

U.S. Department of Justice
Washington, DC 20530

Supplemental Statement
Pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended

For Six Month Period Ending 12/31/2012

(Insert date)

I - REGISTRANT

1. (a) Name of Registrant (b) Registration No.
- JETRO New York 1643
- (c) Business Address(es) of Registrant
1221 Ave of the Americas, 42nd Floor
New York, NY 10020

2. Has there been a change in the information previously furnished in connection with the following?

- (a) If an individual:
- (1) Residence address(es) Yes No
- (2) Citizenship Yes No
- (3) Occupation Yes No
- (b) If an organization:
- (1) Name Yes No
- (2) Ownership or control Yes No
- (3) Branch offices Yes No
- (c) Explain fully all changes, if any, indicated in Items (a) and (b) above.

IF THE REGISTRANT IS AN INDIVIDUAL, OMIT RESPONSE TO ITEMS 3, 4, AND 5(a).

3. If you have previously filed Exhibit C¹, state whether any changes therein have occurred during this 6 month reporting period.
- Yes No
- If yes, have you filed an amendment to the Exhibit C? Yes No
- If no, please attach the required amendment.

¹ The Exhibit C, for which no printed form is provided, consists of a true copy of the charter, articles of incorporation, association, and by laws of a registrant that is an organization. (A waiver of the requirement to file an Exhibit C may be obtained for good cause upon written application to the Assistant Attorney General, National Security Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC 20530.)

Attachment B

JETRO New York (Reg. #1643)

Response to Item 11:

Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), Tokyo, Japan:

The Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), established by a special law in Japan, is a non-profit, Japanese-government supported organization dedicated to promoting mutually beneficial trade and economic relations between Japan and other countries.

In the United States, JETRO currently maintains offices in New York, San Francisco, Chicago, Los Angeles, Houston and Atlanta. These offices provide information relating to the Japanese economy and business as well as U.S.-Japan economic and trade relations and engage in various activities to promote trade and direct investment between Japan and the United States. JETRO offices in the United States are believed to serve similar functions as those of the United States Trade Center (of the United States Department of Commerce) established in Japan.

As the New York-based office of JETRO, JETRO New York provides to public officials, corporations, associations, individuals and any other interested parties information and materials relating to various aspects of Japanese economy and business as well as U.S.-Japanese economic and trade relations. JETRO New York also monitors the development of U.S. economic and market conditions for JETRO.

Ishikawa Prefectural Government:

JETRO New York also serves as a branch office of the Ishikawa Prefectural Government. As such, JETRO New York engages, to a limited extent, in activities to promote mutually beneficial economic and business relations between the United States and the Ishikawa Prefectural Government. As part of such activities, JETRO New York provides information and materials relating to the Ishikawa Prefectural Government. It also monitors U.S. economic and market conditions for the Ishikawa Prefectural Government.

Kanagawa Prefectural Government:

JETRO New York also serves as a branch office of the Kanagawa Prefectural Government. As such, JETRO New York engages, to a limited extent, in activities to promote mutually beneficial economic and business relations between the United States and the Kanagawa Prefectural Government. As part of such activities, JETRO New York provides information and materials relating to the Kanagawa Prefectural Government. It also monitors U.S. economic and market conditions for the Kanagawa Prefectural Government.

Sept 18, 2012	Japan-Midwest US Association, Trade & Partnerships in the Asia/Pacific Region	Minneapolis, MN	Mark Palmquist, James Thompson, Raymond Thomas Rybak, Hiroyuki Ishige, Takeo Iguchi, Kinichi Maebara
Sept 20, 2012	US-Japan Healthcare Study Group	New York, NY	Ryuta Chiba, Imageon Consulting, Inc.
Sept. 21, 2012	JETRO Business Seminar, Consulate General in Nashville	Nashville, TN	Miho Matsushita, Ryo Mizuno, Shingo Nagai JETRO NY Directors
Oct. 2, 2012	US-Japan Medtech Networking Reception	Boston, MA	Harold Smith, JETRO North America Medical Device Advisor, Kazuo Imose, Teijin Group Corporate Officer/General Manager, New Business Dev. Group Teiji Ltd., Satoshi Otsuka, President of Mutoh America Co., Ltd.
Oct 4 2012	CSIS Int'l Councillors Meeting	Washington DC	Alan Greenspan, Ernest Bower, Victor Cha, Christopher Johnson, Leon Panetta
Oct 5, 2012	CSIS Int'l Councillors Meeting	Washington DC	Peter Ammon, Claudio Bisogniero, Francois Delattre, Rich Galen, Steven Roberts, John Zogby
Oct 8, 2012	Ishikawa Prefecture Fair in New York	New York, NY	No speakers
Oct 10, 2012	A Taste of Ishikawa in NY	New York, NY	No speakers
Oct 13-16	NABE Annual Meeting	Marriot Downtown, NY	John Rosner, Micheal Leonard, Lynn Reaser, Charles Steindel, Robert Fry, Martha Evans

Oct 16-18	Industrial Control Systems Joint working Group	Hilton Denver Hotel, Denver, CO	Mr. Edward Marty, ICS-CERT division director, Department of Homeland Security
Oct 22, 2012	US-Japan healthcare Study Group	JETRO, NY	Tatsuro Watanabe, OTSUKA Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd.
Oct 24	Monozukuri Seminar	Nashville	N/A
Nov 15, 2012	US-Japan Healthcare Study Group	JETRO, NY	Jyum Yamazaki, Permanent Mission of Japan to the UN
Nov. 15, 2012	Forum for Japanese Companies in New England	Boston, MA	Shiro Akiyama, Miho Matsushita, Ryo Mizuno, Shingo Nagai Directors, JETRO New York
Nov. 27, 2012	Pension Study Group	JETRO, NY	Dr. Ian Graig, Chief Executive and a founding partner, Global Policy Group, Inc.
Nov 27, 2012	National Economists Club Seminar	Washington DC	Martin Feldstein
Nov 30, 2012	Columbia University Energy Symposium 2012	New York	David Sandalow, Robert B. Catell, Dr. Edward L. Morse
Dec 3, 2012	Special Display of traditional arts of Ishikawa in NY	New York, NY	No speakers
Dec 4, 1012	CSIS Advisory Board Meeting	Washington DC	Jim Young Kim

Dec 5, 2012	CSIS Advisory Board Meeting	Washington DC	David Wessel, Michael Green, Heather Conley, John Alterman, Andrew Kuchins, David Ignatius, Edward Luce
Dec 5, 2012	JETRO LA Office	Los Angeles	Miho Matsushita, Ryo Mizuno JETRO NY directors
Dec 7, 2012	US-Japan Healthcare Study Group	New York, NY	Max Hata and Shusaku Nishikawa, Ernst & Young
Dec 11, 2012	US/South America business Seminar	Miami, FL	Miho Matsushita, Ryo Mizuno JETRO NY Directors
Dec 13, 2012	FDA Seminar	JETRO, NY	Koichi Mizutani, Edgar Asebey, Sachiko Kajitani
Dec. 19, 2012	Pension Study Group	JETRO, NY	Dr. Richard Jackson, Sr. Fellow, Center for Strategic and Int'l Studies
Dec 22, 2012	JPMA-WEST	San Jose, CA	Kentaro Kishimoto, Director, JETRO NY

Jetro/Other Japanese Government Payments to C.S.I.S.

Amount	Month/Year
\$20,000	Jan-11
\$90,000	Feb-11
\$70,000	Mar-11
\$40,000	May-12
\$165,000	Mar-12
\$20,000	Dec-12
\$20,000	Jan-13
\$240,000	Mar-13
\$20,000	Aug-13
\$60,000	Jan-14
\$20,000	Feb-14
\$225,000	Mar-14
\$140,000	Apr-14
\$1,130,000	TOTAL

LAST HALF of 2011 FARA Filing Not Available

Staff & Visiting Fellows

STAFF

Michael Green (</expert/michael-i-green>)

Senior Vice President for Asia & Japan Chair

[Send email](/email/10512/field_contact_email) (/email/10512/field_contact_email)

Nicholas Szechenyi (</expert/nicholas-szechenyi>)

Deputy Director & Senior Fellow

[Send email](/email/10517/field_contact_email) (/email/10517/field_contact_email)

Eri Hirano

Associate Director for Japan & Senior Coordinator for Asia

T: [\(202\) 775-3144](tel:(202)775-3144)

email: ehirano@csis.org (<mailto:ehirano@csis.org>)

Zack Cooper (<http://csis.org/expert/zack-cooper>)

Fellow

T: [\(202\) 775-3256](tel:(202)775-3256)

email: zcooper@csis.org (<mailto:zcooper@csis.org>)

Yuko Nakano

Research Associate

T: (202)775-3214

email: ynakano@csis.org (<mailto:ynakano@csis.org>)

William Colson

Research Assistant

T: [\(202\) 775-3284](tel:(202)775-3284)

email: wcolson@csis.org (<mailto:wcolson@csis.org>)

VISITING FELLOWS

Takashi Arai

Public Security Intelligence Agency

T: [\(202\) 741-3861](tel:(202)741-3861)

e-mail: tarai@csis.org (<mailto:tarai@csis.org>)

Shigenobu Fukumoto

National Police Agency

T: [\(202\) 741-3869](tel:(202)741-3869)

e-mail: sfukumoto@csis.org (<mailto:sfukumoto@csis.org>)

Taisuke Hirose

Nippon Foundation

T: [\(202\) 741-3863](tel:(202)741-3863)

e-mail: thirose@csis.org (<mailto:thirose@csis.org>)

Shinichi Isobe

Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO)

T: [\(202\) 741-3909](tel:(202)741-3909)

e-mail: sisobe@csis.org (<mailto:sisobe@csis.org>)

Makoto Kobori

NTT Data

T: [\(202\) 741-3915](tel:(202)741-3915)

(<mailto:honooka@csis.org>) email: MKobori@csis.org

(<mailto:MKobori@csis.org>)

Kentaro Kubota

Cabinet Secretariat

T: [\(202\) 741-3880](tel:(202)741-3880)

e-mail: [k](mailto:k@csis.org) (<mailto:kkubota@csis.org>) kubota@csis.org

(<mailto:kkubota@csis.org>)

Miko Oyama

Keidanren

T: [\(202\) 741-3868](tel:(202)741-3868)

e-mail: moyama@csis.org (<mailto:moyama@csis.org>)

Masayuki Tanimoto

Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC)

T: [\(202\) 741-3864](tel:(202)741-3864)

e-mail: [m \(mailto:mtanimoto@csis.org\)](mailto:m@csis.org) tanimoto@csis.org
[\(mailto:mtanimoto@csis.org\)](mailto:mtanimoto@csis.org)

Hiroshi Waguri

Ministry of Defense

T: [\(202\) 741-3860](tel:(202)741-3860)

e-mail: hwaguri@csis.org (<mailto:hwaguri@csis.org>)

Shinji Yoshihara

Tokyo Marine & Nichido Fire Insurance Co. Ltd.

T: [\(202\) 457-8743](tel:(202)457-8743)

e-mail: syoshihara@csis.org (<mailto:syoshihara@csis.org>)

ADJUNCT FELLOWS

Jeffrey Hornung

Monika Reinem

Yoshihiro Sakai ([/expert/yoshihiro-sakai](#))

Benjamin Self

Tsuneo Watanabe ([/expert/tsuneo-watanabe](#))

U.S. Department of Justice
Washington, DC 20530

Supplemental Statement

**Pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration Act of
1938, as amended**

For Six Month Period Ending 12/31/13
(Insert date)

I - REGISTRANT

1. (a) Name of Registrant (b) Registration No.

Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP 3492

(c) Business Address(es) of Registrant
1333 New Hampshire Ave, NW
Washington, DC 20036

2. Has there been a change in the information previously furnished in connection with the following?

(a) If an individual:

- (1) Residence address(es) Yes No
- (2) Citizenship Yes No
- (3) Occupation Yes No

(b) If an organization:

- (1) Name Yes No
- (2) Ownership or control Yes No
- (3) Branch offices Yes No

(c) Explain fully all changes, if any, indicated in Items (a) and (b) above.
Please see attached

IF THE REGISTRANT IS AN INDIVIDUAL, OMIT RESPONSE TO ITEMS 3, 4, AND 5(a).

3. If you have previously filed Exhibit C¹, state whether any changes therein have occurred during this 6 month reporting period.

Yes No

If yes, have you filed an amendment to the Exhibit C? Yes No

If no, please attach the required amendment.

¹ The Exhibit C, for which no printed form is provided, consists of a true copy of the charter, articles of incorporation, association, and by laws of a registrant that is an organization. (A waiver of the requirement to file an Exhibit C may be obtained for good cause upon written application to the Assistant Attorney General, National Security Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC 20530.)

II - FOREIGN PRINCIPAL

7. Has your connection with any foreign principal ended during this 6 month reporting period? Yes No

If yes, furnish the following information:

Foreign Principal

Date of Termination

8. Have you acquired any new foreign principal(s)² during this 6 month reporting period? Yes No

If yes, furnish the following information:

Name and Address of Foreign Principal(s)

Date Acquired

Mining Company of Katanga

10/15/13

General Prosecutor Office of the Kyrgyz Republic

7/16/13

9. In addition to those named in Items 7 and 8, if any, list foreign principal(s)² whom you continued to represent during the 6 month reporting period.

Government of British Columbia
Embassy of the United Arab Emirates
Kili/Bikini/Ejit Local Government Council
Embassy of the Republic of Korea
Embassy of Japan
Comision Nacional de Zonas Francas (CNZF)
Hong Kong Trade Development Council

10. (a) Have you filed exhibits for the newly acquired foreign principal(s), if any, listed in Item 8?

Exhibit A³ Yes No

Exhibit B⁴ Yes No

If no, please attach the required exhibit.

- (b) Have there been any changes in the Exhibits A and B previously filed for any foreign principal whom you represented during this six month period? Yes No

If yes, have you filed an amendment to these exhibits? Yes No

If no, please attach the required amendment.

² The term "foreign principal" includes, in addition to those defined in section 1(b) of the Act, an individual organization any of whose activities are directly or indirectly supervised, directed, controlled, financed, or subsidized in whole or in major part by a foreign government, foreign political party, foreign organization or foreign individual. (See Rule 100(a) (9)). A registrant who represents more than one foreign principal is required to list in the statements he files under the Act only those principals for whom he is not entitled to claim exemption under Section 3 of the Act. (See Rule 208.)

³ The Exhibit A, which is filed on Form NSD-3 (Formerly CRM-157) sets forth the information required to be disclosed concerning each foreign principal.

⁴ The Exhibit B, which is filed on Form NSD-4 (Formerly CRM-155) sets forth the information concerning the agreement or understanding between the registrant and the foreign principal.

DATE	ACTIVITY/SUBJECT MATTER (bill, resolution, treaty, position)	CLIENT	GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS OR EMPLOYEES CONTACTED (Name and Title), OFFICE	MANNER OF CONTACT (Meeting, Call, Email)
7/12/13	Japan Caucus	Japan	D. Nelson, Deputy Chief of Staff, Rep. Devin Nunes	Call
9/4/13	Japan Caucus	Japan	D. Nelson, Deputy Chief of Staff, Rep. Devin Nunes	Call
9/5/13	Trans Pacific Partnership Caucus	Japan	D. Nelson, Deputy Chief of Staff, Rep. Devin Nunes; K. Sighinoli, Legislative Assistant, Rep. Charles Boustany; Zach Rudisill, Legislative Director, Rep. Dave Reichert; Call with A. House, Legislative Director, Rep. Devin Nunes	Call
9/6/14	Trans Pacific Partnership Caucus	Japan	A. House, Legislative Director, Office of Rep. Devin Nunes	Call
9/17/13	Trans Pacific Partnership	Japan	K. Sighinoli, Legislative Assistant, Rep. Charles Boustany; Z. Rudisill, Legislative Director, Rep. Dave Reichert	Call
9/24/13	Japan Caucus Co-Chair	Japan	A. House, Legislative Director, Rep. Devin Nunes	Call
10/8/13	Japan Caucus/Chair-Co-Chairs; meeting request	Japan	D. Nelson, Deputy Chief of Staff, Rep. Devin Nunes; M. Roman, Deputy Chief of Staff, Rep. Aaron Schock; Z. Rudisill, Legislative Director, Rep. Dave Reichert	Call
10/18/13	Japan Caucus co-chair	Japan	D. Nelson, Deputy Chief of Staff, Rep. Devin Nunes; M. Roman, Deputy Chief of Staff, Rep. Aaron Schock; Z. Rudisill, Legislative Director, Rep. Dave Reichert	Call
10/29/13	Japan Caucus Co-chair	Japan	D. Nelson, Deputy Chief of Staff, Rep. Devin Nunes; M. Roman, Deputy Chief of Staff, Rep. Aaron Schock; Z. Rudisill, Legislative Director, Rep. Dave Reichert	Call
11/6/13	Caucus co-chairs	Japan	D. Nelson, Deputy Chief of Staff, Rep. Devin Nunes	Call
11/12/13	Caucus co-chairs	Japan	D. Nelson, Deputy Chief of Staff, Rep. Devin Nunes	Call
11/15/13	possible Komatsu site visit in district	Japan	M. Roman, Deputy Chief of Staff, Rep. Aaron Schock	Call

11/20/13	potential dinner with ambassador	Japan	S. Lieberman, Legislative Director, Rep. Vern Buchanan	Call
12/2/13	Discuss with S. Lieberman re: Ambassador meeting with W&M	Japan	Shane Lieberman, Legislative Director, Rep. Vern Buchanan	Call
12/5/13	Call with K. Sighinoli re: Trans Pacific Partnership caucus event (CSIS); discuss with S. Miyamoto re: Trans Pacific Partnership/IPA	Japan	K. Sighinoli, Legislative Assistant, Rep. Charles Boustany	Call
12/12/13	Discuss with Congressman Boustany re: timeline for TPA, Trans Pacific Partnership	Japan	Congressman Charles Boustany	Call
9/11/13	Trans Pacific Partnership	Japan	Scott Nishioki (Rep. Costa COS)	Call
7/10/13	Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement	Japan	Wendy Cutler, Deputy USTR	call
8/26/13	Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement	Japan	Wendy Cutler, Deputy USTR	call
10/3/13	Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement	Japan	Wendy Cutler, Deputy USTR	call
12/10/13	Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement	Japan	Wendy Cutler, Deputy USTR	call
12/12/13	Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement	Japan	Luis Jimenez	call
9/25/13	Immigration Bill	Korea	Stacey Leavondowky, Lofgren COS	Call
9/30/13	Immigration Bill	Korea	Rep. Bass	Call
7/10/13	Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement	Korea	Wendy Cutler, Deputy USTR	call
8/26/13	Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement	Korea	Wendy Cutler, Deputy USTR	call
10/3/13	Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement	Korea	Wendy Cutler, Deputy USTR	call
12/10/13	Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement	Korea	Wendy Cutler, Deputy USTR	call
12/12/13	Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement	Korea	Luis Jimenez	call
7/1/13	preclearance	UAE	Don Cravens (Landrieu COS)	Call
7/1/13	preclearance	UAE	Brian DeVallance (DHS)	Call
7/8/13	preclearance	UAE	Communication with Deutch and Engel office	Call
7/8/13	Egypt Aid	UAE	Leahy COS	Call
7/11/13	Egypt Aid	UAE	A. Smith, L. Sanchez, Garamendi, Deutch, LoweyDurbin, Reed, Menendez, and Coons	Call
7/12/13	Egypt Aid	UAE	Elizabeth Stanley (Lowey COS) and Josh Rogin (COS to Rep Deutch)	Call
7/9/13	To discuss Japanese international trade policy	Japan	Bruce Hirsh, Trade Counsel, Finance Committee	call



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Trade, Leadership & U.S. National Interest: A Discussion with the Congressional TPP Caucus

THURSDAY, DEC 5, 2013

VIDEO DURATION: 00:53:47



DOWNLOAD VIDEO (RIGHT-CLICK AND SAVE)

AUDIO DURATION: 00:53:47



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Featuring:

Co-chairs of the new House TPP Caucus:

The Honorable Charles W. Boustany (R-LA)
U.S. House of Representatives

The Honorable David Reichert (R-WA)
U.S. House of Representatives

introduction by:

Murray Hiebert
Senior Fellow, Sumitro Chair for Southeast Asia Studies, CSIS

moderated by:

Scott Miller
William M. Scholl Chair in International Business, CSIS

Please join CSIS for a discussion about the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) with three of the co-chairs of the new Congressional Friends of the TPP Caucus. We will discuss what TPP will mean for the U.S. economy and Congress's priorities as the negotiations progress.

Thursday, December 5, 2013
9:00a.m.-10:00a.m.
Second Floor Conference Room
1616 Rhode Island Avenue, NW
Washington, D.C. 20036

[Click here to RSVP](#)

MULTIMEDIA



Audio: Korea's Interest in the Trans-Pacific Partnership

DEC 13, 2013

DURATION: 01:03:31

TRADE AND ECONOMICS
ASIA, KOREA



Video: Korea's Interest in the Trans-Pacific Partnership

DEC 13, 2013

DURATION: 01:03:31

TRADE AND ECONOMICS
ASIA, KOREA

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EXPERTS



Murray Hiebert
Deputy Director and Senior Fellow, Sumitro Chair for Southeast Asia Studies

DEFENSE AND SECURITY,
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, TRADE AND ECONOMICS

ASIA, OCEANIA, SOUTHEAST ASIA



Scott Miller
Senior Adviser and Scholl Chair in International Business

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CSIS-JETRO Seminar on Asia-Pacific Economic Integration

Regional Economic Integration and the Role of the United States and Japan

TUESDAY, MAY 14, 2013

VIDEO DURATION: 2:23:10



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AUDIO DURATION: 2:23:10



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Agenda

8:45-8:50 Welcoming Remarks

John Hamre. President. CEO and Pritzker Chair. CSIS

MULTIMEDIA



Audio: CSIS-JETRO Seminar on Asia-Pacific Economic Integration Part I

MAY 14, 2013

DURATION: 2:23:10

TRADE AND ECONOMICS

ASIA, JAPAN



Video: CSIS-JETRO Seminar on Asia-Pacific Economic Integration Part I

MAY 14, 2013

DURATION: 2:23:10

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ASIA, JAPAN

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8:50-9:30 **Opening Address**

Senator Ben Cardin (D-MD), Chair, East Asian & Pacific Affairs Subcommittee, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

9:30-9:50 **Progress Towards Asia-Pacific Economic Integration and the Role of the United States and Japan**

Hiroyuki Ishige, Chairman and CEO, Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO)

9:50-11:05 **New Developments in Asia-Pacific Economic Integration**

Zhang Jianping, Director, Department of International Economic Cooperation, Institute for International Economic Research, National Development and Reform Commission

Shujiro Urata, Professor, Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies, Waseda University

Hank Lim, Senior Research Fellow, Singapore Institute of International Affairs

Comment:

Scott Miller, Senior Adviser and Scholl Chair in International Business, CSIS

Moderator:

Michael Green, Senior Vice President for Asia and Japan Chair, CSIS; Associate Professor, Georgetown University

11:05-11:20 **Break**

11:20-12:00 **Panel Discussion and Q&A Session**

Moderator:

Michael Green, Senior Vice President for Asia and Japan Chair, CSIS; Associate Professor, Georgetown University

12:00-13:25 **Luncheon Address**

Wendy Cutler, Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Japan, Korea, and APEC Affairs

13:25-13:30 **Closing Remarks**

Michael Green, Senior Vice President for Asia and Japan Chair, CSIS; Associate Professor, Georgetown University

13:30 **Adjourn**

FILES

-  [Hiroyuki Ishige Powerpoint Presentation](#)
-  [Hank Lim Powerpoint Presentation](#)
-  [Shujiro Urata Powerpoint Presentation](#)
-  [Zhang Jianping Powerpoint Presentation](#)

EXPERTS



Michael J. Green
Senior Vice President for Asia and Japan Chair

DEFENSE AND SECURITY,
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ASIA, CHINA, JAPAN, KOREA,
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Scott Miller
Senior Adviser and Scholl Chair in International Business

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EVENT PARTNERS

Japan External Trade Organization

CONTACT

Eri Hirano
(202) 775-3144

LOCATION

Center for Strategic and International Studies
1800 K Street, NW
Washington DC, 20006

[\[View Map\]](#)

CSIS IN THE NEWS

US senator seeks rights criteria in trade pact
Global Post
MAY 14, 2013

**Keynote Speech by Hiroyuki Ishige, Chairman and CEO
Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO)
Asia-Pacific Economic Integration Seminar
CSIS, Washington, DC, the United States, May 14, 2013
“Progress Towards Asia-Pacific Economic Integration
and the Role of the United States and Japan”**

Thank you, Mike, for your kind introduction. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. My name is Hiroyuki Ishige, Chairman and CEO of the JETRO.

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to all of you here for joining us today. Let me also extend my deepest appreciation to ambassadors, US government officials and business leaders.

I would also like to thank Dr. Hamre, and Dr. Green, as well as their colleagues at the CSIS for their dedicated work. JETRO has held this annual seminar here in Washington, DC since 2004 and today's seminar is the eighth in cooperation with the CSIS.

As you are aware, Japan has decided to take part in TPP negotiations, making the timing of this seminar most auspicious. Japan's decision is significant in that its participation would expand the economic coverage of the TPP from the current 30% to 40% of the world GDP.

Yesterday, I met a quite a few number of U.S. business people here. All of them welcomed Japan's decision. Yes, Japan's participation increases a business value of the TPP, provide the business opportunities.

However, I think it is also significant in another way. Japan's participation in the TPP negotiations will not only strengthen the TPP, but also stimulate other mega FTAs, namely the EU-Japan EPA, TTIP and RCEP. These four will drive the

development of future global rules of trade and investment even in the stagnation of WTO talks.

This world map illustrates the four mega FTAs and four major economic powers supporting them. I strongly feel they represent a new era across the Pacific, the Atlantic and Eurasia. So we have to change the title next year.

I think that to recover from the stagnant WTO Doha Round, further promotion of these four mega FTAs towards realizing liberalization of trade and investment is essential. To achieve this goal, the US and Japan should take the lead. This is my core message. I will explain why in detail.

This slide shows the schedule of recent negotiations for mega-FTAs. The negotiations in 2012 were centered on the TPP alone. However, in 2013, negotiations of two other FTAs, RCEP and the EU-Japan EPA, have already started, and negotiations of all four mega FTAs will be in progress before summer. This indicates that the trend towards mega-FTAs has accelerated across the globe.

With this acceleration, what form should economic integration in the Asia-Pacific take in the future?

I think that in order to facilitate global liberalization of trade and investment, establishing advanced rules with an extensive economic coverage will be required in this region, a growth center in the world.

To achieve this goal, it is essential for us to create, maintain and accelerate an environment across the world which could be described as global competition

towards liberalization through regional economic integration.

To realize an economic integration framework in the Asia-Pacific region, the TPP and RCEP will function as the dual wheels of the scheme. Each of the two wheels will play its own role. The TPP as an innovation function aiming at an advanced agreement suitable for the 21st century. The RCEP as a function to improve the regional economy by including lesser developed countries such as Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos. These two are mutually complementary. They should inspire each other and play their respective roles.

I think you are already familiar with the TPP. Here, I would like to touch on how other countries have responded to Japan's decision to participate in the negotiations. China and Singapore, for example, have shown strong interest in this announcement.

In China, concerning a joint statement announced by the US and Japan on February 22 in Washington, the People's Daily reported that America is bringing Japan to the negotiating table to deter China's influence. I am not saying it. This is People's Daily report.

And in Singapore, the government stated that Japan's participation would have great implication for the development and stability of the Asia-Pacific region. It also claimed that the conclusion of both the TPP and RCEP will bring us closer to realizing the so called FTAAP.

Judging from the recent actions of other countries, I believe Prime Minister Abe's decision regarding participation can be seen as a potential game changer that will draw many more countries into the scheme. Japan's participation can in fact provide an impetus for ASEAN members, such as Thailand and the Philippines,

to also join the negotiations on the TPP in the near future.

I would be very grateful if experts from China and Singapore attending this seminar could give us their perspectives on this issue.

Next, I would like to talk about the RCEP, the other key to realizing the FTAAP initiative together with the TPP.

The most major features of the RCEP are its wide economic coverage and growth potential, which distinguish this partnership from the present TPP. The RCEP accounts for half of the global population, or about 3.4 billion people, while the TPP accounts for only about 10%, or about 0.7 billion people.

To maintain its extensive economic coverage, member countries in the RCEP are doing their best to set broader agendas. The RCEP's aim to be business friendly demonstrates this perspective.

By applying the so-called "accumulation" rule, the creation of the RCEP would help companies in member countries clear rules of origin with greater ease. Thanks to this rule as well as further liberalization of trade in services, the RCEP would also benefit these companies by giving them more options in choosing procurement sites and improving their supply chains.

Because of this gradually progressive approach of the RCEP, I've heard that, in the US, this initiative is not necessarily considered as an important regional economic integration. RCEP doesn't seem to be popular in the United States, especially in this town.

I do not share this diagnosis. The RCEP will move slowly but steadily.

When I was a boy, my mother once told me, "Hiroyuki - this is my first name - you

are not very quick. But you are determined. Slow and steady wins the race.”

This will be facilitated by the formation of the ASEAN Economic Community by 2015. I think the RCEP will eventually become a very competitive, comprehensive initiative for regional economic integration, again, which will be mutually complementary with the TPP.

Finally, I would like to touch upon the roles of the US and Japan in promoting trade liberalization through mega-FTAs.

Previously, the US, the EU, Canada and Japan, had played a prominent role in establishing global rules for trade and investment in the 20th Century.

As I mentioned at the beginning of my speech, in the 21st Century, with its increasingly globalized supply chains, it will be the four mega-FTAs that will play this role. In this new structure, (what I refer to as the maybe “New Quad”, consisting of) the US, the EU, Japan and China, will assume major roles in promoting free trade as the core of these four regional integrations.

The matrix in this slide describes the relationship of these countries and regions with each scheme. Japan is involved in three of the four, including the TPP. The US and the EU in two, respectively, and China in one.

Looking at the economic scales of each scheme and country, which are also shown in the matrix, Japan is well aware of its responsibility as a bridging partner and of how vital the role of the US and Japan is in this new framework.

In the beginning of my presentation, I emphasized the need for a competition towards liberalization among the various regional integration schemes.

However, if each of the four schemes, which together account for 80% of the global economy, moves independently in uncoordinated competition, it may adversely impact global trade and investment. How can we lead them to a coordinated competition?

To accomplish this, I would like to propose a meeting of trade ministers or senior officials of major economic powers including the US, the EU, Japan and China, responsible for establishing potential global trade and investment rules. Ministers will discuss what common elements those mega-FTAs can have and how they can be coordinated. Of course, the purpose of this meeting is not for negotiations, but mainly for transparency and information sharing or some coordination if necessary.

Now, I would like to touch upon our relationship with China. The US and Japan will also play important roles in this regard. I think that participation in the TPP could be like a second accession to the WTO for China, in that it would provide great impetus for that internal transformation. This is essential for China's sustainable economic growth.

The TPP focuses on not only removal of tariffs but also abolition of subsidies for state-owned enterprises, enhancement of the rules for intellectual property rights, and for government procurement. These have been common issues for the US and Japan in doing business with China.

The US and Japan have essential roles to play for the healthy economic growth of China under new trade and investment rules, as well as in the event it chooses to take part in the TPP. I believe that the US and Japan will sincerely

welcome China overcoming these hurdles and joining the TPP and China will reap great benefits in doing so.

Just as with Korea, there are concerns about the political tension Japan is facing in relations with China. In spite of these difficulties, however, the three countries reached an agreement on starting a trilateral FTA last November in Cambodia. In addition, the leaders of 16 countries, also including Japan, China and Korea, have agreed on the launch of negotiations for the RCEP. Moreover, specific negotiations are in progress both in the Japan-China-Korea FTA and RCEP.

I would like to highlight the fact that the agreements on launching the negotiations were concluded despite the political difficulty surrounding them. According to media reports, the meeting of economic ministers from the three countries was realized thanks to a strong push by China.

When looking at the Japanese Islands from Beijing, one can also glimpse the United States far ahead over the Pacific. Presumably, China made this decision because the focus of its gaze is on the US, rather than Japan, in regard to the TPP. China is very enthusiastic about promoting the RCEP and the Japan-China-Korea trilateral FTA.

Lastly, I would like to emphasize again that the relationship between the US and Japan, which share common fundamental values, such as democracy, free trade, and the rule of law, is essential for promoting trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific region. In order to maintain the best global partnership between the US and Japan, communication between the two countries, strengthening mutual understanding, strengthening mutual confidence, and continuous network building are vital.

Efforts like this have created our relationship of trust, as exhibited in the results of opinion polls in this slide. 84.5% of Japanese feel familiarity with the United States, and 84% of Americans said they can trust Japan. In the international community, where developing countries are now rising, both the US and Japan must now lead the way by spearheading the establishment of advanced international rules.

Additionally, close cooperation between both countries needs to be promoted in the real business world as well.

If we look at the auto sector as an example, which has been an issue in US-Japan bilateral consultation on the TPP, we'd better keep in mind the facts that Japanese affiliated auto manufacturers produce two thirds of their branded cars in the US and began exports to other countries, thus they contribute to the US economy as well as job creation here.

We would of course be enthusiastic if US companies took advantage of Japan as a gateway to Asia for the expansion of their business in the region.

This is all I have to say at this moment. The experts following me will offer valuable insight concerning economic integration in the Asia-Pacific from a variety of perspectives. I hope for this seminar to be a most beneficial and meaningful experience for all of us.

Thank you very much.

Japan and Asia-Pacific Economic Integration: Looking beyond TPP

William W. Grimes

A little over a year ago, on July 23, 2013, Japan formally joined the negotiations to create the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), one of the most ambitious trade negotiations ever. After a number of years of domestic debate and attempts by two previous prime ministers to persuade their coalitions to support it, the new Shinzo Abe administration had resolutely chosen a path toward all-out liberalization of trade and investment that could transform the Japanese economy. TPP had the potential to promote both Asia-Pacific economic integration and domestic reform. Today, however, the TPP process is in limbo and Japan's commitment to comprehensive liberalization is in question. What does this mean for Japan's economy going forward?

Japan in the Asia-Pacific Economy

Despite the old shibboleth that Japan's economic miracle was due to "export-led growth," Japan has in fact been a rather closed economy by many measures.¹ This pattern began to change in the late 1980s, after the rapid appreciation of the yen that began with the 1985 Plaza Agreement. Japanese firms began to source more of their intermediate goods and components from other Asian economies; over time, these practices contributed to the development of extensive regional production networks (RPNs) for the manufacture of consumer electronics, information technology hardware, and (to a lesser extent) automobiles. RPNs allowed for a regional division of labor based on comparative advantage, creating opportunities for developing and middle-income countries up and down the supply chain.

Today, RPNs drive the bulk of East Asian intra-regional trade, with final production being exported globally. This is not simply about regional sourcing, as Japanese foreign direct investment and services trade have generally followed goods trade. Japanese banks, trading companies, and shipping companies have also built regional and global operations that support the needs and activities of manufacturers. To be sure, Japan and Japanese firms are no longer at the center of the regional economy; moreover, RPNs have contributed to the deindustrialization of Japan, creating considerable angst. Nevertheless, it is evident that Japan's economic future lies in further integration into a regional Asia-Pacific economy.

Further integration of Japan into the regional economy will be the result of private-sector decisions and actions, as firms and banks make decisions about how best to serve existing markets and prioritize new ones. Still, government policies are important in shaping incentives.

TPP in Theory and Practice

The concept of the TPP is to create a high-quality, "21st century" trade agreement that will be comprehensive in scope and promote deep integration among its members. It goes beyond existing regional trade agreements by reaching inside borders to address nearly every type of policy that has cross-border implications. The proposed reach of TPP includes rules that govern trade in goods and services, investment, competition policy, government procurement, e-commerce, agricultural policy, financial regulation, intellectual property rights, the activities of state-owned enterprises, labor, and environment. At

¹ Japan's trade-GDP ratio is by far the lowest of any of the major East Asian economies; among industrialized countries, only the United States ranks lower on that measure (<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/TG.VAL.TOTL.GD.ZS>). Inward foreign direct investment (FDI) has also been unusually low—with a cumulative inward FDI stock of \$205 billion (3.4% of GDP), it is lower in absolute terms than FDI stock in Poland and by far the lowest relative to GDP among OECD countries (at 3.4%, far behind the next lowest OECD member, South Korea, at 12.8%) (<http://www.oecd.org/investment/FDI%20in%20figures.pdf>.) Among indicators of economic globalization, Japan punches in its weight class only in terms of outward FDI.

least some of these disciplines would be enforced through an investor-state dispute resolution mechanism that would allow foreign investors to challenge domestic laws, further reducing the policymaking discretion of member states.

Thus, TPP is more than just a trade agreement. If the maximalist positions in each of its disciplines are adopted, it would have a transformative effect on the economies of many of the participating states, including Japan. For Japan, TPP addresses a number of Prime Minister Abe's "third arrow" priorities, while also providing a backdoor means to a U.S.-Japan free trade agreement (FTA), which had long been considered politically infeasible. Externally, TPP would create new opportunities for Japanese firms to enter and do business on a level playing field with locals in the 11 other TPP countries. Internally, it could provide a bludgeon with which to advance the cause of structural reform: forcing Japanese farmers to improve efficiency and cost competitiveness, increasing competition into protected sectors like health care and legal services, and eliminating preferences for partially privatized institutions like Japan Post and NTT.

Theory is not necessarily the same as reality, however. Opposition to TPP runs deep in many participating countries, not only to the "21st century" issues (i.e., the "behind-the-border" issues, e-commerce, supply chain facilitation, intellectual property rights, environment, labor, etc.) but also the "20th century" issues of trade in goods and services. Twentieth century issues are perhaps particularly important between Japan and the United States, which are by far the two largest economies participating in TPP negotiations. According to numerous news reports, U.S.-Japan bilateral negotiations (which are ongoing, even though the formal TPP negotiating rounds are multilateral) have been bogged down by Japan's unwillingness to fully liberalize agricultural imports. U.S. popular and political opposition to TPP is also strong, especially in the Rust Belt, where fears of competition from the Japanese auto industry run deep. U.S. legislators have shown their hostility to the negotiations by not passing trade promotion authority (TPA, or "fast track"). TPA, which requires Congress to vote up or down on trade agreements without adding amendments, has been an essential tool for passage of trade agreements for decades; without it, it is hard to imagine that the United States' TPP partners would make their best and final offers or that the negotiations will be successfully completed. While some commentators have blamed Japanese intransigence over agriculture for the apparent slow pace of TPP negotiations since late 2013, it can also be argued that the Japanese government is holding out on making politically unpopular decisions until it can be sure that a deal is imminent—which will not be the case until (or unless) Congress passes TPA. For now, there is simply not enough evidence to make a meaningful judgment about the Abe administration's intentions.

TPP and Abenomics

The irony is that Japan stands to gain more from TPP than any other participant, at least in absolute terms.² The reason is not primarily that Japanese firms will gain a great deal of market access in other TPP economies. Rather, the major gains are expected to result from removal of its own barriers to imports and domestic competition that have made bastions of inefficiencies out of a number of sectors from agriculture to textiles to legal and health services. According to economic logic, exposing these producers to greater competition will either make them more efficient or drive them out of business and shift resources to more competitive sectors.

To put it another way, a trade agreement with TPP countries is less important to Japan's economic revitalization than large-scale domestic economic reform. The Abe administration shares this assessment of TPP as a domestic policy tool, and indeed several of the items in TPP mirror key elements of Abenomics' "third arrow." However, political resistance to such changes is significant, and there has been limited progress in advancing the structural reform agenda. The result is that the success of Abenomics structural reform has become closely linked with that of the TPP negotiations.

When Prime Minister Abe first came to power, time was on his side. He had a strong majority in the Lower House and was able to appoint accommodative new leadership at the Bank of Japan. After the 2013 Upper House election, he had strong majorities in both houses of the Diet and the prospect of three years without a national election. A year and a half into his administration, with little prospect of TPP being completed before mid-2015 at the earliest, however, the window of opportunity is closing. It appears that Abe can no longer count on TPP to be a silver bullet for structural reform.

What If TPP Continues to Languish?

² Peter A. Petri, Michael G. Plummer, and Fan Zhai, *The Trans-Pacific Partnership and Asia-Pacific Integration: A Quantitative Assessment* (Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, November 2012).

This raises the question of how Japan should move forward in terms of regional economic integration as well as domestic reform. Fortunately, despite the rhetorical commitment to TPP as a central pillar of both pieces of the economic agenda, there are other options. For the domestic agenda, the Japanese government's best bet will be to continue with ongoing reforms, although priorities may shift as TPP sits on hold. With or without TPP, serious structural reform will inevitably be a matter of political will, and victory will not be dramatic but rather the result of an accumulation of incremental changes. Certainly, success is not assured. But serious progress is possible if the Abe administration starts acting with greater urgency on the third arrow.

As for trade agreements, the regional picture does not look promising. Not only is TPP in limbo, but negotiations with other major trading partners are either in preliminary stages or stalled. This is true not only of the ASEAN-centered Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), but also of the Japan-EU, Japan-Korea, and China-Japan-Korea negotiations. While all of these partnerships could have a significant impact on Japanese growth and most would tie the Japanese economy more closely to the dynamism of East Asia, none is a near-term prospect.

Fortunately, regional negotiations do not represent a complete picture of the potential importance of trade agreements. The failure of the Doha Round makes it easy to overlook the successes of multilateral and plurilateral agreements under the World Trade Organization (WTO), including in recent years. Japan can benefit from a variety of recent or upcoming agreements, including the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement, as well as the International Technology Agreement (ITA), which has succeeded spectacularly in eliminating barriers to much of the component trade that has underlain regional and global production networks in information and communications technology hardware; the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA); the Trade in Services Agreement (TISA); and the Environmental Goods Agreement (EGA). By addressing sectoral barriers to trade among coalitions of the willing, these plurilateral agreements have the potential to move forward Japan's economic integration with its Asia-Pacific neighbors without the endless negotiations of a TPP or RCEP and the perils of getting stuck in the "noodle bowl" of multiple nonstandardized bilateral FTAs.

Economic Policy beyond TPP

All this is qualified good news for Japan. The TPP strategy had the potential to kill multiple birds—domestic reform, regional integration, and reinforcement of the U.S.-Japan alliance—with one stone. It is not necessary for any of them, however. Given the reality that TPP will not be concluded quickly (or, perhaps, even eventually), the Japanese government would be wise to focus on a combination of domestic reform and rededication to plurilateral initiatives like the ITA, TISA, and EGA. By doing so, it can advance the goals of shaping an integrated Asia-Pacific economy in which Japanese firms are confident and robust players.

William W. Grimes is a professor of international relations and political science in the Pardee School of Global Studies at Boston University.

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STATEMENT BY C.S.I.S.

H. Andrew Schwartz
Senior Vice President, External Relations
Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS)

You asked if CSIS scholars have “taken a position that is contrary to the foreign policy objectives of those nations” that we have accepted funding from and if I could provide an example. I have to say that I find this question to show that you have been guided by a pre-conceived thesis rather than an objective reading of the facts. I could similarly come back to you and ask you to show me a report that we have done where we clearly took a certain policy position because of the funding we received.

That said, there are numerous examples when our scholars take positions adverse to the three governments you mention. For example, regarding Japan, CSIS’s Japan Chair Michael Green has received funding from the Japanese government since 2006. Over that time:

In March 2007 Dr. Green published an op/ed in the Yomuri Shinbun (circulation 10+million) criticizing Prime Minister Abe's comments on the Comfort Women issue. Dr. Green was attacked in op/eds in the paper the next week and in comic books as anti-Abe and anti-Japan (the lead manga in Japan or “Japanese comic” featured a strip on the episode with pictures of Dr. Green and Ambassador Tom Schieffer snarling under a banner reading "leaders of the anti-Japan clique").

In 2009 and 2010 Dr. Green published articles in the Washington Quarterly and Journal of Japanese Studies dissecting the ruling Democratic Party of Japan and criticizing their management of security policy and the economy. Some in the Party agreed with Dr. Green, but he was also attacked by other members of the government, in the press and American academia for being too hard on them.

When PM Abe went to the Yasukuni Shrine last December Dr. Green said publicly in a large CSIS event that that he agreed with the Obama administration's criticism that it was "unhelpful" --a position of President Obama’s that had been denounced by senior Japanese cabinet members before Dr. Green associated himself with it.

Earlier this year Dr. Green wrote a monograph for Australia’s Lowy Institute on Abe's grand strategy that was generally very positive, but criticized the government's management of relations with South Korea, which Dr. Green said was causing a strategic liability for the US. He has made this point in multiple interviews and seminars this year.

All of these differences with Japanese policy were made in large conferences or major media or academic journals.

I want to put on the record that the notion that CSIS is captive to any government or donor or acts as a foreign agent for governments is ludicrous and will be seen as ludicrous by anyone who is familiar with our work. CSIS’s reputation for honest, objective and independent analytic work is the very reason why we are sought out by the public and private sector and why your esteemed colleagues choose so often to quote us in the paper of record.