rather than individually. As part of this effort, there have been several recent missile defense sales include PAC-3 sales to UAE and Kuwait; and the advanced “THAAD” (Theater High Altitude Area Defense) to UAE and Qatar. In September 2012, it was reported that the United States was putting in place an early-warning missile defense radar in Qatar that, when combined with radars in Israel and Turkey, would provide a wide range of coverage against Iran’s missile forces.56

Other major U.S. arms sales to the GCC countries have been intended to improve their air and naval capabilities and their interoperability with U.S. forces, as well as to improve border and maritime security. The United States has continued to agree to major sales to virtually all of the GCC states, including such equipment as combat aircraft, precision-guided munitions, Littoral Combat Ships, radar systems, and communications gear. Some arms sales to Bahrain have been withheld because of the government’s use of force to suppress Shiite unrest there.

Separate from the efforts to forge a Gulf-wide missile defense, the United States has sought a defense against an eventual long-range Iranian missile system. In August 2008, the George W. Bush Administration reached agreements with Poland and the Czech Republic to establish a missile defense system to counter Iranian ballistic missiles. These agreements were reached over Russia’s opposition, which was based on the belief that the missile defense system would be used to neutralize Russian capabilities. However, reportedly based on assessments of Iran’s focus on missiles of regional range, on September 17, 2009, the Obama Administration reoriented this missile defense program to focus on ship-based systems and systems based in other European

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countries, including Romania. Some saw this as an effort to win Russia’s support for additional sanctions on Iran, although Russia continues to disagree with the plan. The FY2013 national defense authorization act (P.L. 112-239) contained provisions urging the Administration to undertake more extensive efforts, in cooperation with U.S. partners and others, to defend against the missile programs of Iran (and North Korea).

**Figure 1. IISS Estimate of Gulf State Military Spending in Current U.S. Dollars, 1997-2014**

![Figure 1. IISS Estimate of Gulf State Military Spending in Current U.S. Dollars, 1997-2014](image)

*Source: IMF Data, World Economic Outlook Database October 2014.*

**Potential for Israeli Military Action Against Iran**

The United States is not the only country that has openly discussed exercising potential military action against Iran. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel has asserted that a nuclear-armed Iran would constitute an existential threat to Israel, and that Israel would take unilateral action to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran. Netanyahu and other Israeli leaders have denounced the

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57 This option is analyzed in substantial depth in CRS Report R42443, *Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities*, coordinated by Jim Zanotti.
April 2, 2015, framework accord as leaving Iran as a “threshold nuclear state,” and some Israeli leaders have continued to assert that Israel might attack Iran’s nuclear facilities even if a deal is reached. Still, most outside experts consider an Israeli military strike on Iran unlikely if a deal is reached and Iran is assessed as complying. Such a strike would almost certainly receive broad international condemnation and could produce a broader Middle East conflict. In May 2013, by a vote of 99-0, the Senate passed a “sense of Congress” resolution, S.Res. 65, that the United States should support Israel diplomatically, economically, and militarily if it felt compelled to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities.

Although Israeli strategists say that a strike might be a viable option, several U.S. experts doubt that Israel has the capability to make such action sufficiently effective to justify the risks. The IAF is capable but far smaller than that of the United States, and could require overflight of several countries not likely to support Israeli action, such as Iraq.

**Economic Sanctions**

The United States and its partners have employed economic sanctions to try to cause Iran to agree to limits on its nuclear program, to reassess the wisdom of supporting regional armed factions, and to limit Iranian power generally. The imposition and effectiveness of sanctions is analyzed in considerable depth in: CRS Report RS20871, *Iran Sanctions*, by Kenneth Katzman. An outline of the existing sanctions regime is provided in the box below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Growth</th>
<th>Negative 5% growth in 2013, flat to minor (1%) growth in 2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Per Capita Income</td>
<td>$12,800/yr (purchasing power parity) (2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>$988 billion (purchasing power parity) (2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proven Oil Reserves</td>
<td>135 billion barrels (highest after Russia and Canada)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil Production/Exports</td>
<td>About 1.1 mbd exports since the end of 2013. (About1.3 mbd with condensates)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Oil/Gas Customers</td>
<td>Remaining customers: primarily China, India, South Korea, Japan, and Turkey. Turkey also buys 8.6 billion cubic meters/yr of gas from Iran.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Export Markets</td>
<td>Mirrors major oil customers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Imports</td>
<td>Mirrors major oil customers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development Assistance</td>
<td>2003 (latest available): $136 million grant aid. Biggest donors: Germany ($38 million); Japan ($17 million); France ($9 million).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation</td>
<td>About 25%, down from about 42% in 2013-2014.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment Rate</td>
<td>Official rate is 15.3%, but outside experts believe the rate is higher</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:** CIA, *The World Factbook*; various press; IMF; Iran Trade Planning Division; CRS conversations with experts and foreign diplomats.
Table 10. Digest of Existing U.S. Sanctions Against Iran

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sanctions Against Foreign Firms that Deal With Iran's Energy Sector</th>
<th>The Iran-Syria-North Korea Nonproliferation Act (P.L. 106-178, March 14, 2000) authorizes the Administration to impose sanctions on foreign persons or firms determined to have provided assistance to Iran's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs. Sanctions include restrictions on U.S. trade with the sanctioned entity.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sanctions Against Foreign Firms that Aid Iran's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs</td>
<td>The Iran-Syria-North Korea Nonproliferation Act (P.L. 106-178, March 14, 2000, as amended) authorizes the Administration to impose sanctions on foreign persons or firms determined to have provided assistance to Iran's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs. Sanctions include restrictions on U.S. trade with the sanctioned entity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ban on Transactions With Foreign Entities Determined to Be Supporting International Terrorism</td>
<td>Executive Order 13324 (September 23, 2001) authorizes a ban on U.S. transactions with entities determined to be supporting international terrorism. The Order was not specific to Iran, but several Iranian entities have been designated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ban on Transactions With Foreign Entities That Support Proliferation</td>
<td>Executive Order 13382 (June 28, 2005) amended previous executive orders to provide for a ban on U.S. transactions with entities determined to be supporting international proliferation. As is the case for Executive Order 13324, mentioned above, Executive Order 13382 was not specific to Iran. However, numerous Iranian entities, including the IRGC itself, have been designated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divestment</td>
<td>A Title in P.L. 111-195 authorizes and protects from lawsuits various investment managers who divest from shares of firms that conduct sanctionable business with Iran.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter-Narcotics</td>
<td>In February 1987, Iran was first designated as a state that failed to cooperate with U.S. anti-drug efforts or take adequate steps to control narcotics production or trafficking. The Clinton Administration, on December 7, 1998, removed Iran from the U.S. list of major drug producing countries. This exempted Iran from the annual certification process that kept drug-related U.S. sanctions in place on Iran.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanctions Against Human Rights Abuses and Internet Monitoring</td>
<td>Various laws discussed above, and Executive Orders, impose sanctions on named Iranian human rights abusers, and on firms that sell equipment Iran can use to monitor the Internet usage of citizens or employ against demonstrators.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CRS. For analysis and extended discussion of U.S. and international sanctions against Iran, see CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman.
Possible Additional Sanctions

Should a comprehensive deal not be agreed, the Administration and Congress say additional U.S. and possibly other multilateral sanctions are likely to be imposed. Options include:

- Mandating reductions in diplomatic exchanges with Iran, prohibiting travel by additional Iranian officials, or banning passenger flights to and from Iran.
- Limiting lending to Iran by international financial institutions. Resolution 1747 calls for restraint on but does not outright ban international lending to Iran.
- Banning trade financing or official insurance for trade financing. This option was not made mandatory by Resolution 1929, but several countries imposed this sanction (as far as most trade financing) subsequently.
- Banning all investment in Iran’s energy sector. Such a step is authorized, but not mandated, by Resolution 1929. Several countries used that authority to impose these sanctions on Iran.
- Restricting operations of and insurance for Iranian shipping. A call for restraint is in Resolution 1929, but is not mandatory. The EU and other national measures announced subsequently did include this sanction (IRISL) to take effect as of July 1.
- Imposing an international ban on trade with Iran, particularly purchases of Iranian oil or gas. A related idea could be the enactment of a global ban on trade with Iran or of U.S. sanctions that seek to compel a partial or comprehensive global ban on trade with Iran.

Further Option: Regime Change

Even before the election of Rouhani, the Obama Administration has consistently sought to allay Iran’s long-standing suspicions that the main U.S. goal is to unseat the Islamic regime in Iran. Since then, in a September 24, 2013, General Assembly speech, President Obama explicitly stated the United States does not seek to change Iran’s regime. However, many of Iran’s leaders, particularly Khamene’i, continue to articulate a perception that the United States has never accepted the 1979 Islamic revolution. Khamene’i and other Iranian figures note that the United States provided some funding to anti-regime groups, mainly pro-monarchists, during the 1980s, and the George W. Bush Administration expressed attraction to this option on several occasions.

There was criticism in Iranian opposition and other circles of the Administration decision not to materially support the 2009 domestic uprising in Iran. The Administration asserts that it was appropriately critical of the regime crackdown on protests. On December 28, 2009, President Obama stated that “Along with all free nations, the United States stands with those who seek their

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58 CRS conversations with U.S. officials responsible for Iran policy. 1980-1990. After a period of suspension of such assistance, in 1995, the Clinton Administration accepted a House-Senate conference agreement to include $18-$20 million in funding authority for covert operations against Iran in the FY1996 Intelligence Authorization Act (H.R. 1655, P.L. 104-93), according to a Washington Post report of December 22, 1995. The Clinton Administration reportedly focused the covert aid on changing the regime’s behavior, rather than its overthrow.
universal rights.” On September 19, 2010, then-Secretary of State Clinton asserted that overt and extensive U.S. support for the opposition could undermine the opposition’s position in Iran.

In 2011, the Administration reevaluated its stance slightly in the context of the broader Middle East uprisings. Statements by then-Secretary Clinton accused Iran of hypocrisy for supporting demonstrations in Egypt while preventing similar free expression inside Iran. Many observers noted that President Obama’s 2011 Nowruz address was far more explicitly supportive of the Iranian opposition than in past years, mentioning specific dissidents who have been jailed and saying to the “young people of Iran ... I want you to know that I am with you.” Since that statement, the Administration has sanctioned Iranian officials for human rights abuses in Iran and for assisting Syria with its crackdown against demonstrations. These statements and steps stop short of constituting a policy of “regime change,” although Iran interprets any public support for the domestic opposition as evidence of U.S. intent to overthrow the clerical government.

Some in Congress have advocated a U.S. policy of overthrow of the regime. In the 111th Congress, one bill said that it should be U.S. policy to promote the overthrow of the regime (The Iran Democratic Transition Act, S. 3008).

**Democracy Promotion and Internet Freedom Efforts**

In the absence of all-out U.S. pursuit of regime change, successive Administrations and Congress have agreed on steps to promote gradual political evolution in Iran through “democracy promotion” and sanctions on Iranian human rights abuses. The laws and Executive Orders discussed in this section are analyzed in greater detail in CRS Report RS20871, *Iran Sanctions*. That report also contains tables listing Iranian entities sanctioned under these provisions.

U.S. actions have focused on preventing the Iranian government’s suppression of electronic communication. Several laws and Executive Orders issued since 2010 are intended to promote Internet freedom, and the Administration has amended U.S.-Iran trade regulations to allow for the sale to Iranians of consumer electronics and software that help them communicate. Under Secretary of State Wendy Sherman testified on October 14, 2011, that some of the democracy promotion funding for Iran has been to train Iranians in the use of technologies that undermine regime Internet censorship efforts.

**Democracy Promotion Funding**

Binding legislation to favor democracy promotion in Iran was enacted in the 109th Congress. The Iran Freedom Support Act (P.L. 109-293), signed September 30, 2006, authorized funds (no specific dollar amount) for Iran democracy promotion. Iran asserts that funding democracy promotion represents a violation of the 1981 “Algiers Accords” that settled the Iran hostage crisis.

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59 White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Statement by the President on the Attempted Attack on Christmas Day and Recent Violence in Iran,” December 28, 2009.


62 This legislation was a modification of H.R. 282, which passed the House on April 26, 2006, by a vote of 397-21, and S. 333, which was introduced in the Senate.
and provide for non-interference in each other’s internal affairs. The George W. Bush Administration asserted that open funding of Iranian pro-democracy activists (see below) was a stated effort to change regime behavior, not to overthrow the regime, although some saw the Bush Administration’s efforts as a cover to achieve a regime change objective.

The State Department, the implementer of U.S. democracy promotion programs for Iran, has used funds in appropriations (see Table 11) to support pro-democracy programs run by at organizations based in the United States and in Europe; the department refuses to name grantees for security reasons. The funds shown below have been obligated through DRL and the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs in partnership with USAID. Some of the funds have been appropriated for cultural exchanges, public diplomacy, and broadcasting to Iran. A further indication of the sensitivity of specifying the use of the funds is that, since FY2010, the Obama Administration has requested funds for Iran democracy promotion as part of a broader “Near East regional democracy programs” rather than delineating a specific request for Iran programs.

Many have consistently questioned the effectiveness of such funding. In the view of many experts, U.S. funds would make the aid recipients less attractive to most Iranians. Even before the post-2009 election crackdown, Iran was arresting civil society activists by alleging they are accepting the U.S. democracy promotion funds, while others have refused to participate in U.S.-funded programs, fearing arrest.63

Perhaps in response to some of these criticisms, the Obama Administration altered Iran democracy promotion programs somewhat toward working directly with Iranians inside Iran who are organized around such apolitical issues as health care, the environment, and science.64 During 2009, less emphasis was placed on funding journalists and human rights activists in Iran, or on sponsoring visits by Iranians to the United States.65 One issue arose concerning the State Department decision in late 2009 not to renew a contract to the Iran Human Rights Documentation Center (IHRDC), based at Yale University, which was cataloguing human rights abuses in Iran. However, IHRDC has reportedly continued to receive some U.S. funding to continue its work.

Broadcasting/Public Diplomacy Issues

Another part of the democracy promotion effort has been the development of new U.S. broadcasting services to Iran. The broadcasting component of policy has been an extension of a trend that began in the late 1990s. Radio Farda (“tomorrow,” in Farsi) began under Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), in partnership with the Voice of America (VOA), in 2002. The service was established as a successor to a smaller Iran broadcasting effort begun with an initial $4 million from the FY1998 Commerce/State/Justice appropriation (P.L. 105-119). It was to be called Radio Free Iran but was never formally given that name by RFE/RL. Radio Farda now

63 Three other Iranian Americans were arrested and accused by the Intelligence Ministry of actions contrary to national security in May 2007: U.S. funded broadcast (Radio Farda) journalist Parnaz Azima (who was not in jail but was not allowed to leave Iran); Kian Tajbacksh of the Open Society Institute funded by George Soros; and businessman and peace activist Ali Shakeri. Several congressional resolutions called on Iran to release Esfandiari (S.Res. 214 agreed to by the Senate on May 24; H.Res. 430, passed by the House on June 5; and S.Res. 199). All were released by October 2007. Tajbacksh was rearrested in September 2009 and remains incarcerated.

64 CRS conversation with U.S. officials of the “Iran Office” of the U.S. Consulate in Dubai, October 2009.

broadcasts 24 hours/day. Based in Prague, Radio *Farda* has 59 full time employees. No U.S. assistance has been provided to Iranian exile-run stations. Its estimated budget is $11.1 million for FY2014 and $11.5 million for FY2015.

**VOA Persian Service (Formerly called Persian News Network (PNN)).** The VOA established a Persian language service to Iran in July 2003. Prior to 2014, it was called Persian News Network (PNN), encompassing radio (1 hour a day or original programming); television (6 hours a day of primetime programming, rebroadcast throughout a 24-hour period); and Internet. The service had come under substantial criticism from observers for losing much of its audience among young, educated, anti-regime Iranians who are looking for signs of U.S. official support. VOA officials told CRS in August 2014 that they have successfully addressed these issues through the human resources office of the VOA. VOA officials say they are bringing back a show that had particular appeal with audiences inside Iran—“Parazit” (Persian for static)—a weekly comedy show modeled on a U.S. program on Comedy Central network called “The Daily Show.” Observers say that the show deteriorated in quality in 2012 after its founder, Kambiz Hosseini, was ousted from it and it was taken off PNN in February 2012. A different show that satirizes Iranian leaders and news from Iran—called On Ten—began in April 2012.

According VOA briefings, costs for PNN are: FY2010, $23.78 million; FY2011, $22.5 million; FY2012, $23.32 million. In FY2013 its costs are expected were about $18 million. Its budget for FY2014 is $23.1 million and $17.9 million for FY2015.

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66 The conference report on the FY2006 regular foreign aid appropriations, P.L. 109-102, stated the sense of Congress that such support should be considered.
Table 11. Iran Democracy Promotion Funding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Funding Source</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY2004</td>
<td>Foreign operations appropriation (P.L. 108-199)</td>
<td>$1.5 million</td>
<td>earmarked for “educational, humanitarian and non-governmental organizations and individuals inside Iran to support the advancement of democracy and human rights in Iran.” The State Department Bureau of Democracy and Labor (DRL) gave $1 million to a unit of Yale University, and $500,000 to National Endowment for Democracy.</td>
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<tr>
<td>FY2006 supp.</td>
<td>Total of $66.1 million (of $75 million requested) from FY2006 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 109-234)</td>
<td>$20 million</td>
<td>for democracy promotion; $5 million for public diplomacy directed at the Iranian population; $5 million for cultural exchanges; and $36.1 million for Voice of America-TV and “Radio Farda” broadcasting. Broadcasting funds are provided through the Broadcasting Board of Governors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY2007</td>
<td>FY2007 continuing resolution</td>
<td>$6.55 million</td>
<td>for Iran (and Syria) to be administered through DRL. No funds were requested.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY2008</td>
<td>$60 million (of $75 million requested) in Consolidated Appropriation (H.R. 2764, P.L. 110-161), of which, according to the conference report $21.6 million is ESF for pro-democracy programs, including non-violent efforts to oppose Iran’s meddling in other countries. $7.9 million is from a “Democracy Fund” for use by DRL. The appropriation also fully funded additional $33.6 million requested for Iran broadcasting: $20 million for VOA Persian service; and $8.1 million for Radio Farda; and $5.5 million for exchanges with Iran.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>FY2009</td>
<td>Request was for $65 million in ESF “to support the aspirations of the Iranian people for a democratic and open society by promoting civil society, civic participation, media freedom, and freedom of information.” H.R. 1105 (P.L. 111-8) provides $25 million for democracy promotion programs in the region, including in Iran.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>FY2010</td>
<td>$40 million</td>
<td>for Near East Regional Democracy programming. Programs to promote human rights, civil society, and public diplomacy in Iran constitute a significant use of these region-wide funds.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY2011</td>
<td>$40 million</td>
<td>requested and will be used for Near East Regional Democracy programs. Programming for Iran with these funds to be similar to FY2010.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY2012</td>
<td>$35 million for Near East Regional Democracy, and Iran-related use similar to FY2010 and FY2011.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>FY2013</td>
<td>$30 million for Near East Regional Democracy, with Iran use similar to prior two fiscal years.</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>FY2014</td>
<td>$30 million for Near East Regional Democracy, with Iran use similar to prior three fiscal years.</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>FY2015</td>
<td>$30 million for Near East Regional Democracy, with Iran use likely similar to previous years. Request mentions funding to be used to help circumvent Internet censorship.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>FY2016</td>
<td>$30 million</td>
<td>requested for Near East Regional Democracy, with Iran use likely similar to prior years.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Information provided by State Department and reviewed by Department’s Iran Office, February 1, 2010; State Department Congressional Budget Justifications; author conversation with Department of State Iran Office, April 21, 2011.

State Department Public Diplomacy Efforts

The State Department also is trying to enhance its public diplomacy to reach out to the Iranian population.

- In May 2003, the State Department added a Persian-language website to its list of foreign language websites, under the authority of the Bureau of International Information Programs. The website was announced as a source of information about the United States and its policy toward Iran.
• In February 14, 2011, the State Department began Persian-language Twitter feeds in an effort to connect better with Internet users in Iran.

• In part to augment U.S. public diplomacy, the State Department announced in April 2011 that a Persian-speaking U.S. diplomat based at the U.S. Consulate in Dubai would make regular appearances on Iranian media.

Since 2006, the State Department has been increasing the presence of Persian-speaking U.S. diplomats in U.S. diplomatic missions around Iran, in part to help identify and facilitate Iranian participate in U.S. democracy-promotion programs. The Iran unit at the U.S. consulate in Dubai has been enlarged significantly into a “regional presence” office, and “Iran-watcher” positions have been added to U.S. diplomatic facilities in Baku, Azerbaijan; Istanbul, Turkey; Frankfurt, Germany; London; Ashkabad, Turkmenistan; and Herat Afghanistan, all of which have large expatriate Iranian populations and/or proximity to Iran. An “Office of Iran Affairs” has been formed at the State Department, and it is reportedly engaged in contacts with U.S.-based exile groups such as those discussed earlier.

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Opposition Group: People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (MEK, PMOI)

The best-known exiled opposition group is the Mojahedin-e-Khalq Organization (MEK), also known as the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI). Secular and left-leaning, it was formed in the 1960s to try to overthrow the Shah of Iran and has been characterized by U.S. reports as attempting to blend several ideologies, including Marxism, feminism, and Islam, although the organization denies that it ever advocated Marxism. It allied with pro-Khomeini forces during the Islamic revolution and, according to State Department reports, supported the November 1979 takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. The group was driven into exile after it unsuccessfully rose up against the Khomeini regime in September 1981. It has been led for decades by spouses Maryam and Massoud Rajavi but in 2011 Ms. Zohreh Akhyani was elected as MEK Secretary-General. Maryam Rajavi is based in France but the whereabouts of Massoud Rajavi are unknown.

The State Department designated the PMOI as an FTO in October 1997—during the presidency of the relatively moderate Mohammad Khatami. The NCR was named as an alias of the PMOI in October 1999, and in August 2003, the Treasury Department ordered the groups’ offices in the United States closed. State Department reports on international terrorism for the years until 2011 asserted that the members of the organization were responsible for: the alleged killing of seven American military personnel and contract advisers to the former Shah during 1973-1976; bombings at U.S. government facilities in Tehran in 1972 as a protest of the visit to Iran of then-President Richard Nixon; and bombings of U.S. corporate offices in Iran to protest the visit of then Secretary of State Kissinger. The reports also listed as terrorism several attacks by the group against regime targets (including 1981 bombings that killed high ranking officials), attacks on Iranian government facilities, and attacks on Iranian security officials. However, the reports did not assert that any of these attacks purposely targeted civilians. The group’s alliance with Saddam Hussein’s regime in contributed to the designation, even though Saddam was a tacit U.S. ally when the group moved to Iraq in 1986.

The PMOI challenged the FTO listing in the U.S. court system and, in June 2012, the Appeals Court gave the State Department until October 1, 2012, to decide on the FTO designation, although without prescribing how the Department should decide. On September 28, 2012, maintaining there had not been confirmed acts of PMOI terrorism for more than a decade and that it had cooperated on the Camp Ashraf issue (below), the group was removed from the FTO list as well as from the designation as a terrorism supporter under Executive Order 13224. However, State Department officials, in a background briefing that day, said “We do not see the [PMOI] as a viable or democratic opposition movement…. They are not part of our picture in terms of the future of Iran.” The NCR-I reopened its offices in Washington, DC, in April 2013. The State Department has been meeting with the MEK since its removal from the FTO list, including in Iraq.

Camp Ashraf Issue

The de-listing of the group has not resolved the situation of PMOI members in Iraq. U.S. forces attacked PMOI military installations in Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom (March 2003) and negotiated a ceasefire with PMOI elements in Iraq, according to which the approximately 3,400 PMOI members consolidated at Camp Ashraf, near the border with Iran. Its weaponry was placed in storage, guarded first by U.S. and now by Iraqi personnel. In July 2004, the United States granted the Ashraf detainees “protected persons” status under the 4th Geneva Convention, although that designation lapsed when Iraq resumed full sovereignty in June 2004. The Iraqi government’s pledges to adhere to all international obligations with respect to the PMOI in Iraq have come into question on several occasions: on July 28, 2009, Iraq used force to overcome resident resistance to setting up a police post in the camp, killing 13 n residents of the camp. On April 8, 2011, Iraq Security Forces killed 36 Ashraf residents; the State Department issued a statement attributing the deaths to the actions of Iraq and its military.

In December 2011, the Iraqi government and the United Nations agreed to relocate Ashraf residents to the former U.S. military base Camp Liberty, near Baghdad’s main airport. The relocation was completed by September 17, 2012, leaving a residual group of 101 PMOI persons at Ashraf. The group asserted that conditions at Liberty are poor and the facility is unsafe. On February 9, 2013, the camp was attacked by rockets, killing eight PMOI members; the Shiite militia group Kata’ib Hezbollah (KAH) claimed responsibility. Another rocket attack on the camp took place on June 15, 2013. On September 1, 2013, 52 of the residual Ashraf residents were killed by gunmen that appeared to have assistance from Iraqi forces guarding Ashraf’s perimeter. Seven others remain missing. All survivors of the attack were moved to Camp Liberty, and Ashraf has been taken over by Iran-backed Shiite militias.

Since 2011, the U.N. High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) has sought to resettle PMOI members outside Iraq. About 600 have been resettled so far: 450 to Albania; 95 to Germany; 95 to Italy; 15 to Norway; and 2 to Finland. The United States reportedly might resettle 100 or more, but the U.S. requirement that those resettled disavow the group has apparently held up implementation of that program. About 200 have returned to Iran; a few of them reportedly have been imprisoned and/or mistreated.
Figure 2. Structure of the Iranian Government

Source: CRS.
Figure 3. Map of Iran

Source: Map boundaries from Map Resources, 2005. GRAPHIC: CRS.
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