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1st Session }

SENATE

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{No. —

OVERSEAS INFORMATION PROGRAMS  
OF THE UNITED STATES

REPORT

OF THE

SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON OVERSEAS  
INFORMATION PROGRAMS

PURSUANT TO

THE PROVISIONS OF S. RES. 74, 82D CONGRESS, 2D SESSION,  
AND S. RES. 44, 83D CONGRESS, 1ST SESSION



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AND SENATE RESOLUTION 44 (83D CONG.) ON OVERSEAS INFORMATION PRO-  
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### FOREWORD

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The Committee on Foreign Relations on June 5, 1953, authorized the transmittal to the Senate of a report from the Special Committee on Overseas Information Programs created pursuant to the terms of Senate Resolution 74 (82d Cong.), as amended by Senate Resolution 44 (83d Cong.).

JUNE 15, 1953.

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## OVERSEAS INFORMATION PROGRAMS OF THE UNITED STATES

JUNE 15, 1953.—Ordered to be printed

Mr. HICKENLOOPER, from the Special Committee on Overseas Information Programs, submitted the following

### REPORT

[Pursuant to S. Res. 74, 82d Cong., and S. Res. 44, 83d Cong., 1st sess.]

#### 1. INTRODUCTION

In his state of the Union message, February 2, 1953, President Eisenhower asserted the necessity "to make more effective all activities related to international information." The President declared that "a unified and dynamic effort in this whole field is essential to the security of the United States and other peoples in the community of free nations," and added, "there is but one sure way to avoid global war and that is to win the cold war."

An international information service is a new tool in the conduct of United States foreign relations. Its full potentialities are scarcely realized. Our international information program must support and promote our foreign policy and our foreign relations or it has no reason for existence.

This country did not engage extensively in overseas information programs until World War II. After the war and until 1948, the activity was lodged within the Department of State and conducted on a limited basis. In addition an educational exchange program was provided for under the Fulbright Act of 1946 (Public Law 584, 79th Cong.) and a second program added by the Smith-Mundt Act (Public Law 402, 80th Cong.) in 1948. The former financed the exchange of professors, students, and others out of foreign currency funds accruing from the sale of surplus properties abroad.

The Smith-Mundt Act gave permanent legislative authority to the information program of the Department of State, assigning to it the following objectives:

To promote a better understanding of the United States in other countries and to increase mutual understanding between the people of the United States and other countries.

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It is possible the passage of the Smith-Mundt Act was passed, the Economic Cooperation Administration launched a separate information program to publicize the European recovery program.

By Executive order, in 1950, a further step was taken to enlarge the scope of overseas information activity. To the function of promoting "mutual understanding" and a "full and fair picture" of the United States, which were the purposes of the Fulbright and the Smith-Mundt Acts, President Truman directed that there be added the "Campaign of Truth." This mandate constituted an attempt to broaden the original intent of the information program into a more dynamic psychological weapon to meet the growing threat of communism.

These shifts in purposes and emphasis in the program during the past several years have reflected themselves in constant changes in organizational structure both within the Department of State and within the executive branch generally. From a relatively minor function under an Assistant Secretary of State, the administration of the information program has evolved through a series of reorganizations into a quasi-autonomous unit which since January 1952 has been called the International Information Administration.

Congressional assessment of the need and value of the program is suggested in a history of fluctuating appropriations for the overseas information and educational exchange services. In the last year of World War II, appropriations were approximately \$70 million. By 1948 they had decreased to \$20 million. By 1950, after the passage of the Smith-Mundt Act, appropriations for the program administered by the Department of State reached \$47 million. When President Truman's Executive order inaugurated the "Campaign of Truth" in 1950, Congress appropriated \$121 million. A substantial proportion of this sum, however, was earmarked for the construction of radio facilities for the Voice of America. For the past 2 years appropriations have amounted to approximately \$85 million annually for the International Information Administration. In total, upward of half a billion dollars have been appropriated for international informational and educational activities since 1945.

In terms of cost and personnel, the United States information program has now reached a level of operations which is second only to that of the Soviet Union. The Department of State estimates, that Russia spends \$1.4 billion annually for propaganda, both for internal and external purposes, and employs over a million propagandists. The propaganda of the Communists is unconcerned with truth and is militant in promoting world communism. In this, it is similar to Nazi methodology.

The United States cannot and will not tolerate in its own program the utter disregard for truth which has characterized the foreign information programs of totalitarian nations. Nor has this country accepted the premise of the British information system, which while factual and nonpropagandistic in tone, concerns itself primarily with the affairs and interests of the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth. The short history of the American program has been characterized by a search for means which would advance both the interests of the United States and the community of interests of the non-Communist world.

## 2. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

By 1951, while there was general agreement in this country on the importance of overseas information service, at the same time there was doubt as to the efficiency and effectiveness of the program. The program had not been examined by Congress since passage of the Smith-Mundt Act in 1948, other than for annual hearings by the Appropriations Committees and a brief hearing in 1950 on Senate Resolution 243 to expand the information program. On February 19, 1951, Senators Alexander Wiley and William Benton introduced Senate Resolution 74 (82d Cong.) proposing a complete study of the United States information program. Reporting the resolution favorably, the Foreign Relations Committee noted the receipt of a variety of criticisms of the program.

Senate Resolution 74 was passed by the Senate on June 30, 1952. The resolution directed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee or a subcommittee thereof to conduct an investigation and study of the objectives, operations, and effectiveness of the overseas information programs of the United States. The committee was to be composed of members of the Foreign Relations Committee appointed by the chairman and two other Senators appointed by the President of the Senate. Those designated in the 82d Congress were Senators Fulbright, chairman; Gillette, Benton, Wiley, Hickenlooper, and Mundt.

This special committee submitted an interim report on January 30, 1953 (Senate Report No. 30, 83d Cong.). This interim report stated that "the overseas information services and programs of the United States and private agencies are very important and that they must and can be strengthened." It also recommended continuation of the investigation in order that the full study called for by Senate Resolution 74 might be completed.

Senate Resolution 44 (83d Cong.), passed February 20, 1953, continued the special committee until June 30, 1953. The committee appointed under Senate Resolution 44 (83d Cong.) consists of Senators Hickenlooper, chairman, Wiley, Knowland, Fulbright, Gillette, and Green from the Foreign Relations Committee and Senators Mundt and Hill from the Senate at large. As in the previous session, both political parties are equally represented.

## 3. PROCEDURE OF THE INVESTIGATION

*(a) Evaluations of overseas operations*

As an initial step, the special committee requested American Ambassadors to evaluate the information program at their missions abroad and to suggest improvements. Approximately 80 responses were received.

The committee also sought appraisals of the program from American foreign correspondents. Fifty-five evaluations were supplied to the committee.

Similar requests were made of American religious groups and business organizations with extensive operations abroad. From these groups and organizations the committee obtained approximately 10 summary reports covering observations of their overseas associates.



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(b) *Investigations by members of the committee*  
 During November-December 1952, Senator Hickenlooper inspected information operations in the Far East, Senator Fulbright, in Europe, and Senator Gillette, in the Middle East. Senator Wiley had previously observed the program in Europe and the Mediterranean area.

Extensive discussions with personnel of the United States missions abroad and other informed Americans and with local nationals were held at the various posts visited. These discussions provided considerable insight into the weaknesses and strengths of the program.

(c) *Staff studies*

To secure additional information, the committee directed its staff to prepare studies on various aspects of the program. Eight such studies have been published as committee prints during the course of the investigation.

Staff Study No. 1, United States Overseas Information Programs, provided background information, surveyed the current status of overseas informational activities and brought together basic documentation.

Staff Study No. 2, The Information Program of Great Britain, contained comparative data on the size and techniques of the British Overseas Information System.

Staff Study No. 3, The Soviet Propaganda Program, highlighted the activities carried on under the most extensive propaganda operation in the world.

Staff Study No. 4, Organization of United States Overseas Information Functions, discussed alternative solutions to the problem of the organizational location of the information program in the executive branch of the Government.

Staff Study No. 5, Analysis of Reports From United States Mission Chiefs Abroad, summarized the strengths and weaknesses of the information program, as seen by the Ambassadors in the field.

Staff Study No. 6, Analysis of Reports From American Correspondents Overseas, and Staff Study No. 7, Analysis of Communications Received From Business and Religious Organizations, supplied the committee with an additional summary of evaluations of the program and with suggestions for increasing its effectiveness.

Staff Study No. 8, Voice of America Broadcasts on the Death of Stalin, analyzed a sampling of radio scripts to assess the manner in which this subject was handled in official broadcasts to various parts of the world.

In preparing these studies and in carrying out its work generally, the committee had the assistance of the regular staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress. By drawing on this pool of specialized personnel, the committee was able to conduct its investigation with a minimum of full-time staff employees and with consequent savings in costs.

(d) *Hearings*

The first phase of hearings was held on November 20 and 21, 1952, prior to the departure of members of the committee on overseas inspections. This phase was primarily exploratory in nature, designed to establish the scope of the investigation and to provide the com-

mittee with background data for use abroad. The witnesses included representatives of the Department of Defense, the Department of State, the International Information Administration, the Mutual Security Administration, and the Technical Cooperation Administration.

After the return of the committee members from their surveys abroad, a number of informed and interested persons outside of Government were invited to testify at public hearings on the information program. In issuing these invitations, the committee sought to draw upon the experience of former officials of the Information Administration, the Advisory Commissions on Information and on Educational Exchange provided for under the Smith-Mundt Act, public-spirited organizations and relevant industries such as radio, motion pictures, and publishing.

A total of 35 witnesses were heard during the second phase of the hearings which extended from March 6 to April 1. Among the organizations represented were the following: the Motion Picture Association of America, the American Book Publishers Association; the American Library Association; the American Legion; the Ford Foundation; the National Association of Radio and Television Broadcasters; International House; the National Association of Foreign Student Advisers; the Institute of International Education; the National Education Association; Board of Foreign Scholarships; the Saturday Evening Post; the World-Wide Broadcasting System; the Advertisers Council of America; the American Federation of Labor; and the American Institute of Public Opinion.

On completion of the second phase, hearings were recessed for several weeks. During the interval, the committee prepared summaries of criticisms and suggestions relating to the program. These were given to the Department of State with the request that informed witnesses be designated to comment on the specific criticisms and suggestions.

Testimony of Dr. Robert L. Johnson, Administrator of the information program, and eight other official witnesses was heard in a third phase of the hearings, April 20 to 27.

The committee then convened in New York May 11, 12, 13. This fourth phase dealt with statistics and programs designed largely to show the effectiveness of the Voice of America, but it also covered potential uses of television and other forms of telecommunications in the information program.

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Since radio broadcasting had been most severely criticized in reports received by the committee, officials of the Voice of America were given the fullest possible opportunity to explain the operation and to answer criticisms. Some 30 witnesses were heard during the sessions of the committee in New York.

The committee has analyzed the mass of information which has been accumulated. It has reached conclusions and is prepared to make recommendations on the overseas information programs as required under Senate Resolution 74 as amended by Senate Resolution 44. For the most part, these treat with the activities of the International Information Administration of the Department of State, but also concern themselves with the specialized information programs of the Mutual Security Agency and the Technical Cooperation Administration.

The information program of the Department of Defense deals with special problems growing out of the presence of American troops abroad and the training of foreign military personnel in this country. The committee has taken cognizance of the military program but makes no attempt to offer recommendations with respect to it. An appropriate body of the Senate may wish to examine its operation in detail.

#### 4. PRINCIPAL WEAKNESSES OF THE INFORMATION PROGRAM

##### (a) *Ineffective coordination of psychological policy*

The Psychological Strategy Board was established to coordinate the psychological policies of the United States. Much of its activities are necessarily of a highly classified nature, but data has been available to the committee which suggests that the Board is not effectively discharging its function.

The Executive order (June 20, 1951) creating the Psychological Strategy Board is loosely drawn. It lodges various responsibilities in the Board but limits its authority to "guidance" and "reporting." Lewis K. Gough, commander of the American Legion, testified that he has been advised that—

not a single major recommendation of the Board has been executed by the departments or agencies to which it reports.

This report was not challenged by representatives of the executive branch. Observations of members of the committee abroad and other evidence moreover suggest that the component agencies of the Board, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Department of Defense, and the Department of State are continuing to go their separate ways in matters of psychological policy. This lack of coordination has no doubt reduced the effectiveness of the overseas information program. Just as this country cannot afford to have conflicting foreign policies, it cannot support conflicting policies within the Government in dealing with other nations or in handling major international issues.

##### (b) *Duplication and competition in informational activities of United States agencies operating abroad*

The Mutual Security Agency (MSA) and the Technical Cooperation Administration (TCA) operate overseas information programs. The committee has been told that these programs have been merged or coordinated with those of the International Information Administration (IIA). Examination of the written merger agreements, however, suggests that they are more in the nature of cartel arrangements with much duplication, some conflict, excessive personnel, and continuing high operating costs.

Specifically in the Far East there has been no attempt to combine the information programs of MSA and IIA. In several countries, the committee found two separate and distinct information structures. This has resulted in duplication, conflict in programs, and excessive personnel.

It is difficult to evaluate the written understanding between TCA and IIA on avoidance of duplication in informational effort since the former is still a comparative newcomer to the field. The rapid growth of the information budget of TCA, however, suggests that its ambi-

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tious expanding information activities should be kept under observation if a duplication of the situation that has developed between MSA and IIA is to be avoided.

In pointing out this duplication the committee questions the continued need for multiple overseas information programs. It sees in the present situation unnecessary risks of conflict in policy, increased administrative costs and excessive informational activity.

The same observation is generally true of the separate exchange of persons programs administered by MSA, TCA, and other agencies. These programs were separately authorized by law and by law were to be administered separately. There may be some types of exchanges so intimately related to the major projects carried on by MSA, TCA, and others that they can be better handled by these agencies themselves. While these exchanges differ in degree from those administered by the IIA under the Smith-Mundt and Fulbright program, the committee questions the need for their scattered administration. It believes that the absence of efficient coordination in this field is adding to administrative costs and is probably creating costly competition among various agencies operating in this field.

*(c) Lack of budgetary stability and continuity of administrative direction*

In the postwar years, appropriations for the overseas information program have fluctuated sharply, drastic cuts caused in the main by dissatisfaction with its operations alternating with precipitate increases. Simultaneously, there have been rapid changes in the organization of the program and in its administrators. There have been some 5 major reorganizations and 5 Administrators in the last 5 years.

This instability has been costly. It has resulted in much lost administrative motion. It has had an adverse effect on the ability to recruit the type of specialized personnel needed in this program. It has, on occasion, produced too rapid expansion with consequent waste. It has made it difficult for Appropriations Committees to judge past performance or to estimate the probable effectiveness of new organizational proposals.

Many of the witnesses have cited the repeated shifts in the direction of the program as a major factor in reducing its effectiveness. The committee concurs in this view. It would point out, however, that in any new undertaking there is bound to be a certain amount of instability. It takes time and experimentation to determine an effective level and method of operation. In the case of the information program, difficulties have been accentuated by the limited experience of the United States with an activity of this type. Even more serious is the fact that those who have been responsible for the program in the past have tended, perhaps inadvertently, to hold out to Congress and to the American people an exaggerated picture of the accomplishments of overseas information which has produced cycles of excessive expectation and disappointment. These reactions have been reflected in fluctuating appropriations.

The committee believes that the program can be stabilized by presenting realistic goals. It is damaging to the entire program when the Appropriations Committees are led to expect results which are not attained. A realistic information program, properly administered, can be of inestimable value in producing a favorable attitude toward us and our policies. The present Administrator, Robert L. Johnson,

various his interpretation of the role of Government information when he testified that—

A Government program of information and educational exchange can be only a small segment of the great flow of American ideas which reach other peoples through the printed word, our products and our skills, our Armed Forces, and our tourists.

The committee believes that the information program must settle into a clearly defined continuing pattern of operation. Enough knowledge of the nature and possibilities of overseas information has now been accumulated to make this possible. To apply this knowledge, however, will require a well-defined scope of activities, reasonable stability in appropriations, technically competent personnel and a continuity of administrative direction. The committee feels that this can be accomplished.

*(d) Ineffective administration of the program by the Department of State*

Numerous witnesses testified to the inadequacy of, or perhaps indifference to, the administration of the program in the past by the Department of State. Those who had previous experience in operating the program were unanimous in agreeing that the program had been hampered among other things by the redtape, budgetary rigidity, and bureaucratic rivalry in the Department. Those who had observed the program in unofficial capacities generally expressed the view that the administrative needs of a hard-hitting, fast-moving information program could hardly be met within the confines of a cautious, tradition-bound, bureaucratic foreign office. Many witnesses favored complete separation of the program from the Department and its elevation to the Cabinet level.

The attitude of the public affairs officers at the posts abroad was somewhat in contrast to those mentioned above. While these officers still complained of certain administrative inadequacies and discrimination on the part of old-line Foreign Service personnel, nevertheless, they agreed that the situation in the field had improved during the past year or two and there was little sentiment among them for complete separation. Their attitude was succinctly expressed by one field officer in this manner: "The administrative link is too close; the policy link is not close enough. This should be reversed."

A most serious indictment against the administration of the program by the Department came from the Advisory Commission on Information. In its Seventh Semiannual Report, February 23, 1953, the Commission stated:

During the past 5 years we have observed the efforts made by top officials of the information program to overcome internal resistances and misunderstandings of the Department of State. They have been hampered by established procedures and traditions developed for the purposes of political diplomacy and not for propaganda and information. Too much time and effort on the part of IIA has been spent in attempting to fit the program into the structure of the Department and to the convincing of officials of its importance.

There has been a singular lack of enthusiasm and imagination in the Department's development of the information program. When the program was first set up under Department of State auspices it got off to a slow and unconvincing start. There was much overt and covert opposition to it in the Department. Instead of initiating and carrying on a fresh, dynamic program, the Department converted it into a low-level and secondary operation. It soon became apparent that the Department was more interested in conforming the information program to its own long-established conventions than in carrying out the congressional intentions of Public Law 402.

Repeated recommendations of our Commissions were disregarded or reluctantly and halfheartedly adopted. Such progress as has been made has followed only after repeated recommendations, protests, and threats of reduced appropriations.

[It is to be noted that the Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange, however, recommended that educational exchange should remain in the Department of State.]

These criticisms, in the main, seem to be valid. Some may excuse these shortcomings by pointing out that they are characteristic of the early stages of any new undertaking. The fact is, however, that after 7 years the program should have arrived at maturity.

(e) *Inadequate personnel and faulty personnel practices*

The committee recognizes that there are many able men and women employed in the Information Administration. It cannot, however, ignore the observations of a number of witnesses to the effect that unsuitable or unqualified persons fill many posts in the administrative hierarchy both at home and overseas. Dr. Wilson Compton, former Administrator of the program, touched on a principal source of the difficulty when he testified that—

The building up of this program was pushed somewhat faster than the available qualified personnel would justify; also, to some extent and in some activities, there has been accumulated a sort of overhead of persons who may have been fairly well qualified for the function they were asked to discharge when they were originally employed, but who are not very well qualified for the function that they are asked to discharge now.

Other difficulties in the field of personnel arise from personnel practices for which the Department of State is responsible. Information employees are fact disseminators, not fact gatherers, as are regular Foreign Service officers. The temperament and the skills required for the one are not the same as for the other. The testimony of various witnesses and observations overseas leads the committee to believe that this distinction has not been sufficiently recognized either in recruitment or assignment.

Nor has the Department established what the committee would regard as a satisfactory training program for employees in the information service. Inexperienced people are often sent abroad after the most meager orientation, and followup training at the posts is more a matter of chance than policy. In this connection, the committee cannot overemphasize the desirability of officers abroad being proficient in the language, history and culture of the country of assignment.

The committee finds that comparatively low salary classifications for key policy positions and the inadequacy of prestige attaching to such positions in the Information Administration add to the difficulties of attracting and holding professionally competent employees. The Department of State has assigned to the Information Administration only 3 out of the 27 classified supergrades which it is allotted. The Information Administration, however, comprises 40 percent of the total personnel of the Department.

Unfortunately, there is little doubt that the Information Administration has frequently been used in the past as a "dumping ground" for departmental employees for whom other assignments are not conveniently available or as a stepping-stone for Foreign Service officers whose primary interests lie elsewhere or for interim appointments for officers awaiting other assignment. The committee would like to make clear that it has no objections to temporary interchanges

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of the Department for training or special purposes. There is much to be gained from cross-fertilization of the fact disseminators and the fact gatherers. The committee feels, however, that the practice pointed out by Mr. Ben Hibbs, editor of the Saturday Evening Post, is not in the best interests of the program or the Department. Mr. Hibbs testified that ever since he has been a member of the Advisory Commission on Information—

it has been the practice of the State Department to assign young Foreign Service career men to important posts in information work—particularly to posts located abroad. This is regarded as just another tour of duty by many of these fellows—something to be endured on the climb up the ladder. Their goal is not to be topnotch information men but eventually to be ministers and ambassadors. Most of them are competent young men, some of them brilliant, but they are not particularly well equipped for important information posts.

Another personnel practice which should be mentioned as disruptive of the effectiveness of the program is the current system of rotation of assignments followed by the Department. Officers frequently have little time to familiarize themselves with a post before they are assigned elsewhere. The result is that there is little incentive to become really expert in the language and customs of the area to which they have been assigned. Short tours of duty may be justified for the diplomatic and consular service, but the committee does not believe that the same principle should apply to the Information Service.

The committee would like to emphasize the vital importance which it attaches to the solution of the personnel problems which have been cited. It is essential to have well-selected, well-trained persons in this program. Information employees overseas are under the constant scrutiny of other peoples. Indeed, it is of paramount necessity that they meet local inhabitants and be in constant communication with them. In relationships of this kind, a misfit, an incompetent, or a person with alien sympathies can do serious damage to the prestige and interests of the United States and our objectives.

*(f) Maladjustment of responsibility between Washington and the field*

During the past 5 years the information program has gradually shifted from a centralized to a decentralized operation. Formerly most information materials were prepared in this country and planning and operating decisions were made largely in Washington. The field posts were primarily disseminating centers with limited influence over what was disseminated. The pattern of operation differed little from post to post.

This situation has been steadily reversed in recent years. Regional reproduction centers overseas and the individual posts themselves are now turning out substantial quantities of the information material used in the program. The posts are presently the principal focus of the entire program and exercise prime influence in planning the operations for their respective localities on a tailor-made basis.

The committee's own observations generally support the views of the many witnesses who found this change of emphasis beneficial. Situations, customs, and attitudes differ from post to post throughout the world. By placing the emphasis on the field operations, it has been possible to adjust to these differences and thereby gain greater acceptance for the activities of the program. The absence of such adjustment in the past undoubtedly contributed to general ineffectiveness.

(g) *Failure to secure foreign cooperation in propagating common concepts*

Analysis of the operation of the information program reveals that two major concepts have developed. One might be termed the national program which encompasses primarily the dissemination of information about the United States, its peoples, and policies. The other concept involves propagation of international matters in which the United States has an interest, but not a unilateral interest. Included in this latter is the publicizing of anticommunism, democracy, the United Nations, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

In the first concept, the information program serves as an American instrument for communicating information about the United States. In this, the committee believes, the program should be a firm, forthright, clearly identified voice of this country based upon a pattern which is understandable to the recipients.

In its other concept, however, the program serves not alone as an American instrument but as a part of the total voice of world freedom. Propagation of information about the aims of the free world on the one hand and the evils of aggressive communism on the other should be the concern of all countries and all peoples. This is not and ought not to be a unique American responsibility. The evidence suggests that the manner in which our information program is administered in some areas has created an impression of this kind.

The committee believes that the character of our program should be such as to enlist the active cooperation of other nations and peoples in propagating common concepts, to the end that it may stimulate their enthusiasm and friendship and not their apathy or suspicion. The greater our unilateral effort, the higher will be the cost to this country and the more the need for American personnel. However, the more cooperation which we receive from other countries, the greater will be the impact of the message.

This weakness in the program varies in specific detail from post to post. In general, however, the variance seems to be directly related to the caliber of the field personnel. The more capable the officers the more conscious they appear to be of the value of foreign cooperation and the more likely they will be to obtain such cooperation.

There is still another aspect of the problem that should not be overlooked. In the absence of coordination among free governments and unofficial agencies, a listener in Iron Curtain countries may hear conflicting ideas from the Voice of America, the British Broadcasting Corporation, Radio Free Europe, etc. The free world should unquestionably speak with many voices but its fundamental messages should be the same. The committee believes that each voice should be concerned as to what the other is saying.

(h) *Failure to utilize fully widespread public interest in this country to further program*

The generous cooperation which the committee has received in its investigation from nongovernmental sources attests to the widespread public interest in the information program. Many individuals and groups have indicated their desire to help in promoting a better understanding of the United States and in developing mutually beneficial relations with other countries.

The committee is aware of the steps that have been taken by the Information Administration to bring about public participation in the



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used for want of effective leadership and guidance. It agrees with the many witnesses who testified along the lines of the following statement by Waldemar Nielsen, former Director of the information program of the Mutual Security Agency in Europe:

\* \* \* I think we must make much greater use of private and semiprivate American organizations in the field of international propaganda.

I think that there is a tremendous contribution that can be made by American churches, by American trade unions, by American organizations like the American Legion, to the general problem of advancing American interests and informing, creating world understanding of American concepts and American ideas.

(i) *Unsatisfactory evaluation methods*

There is general agreement that one of the prime needs of the program is a realistic system for evaluating effectiveness. Such a system involves techniques for calculating the reach of the program (how many people are being contacted by radio, publications, motion pictures, etc.) and the impact which it is making on the attitudes of the people contacted.

Increasing efforts are being made by the Information Administration to measure effectiveness. Evaluation units are maintained in the various media. The Administrator has a small evaluation staff. Evaluating officers have been assigned to a few field posts. Private research agencies under contract have undertaken evaluation studies for the Information Administration. Even the semiannual reports of the Advisory Commissions constitute a kind of evaluation of the program for the Secretary of State and the Congress.

These efforts notwithstanding, the committee shares the conviction of many of the witnesses that inadequate evaluation remains a principal weakness of the program. Part of the difficulty stems from the scattering of responsibility for the evaluation function and the haphazardness that appears to characterize the present approach. In these circumstances, the probability of bias in evaluation increases and, inevitably, the cost. Another difficulty is the tendency of evaluators to depart from their main task of measuring effectiveness and to give undue emphasis to the development of impressive data to justify the program to the Administrator and to Congress.

Even more serious, perhaps, is the common error noted in all branches of the Information Administration of judging effectiveness by feverishness of activity. Frequently, it seems to the committee, information personnel delude themselves with the conviction that if the graph of output of information material shows a constantly ascending curve then all is well with the program. It is the unusual officer, the committee found, who recognizes that the effectiveness of the information program does not depend on quantity.

The committee also notes that at some posts to which independent evaluation officers had been assigned directly from the office of the Administrator, the results have been neither satisfactory nor happy. A principal difficulty appears to be that the status of these officers in the chain of command and the extent of their authority is ambiguous. In consequence, they are sometimes inhibited from exercising the very independence of judgment and action which was the principal justification for their assignment to the field in the first place.

The problems discussed above are those which primarily concern internal evaluation within the Information Administration. The

Advisory Commissions were established by Public Law 402, to provide among other things independent assessments of the overall effectiveness of the information program to Congress and the Secretary of State. The committee does not believe that the Commissions have effectively discharged this particular function as they might have done with broader authority. In reaching this conclusion, the committee in no way intends to reflect on the able, public-spirited persons who have voluntarily given their time and efforts to the work of the Commissions. The problem lies not in the Commissioners but in procedures which leave them dependent on the Department of State for staff and for information on which to base their reports and which do not provide for a clear-cut method of reporting to Congress.

The committee believes that scientific evaluation techniques to measure public demand and acceptance developed in the United States by business and industry might be more profitably adapted in the planning and execution of this program.

(j) *Lack of a common understanding of the objectives of the information program on the part of the Administration, Congress, and American people*

Many witnesses pointed out the necessity for clarification of the objectives of the information program so that the Administration, Congress, and the American people will know what to expect of it. The confusion over the purposes of the information program exists within the Information Administration itself. Mr. Lloyd Free, public-affairs officer in Italy, testified that—

The most fundamental weakness in the IIA program as heretofore administered is a lack of a basic understanding shared by all \* \* \* of the job to be done.

The committee's observations in various parts of the world corroborate Mr. Free's opinion. Frequently public-affairs officers seemed to distort the legislative purpose of the program beyond most liberal interpretation. At some posts, the objectives stated in Public Law 402 (80th Cong.) were being strained to cover activities of a kind and on a scale which appeared quite remote from the original intent of the Smith-Mundt Act.

This diversity of interpretation and understanding of purpose leads to costly, ineffective, and sometimes questionable activities at many posts. It frequently resolves itself into superabundant activity calculated to satisfy everyone's concept of what overseas information should be but which instead confuses. The committee is convinced that a prime reason for the recurrent outbursts of criticisms and consequent instability of this program has been the administrative failure to develop among participating personnel a clear and uniform understanding of the aims of the program together with effective methods for their achievement and to communicate that understanding to Congress and the American people.

##### 5. THE MEDIA—STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES

As presently administered, the information program is carried on primarily by field posts which are serviced by five media. These are the Information Center Service, the International Education Exchange Service, the International Motion Picture Service, the International Press Service, and the International Broadcasting Service (the Voice of America).

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The number of information centers has grown from none in 1948 to 200 in 63 countries in 1952. In addition, there are 34 binational centers, largely in Latin America.

Stimulating favorable attitudes abroad through the use of overseas information libraries is a long-range process. Nevertheless, the potentialities of this medium are considerable. Their appeal is primarily to the groups who are most directly concerned with international relations, i. e., students, Government officials, members of the professions, and various groups and organizations.

Information from all sources, including the committee's own overseas observations, indicates that these centers contribute effectively to the purposes of the information program. Former Directors of the information program testified to their value. Nonofficial observers abroad who communicated their views to the committee generally concurred.

There are, however, certain precautions which are indicated if the utility of the library program is to be preserved and extended. Care must be taken to prevent field posts from distorting the purposes of the libraries. The libraries are essentially American institutions and their atmosphere, collections, and functions must be maintained as such.

The committee does not refer to the binational centers, which are specifically designed to blend the culture of our country with that of another. What should be avoided is the tendency, particularly in underdeveloped countries, for the library administration to undertake functions which are properly those of local authorities and which burden the United States with responsibility for providing general library facilities. This tendency, if not checked, is bound to lead to increased and unwarranted costs, substitution of American initiative for what should properly be local initiative and, in some situations, adverse reactions to what will be termed "American cultural domination."

During its overseas inspections, members were repeatedly told of an unfilled demand for translations into the local languages of certain American books, particularly those of a technical nature. While English is the major secondary language of most of the individuals abroad who would be interested in our overseas library facilities, an increase in the percentage of translations from English in the collections would probably result in a considerable and proper expansion in the use of the information centers. This is a matter for consideration by the Administrator. Local authorities in some countries should be prevailed upon to cooperate in providing translations into their languages as part of a community educational process.

Finally, the committee wishes to call attention to the problem of book selection for the overseas libraries, particularly books of a controversial nature. The wise selection of books for inclusion in the libraries abroad is fundamental to the success of this undertaking. Unless reasonably consistent, commonsense criteria are established and maintained for this program the effectiveness of these libraries for our best interests may be diminished.

An adequate cross section of American literature should be provided for a better understanding of American life and culture but writings of Communists or Communist sympathizers should not be tolerated

in any manner which would indicate their acceptance by the American people.

(b) *Exchange of persons*

In comparative ratings of the various mediums, it is generally conceded that the exchange-of-persons program under the Smith-Mundt Act and the Fulbright scholarship program is among the most effective instruments for the creation of mutual understanding and good will.

Since 1948, a total of 15,722 students, professors, and other persons have been exchanged under the program of the Department of State, 11,866 coming to the United States and 3,856 going abroad. Some 42 percent of the cost of exchangees coming to the United States and 98 percent of the outgoing exchangees have been financed out of foreign-currency funds realized from the sale of surplus war materials rather than from new appropriations of dollars.

The strength of the exchange-of-persons program appears to stem from diverse factors. The program enjoys a high prestige both at home and abroad and is therefore able to attract the voluntary participation of leading citizens. It is nonpolitical and nonpropagandistic in character so that it is acceptable in all parts of the non-Communist world. More than any other part of the program, exchanges are a two-way undertaking which stimulate foreign participation. Exchangees often are or may become prominent in government, business, and the professions and their potential impact on attitudes toward this country is considerable.

The difficulty with the exchange-of-persons program has been largely of an administrative nature, dealing with such questions as selection and orientation of exchangees and financial arrangements.

The committee was particularly concerned with the administrative location of the exchange-of-persons program in the event that the information program should be separated from the Department of State. Many official witnesses concurred in the view of Dr. Robert L. Johnson on the desirability or even the necessity of retaining exchange of persons with the other media. Dr. Johnson stated:

\* \* \* The more I have learned about it \* \* \* the more I feel that really the exchange program is the hard core of our entire information program and that the movies, our press, our publications, and our voice are really supplementary \* \* \*

Informed nonofficial witnesses, concurring in this high evaluation of the utility of the exchange program were of the opinion, nevertheless, that its effectiveness would best be served if it remained an integral part of the Department of State. Some advocated separation of exchanges from the other media even if the Information Administration remained in the Department. Their principal argument was directed to preservation of the nonpropagandistic, nonpolitical character of the exchange program which otherwise might be lost.

While there may be advantages in retaining all the media in one agency, nevertheless the committee believes the exchange-of-persons program should be retained in the Department of State without substantial change in its administration or programs. The relationship between short-range media such as radio and press and long-range educational media such as exchange of persons is not so interlocked that, properly administered, the divorcement of this single unit would be detrimental to our overall purpose.

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*(c) Motion pictures*

The Information Administration exhibits motion pictures in more than 30 languages in 87 countries. It operates several hundred mobile motion-picture units mostly in the Middle East and the Far East.

The evidence supports the value of the continued use of motion pictures in the program. The strength of this medium lies in its combined visual and audio appeal and its mass impact. The committee, however, feels that it would be an error to use size of audience reached as the measure of effectiveness. The appeal of free motion pictures, regardless of content, is very great especially in impoverished parts of the world. Documentary and other types of films are useful in the program when they convey an intelligent and progressively unfolding message related to the objectives of Public Law 402. When films are properly used and tied in with other media their value is potentially great. The showing of films willy-nilly merely to attract mass attention for the moment is abortive and expensive. On occasions it is detrimental.

With respect to the quality of motion pictures employed in the program, the committee is inclined to agree with the opinion of Mr. Eric Johnston, president of the Motion Picture Association of America, who testified:

\* \* \* I am inclined to think that the State Department shorts have improved a great deal in the last few years; they have learned. \* \* \*

Officials of the motion-picture program appear to have become aware of the dangers of stimulating envy and resentment by accentuating the difference between the standard of living in this country and others.

There also seems to be a better understanding of the great importance of selecting films which will not run counter to the traditions and customs of the audience before whom they are exhibited. Films which are not carefully chosen in this respect can do more harm than good. Senator Green, for example, recalled the shock to an audience in India when bathing beauties were shown as one of the best features of the State of New Jersey. Undraped women in public violate the Indian code of propriety.

With respect to the mobile motion-picture units employed in the program, the committee believes that with proper selection of subject matter they are valuable. These units undoubtedly attract mass audiences, particularly in remote areas, and bring a picture of American life to people who might otherwise have only hearsay impressions of this country. With artful selection of subject matter they are effective. On the other hand, there are certain drawbacks in the use of these units. The public-affairs officer in Italy, Mr. Lloyd Free, stated the problem in this fashion:

They are subject to two difficulties: One is cost, because they are very expensive to operate; the other is, that if they are operated as a straight United States proposition, there is considerable danger of them inviting a reaction about United States intervention.

Continuous attention to and careful selection of subject matter must be emphasized in this program.

*(d) Press and publications*

The International Press Service has facilities both in this country and abroad for the production and dissemination of press copy and

publications. Its output consists of pamphlets, magazines, leaflets, cartoon books, reprints, posters, photographs, displays, newsletters, and fast-press materials.

The committee has received diverse comments on the press and publications program from all parts of the world, many of them critical. Criticisms have been directed at both press materials and pamphlets, posters and other publications produced by the International Press Service of the Information Administration. In the case of press materials, the principal comments from abroad have concerned themselves mostly with the slowness, the bulk and the style of the material. There has been advocacy of the complete abolition of the wireless file on the grounds of its relatively minor value and its competition with the regular commercial news services.

With respect to publications as distinct from the press materials of the International Press Service, criticisms are directed at the massiveness of the operation and the contents and style of the literature produced and distributed. The comment of Theodore Repplier, member of the Press Advisory Committee of the Advisory Commission on Information, is typical of one shortcoming that is repeatedly cited. Mr. Repplier testified:

I believe that IPS material designed to reflect American life is too diffuse. It tries to cover too much ground. It tries to convey too many ideas about the United States. We do not have that much time, and we do not have that much money. To use advertising terms, we are trying to sell too many products in too short a time, with too small an appropriation. If we are to make headway, we must, I think, confine our \* \* \* material to transmitting one idea at a time. This is a principle of sound advertising, the application of which I feel is very much needed.

Mr. Boris Shishkin, director of research of the American Federation of Labor, gave voice to another common criticism when he stated:

Too often \* \* \* substance has been sacrificed to form. A swanky brochure, with half-tone illustrations exquisitely laid out and printed on heavy slick paper, is likely to be resented by an impoverished worker and farmer. Some have told the story in language far over the heads of the people they have tried to reach.

With printing plants in various parts of the world, output of publications runs into hundreds of millions of reproductions annually. The committee has had numerous complaints to the effect that much of the centrally produced material is unsuitable for use by particular posts. The flow of this material, however, has reportedly decreased in recent months. There have also been reports of wastage in distribution. If these reports are valid, responsibility at least in part is attributable to the posts in the field since they now exercise considerable choice over the materials that are supplied to them.

It should also be noted with respect to the press service that in many regions not reached by regular commercial news services, the IPS wireless bulletin is a principal source of information for indigenous newspapers and other publications. Statistics kept by the International Press Service indicate that features, photos, and other prepared press materials are sought in considerable quantities by foreign publications. However, the information service should not become a competitor of commercial news and related services in any areas which they serve.

(e) *Voice of America and other forms of telecommunications*

In 1942, the United States Government began to broadcast news commentaries and other programs to the people of the world by short-wave radio. This was done through the Office of Coordinator of Information. Programs were to serve as an instrument primarily of psychological warfare, but, also, as a means of making America's wartime mission clear to friends and enemies abroad.

With the outbreak of World War II the United States took control of all shortwave international broadcasting transmissions in this country. These had all been built by private enterprise, and the operation was continued during the war by the owners under contract with the Department of State.

Between 1942 and 1944 the Government constructed additional transmission facilities.

It had been the intent of the Government at the end of the war to discontinue international broadcasting, but with the development of the cold war and the consequent enactment of Public Law 402 in January 1948, it was deemed necessary and vital to expand our short-wave transmitting facilities. Public Law 402 directed the Secretary of State to—

purchase, rent, construct, improve, maintain, and operate facilities for radio transmissions and reception—

and the Secretary was also directed to—

utilize to the maximum extent practical the services and facilities of private agencies.

Today the Voice of America network consists of—

(a) New York, Washington, and Munich studios for program origination.

(b) Twelve domestic plants (at present) containing 42 transmitters with powers up to 200 kilowatts.

(c) Overseas plants at Munich, Tangier, Salonika, the Courier (at Rhodes), Colombo, Manila, and Honolulu.

(d) The network is further extended by many relays of specific VOA language programs over stations and networks in many areas including Europe, the Middle East, and Latin America.

(e) The network will be greatly strengthened by the high-power plants expected shortly to become operational at Munich, San Fernando (Philippine Islands), and Okinawa.

The domestic transmitters are used primarily to send programs to relay bases, and the relay stations in turn retransmit programs on medium-wave and shortwave to listeners in assigned target areas. The well-known technical difficulties inherent in shortwave broadcasting and the preference of listeners in most parts of the world for medium-wave broadcast make the relay bases the primary source of program transmission to listeners.

This large expansion in broadcast facilities, along with others in the planning and construction stage, has been undertaken at a most substantial cost to the American taxpayer. A large part of the appropriations of the International Information Administration have and will be expended for these purposes.

The ostensible goal of the Voice of America is to transmit programs clearly and consistently to foreign areas selected for it, with determinations of policy content made by the Department of State. In

other words, the intent is to create a direct communication link to reach all listeners in designated areas at any determined time with consistently reliable signals.

The committee and its staff have devoted considerable time and study to an examination of the Voice of America plant with relation to its objectives and have arrived at certain conclusions. It must be kept in mind that the geographic location of the United States puts it at a distinct disadvantage in reaching the rest of the world with short-wave broadcasts. The great distances which radio beams must travel dissipates a major part of the energy. To overcome these deficiencies American technical science has achieved means to increase the reliability and strength of signals.

At best, with existing facilities, deficiencies exist in the reception of shortwave signals overseas. After studying the developments of the shortwave broadcast facilities, the committee believes that the planning has been haphazard, frequently unscientific, and at all times costly. Its engineering has been inexperienced and mediocre, and often inadequate. Thorough technical studies, including those of the electromagnetic barriers, were not made or considered at certain locations (e. g., "Baker East" in North Carolina and "Baker West" in the State of Washington) before contracts were let and extravagant expenditures made. Signal propagation problems were not thoroughly resolved. Certain station sites were acquired and building contracts let before adequate engineering specifications were on the drawing board. The result has caused confusion within the organization itself and suspicion of the competence of the VOA on the part of the American public. These shortcomings have been among the primary factors which have stigmatized the Voice of America as inefficient, both in this country and abroad.

The electronics profession has brought radio transmission to a fairly exact science. The United States has the leading technologists in the world. The committee believes, nevertheless, that in spite of the enormous grants of money that have been made to it by Congress, the Information Administration has failed in establishing effective radio communication of our message of freedom to the world. It has failed to make adequate use of the available technical skills of our country.

The committee sought diligently for consistent, concrete evidence of the effectiveness of our radio transmissions. The following observation by the chairman, however, typifies the experience of other members of the committee who traveled abroad:

I, personally, have had a very disappointing series of reports in those countries as to the listening audience and the effectiveness of the Voice of America, on standard bands. \* \* \* But as for the Voice of America, which broadcasts on shortwave, I have been told repeatedly that nobody listens to it—that is, comparatively speaking—and that very often the places we want to reach do not have the proper sets to receive the shortwave broadcasts.

In hearings in New York, officials of the International Broadcasting Service took issue with critics of the Voice, particularly those abroad. It was pointed out that programs beamed to foreign countries were intended for indigenous persons and that Americans abroad, including those in the embassies, generally did not make efforts to listen to them. Consequently, Voice officials contended, their reports were not necessarily based on first-hand observations, and, further, might



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be prejudiced by the desire of those at the posts to obtain increased funds for local use at the expense of the broadcasting medium.

Insufficient proof was given to the committee by Voice of America personnel who appeared before it to sustain the claim that our signal was adequately received abroad. In fact, there exists no overall continuing monitoring service in the Voice of America. Only recently a start has been made to determine transmission strength in this country and receiver strength abroad. This should have been done long ago.

With respect to the administrative setup of the VOA, the New York operation of the VOA leaves much to be desired. In the first place, it is housed in seven separate buildings at high rentals. It lacks coordination of activities, and authority is divided between the New York Administrative Office and the International Broadcasting Service. This division places the Administrator of the broadcasting service in the anomalous position of being unable to fix responsibility on his staff for producing results. This was certainly evidenced in the chaotic conduct of the construction program. Duplication in staff, friction amongst personnel, and other inefficiencies were the result. The committee is advised that as of May 18, 1953, the IIA took steps to merge certain functions of the New York administrative office and the International Broadcasting Service.

The accounting operations for the International Broadcasting Service show the need for many changes and improvements. Here again there is division of responsibility between the New York Administrative Office and the International Broadcasting Service.

There exists many personnel problems in the New York operation. In part, this is attributable to too frequent changes in overall policy, multiple internal reorganizations, too frequent executive shifts, and budgetary fluctuations.

The function of the Voice of America is primarily that of a service organization. In theory, it operates the instrumentalities for conveying the message of the United States as determined by the policy advisers in Washington. It does not and should not make policy. If, as has often been true, policy decisions are uncertain, or laggard or confused, the corollary can only be a dilute, delayed, or bewildered Voice over the air waves.

When it phrases policy for broadcasting purposes ineffectively, or inaccurately, however, the Voice must be—as it has been—criticized. The committee has paid much attention to a review of the scripts sent out by the Voice. It cannot rate many of them high in message value or purpose. Many of them might well have been omitted.

The committee also notes that the view expressed by Mr. George Probst, director of the University of Chicago Roundtable, is one that was frequently heard during the course of this investigation. The committee agrees with Mr. Probst, who testified:

\* \* \* the Voice of America is ineffective and unsuccessful in talking to our friends and our potential friends who live in this third world between Russia and the United States. The stance or posture of the Voice of America has been and is a commercial salesmanship framework that puts us into a competitive shouting contest with the Kremlin. Europeans find our American broadcasting technique of flogging the listener with words uncongenial and unsubtle. \* \* \*

An important problem for the Administrator is to see to it that in the message content the purpose of Public Law 402 is adhered to. It must not be the decision of the section head as to what he and his assisting foreign-language advisers believe would be the best palliative to give our particular friends abroad, but what the undiluted forthright message of America is and what it stands for. That is why there must be strong and informed direction at the top. That is what is presently lacking. It would be better to forego broadcasts entirely than to diminish the character and simple impact of our story. Much of the justifiable criticisms of the Voice's message will be forgotten if we quite literally adhere to the objectives of section 2 of Public Law 402; namely:

to disseminate abroad information about the United States, its people, and policies \* \* \*

At the New York hearings evidence was inserted in the record to refute the charges of the lack of audience interest in VOA broadcasts. Mr. Robert Francis, Acting Deputy Administrator of the International Broadcasting Service, for example, testified:

\* \* \* We have over a million requests for program schedules, which are only sent out when people write in and ask for them. \* \* \*

Our audience mail is running over 300,000 pieces of mail a year. That is a tremendous amount of audience mail, particularly when you consider that it is quite expensive and difficult usually for someone living abroad to write a letter to the United States; sometimes the postage is 30 cents.

Even though presented with enthusiastic sincerity, the committee was not convinced by the elaborate testimony and presumptive evidence given by VOA personnel to establish numerical and other proof of foreign audience reception. Much of the data was of a speculative nature.

*(f) Television*

It would appear to the committee from its experience and from testimony which has been received that a universal picture language, through television, is bound to become a major factor in working toward greater unity of the non-Communist world. The Information Administration seemingly has not kept pace with important technological developments in this field. While acknowledging that audiovisual media are of prime importance in the information and educational field, the Administration has paid little attention to new telecommunication methods, including television.

The committee has examined the development of television in the United Kingdom and Western Europe. Without doubt television offers great possibilities for the international information program. Studies should be undertaken to determine the practicability of television broadcasts in various areas. The technical problems of such broadcasts are less complicated than would appear at first glance.

*(g) RIAS*

Aware of the general opinion that the American radio station in Berlin, Germany, has achieved notable success in the field of information, the committee took steps to survey its present effectiveness. The station was built in the early days of the Berlin blockade and became at once our principle weapon in countering Communist propaganda.

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It has been steadily increased in power, operating now with a new transmitter. It relays several programs of the Voice of America daily in addition to about 16 hours of original programs. A second RIAS transmitter is located at Hof, Germany.

RIAS is overstaffed but it performs effectively and offers unique opportunity for continuing the fight against communism. Its independence of action should not be substantially interfered with. It could be made more effective by reviving the techniques used on the station during the Berlin blockade, by relaying its programs over American-controlled transmitters in Austria and by coordinating much of the RIAS program with the Voice of America in Munich and possibly with Radio Free Europe.

#### 6. RECOMMENDATIONS—ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION

##### (a) *Strengthen coordination of psychological strategy*

The security ramifications of the work of the Psychological Strategy Board are such that the committee is not in a position to make specific recommendations with respect to it. Such evidence as is available, however, clearly points to the need for adjustments in coordination of psychological strategy. A number of possible remedies suggest themselves. One is to strengthen the Psychological Strategy Board by adding to it a representative of the White House and conferring on the Board powers to secure the necessary cooperation on policy from all executive departments and agencies. An alternative might be to abolish the Psychological Strategy Board and transfer responsibilities in this field to the National Security Council. Without prescribing the details of the remedy, the committee believes the President should deal with the problem as a matter of urgency. Conflicting approaches in this field which now characterize the operations abroad of several executive agencies must not be allowed to weaken our world position.

##### (b) *Consolidate nonmilitary overseas information programs; coordinate all exchange of persons programs*

The committee examined pro and con the continuance of the separate information programs of the Mutual Security Agency and the Technical Cooperation Administration. Information is an important part of the success of these agencies, and this is the basic contention for separate information programs. Senator Mundt, however, pointed out the inherent danger of separate information programs when he remarked:

\* \* \* we started out with MSA and the theory originally of the information service was that it was to be rendered through the so-called IIA Administration. Then they said, "Well we need just a little authority. We have got certain things to tell in a different way." So they started out and have now reached the point where they have an exchange program of their own, they have a series of radio programs of their own, and they have a literature distribution program of their own. They virtually operate a second IIA of their own, and now quickly following in their tracks is point 4 which says, "We also have a little different angle."

The argument for separate agencies must also be weighed against the cost, the increased personnel and the dangers of conflicting influences on foreign policy growing out of separate programs. Mr.

Waldemar Nielsen, a former Administrator of the MSA information program in Europe, stated:

\* \* \* I am firmly convinced, on the basis of my operating experience in Europe in connection with the MSA information program, that there should be an integration of all the civilian information agencies of the American Government operating abroad.

The committee notes, finally, that much of the material produced and disseminated by the International Information Administration publicizes the work of MSA and TCA. It would seem, then, that if duplication is to be avoided, either the International Information Administration should minimize publicizing the work of these other agencies or they should leave this responsibility to the IIA.

It is the view of the committee that neither the MSA or the TCA should assume responsibility for the direct production or dissemination of material abroad which publicizes their programs. There is no convincing reason to believe that this responsibility cannot be performed satisfactorily and with greater economy by the International Information Administration.

With respect to the exchange of persons programs now operated by MSA and TCA and other executive agencies, their purposes do differ substantially, in some cases, from those envisioned under the Fulbright Act and the Smith-Mundt Act which are presently administered by the Department of State. Mr. Francis J. Colligan, Deputy Director of the Educational Exchange Service, in response to a question by Senator Fulbright on the problem of coordinating these various programs, testified:

\* \* \* I am not at all sure \* \* \* that one could completely merge them because many of them grow out of pin-pointed needs arising out of the broader projects which MSA and TCA may be conducting, for example, a public health project in Bangkok, Thailand.

On the other hand, the subdivision of responsibility, once begun, is difficult to check and genuine need for separate activity can easily become confused with the individual agency's concept of what it considers necessary.

The committee believes that the exchange of persons programs should be continued as separate projects, pending further study. There is, however, an immediate need for administrative arrangements which will require all exchanges sponsored by the various agencies to channel through and to have the approval of an appropriate division in the Department of State. Such a procedure should help to prevent duplication in certain fields of study and an imbalance of selections as among the different geographic areas of the world. It should also be possible for anyone desiring information about any aspect of the exchange program to obtain such information from a central source in Washington.

(c) *Give the International Information Administration greater autonomy within the Department of State for a trial period of 1 year; or establish it as a separate agency, except that the exchange of persons program should remain in the Department*

This recommendation was arrived at after exploration of all aspects of the administrative problem. It was communicated to the Presi-

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dent on May 8 by the chairman, in the form of a resolution of the committee.<sup>1</sup>

Much of the testimony received by the committee favored complete severance of the entire information program from the Department of State.

There is potential difficulty in coordinating information activities with foreign policy. Such coordination depends on day-to-day contact at all levels, not merely on occasional meetings of the heads of the two bodies. One of the principal complaints in the past has been the inadequacy of this contact. The committee also has taken into account the reports from the field which indicate that the relationship is much improved. The difficulties which the program encountered in working within the Department in the past might, of course, be eliminated by providing the Information Administration with higher status and greater autonomy. Regardless of where the program is lodged, its Administrator must continue to use the facilities of the Department.

Against these considerations, the committee has weighed the arguments for full separation which were summarized by Dr. Robert Johnson, the Administrator, in this fashion:

\* \* \* My personal opinion, in brief, is that the creation of a separate agency will assure these things: (1) A greater flexibility, (2) a singleness of purpose, (3) a sharper, faster approach, and (4) a better chance to attract highly qualified people.

New administration and greater autonomy for the information program within the Department of State might make possible the realization of the advantages of separation without the disadvantages that separation involves. An additional year's trial, so as to avoid further dislocation and the instability entailed in another major organizational upheaval, might be defended. But the committee approves the change, provided that the exchange of persons remains in the Department of State. The committee notes that Reorganization Plan No. 8, submitted by the President on June 1, conforms with this recommendation.

<sup>1</sup> Text of letter and resolution follow:

MAY 8, 1953.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The Senate Committee on Overseas Information Programs of the United States today adopted the enclosed resolution setting forth its views on the administrative location of the information programs in the executive branch.

As you know, the committee was created during the last session of Congress and operated under the chairmanship of Senator Fulbright. It was continued this session by Senate Resolution 44. The members are Senators Wiley, Mundt, Knowland, Green, Fulbright, Gillette, Hill, and myself.

We respectfully submit these considered views.

Very sincerely yours,

BOURKE B. HICKENLOOPER, *Chairman.*

RESOLUTION OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON OVERSEAS INFORMATION PROGRAMS OF THE UNITED STATES CREATED BY SENATE RESOLUTION 74, 82D CONGRESS

Whereas this committee has conducted a thorough and comprehensive study of the international information and educational exchange programs, it feels justified in submitting to the President the following views:

The committee believes that the complete separation of all international information and educational functions from the Department of State would be inadvisable and would tend to give educational exchange programs a propaganda flavor, nevertheless:

(1) In the event the executive department deems it advisable to separate the overseas information operations from the Department of State and vest them in a new, independent information and propaganda agency at the subcabinet level, the committee strongly recommends that the educational exchange programs remain in the Department of State;

(2) If the executive department does not desire to separate the educational exchange programs from the other information activities, then the committee believes that the programs should be kept together, within the framework of the Department of State, for at least 1 year in order that the new management may have an opportunity for more study before making final determinations of the disposition of these programs. In this event, the committee recommends that the Administrator of the information and educational programs be elevated in his position, within the Department of State, so that he be given greater authority and responsibility in administering the policies and personnel of the programs: It is therefore

*Resolved* That these views be respectfully transmitted by the chairman to the President for his consideration.

The committee notes that Dr. Martin McGuire, a member of the Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange, stated:

\* \* \* The Commission [on Educational Exchange] has officially expressed its strong conviction that the administration of the educational program should be lodged in and retained by the Department of State. \* \* \*

It has also given careful attention to the views of Senators Mundt and Fulbright, members of the committee, who have a long experience with these programs. Both Senators have stressed the view that the continued success of the exchange program rests on close ties with the Department. They have pointed out the likelihood of the loss of prestige and the nonpropagandistic reputation which now attaches to the program if it is a part of an independent information agency. These are essential attributes if the exchange program is to continue to attract the type of distinguished cooperation both at home and abroad which is necessary to its effective operation.

The committee recognizes certain administrative advantages in retaining all the media in a block. If the net effect of such retention, however, may be the undermining of the exchange program it cannot advocate this course.

No matter where the information program is lodged, the committee is convinced that in the operations of our missions abroad, there can be but one source of authority; namely, the chief of mission. To that end, there must certainly be the closest coordination between the Information Administration and the Department of State and the Secretary of State must lay down the policy directives for the Information Service.

The ultimate success or failure of the information program, irrespective of its departmental lodgment depends on skilled administration and personnel. With these, the program can succeed within or without the Department of State. Without these, it will fail wherever placed.

*(d) Establish independent personnel system suited to the needs of the overseas information program.*

The committee concurs with the many witnesses who testified to the desirability of an independent personnel system regardless of where the program is ultimately located. It believes that this independence should be outlined in general as follows:

1. The number of supergrades in the Information Administration should be increased and be filled by outstanding specialists in informational or related activities.

2. The interchange of select personnel between the Department of State and the International Information Administration should be permitted with the mutual approval of the Secretary of State and the Administrator.

3. The Administrator should have broad authority to separate unsuitable employees without, at the same time, subjecting the individual employee to capricious or arbitrary treatment.

4. The principle of not expanding particular operations until suitable employees are available should be observed.

5. More effective and extensive use should be made of well-screened local employees at posts abroad, with a consequent reduction of American nationals.

6. Rotation policies now in operation should be reviewed and revised to permit retention of employees with special aptitudes for particular areas at the same post for longer periods of time.

7. The "hardship post" concept, under which special inducements are given to personnel to serve in certain geographic areas, should be abandoned wherever possible. Every effort should be made to secure and assign to difficult posts personnel who are interested in the area and who will make personal adjustments necessary for living therein for prolonged periods.

8. Members of an employee's family accompanying him overseas should be screened to evaluate their adaptability to official residence abroad.

9. A regular basic training program for employees should be established in this country geared to the specific needs of the information program.

10. Training in the language, culture, and history of the area of assignment, as a regular in-service training, should be continued by all employees.

11. A realistic adjustment in representation allowances should be made for key public affairs employees overseas.

12. The provisions of the Smith-Mundt Act for FBI checks of all personnel should be continued and should be vigorously enforced.

The committee believes that the sooner these measures are carried out the earlier the personnel policies of the Information Administration will begin to reflect the needs of the program.

*(e) Consider establishing regional coordination of the program in all areas of the world*

As previously pointed out, the committee is in general agreement with the present trend toward decentralization of responsibility to the country post. It also warns of the danger of carrying this process too far.

Reconciling the responsibility of Washington with an effective degree of autonomy in the field is the responsibility of the Administrator. There may be a need for regional coordinators in some parts of the world to serve as a midpoint in authority between headquarters and the local posts. These regional coordinators could serve to channel efforts within the framework of regional policies. In this fashion, they could act as a restraint on unwarranted and costly variations and potentially dangerous conflicts in the program between posts. They could also encourage cooperative study and action within the region on common informational problems.

*(f) Explore possibilities of increased cooperation and coordination with friendly foreign governments and groups*

Many of the public affairs officers abroad recognize the need for more realistic cooperation and have worked closely with other foreign information offices and private groups at the local level. It is suggested that the Administrator explore fully the possibilities of coordinating our program with that of other friendly nations and organizations and that he recommend to the Secretary of State ways and means of increasing their participation in propagating common ideas and ideals.

(g) *Encourage greater participation of scientific groups, organizations and individuals in the program*

The committee commends the efforts to enlist nongovernmental interest in the information program. However, most of the witnesses who testified on the point felt that much more is needed in this respect. Dr. Wilson Compton testified:

A great fundamental handicap to this program is the limitation by law of the authority of the International Information Administration to tell its own story to the American people for whom it undertakes to speak.

The committee believes that reasonable publicity about the program in the United States should be available to encourage the participation of the American people. Publicizing in the past was halted by legislative action because of the feeling that it was being used primarily for self-glorification and as a means of promoting higher appropriations.

It is of particular importance that the Information Administration take the initiative in establishing continuing liaison with the motion picture industry, press and publication industries, the overseas transportation industry and other large private organizations with extensive foreign interests, contacts and influence. Through voluntary cooperation with these organizations, it should be possible to make more truly representative the total picture of this country that is commercially distributed abroad.

Finally, the committee wishes to reiterate a recommendation which has been made many times since it first appeared in the Smith-Mundt Act in 1948. To the greatest practicable extent, private commercial channels of communication should be used in carrying out the purposes of the program, provided security is insured.

(h) *Consolidate all evaluation functions of the IIA in an independent evaluation and inspection corps responsible directly to the Administrator, with records of the corps accessible to appropriate congressional committees and the Advisory Commissions*

Consideration was given to the question of the removal of the evaluation function from the Information Administration and assigning it to the Advisory Commissions or to a joint committee of Congress as was suggested by some witnesses. The committee felt, however, that continuous evaluation and inspection is a responsibility of management. Except for periodic outside audits, the Administrator should have the responsibility for realistic evaluation of the needs and the effectiveness of the various aspects of the operation.

The committee recommends that the Administrator consider the practicability of a small evaluation and inspection corps competent to utilize modern scientific evaluation techniques. This corps might well replace the present scattered evaluation groups. To be effective, the corps would have to be independent of the chain of command and responsible only to the Administrator. To insure their independence employees of the corps should not normally be subject to reassignment elsewhere in the Information Administration.

The complete records of the evaluation corps should be available at all times to proper congressional committees and the Advisory Commissions.



*(a) Strengthen overseas libraries and exchange of persons programs*

The committee believes that these media merit strengthening. Additional use of our foreign currency funds should be considered for this purpose. Expansion could be projected over a period of years on the basis of the capacity of both programs to expand without stretching their functions, impairing adequate screening, or altering their fundamental character.

With respect to the libraries, the committee is of the opinion that an increased allocation of funds could be utilized most effectively to enlarge collections, particularly of technical books and to expand the translations program. In some countries, there is also a need to improve working quarters.

On the issue of selection of controversial books, the committee feels that the Administrator must establish the specific criteria to guide his subordinates and be prepared to explain these criteria. He cannot delegate this responsibility to others. The committee is convinced that if clear-cut, commonsense criteria, based on what is useful in terms of the objectives of the information program, are set down and properly explained, they will find general acceptance on the part of all who seek to protect and to advance the interests of the United States.

In recommending an expansion of both educational and other types of exchanges, the committee has taken into consideration the great weight of favorable testimony and other opinions of its effectiveness. Among these is a letter from General Eisenhower to Kenneth Holland, dated October 16, 1952 which was inserted in the record. It reads in part:

I firmly believe that educational exchange programs are an important step toward world peace.

\* \* \* \* \*  
It is very heartening that so many thousands of students, teachers, specialists, and trainees from abroad will have an opportunity this year for advanced study in our colleges and industrial plants, and that equally large numbers of American students will study abroad.

\* \* \* \* \*  
It is my personal hope that this activity, so important in the future of the world, will continue to expand in the coming years.

In a survey of Cabinet officials of member countries of the United Nations conducted by International Public Opinion Research, Inc., for Time magazine, it was reported that among media of information "the largest vote was given to the 'exchange of students and visitors' as the most effective means for increasing the flow of information between nations. Such exchanges were far out in front on every continent. In fact, running throughout most of the questionnaires, there was a constant theme that face-to-face contacts are the best way to gain greater understanding around the world."

With respect to the administrative shortcomings in the exchange of persons program, the committee makes the following specific suggestions:

1. Foreign currency funds applicable to the Fulbright program (Public Law 584, 79th Cong.) should be exempt from the Rabaut amendment (Public Law 547, sec. 1415, 82d Cong.). In its limitations

on the use of local currency funds, the amendment has hampered effective programing.

2. The Commission on Educational Exchange should establish the criteria for selection of educational exchanges provided for under the Smith-Mundt Act (Public Law 402, 80th Cong.).

3. Wherever practicable, the binational commissions abroad functioning as part of the Fulbright program shall also make selections of educational exchanges under the Smith-Mundt Act.

4. Consideration should be given to alleviating unusual or emergency financial expenses incurred by exchanges during the period of their participation in the exchange program.

5. Provision should be made for broader orientation of foreign students on all aspects of American life.

6. It is of the utmost importance that exchangees are selected with the greatest prudence, and plans for their training carefully formulated.

*(b) Continue the motion picture program*

The committee is of the opinion that the motion-picture program should be continued. The Administrator must exercise close supervision in order to make certain that the program remains closely tied to the purposes of Public Law 402 (80th Cong.). In this connection, the committee suggests that wherever practicable a nominal rental fee be charged for the use of films, a practice which is extensively employed in the British information program.

With respect to the mobile motion-picture units, the committee recommends their limited use where they are clearly beneficial to the program. It believes that local channels of distribution may frequently be substituted for the units.

The Administrator should consider the advisability of establishing a motion-picture advisory group especially with a view to minimizing further the number of objectionable commercial films which, when exported, tend to give a distorted picture of the United States. Mr. Eric Johnston, in testimony before the committee, expressed the willingness of the private motion-picture industry to cooperate with the Government. This is an offer which the committee believes should not be ignored.

*(c) Reappraise the press and publications service*

While the press and publications program, taken as a whole, is a useful instrument in furthering the purposes of the information program, parts of it should be revised, reduced, or eliminated. A prerequisite to valid judgments on what specifically should be done, however, would be an expert investigation of the entire operation as well as an authoritative evaluation of the content of the materials. The Administrator is urged to conduct a full efficiency and effectiveness audit of the International Press Service including an analysis of the desirability of continuing certain newspapers and periodicals as quickly as possible as a preliminary to making adjustments in the program. The committee believes it desirable in this connection to explore the possibilities of selling some of the publications. This practice is followed at a few American posts abroad and is a regular policy of the information programs of certain countries. This would be one method of proving the attractiveness of such publications.

Approved For Release 2003/07/03 : CIA-RDP80R01731R003300260002-0 (d) *Explore the possibilities of more effective use of telecommunications, including television, in the program*

The Voice of America is more effective and more useful than some of the public criticisms in recent times would suggest. The fact remains, however, that there have been serious shortcomings in this operation. The time has come to face these shortcomings and to correct them. It is a task that is essentially administrative in nature and the new leadership should move promptly to tackle it.

The Administrator must reappraise the entire structure of the Voice of America. In matters of administration, such problems as relocation of the Voice either in one building in New York or Washington, fiscal procedures, inadequacies of budgetary and accounting systems and personnel, require immediate attention. Many of these matters have been the subject of costly and detailed management surveys by outside experts. The need now is to put their relevant recommendations into practice.

With respect to broadcasting facilities of the Voice, the committee feels that the Administrator should reorganize the engineering section of the Voice of America from top to bottom, and to this end should secure the best available assistance from the telecommunication industry. The committee has been told that the American electronic industry is anxious to further this effort of our Government, but it has never been invited to do so and, in fact, has been alienated because of the treatment it has received from the persons in the Voice in charge of engineering.

In undertaking a reappraisal of the Voice, the committee believes the Administrator must do battle with entrenched incompetence wherever it is found. He must deal realistically with claims of broadcasting success which are supported by impressive but sometimes misleading statistics. He must weigh the present cost of communication by radio against the cost of other media, making due allowances for emergency situations or future technological improvements in which the importance of telecommunications might be greatly enhanced.

The committee suggests that the Administrator realistically review the relative importance of all foreign broadcasts. It may be that some could be limited—others strengthened. Retention of frequencies must ever be considered. It is unwise solely for economic purposes to abandon friends or potential sympathizers. It may be that certain of the recent curtailings have been more arbitrary than wise.

While the subcommittee is anxious that inefficiency and waste be eliminated from the broadcasting service, it has no desire to see this operation discontinued or crippled. There are many millions of people presently under Communist control. Radio broadcasts are our sole information contact with these people. The job of the Voice of America is to reach them and to tell them the American story—a story based on truth and liberty. To reach these people continually and effectively the Voice must overcome jamming techniques and must keep apace with technological advances which will enable it to penetrate the iron curtain.

The world is under great political stress and many people have been strengthened in hope and conviction by listening to the Voice. This is not an opportune time to abandon these listeners. The Voice of

America can be strong in both signal and message. The program can also be economical and effective at the same time if the Information Administration is adept in the handling of the operation.

Telecommunication is an essential medium in reaching other nations. The developments in television and other techniques have immense potentialities as yet scarcely recognized. The feasibility of linking the Atlantic nations and much of the non-Communist world with this media in vast television networks is established. It could become a reality in a comparatively short time. Other nations are already expanding rapidly in this field and it is essential that the United States, whose technical accomplishments have speeded the development of telecommunications, remain in the vanguard.

The subcommittee suggests, therefore, that a national commission be established, composed of representatives from the Government, the telecommunication industry, education, and other appropriate groups. It should be directed to study the present status and the potentialities of the international use of all forms of telecommunications and it should report its recommendations to the President and to the Congress.

#### 8. GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS

##### (a) *Avoid drastic cuts in appropriations for the information program*

Recognition of the importance of the information program is general and is characteristic even of those witnesses who were highly critical of certain aspects of the program. The committee is unanimous in endorsing the continuance and the strengthening of this program. It has given careful consideration to the views of many who like Dr. George Gallup, director of the American Institute of Public Opinion, advocated a considerable expansion of the operation. Dr. Gallup testified that—

It is almost \* \* \* ridiculous \* \* \* to attempt to win the people of this world to our point of view with the present amount of money, which is only a little bit . . . one or two companies, incidentally, spent in reaching the people of this country through advertising.

\* \* \* One or two companies in this country spend as much as we do [on the information program] just to sell soapflakes and soap products to the American public. We find that they have found it necessary to spend that much money to sell products that everybody regards highly.

For the present the committee believes, however, that an enlargement in total expenditures for this service is unwarranted. The information program has grown rapidly and further expansion now might prove wasteful. The present need is for a revamping and coordination of activities. Few public affairs officers at the posts abroad indicated a need for additional funds. Reports have been received, moreover, which suggest that some areas of the world have already been oversaturated with propaganda. This again is an administrative problem.

Budgeting for the information program should not be based on past expenditures, but funds should be apportioned among the various media and to the posts in accordance with present needs. The Administrator should also be given as much flexibility as feasible to reallocate funds during a fiscal year, if shifting circumstances make changes desirable.

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It is easy to devise projects which will absorb increased appropriations. This program could operate at many times the present level, if the only test for appropriations were: How many projects can be developed? This criterion should read: How many effective projects can be developed within reasonable financial limits?

If the recommendations contained in this report are put into effect the committee is of the opinion that a far more effective overseas information program can be developed. In the first place, considerable savings should result from consolidation of the MSA and TCA information programs under the International Information Administration. Secondly, a reduction in American personnel abroad implicit in recommendations 6 (d) and 6 (f) should lead to lower operating costs. Finally, a continuing appraisal of all operations by an evaluation corps such as envisioned in recommendation 6 (h) should lead to a tighter, more efficient and more economical organization.

(b) *Adhere to the terms of Public Law 402 (80th Cong.) and maintain a tone in the program worthy of the United States and its citizens*

Public Law 402 (80th Cong.) states that the objectives of the act are to promote a better understanding of the United States in other countries and to increase mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries. These are clearcut purposes and the committee sees no reason for alteration of them. The difficulty in the past has not been with the purposes but rather with the means which have not fully served these purposes.

It should be borne in mind that the opinion of the world regarding the United States and its objectives is being affected continuously by news developments in the United States. In that news, the official efforts of the International Information Administration play but a relatively small role.

Infinitely larger is the role played by Congress, by the executive branch, the judicial branch, and by the organizations and individuals on the American scene acting on issues which might once have been considered "domestic" but which are now of deep international significance. A single action by an American organization, a speech by a Member of Congress or by an official of the executive branch, or an Executive order, administrative regulation or law, can produce—in and of itself—an impact throughout the world of vast and enduring proportion.

Similarly, the words and deeds of America's citizens abroad, whether they be members of our Armed Forces, tourists, businessmen, clergymen, students or officials of the Government, can accomplish profound and lasting results.

As chief of mission in a country, the United States Ambassador is in a particularly potent position to contribute formally and informally to the objectives of the information program. Wholly aside from the ordinary type of media releases, a well-directed impromptu comment on the part of the Ambassador, a meaningful gesture, can cause a significant impression throughout the length and breadth of the country to which he is accredited.

We must not, therefore, become so preoccupied with organizational forms, procedures and programs that we fail to take due cognizance of the spontaneous activities of Americans—individually and collectively—in their words and deeds—in helping to affect the thinking of the world.

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Finally the committee hopes that the program will not only help to make other nations over in our image. Most of them have cultures and traditions much older than ours and we have much to learn from them.

#### 9. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

##### (a) *Accomplishments of the investigation*

This committee has spent almost a year in this investigation of our overseas information program. The objectives, methods, effectiveness, and utility of overseas information have been extensively explored.

This report and the records of the investigation, the committee believes, identify the principal weaknesses of the overseas information program and point the way to a realistic strengthening of the entire operation. Experience will undoubtedly bring to light additional weaknesses and indicate the desirability of further changes and adjustments. The committee feels, however, that the results of the investigation can prove helpful for the effective future development of the program.

##### (b) *Limitations of the investigation*

The committee should like to make clear what it has regarded as the limits of its responsibility in the investigation. This report contains recommendations which may require legislation.

The report also contains recommendations which are administrative in nature. The committee has set them forth because it feels that the Congress and the Administrator should have the views of a senatorial group which has made an intensive study of the program. The committee believes however, that it should not intrude upon the administrative responsibilities. In matters which lie within his province, the Administrator of the program has the responsibility and must have the authority to discharge that responsibility.

The principal role of a senatorial investigation of this kind is in the nature of a post audit of an operation which is carried on by the Government and also for the purpose of proposing corrective legislation if that is indicated.

##### (c) *Remaining tasks*

A substantial portion of the committee's responsibilities under Senate Resolution 74 and Senate Resolution 44 has now been discharged. There remain two major tasks: (1) Examination of the operation and effect of the program in the American Republics; and (2) a test-check of such action as may be taken on the committee's recommendations.

The committee proposes, therefore, the extension of its authority until January 31, 1954, without additional funds. During the ensuing period, any necessary legislation can be prepared for the consideration of Congress. The committee anticipates making a field study in Latin America as provided for in Senate Resolution 44. Such a study will also make possible observations of the effect of its recommendations and a firsthand investigation of the recent cutbacks in Voice of America broadcasts to that area.