The Director of Central Intelligence Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence C	Council 24 February 1984	
MEMORANDUM FOR:	Director of Central Intelligence Deputy Director of Central Intelligence	
FROM:	David B. Low National Intelligence Officer at Large	
SUBJECT:	Prospects for Use of Chemical Weapons by Iraq Aqainst Iran Over the Next Six Months	25>
1981. Chemical p <u>urchased in Wes</u> both mustard and 2. The <u>mus</u>	tard program was successful, resulting in at least a small	25)
mid-1983. The n	capability and a stockpile of perhaps 70 agent tons by erve agent program lagged behind the mustard program, uantities of lethal nerve agent have been produced and	25)
TOUL WINCH INION OU	st large-scale use of an agent by the Iraqis was in July r rounds loaded with CS (tear gas) were used effectively to ian infantry assault.	25)
Saddam Hussein r	use of mustard agent occurred in July 1983, when President eportedly authorized the use of mustard agent and, some 50 250-kilogram bombs filled with re used along with tear gas to retake a mountain. Iraqi	25>
commanders used	mustard again in October 1983 during an Iranian attack.	25>
anticipated maio mustard agent to	on Tuesday of this week threatened to counter the r Iraqi offensive with new weapons. Iraq almost certainly will resort to widespread use of help blunt the offensive. As grave as this assessment is, cerned about another aspect of this situation which is	2

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summer.

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TOP SECRET

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6. There are two major Iraqi chemical warfare facilities. Salman Pak, located 20 kilometers south of Baghdad, is the smaller CW facility, probably used for research and development and small-scale production. Full scale production will occur at the larger facility near Samarra, 70 kilometers northwest of Baghdad. This complex is isolated, very well secured, quite extensive and nearing completion.

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Mustard is already being produced at the site, so it is considered likely that this is chemical processing equipment for the production of other agents, probably nerve agents. These analysts estimate that the equipment could become operational in six months.

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. This situation has many potential implications, such as:

- -- the use of lethal nerve agent would breach a significant CW-use barrier
- -- the Iranian reaction is unpredictable, ranging from efforts to obtain their own CW capability to terrorism directed at real or imagined Western "suppliers" of this capability
- -- the prospect of Iraqi supply of agents to other Arab states or to terrorists
- -- Israeli nervousness at this elevation in Arab weapons capability (another preemptive strike?).

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10. Actions:

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- -- A NID article is already being drafted which will cover some of this ground. I will see that technical briefings are made available to appropriate intelligence managers.
- -- I will explore with NIO/NESA whether a Community paper is called for.

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 You may wish to alert key policymakers of the potential for nerve agent use by Iraq late this summer.

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David D. LOW

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Over the Next Six Months

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