



National Security Agency/Central
Security Service

15 APR 2013


Information Paper

**Subject: (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) NSA Intelligence Relationship with Turkey –
Turkish National Intelligence Organization (MIT) and the Turkish
SIGINT Intelligence Directorate (SIB)**

(U) Introduction

(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) NSA's 50-plus year SIGINT relationship with the Government of Turkey (GOT) includes cooperation with the civilian SIGINT service within the Turkish National Intelligence Organization (MIT) and the Turkish military SIGINT Intelligence Directorate (SIB). Of note, the GOT decided in 2011 that the military SIB would be made subordinate to the civilian MIT. SIGINT collaboration with MIT and SIB provides NSA access to military targets of interest in [REDACTED] Russia and Georgia, as well as counter-terrorism (CT) targets such as the Kurdistan People's Congress (Kongra Gel, aka KGK, formerly PKK), the Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C) and radical Islamic terrorist elements. Also, NSA's Information Assurance (INFOSEC) Directorate has a relationship with the Turkish General Staff/J6 as well as with the Turkish National Research of Electronics and Cryptology (UEKAE).

(U) Key Issues



(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) The Counter Terrorism (CT) SIGINT exchange with Turkey was expanded by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) in July 2002 to include actionable intelligence. In May 2007, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) modified the guidance to include actionable intelligence against KGK leadership in Northern Iraq. Additional CT targets worked with the GOT include the DHKP/C and radical Islamic terrorist elements such as al-Qa'ida (AQ) and its affiliated groups.

(S//SI//REL TO USA, TUR) A Memorandum of Agreement between the National Security Agency and the Republic of Turkey, represented by the Turkish General Staff Electronic Systems Command (now SIGINT Intelligence Directorate - SIB) was signed 04 April 1995. The purpose of this agreement was to ensure mutual exchange and cooperation for enhancing, supporting, and developing the SIGINT capabilities of the Turkish Military

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
Dated: 20070108
Declassify On: 20320108

SIGINT organization with GES (now SIB) and NSA in order that we may more effectively carry out their missions against mutually agreed upon targets. This agreement between NSA and MIT/SIB updates and further implements the U.S.-Turkish SIGINT arrangements entered into in 1980. NSA will propose a review of the 1995 agreement during a Strategic Planning Conference at NSA Washington in May 2013.

(S//SI//NF) NSA is working to re-establish cooperation with the MIT on Project SEA SENTRY II, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] for U.S. customers in exchange for geographical access and regional monitoring capabilities for the Turks.

(U) Discussion

[REDACTED]

(U) What NSA Provides to the Partner

- (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) NSA provides equipment, technology, training, and U.S. SIGINT requirements and reporting to the Turkish partner to better assist NSA in fulfilling U.S. intelligence requirements.

- (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) In terms of equipment and technology NSA provides both collection and cryptographic equipment. A Cryptographic Modernization program is under way with both partners to upgrade encryption on all shared and some non-shared communications links. A High Frequency Direction Finding (HFDF) collection site is

[REDACTED] NSA also provides decryption of DHKP/C internet traffic the Turks collect.

- (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) U.S. SIGINT requirements and reporting cover military and paramilitary targets in [REDACTED] and the KGK. This reporting is a mixture of near-real time and product "Tear Line" reports and analysis.

- (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) NSA provides daily interaction and actionable intelligence on foreign fighter Sunni extremists, against both Turkish and non-Turkish individuals. NSA provides regional Tactical [REDACTED] reporting in two hour increments.

(U) What the Partner Provides to NSA

- (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) The partner provides near real time reporting on military air, naval, ground, and paramilitary targets in Russia, [REDACTED] Georgia, Ukraine, and on KGK

targets, as well as daily summary reporting of Black Sea and CIS Naval and Air activity and

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

- (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) NSA enjoys joint operational access to the HFDF site in [REDACTED] which, in turn, functions as a node on NSA's world-wide CROSSHAIR HFDF geolocation service. The U.S. and 2nd Parties receive approximately 400,000 fixes yearly utilizing Lines-of-Bearing from the [REDACTED] site while the Turks receive approximately 5000 fixes yearly from its regional usage of CROSSHAIR, an 80 to 1 ratio in FVEY's favor.

- (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) NSA receives Turkish transcripts of KGK voice collection. Cooperation on the KGK target by the U.S. Intelligence Community in Ankara has increased across the board since the May 2007 DNI Memorandum encouraged all to do so.

(U) Success Stories

[REDACTED]

(U) Problems/Challenges with the Partner

(S//SI//NF) Turkey is both a SIGINT partner and an intelligence target. This dynamic between partner and target surfaces when conducting risk-benefit analysis to determine what technologies can be shared with the Turkish partners.

(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) MIT/SIB continues to be a cooperative partner working with NSA to fulfill joint intelligence requirements and has the potential to become a significantly more productive partner if Turkish-U.S. relations were to improve. Turkey's unique geographic access offers collection potential to fill additional SIGINT requirements.

TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN

(TS//SI//NF) U.S. intelligence reporting in recent years indicates possible Iranian connections with Dr. [REDACTED], the head of the MIT/SIB. The possible impact of these connections to the U.S. SIGINT relationships is unknown at this time.

(U//FOUO) Prepared by: [REDACTED]

TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN